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INTRODUCTION 
The  Seventh Report  of the Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  contains 
1.  A synopsis of the activities of the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission 
and its Working  Parties for  1969. 
2.  A recapitulation of  the accident statistics for  the years  1958  to 1969 
with comments  on  their trend. 
3.  A study of the manner  in which the Recommendations  of the Mines  Safety 
and Health  Commissions  have been  implemented as at 1st January  1970. 
Since progress in promulgating regulations is only  reported on every  two 
years~ this does  not  feature  in this Report. 
The  items listed on the preceding page  have  been relegated to the  annex. 9 
SECTION  I 
ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
In  1969  the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  held one meeting,  the 
Restricted Committee  three,  the Working Parties and their Sub-Committees:  39.  In 
addition,  the  Secretariat of  the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  organised or 
gave its  support  to four  informational meetings  for  interested trades unions.  The 
overall  ~otal was  therefore 47  (32  in 1968)  covering  59  days,  several meetings  hav-
ing  lasted 2  days. 
The  breakdown of  the meetings  of  the Working  Parties and their Sub-Commit-
tees is as follows: 
Rescue  arrangements,  Mine  Fires,  Underground  Combustion:  6 
Rescue  arrangements:  2 
Ventilation Sub-Committee:  6 
Shaft-fires Sub-Committee:  2 
Fire-resistant fluids  Sub-Committee:  3 
Winding  and  guide ropes:  2 
Electricity:  11 
Joint  accident statistics:  3 
Health:  3 
Psychological  and sociological factors affecting safety:  1 
This  large  number  of  meetings has,  nevertheless,  not  resulted in conclu-
sions capable of  being adopted  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission.  However, 
some  technical reports were  accepted and distributed,  such  as the report  on cables 
serving mobile  machines  underground  and their protection,  the description of  a  new 
method  of  fatigue-testing winding  ropes,  n·note  on the use  of  foamed  polyurethane 
underground  together with the criteria which this product,  or  any  other substance 
used  for  the  same  purpose,  has  to satisfy and the  bi-annual report  on  rescue sta-
tions.  These  reports are annexed. 
In addition,  the Joint  Accident  Statistics Working  Party has  nearly fin-
ished  drawing  up  a  body  of statistics covering  both  light accidents and  the pits 
accidents  and  nature  of  the  injuries,  while  the Health Working Party  has  initiated 
three reports on  methods  of dust  suppression;  these it submitted to the Restricted 
Committee which  expressed the wish  that  they  become  the subject of Recommendations. 
Within the  framework  of  the  exchange  of  information provided by  the  Commis-
sion of  the European  Communities,  the  Secretariat of  the  Mines  Safety  and Health 
Commission  organised or assisted 4  one-day  conferences of  the  interested trade unions 
at  Essen,  Heerlen,  Autrans  and  Luxembourg,  at which  the latest results of  the Mines 
Safety  and Health  Commission were  made  known. 
Lastly,  the Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission,  at 1st meeting  on  20 June 
1969,  took  note of the Resolutions  (Official Journal  of  the  European Parliament, 
doc.  207)  adopted  by  the  European Parliament  at its session in May  1969  after it had 
cpnsidered the Fifth Report  on activities of  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission 
(for the year  1967). 
It was  notified of  the  large  number  of  interventions made  concerning this 
report  and  of  the explanations given by  the  Chairman,  M.  LEVI  SANDRI.  The  Mines 
Safety  and Health  Commission decided to take  into account,  as far  as at all possible, 
the wishes of the  European Parliament,  and  instructed the Secretariat to prepare 
draft  terms of reference for  studying environmental  factors,  the medical  aspects of 
dust  suppression methods  and  the problems  involved in the safety-training of  foreign 
workers. 10 
It adopted the wish of  the Parliament  to launch  a  comparative study of 
m1n1ng  regulations  in force  in member  countries,  and  to prepare  a  list of  Community 
· equipment  for  the rescue  of  those  trapped  by  means  of  large-diameter boreholes. 
In  1969  the Secretariat  embarked  on  the preparatory work  for  these  new 
tasks,  bearing in mind  any  possible results from  research already  in hand within the 
Commission. 
The  European Parliament,  at its session of  27  November  1969,  studied the 
Sixth Report  of the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  for  1968,  but its Resolutions 
could  not. be discussed within the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  during  1969. 
These  Resolutions  included the previous ones  and,  in addition,  called for  a  study of 
falls of  ground,  mechanisation  and ventilation,  the latter comprising.the study of 
the use  of detectors and particularly those detecting oxygen-deficiency. 
As  in previous Reports,  this first section sets out  to survey,  as concisely 
as possible,  Working  Party  by  Working  Party,  the origin of  the work,  development  of 
the work  during  the meetings  in 1969,  and  any  results obtained in certain work,  to-
gether with the outstanding problems. 
I.  TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 
A.  Rescue  arrangements,  Mine  Fires,  Underground  Combustion 
The full Working  Party held three Plenary Meetings,  one  of these at  Essen, 
and  three restricted preparatory meetings. 
The  rescue experts who  were  members  of this Working Party met  on  two  occa-
sions,  one  being  a  visit to the rescue centre of the  Sulcis coalfield. 
Eleven meetings  of  experts were also held on  the stabilisation of ventila-
tion,  fire-resistant  fluids  and  shaft  fires. 
This work  continued the  implementation of established terms  of  reference, 
to which  number  were  added,  among  other subjects,  ventilation problems,  thereby  com-
plying with the wishes expressed  by  the European Parliament.  This list of  terms  of 
reference is annexed. 
They  appear  below  in the  order already established in previous Reports, 
which  is not  necessarily  an  order of priority. 
1.  Shaft  fires 
The  work  of this Sub-Committee which started after the  MARCINELLE  disaster 
in  1956  included,  among  other things,  the experimental extinguishing of  a  test 
fire  in an  abandoned shaft at  DORSTFELD  in 1964  and various water  injection tests 
in shafts. 
To  be  able to complete  the re-appraisal of the  Recommendation of the Mines 
Safety  and Health  Commission  of  8  April  1960  (1)  regarding the extinction of shaft 
fires,  it was  necessary  to re-assess the value  of  the  aeromotor effect of water 
falling  down  a  shaft,  which is shown  in graph  form  in this Recommendation,  discre-
pancies having  been  noted  in the practical tests carried out  at  the Arenberg-Fort-
setzung pit  (Germany),  RESSAIX  (Belgium)  and  later in Czechoslovakia. 
The  two  experts in charge  of  the tests at  ARENBERG  and  RESSAIX  agreed, 
first,  on  a  programme  of water  injection in a  shaft about  to be  abandoned at 
RESSAIX  and  then started the tests themselves.  Evaluation of  the results is in 
hand  and  the conclusions  should  be  submitted during  1970. 
(1)  Second Report  of the Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission,  page  26  (French text). 11 
2.  Fire-resistant  fluids 
With  regard to flame  propagation in a  mixture of coaldust  and fire-resistant 
oil  (cf.  Sixth Report,  page 8),  the results obtained at  the  4  experimental stations 
in the  Community  have  shown  up  discrepancies.  During  comparative tests at  two of 
these stations all those conducting  the tests were  able to identify the most  signi-
ficant factors  from  among  the slight variations in equipment  and  methods prevailing 
despite the joint criteria adopted.  Uniform criteria are being drafted. 
3.  Foamed  polyurethane seals 
The  Working  Party studied an experts report,  recapitulating the test re-
sults at the HASSELT  (Belgium)  Centre  de  Coordination des  Centrales de  sauvetage, 
the experimental  TREMONIA  pit at  Dortmund  (Germany),  the  Buxton  Experimental 
Establishment  of the  Safety  in Mines  Research  Establishment  (United  Kingdom)  and 
taking  into account  the circumstances of  the fire at Michael  Colliery  (Fife)  in 
the United  Kingdom  (Sixth Report,  page 9). 
The  Working  Party drafted a  Note  (cf.  Annex)  in which it reconsiders the 
sealing properties of  this material  and  the multiplicity of  its applications  in 
mines,  which  are advantageous to either safety or health:  seal stoppings,  sealing 
of  roadway  walls,  insulation ,of  certain mains. 
It stresses also the  inherent  dangers:  the possibility of  spontaneous  com-
bustion when  applied in too thick coatings;  very  rapid flame  propagation when  the 
foam  is applied as  a  stopping  throughout  the roadway  leading to large-scale pro-
duction of  dangerous  fumes  with  a  low  oxygen  content;  danger  of electro-static 
charges. 
Having weighed these advantages  and risks and  the means  of  largely obviat-
ing  them,  the Working  Party  considers that this material cannot  be banned  but  can 
only  be used with reservations,  the permissible applications and  circumstances 
being  known  to those  in charge. 
Finally,  the Working  Party established a  list of criteria,  for  the benefit 
of the chemical  industry  concerned,  to which  this or a  similar material  should 
conform so that it may  be used without  reservations underground,  the  main crite-
rion being that  the material  should  be  fire-resistant without  the addition of  a 
special fire-resistant or plaster coating,  even  if it is applied as  a  stopping. 
4.  Rescue  by  means  of  large-diameter boreholes 
In  1968  the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  approved  a  proposal  for  ex-
periments at  Community  level to investigate unsolved problems regarding the drill-
ing  of  large-diameter rescue holes underground,  in pursuance of  Article  5  of its 
terms of reference,  it proposed to the  Commission  of  European  Communities  that 
these tests be  carried out  (cf.  Sixth Report  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health.Com-
mission,  page  9). 
In  1969  the  Centre  d'etudes et de  recherches  des  charbonnages  de  France 
(CERCHAR)  in Paris and  the  Steinkohlenbergbauverein in Essen submitted their 
request  for  financial  support  for  these tests,  which  was  granted at  the end of 
1969.  This  work  is now  in hand. 
5.  Ventilation 
Practical conclusions on  applying  the  theory  of  stabilisation of ventila-
tion  (Sixth Report,  page  10)  were  sent  to the  Governments  and to interested cir-
cles in 1968  for  appropriate action. 
These conclusions aroused considerable interest  and were  the subject of 
courses and  information meetings  in 1969  before  being put  into operation,  and were 
also considered elsewhere,  as  had  been agreed  by  the Mines  Safety  and Health 
Commission. 12 
So  it was  that  the  Committee  of  Experts met,  at  the Centre  de  Calculs des 
charbonnages  du  bassin de  Lorraine,  the Ventilation Committee  of  the  Steinkohlen-
bergbauverein,  Essen,  to consider the objection raised by  the latter that the  con-
clusions  had  in part  been outstripped by  modern  computing methods:  computers  and 
ventilation simulation systems.  The  experts of  the Mines  Safety and Health  Commis-
sion,  on  the other hand,  believed that it was  essential to understand the  theory 
of ventilation stabilisation  (1)  and  that  the  information derived  from  these con-
clusions was  necessary  even in cases where  a  computer was  to be  used,  since this 
would  enable the  questions to be correctly put  to the  computer  and  to assess valid-
ly the.usefulness of its replies,  in the  light of the latest knowledge  in the field 
of ventilation stabilisation. 
In addition the  Committee  of  experts continued the  study  of these problems 
which  had  been  left in abeyance  in its documentation,  dealing primarily with the 
degree  of  instability of  roadways  diagonal ta ventilation (with or without under-
ground  fires being present,  and  the  thermodynamic  effects of  a  fire occurring in 
mine  workings with descentional ventilation;  on this subject it will make  use of 
the results of tests carried out  at  the experimental  TREMONIA  pit at  Dortmund. 
6.  Requirements  for  fire-resistant  clothing 
The  Working  Party was  given these  terms  of reference as  a  result of  the 
MONT-CENIS  disaster at  HERNE-SODINGEN  (cf.  Fifth Report  of the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission,  page  16). 
The  Working  Party began  the  study  of this question by  examining,  in coopera-
tion with  the Occupational Medicine  department,  the research work  subsidised by 
the  Community  to develop protective clothing for  the  Iron and  Steel industry in-
tended against  constant  sources of  heat,  whereas  in coalmines  clothing needs  to 
protect the  rescue worker  during his rescue  operations against  high temperature 
flame  (1  3000)  present  for  a  relatively short  space of  time  (several seconds)  and 
subject to relatively  low  pressure.  Existing and  subsequently  improved clothing 
was  then tested at  the  Rescue  Centre at  ESSEN-KRAY  in conjunction with the manu-
facturers,  where  both  dummies  and wearers were  exposed to a  flame  of  ignited  li~nite, 
measurements  being taken on  the  surface of  and  inside the clothing itself.  The 
outcome  was  that clothing of existing man-made  fibres  should,  in order to protect 
the wearer against  the heat  of  the  flame,  be  worn with cotton underclothing which 
has the drawback  of retaining the body  heat  of  the rescue worker  and hindering him 
in his work. 
Tests were  also carried out  at  the  Rescue  Centre at  MERLEBACH  with  a  power-
ful  dust  explosion,  while  rescue operations were  being tried out  in conditions of 
high  thermal  charges at  the Centre  de  Sauvetage at  HASSELT  where  research is being 
carried out  on  ways  of  cooling  down  the rescue worker. 
The  members  of  the  Working  Party  and  a  restricted group  of  specialists were 
present at  these tests at  ESSEN  and  did  some  work  on establishing criteria with 
which  fire-resistant  clothing"should comply,  taking  into full  account  the very 
special conditions in which this clothing is used  by  rescue workers.  This· work is 
not  yet  completed. 
7.  Rescue  arrangements 
The  rescue  experts  took  note  of a  hydromechanical  method of  constructing 
plaster stoppings developed  by  the Rescue  Centre of  the  SAARBERGWERKE  AG. 
A method  of constructing plaster stoppings  had previously,  as the result  of 
tests financed  by  the High  Authority  and  conclusive try-outs,  been the subject of 
regulations governing the construction of  such  stoppings established by  the  ESSEN-
KRAY  Centre  and  approved  in 1964  by  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  (Annex 
X to the Third Report). 13 
The  hydromechanical  method  is a  development  of  the earlier method:  a  spe-
cial plaster is used,  which  can  be stored for  one year,  and  this is injected in 
liquid form after mixing  in a  special mixer.  The  construction of  the stopping  and 
the setting time  of  the plaster are even quicker  than  by  the dry  method,  or the· 
mixing  of water  and  plaster on site.  The  resistance of  the  stoppings to explosion 
is ensured in a  shorter space of  time  and  the distance between the stopping  and 
the majority of the men  is further  increased:  it is normally  up  to 500 m with  a 
throughput  of  7  m3/hour. 
The  Directors of Rescue  Stations and  some  experts studied the  Seventh 
Report  of Rescue  Arrangements  for  1967  and  1968  in Community  countries and  the 
United  Kingdom  and  noted  amendments  adopted at  the Centres,  new  equipment  and 
lessons to be  learnt  from  accidents which  occurred during  rescue work. 
In the  Sulcis coalfield in Sardinia they visited the fully mechanised 
Seruci pit and  embarked  on  an  exchange  of  information on  safety and rescue ser-
vices and the equipment  available to these. 
B.  Winding  ropes  and shaft  guides 
The  Working  Party noted the decision of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commis-
sion  (Sixth Report,  page  10)  and  considered that,  from  the safety point  of  view,  there 
was  value in carrying out  a  test programme  on  the  dynamic  stresses on shaft  guides. 
This note  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  had  been  forwarded  to the branch 
of the  Commission  engaged  on mining  research and  concerned with  the  request  for  finan-
cial aid originating  from  the experimental  TREMONIA  pit for  carrying out tests in 
this field. 
The  synoptic  summary  covering  the regulations at present  in force  in Commu-
nity countries and  the United  Kingdom  with regard to cage  suspension gear was  sub-
mitted to the Restricted Committee.  To  this summary  a  note  will be  added  indicating 
to what  extent  the regulations existing on national  levels should be  elaborated or to 
what  extent minimum  standardised regulations should be  the  subject  of  a  Recommendation 
of  the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission. 
The  Working  Party  took note,  as part  of its terms  of reference,  of  a  new 
method  developed  by  the "Institut fur  Fordertechnik und  Werkstoffprufung  der  Seil-
prufstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschaftskasse"  of  Bochum  for  studying  the  fa-
tigue  in winding  ropes.  This  method enables the  dynamic  stresses to be measured which, 
before  now  it was  not  possible to determine exactly.  In this device,  comprising three 
pulleys and  a  pulsator,  the  ropes are  subjected to various  lengthy  dynamic  stresses 
approximating actual stresses. 
Numerous  tests on thin haulage ropes  in roadways were carried out  and tests 
on thick winding  ropes  have  been started.  These  have  featured  in an  interim report, 
accepted  by  t~e Restricted Committee  (1),  which was  distributed to interested circles 
because of the novelty  of  the  method;  it is annexed. 
C.  Electricity 
The  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  has accepted  for  distribution the 
"Report  on  the characteristics and  the electric protection of cables supplying mobile 
machines  (coal cutters,  power  loaders,  etc.)  used underground  in coalmines  in the 
different  Community  countries" as stated in the  Sixth Report,  page  11.  This report 
is annexed. 
Due  in part to the dangers arising  from  the great  forces  to which  cables 
are subjected and in part to the  technical nature of this important  documentation 
which  makes  it a  domain  of  specialists,  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission has 
requested the Working  Party to abstract  from  this study,  conclusions of broader appli-
cation which could serve as recommendations.  During  several restricted meetings it 
(1)  and  by  the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  on  21  February  1970. 14 
proved possible to identify minimum  requirements  taking  into account  the relative 
importance  of  the  many  faults to which  cables are prone;  these will be  submitted to 
·the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  in 1970. 
In addition,  the  Working  Party has  nearly  completed the  study of  the  terms 
of  reference already mentioned in the  Sixth Report: 
- on  the  subject  of the effect on electrical equipment  underground  of  hygroscopic 
salts used  for  fixing coal dust,  it took note  of  the reports on  the experience col-
lected underground  in West  German  pits,  on the  Community-aided research carried out 
at the Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  of  Dortmund  and  on  the  laboratory tests carried 
out  in France;  the final report will be  completed  in 1970. 
- it has utilised the extensive documentation  on  surges  in underground workings  due 
to lightning,  available  from  Eastern Countries and  Community  Countries,  and  a  re-
port  on  the  firedamp  explosion at Mainsforth Colliery  (United  Kingdom)  on which  the 
terms  of  reference were  based;  the  final report  is nearly completed. 
- the  Working Party has  compared  the safety measures  adopted  in the  Community  and  the 
United  Kingdom  on trolley  locomotives underground  and  in particular on  the possibil-
ity of  reducing the  incidence of  trolley sparks;  the final report  is nearly  com-
pleted. 
Finally,  the Secretariat has  assembled material on  the  composition of elec-
tric cables for tensions up  to 6  000 volts and  protective devices for  these,  which 
each delegati9n on  the Working Party has prepared for  its own  country;  this subject 
will be  dealt with starting early in 1970. 
D.  Flammable  dust 
The  programme  of joint research for  studying dust  explosions requested by 
the  Mines -Safety  and Health  Commission,  the effectiveness of barriers in large cross-
sections,  weak  and  very  powerful  explosions  and  the adaptation of these barriers so 
that  they  do  not  impede  normal  roadways  activity has  continued to be  the subject of 
research  in two  institutes of the  Community. 
The  Secretariat  has  received the  latest results of this research which will 
be  submitted to the Working  Party  in 1970.  The  latter will also study the  circum-
stances of  two  explosions whose  characteristics were  obtained  and  notified as  a  re-
sult of  a  questionnaire  issued by  the Working  Party  in 1968. 
E.  Joint  Accident  statistics 
The  Working  Party has  continued the work  started in 1968  referred to in the 
Sixth Report,  page  12. 
Having  investigated tne distortions which  might  occur as  between countries 
in the  Community  classification employed  since  1958  for  the recording of  fatal and 
serious accidents according to their causes,  the Working Party  found  that the--discre-
pancies were  insignificant and  did  not  detract  from  the validity of these statistics. 
The  Working  Party has also prepared two  tables.  One  gives  a  breakdown of 
accident  victims underground according to where  they  occurred  (mine  workings,  driv-
ages,  shafts and  staple pits,  other sites),  to their degree  of  seriousness  (involving 
absences  of  from  4  to  20 days,  21  to  56  days  and  fatalities)  and  the  12 categories 
of  causes which are the  same  as those used  for  surveys  since  1958 with slight modi-
fications made  in the light of  the analysis referred to above. 
The  second table gives  a  breakdown of victims according to the place of 
the  injuries,  the  nature of  the  injuries and  the gravity of the accident:  over  56 
days  absence  or fatality. 15 
Before submitting the results of this work to the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission  the Working Party has still to assess the statistical validity of these 
findings,  that is,  to incorporate the rates  (in millions of working  hours)  estab-
lished,  with  due weighting  for reliability,  which will make  possible  a  comparison 
of the different rates with  regard,  on  the  one  hand,  to their trend in time  and,  on 
the other,  to their statistical significance. 
F.  Study  of accidents 
In  1969  the Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission was  informed of  five acci-
dents  and studied supplementary reports on  two  accidents which  occurred in 1968. 
a)  Accident  in the Gerard shaft at the Gardanne  Colliery in the Provence coalfield 
- 25  February  1969  - massive fall of  ground  - six killed. 
A provisional report  on this accident  was  made  to the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission. 
Whilst waiting for  the final  conclusions of  the  inquiry,  it is possible 
to summarise  the main circumstances as  follows  : 
A heavy  and  sudden fall of  ground  occurred at  a  depth of  600 metres in a 
roadway  being driven using  a  continuous miner  in a  level  seam of lignite 5  metres 
in thickness with  a  sound  roof.  This  seam was  being worked  by  the  room  and pillar 
method  and was  100 metres in length and  between 7  and  10 metres in width.  The 
fall occurred when  a  residual pillar was  being driven between two  faces  already 
worked  and hydraulically  stowed,  in a  seam thickness reduced to 3.5 metres  due 
to convergence.  The  six miners  engaged  on heading  work were  buried where  they 
were.  The  causes are  not  yet  proven but  the  following  facts  have  been established 
- the fall was  accompanied  by  coal bursts;  tremors were  felt  on the surface; 
- the  two  stowed  rooms  either side of  the  disaster roadway  were  not  crushed; 
- the safety  seam  had  been partially worked previously  in this section due  to 
the  local working  out  of this  seam. 
b)  Accident  in pit 10 of  the  Escarpelle  in the  Douai  group  of  the Nord et  Pas-de-
Calais coalfield - 24  March  1969  - fall of  cage  in a  staple pit - 5  killed. 
A cage used for material in an interior shaft of 90 metres  in depth suf-
fered  a  virtual free-fall of that distance,  probably  as  a  result of  an unfortu-
nate action by  the winder,  who  stated that  he  was  unaware  there were  five fit-
ters in the cage.  The  shaft wasequippedwith ladders and the use of  the cage  by 
men  was  forbidden.  The  shaft winding  gear was  of  an old type,  worked  by  compressed 
air and equipped with  two  drums  one  of which  could  be  disengaged. 
The  accident will be  the subject of  a  final  report  when  the  inquiry is 
completed. 
c)  Accident  at  the  Emil  Emscher  Colliery at  Essen-Altenessen  (Ruhr)  - 2  October  1969  -
heavy  fall of  ground  - 4  killed,  5  rescued. 
Even  though  in this accident  less than  5  people were killed, it was  the 
subject  of  a  report  to the Restricted Committee  due  to the interest it presents 
from  the viewpoint  of  rescues  by  means  of  large-diameter  boreholes. 
It occurred in a  face  120 metres  in length working  a  steep seam  (789)  laS 
metres  in thickness using straight steps 3.25 metres  in height with wooden  sup-
ports.  The  bottom roadway,  9  m2  in cross section with metal  arches was  driven 40 
metres  in advance  of  the  face  and  54.6 metres  in advance  of  the pillar. 16 
As  a  result of  a  roof slip,  the coal  and  the roof  of  the  five  lower  steps 
fell  in,  blocking the bottom roadway  for  a  stretch of  31  metres,  5  miners  finding 
shelter in the  advance  heading  of the  lower part of  the roadway  and  4  others re-
maining  in the fall area. 
The  rescue  of  those  entombed was  effected by  the classical method  for  cases 
of this kind:  the  drivage of  a  roadway  under  the bottom road using the latter's 
tracks as  a  roof.  It was  completed  in 3  days. 
At  the  same  time,  as  from  the  gate road - and  at  a  point where  the height 
happened to be  sufficient;  a  193  mm  diameter  borehole was  drilled downwards 
through  the  coal,  the coal  being  brought  up  at  the sides with the injected water. 
This  borehole  reached  the trapped men  after 23  hours work  but  became  blocked up 
when  the drill-rod was  withdrawn.  A second  62  mm  diameter  borehole which was  later 
to have  been widened to a  diameter  of  500 mm  to allow  the passage of the rescue 
capsule,  was  also drilled as  a  cross-cut  from  another  roadway at  a  higher  level 
and  reached the point  of  the  trapped men,  but  only after they  had  been rescued. 
The  difficulties encountered were  of  a  type which,  among  others,  gave rise 
to  a  request  for  Community  tests as  noted  in paragraph 4. 
The  following  two  accidents were  not  studied by  the Mines  Safety  and Health 
Commission  because  they  did  not  have  5  victims and did not  appear to promise use-
ful  information on  Community  level.  The  Secretariat of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  has,  however,  been notified of  these,  together with  a  brief account  of 
the  circumstances.  In addition,  these accidents were  the subject  of  condolences 
on the part  of  the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  and  Community  financial 
assistance to the  families  of  the victims. 
The  accidents in question appear  below under  d)  and e). 
d)  Accident  at  the  Barrois mine  at· Pecquencourt  of  the  Douai  group  in the  Nord et 
Pas-de-Calais coalfield - 28  November  1969  - 4  killed. 
A heavy  fall of  ground  occurred in a  short  steep face  20 metres  in height, 
being worked  experimentally  by  "hydraulic shotfiring",  a  method which consists of 
forcing  into the coal,  during water  injection,  an  additional quantity of water 
under  500 atm pressure,  which  cracks the  coal  and  enables it to be  won  without 
dust. 
e)  Accident  at  the  Rossenray  Colliery at  Kamp-Lintfort  (Ruhr)  - 27  October  1969  -
fall of  ground  - 4  killed. 
A fall  of  ground  occurred during  the starting up  of  a  roadway  leading  from 
a  main  roadway;  for  reasons  as yet  unknown  the  supports at the  roadway  junction, 
together with  some  3  metres of  overburden,  collapsed on the  4  miners. 
f)  Accident  at  the  "Minister  Aschenbach"  Colliery  (Ruhr)  - 4  October  1968  - fire-
damp  and  coaldust explosion- 17 killed- (cf.  Sixth Report,  page  13). 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  examined  a  provisional report 
on  this accident.  Whilst waiting for  the final  conclusions of  the research car-
ried out  at  a  number  of institutes in the  Ruhr  and the conclusions  of  the inquiry 
itself, it is possible to summarise  the  circumstances of this accident  as  follows: 
It occurred in a  caved  face  which  had  been started up  4  days previously 
in a  slightly inclined seam  between 1.6 and  1.8 metres  in thickness.  In order to 
initiate caving of the roof,  which  was  of  sandy  shale,  shotfiring had  been carried 
out  in the roof  of  the  face,  the  shots having  been halted  two  hours before the 
explosion.  The  shots had  caused  a  violent  roof fall in the caving zone  and  heavy 
pressure at the coalface,  especially in the  lower part which  had  advanced  15 
metres  in relation to the original rise heading,  slewing round  the upper part. 1~ 
The  second  report  deals with the specialised services entrusted with moni-
toring dust  levels  in underground workings. 
Taking into account  the main regulations in force  in the countries of  the 
Community  and  the United  Kingdom~  the report  formulates  - with  a  view  to achieving 
a  degree  of uniformity in the way  in which  these services operate  - a  number  of cri-
teria to which  they  should  conform~  both in their  composition and  their procedures. 
The  third report's purpose is to reduce dust  levels resulting from the use 
of  coalwinning and road heading  machines.  It recommends  close collaboration between 
manufacturers~ mining  and research services or centres  from  the initial design to 
the development  of these machines.  In this way  the set-backs and difficulties will 
be  avoided which  previously arose with the introduction of machines well-designed 
from  the point  of  view  of their economic  performance but  unacceptable  on account  of 
the dust  levels produced. 
The  Restricted Committee  (1)  has requested that  these draft reports be 
further  amended. 
B.  Psychological  and  sociological factors affecting safety 
The  Secretariat has collated documentation on  continuous transport  systems 
and their use to finalise the safety campaign referred to in the  Sixth  Report~  page 
15.  This  documentation comprises illustrated compilations  describing  armoured  and 
belt  conveyors  and  the protection they can  be  afforded at present  and  the regulations 
and  proper  handling instructions for all continuous transport  systems;  it also con-
tains  a  list of  audio-visual  and  film material available in the  Community  which will 
be offered to those taking part in the safety campaign.  These different documents 
will be  condensed  and where  necessary  supplemented with  a  view  to their distribution. 
A detailed programme  for  the practical conduct  of  such  campaigns  has  been 
devised by  the Secretariat  and  studied by  a  group  of experts before being  submitted 
to the Working Party which will  study it in 1970. 
The  programme  comprises the organisation of the different  stages of this 
campaign which  can be  grouped into stages of  preparation~  execution and evaluation 
of results. 
The  preparatory stages are  in hand  both in the Secretariat of the Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  in the different coalfields. 
(1)  and  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  26  February  1970 19 
SECTION  II 
JOINT  ACCIDENT  STATISTICS 
As  in previous Reports,  the statistical tables reporting serious  and  fatal 
accidents which  occurred in the various  Community  coalfields in 1968  have  been placed 
in a  separate annex;  they  are as usual,  classified by  cause of accident  for  the vari-
ous  coalfields,  the member  countries  and the Community. 
The  presentation of the recapitulary information reproduced  below is also 
identical with that used in previous years.  In Tables  A and  B  below,  the information 
is grouped  by  cause of  accident  for  the  Community  countries  from  1958  to 1969;  table 
C,  using the  same  sub-divisions,  shows  the fatalities and seriously injured  from 
1960 to 1969  for  group  accidents,  i.e.  those which  cause  the death or serious injury to 
to more  than five victims. 
The  graphs  E  - K present  the data mentioned  above  for  all accidents,  includ-
ing  group  accidents;  they  are  intended to show  a  particular statistical trend,  and 
even perhaps  a  certain degree  of variation. 
The  Working  Party for  "Joint Statistics for  Mine  Accidents"  continued its 
work  in 1969.  It has  found that  the discrepancies which  may  arise from  a  different 
interpretation of the classification system established by  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  in 1958,  are insignificant and  do  not  basically invalidate the 
earlier statistics.  It is currently examining  to what  extent it is possible to estab-
lish,  from  the statistical viewpoint,  a  chronological comparison of  the accident 
rates for  each  of  the countries  and  for  the  Community,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  compa-
rison as  between the countries,  on the other.  The  comments which  follow,  therefore, 
are subject  to reservations while awaiting the completion of this work. 
Let  us,  first,  examine  as  in the previous reports the  number  of fatalities 
and  serious casualties per  number  of  tonnes extracted  (Table  D),  this being done 
purely  for  indicative purposes,  as has  been stated previously,  the  level of safety 
being  determined rather per million hours worked,  as wil.l  be  seen below. 
As  this Table  and  graphs  I  and  K show,  production in the Community  fell 
off in 1969  by  only  2  %  (as against  4  % in 1968)  and  the  number  of hours worked  by 
9%  (11% in 1968),  while the o.m.s.  rose  by  6.5%  (7% in 1968). 
The  number  of fatalities per million tonnes fell from  1.32 in 1968  to  1.18 
in 1969  (more  than 3  in 1958)  and  the  same rate for  serious casualties,  after under-
going  a  reduction of one-third from  1958  to 1967,  showed  a  levelling-out  in  1968 
which was  maintained in 1969  (40.82 against  41.4  in 1968). 
A look at  the  number  of fatalities per million working  hours  (Tables  B,  D 
and graph  E)  shows  that: 
The  rate of fatalities is the  lowest  since  1958  and  seems  to confirm the 
levelling-out  noted  for  1967  and  1968.  In absolute terms,  the  number  of fatalities 
has  continued to fall off,  dropping  from  240 in 1968  to  209  in 1969,  i.e.  a  reduc-
tion of  approximately  13  %,  while the  number  of hours worked  also dropped  from  522 
to 476  millions,  i.e. reduction of  approximately  9  %.  In  1969,  the accidents classi-
fied under  headings  I  to V  (Table  B  and  graphs  E  and  G)  caused 94  % of the total 
fatalities  (84%  in 1968)  and are distributed as  follows:  Cause  I  (roof falls):  40% 
(35% in 1968);  Causes  II and  III  (haulage  and  transport,  and  movement  of personnel): 
42  % (37% in 1968);  Causes  IV  and V  (machinery,  handling of tools  and falling ob-
jects:  12%  (12% in 1968). 
The  number  of  serious casualties per million hours worked appears  in Table 
A and  graph  F.  The  rate of  incidence  of  15.160 is increasing compared with  1968  and 
is now  at its highest  level since 1958.  As  before,  it will be  noted that  there is the 20 
same  predominance  of  the accident  rates for  categories  I  to V:  97  % of  the total of 
serious casualties,  distributed in three roughly  equal parts:  category  I  (roof falls) 
·29.5 %;  categories II and  III  (haulage  and  transport,  and  movement  of personnel)  34 %, 
and categories  IV  and  V  (machinery,  handling  of  tools  and  falling objects)  33.5 %. 
As  shown  by  graph  H,  the roof falls are still the most  important  cause of  accidents; 
this accident rate,  running  against  the  general trend towards  a  reduction noted up 
to 1967,  has  continued to rise since then,  recording  a  new  increase of  5.5% compared 
with  1968. 
The  rates for  categories  II and  III which  also showed  a  trend towards re-
duction,  also rose by  4  % in 1969.  The  rates for  categories  IV  and  V have  continued 
to rise,  as during previous years,  this increase being 8  % in 1968  anQ  6  % in 1969. Germany  Belgium 
C AU  S  E 
(1958-1964) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962 
1)  Falls of ground  4.843 4.779 4.886  4,797  4,682  4•663  4.894  5,91  4.294 4.32  4.071  4.439 
2)  Haulage  and transport  2.550  2.569 2.44f  2.458  2,501  2.43  2.385 4.132  2.97!  2,70!  2.77C  3,331 
3) .Movement  of personnel  2,497 2.463 2.34E  2.512  2,608 2.64E  2.744  1,35  0,998  l,OOE  1.062  1 .. 136 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and  0.767 0,914  0,920  0,867  1.046  1.2l:l  1.242 2,804  2.085 2,386  2,097 2,461  supports 
5)  Falling objects  2.537 2.719 2.738 2.945  3.077 3.03E  3.242  0.41  0.371  0.354  0.301  0.445 
6)  Explosives  0.015 o.ou 0,010  0,009 0.006  O,OOE  0,006  0,02  0,007 0.032  0,018  -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
o.ou 0.016  - 0.002  0.123  0,010  - - - - - - dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  - - 0.011  - - suffocatiou hy  natural  gases  - - - - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - 0,003  0.002  - - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  0.004  - - - - 0.004  - - - - - 0.010 
11)  Electricity  0.010 0.014  0,012  0.014  0.006 0.012  0.00!  o.ou  - 0.016  0.018  0.010 
12)  Other Causes  0.487 0.522  0,45  0.503  0.488 0.47  0.477  0.26(  0,255 0,26C  0,301  0,351 
TOTAL  13.721 4.007 13,8U  4.10! 14.539 4.499 14,99!  4.924  10.989 11.08! 10.638 12.161 
(1965-1969)  1965  1986  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1986  1967  1968  1969 
1)  Falls of ground  4.732  4.721  4.524  4.6U  4,736  3.574  3.568  3.85(  3.676 5,075 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2.411  2.067  1.913 1.994 2,195  2.866  3,269 2,96(  3,220 3,169 
3)  Movement  of personnel  3.032 2.852  2,974  3.30<  3,399  0.771  0.936 0.903  1.122 1,186 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and 
1.234  1.396 1,291  2.12E  2.146 2.265  1.903 2,353  suppo1•ts  1-244  1.124 
5)  Falling objects  3.344 3.272 3.642 3.713 4,036  0.29~  0,349 0.459  0.358 1,244 
6)  Explosives  0.005 0.005 0.017 o.ou 0.001  - 0,013 0,05E  0,049  -
7)  Explosion of firedamp or coal  o.ou 0.013  - 0,  ()(}I  0,004  0.031  - - - 0,019 
dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of fireds•p,  0.005  - 0.003  - - - 0.013  - - -
suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground combustion and  fires  - - - 0.004  - 0.021  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.002  0.01~ 0.006 o.on 0,026  0.010  0.013  - 0.016 0,019 
12)  Other Causes  o.JS•I  0.414  0.396  0,429 0,402  0.33.  0.362  0.278  0.228 0,175 
TOTAL  15  .. 133 Lt.59K 14.599  5,540 16,09E  0.024 10.669 0.771 10.572  3,24( 
--- --
A,  Co•parative Table of 
numbers  of persons  incapacitated  by  underground  accidents 
for eight week• or longer 
years  1958-69 
per  •ooo,ooo  man-hours 
France 
(excl,  Provence) 
1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959 
4-432  4.41  5.027 4.665 4.774  4,41E  4.222  4.177 4.308 1.355 1.378 
3,565 3.419  1.980 1.695 1.92(  2.10E  2.196  2.364 2,278 1.335 0.984 
1.066 0,96  1.505 1,118  2.8~ 2,33  2,458 2.368 2.383  0,668 0.394 
2.414 2.31C  0,914 1.022 1.62  2.52:l  2,991 3,096 3.042 1.169 0.984 
0,547 0.397  1.890 2.187 1.893  2,29~  2.073  2.278  2,074  1.1~9 1.698 
0,019 o.ou  0.()\13  0.051  0.031  0,01  0.051  0,009 0.013  0.167  -
- 0,00!  0.047 0.088  - - 0.004  - - - -
- - 0,004  - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - 0,018  - -
0.009  - 0,014  - 0.004  0.02!  0.004  0,014 0,009  - -
0,198 0.26E  2.956 2.768 0,793  0.36  0.240 0,354 0.227 0,334 0,591 
2.250  1.79!  4.380  3.594  13,909 14.079  4.239 ".66C  4.347 6,197 6.29! 
1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966 
3.941 3.927 3,634  4.16  4,044  5.572 6,36( 
2.153  1.858 1.918  1.941  1,556  - 0,70 
2,087 2.239 2.174  2.815 3,226  - 0,707 
2,272  2.639 2.773 3.011  3,070  7.164 7.06 
1.839 1.785 2.114  2 .34!E  2.537  0.796  -
0,037 0.010  0.011  - 0,050  - -
- 0.029  - - - - -
- - 0.005  - - - -
- - - - - - -
- 0.005  - O,OOE  - - -
0.014  - 0.005  o.OOE  0,014  - -
0.174  0.200  0.185  0,23  0,291  1.592 3,360 
12,517  12.692 12.819  4,57(  1,788  ~.124  ~.201 
Italy 
1960  1961  1962  1963 
1,808  - 0.792  0.366 
1,205 0,676 1.847 1,465 
1.005 1.578 1,056 0.732 
0,603 0,902  1.584 1.465 
1.808 2.029 2.375 3,296 
- 0.225  - 0.366 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.603  0.451  - -
7,032  5,861  7,654 7,690 
1967  1968  1969  1970 
5,580 0,812  3,656 
0,797 0.812  -
1,594 0,812 1,462 
3.552  7,304 8.043 
6,377 6,493 3,656 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
3.189 0,812  -
~1.089 7,043  6,81 
Netherlands  Community 
1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
0,893  1,32e  1.464 1.305 1.82!  2,238 1.742 2,017 4.846  4.49(  4.571  4.434 4.387  4.337 4,509 
1,787  1.511 1.562 1.898 1,92  2,590 1,826 1,952 2.602 2.347  2.310 2.371  2.521 2.520 2,346 
1,78  0,324  0.386 0.187 0,51  0,580 0.630  0.472  2.003  1,823  2.185 2.185 2.282 2.261  2.326 
3.12  0.61  0,402 0,780 0.91  1.015 1,050 1,094 1.098 1.064  1.264 1.423 1.712 1.818 1.848 
3.574  0,401  0,515  0,492  0.81!  0,642 0.630 0,923  1.962 2,161  2.105 2.353  2.375 2.406  2.442 
- - - - - - - 0.021  0.023  0.02(  0,017  0,012  0.018 0.010 o.ou 
- - - - - - - - 0,017 0.030  0,010 o.ool  0,071  0.006  0.001 
- - - - - - - - 0.002  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - 0,002  0.001  - - -
- - - - - - - - 0.002  - - - 0.001  0.002  0.003 
- - - - - 0,021  - 0.021  0,010 O.OOE  0,010 0.018  0.007 0.012  0.008 
- 0.262  0,161  0,390 0,21(  0,497 0.147 0,129  0,985 l.OU  0.513  0.428 0,404  0,390 0,364 
~n.l68  4.441  4.490  5,051  6.21~  7.583  6.025 6,629 13.551 P,954  12.986 IJ3.227  ~.781  13.781 13,861 
1971  1965  1966  1967  l!i68  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
1.923 1.688 2.466  2.45( 2,737  4.215 4.186' 4.060 4.261 4,492 
2.80E  2.621  1,866 2.40  2,562  2.416  2.17  2.037  2.139 2,118 
0.774  0.605 0.766  1.16( 1,165  2.364 2.32(  2.354 2.795 3,023 
1.282 2,066  0,833  1.03  1,689  1.773 1.815  1.790 1,945 1,865 
0.862 0,958 0.866  1.59( 1,106  2.415 2,362  2.638 2.858 3,185 
- - - - - 0.013  0.007  0,019  0,015 0,019 
- - - - - o.on 0,016  - 0.002 0,004 
- - - - - 0.002  0.001  0.003  - -
- - - - - 0.002  - - 0.002  -
- - - - - - 0.001.  - 0.002  -
- - - - - 0.006 0.007  0.005 o.old 0,021. 
o.088  0,353  0,700 0.30  0,116  0.289 0.354  0.337 0.341 0,333 
7.73  8,291  7.497 8,93!  9,375  13.506 13,242  3;246 !J.f..37C  5,161 Germany 
C  A  U  S  E 
(1958-1964) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959 
1)  Fa 11s of ground  0.268 0,290  0,263  0.216  0,28C  0.26(  0.20C  0,223  0,213 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0.179  0.169 0,182  0.196  0.149  0.178  0,30C  0,101  0,124 
3)  Movement  of personnel  0,094  0.097 0,07C  0.086  0.059  0.089 0,071  0.011  0,027 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and  O.OlG  0.027 
supports  o.ou  0,027 0,037 o.ou  0.021  o.oo~ 0,014 
5)  Falling objects  0,065 0.041  0,035  0.065  0.094  0.072  0.054  0.016  -
6)  Explosives  0,009 0.003  0.000  - 0,004  - 0.002  ()',011  0,014 
7)  Explosives of  firedamp  or  coal  0.011  0,012  - dusts  - 0.66(  0.002 o.  oo:l  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
0.005 0.()93  O.oo:l  0.004  0,002  - - 0,016  0,014 
9)  Underground  co11.bustion  and  fires  - 0.003  - 0.002  - 0.006  o.oo!  - 0.007 
10)  Inrushes of water  - 0.003  0.002  - - 0.004  - 0,011  -
I 
0.022  O.OCI8  0.002  0.005  0.010  0.002 o.oo  0,021  - 1)  Electricity 
2)  Other  causes  0.025 0,025 0.036 0.049  0.049 0.02S  0.01  O.OOf  -
T<Jl'AL  0.687 0.680  0.611  0.651  1.344 0,65i  0.58  0.42<  0,413 
(1965-1969)  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966 
1)  Falls of ground  0.184 0.197 0.201  0.148 0,192  0,23~  0,324 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0.191  0.175 0.151  0,126  0,143  0.166  o.187 
3)  Movement  of personnel  0.07(  0,094  0.076 0,079 0.056  0.011  0.025 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and 
0.030 0.020 0.014  0,034  0.052  0.025  supports  0.025 
5)  Falling objects  0,058 0.048 0.063  0.051  0,049  - -
6)  Explosives  - - - 0.004  - - -
7)  Explosives of  firedamp  or  coal  0.019 0.056  - 0,061  - 0,011  - dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedaap,  0.002  0,002 
suffocation by  natural cases  0.007  - 0,004  0.041  0.013 
9)  Underground  coabuation and  fires  0.005  - - - - 0.011  -
10)  Inrushes of  water  - - - - - - -
ll) E1ect>•icity  0.005  - 0,003  0.004 0,004  o.ou  -
12)  Other  causes  0.023  0.027 0.017  0,022 0,022  - 0.013 
TOTAL  0.582 0,629 0,542  0.509 0,504  0.542  0.587 
Belgium 
1960  1961  1962 
0,299 0,266  0.246 
0.157  0.168 0.142 
O,OCI8  0.035 0.010 
0.016  0.027 0.047 
O,OCI8  - 0.010 
- - -
0,016  - -
- - 0.047 
- - -
- 0.044  0.047 
0,024  - -
0,006 0,009 0.019 
0,536  0.549 0.568 
1967  1968  1969 
0.264  0.179 0,214 
0,18(  0,114 0.017 
- 0,033  -
0,028  0,065  -
- 0,016  -
- 0.016  -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
0.014  0.033 0,019 
0.042  - -
0.528 0.456 0,330 
B.  Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
years  1958-69 
per  '000,000 man-hours 
France 
(excl.  Provence) 
1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959 
0.264  0,22~  0,235 0.192  0,186  0,2lll  0.167 0,120 0,127 0,167  -
0,245 0,16E  0,115  0.085 0.082  0.122 0.077 0.121  0,141  - 0,197 
0,057 0,021  0,007 0.018 0,027 0.001  0,043  0.009 0.009  - -
- o.ou 0,018 0.040 0.016  0,001  0,030 0.009 0,036  - -
0.019  0,011!  0.025 0.007 0,004 0.01  0.030 0.009  0.018  - 0.197 
- - - 0,026  - - - 0.005 0.005  0,501  -
- - 0.115 0.121  - - 0,004  - - - -
- - 0,043  0.026 0.019 0.()()1  - 0.019 0.009  0,167  -
- - - - - - - - - - -
0.019  - - - - 0.()()1  - - - - -
0.009 o.oos  - 0.011  0.012  - 0,009 0.024  - - -
0-028 o.oos  0.036 0.029  0.008  - 0.009 0.014 0.014  - -
0.641  0.471  0.594 0,555 0.354 0.38:  0,369 0.330 0.359  0,835 0,394 
1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966 
0.164  0,214 0,159 0,17  0,149  - -
0,052  0,126  0.08~ 0.'10  0,186·  - -
0,042  0.024 0,016  0.02l  0,014  - -
0.009 0.015 0.016  o.OOii  - - -
0.019 0,015 O.Oll  0,03  0,014  - -
0,009 0.005 o.oos  O.OOii  - - -
0.155  - - 0,03E  - - -
- 0,005 0.02,  o.ou 0,007  - -
- - - - - - -
0.005  - o.oos  - - - -
- 0.01C  - - 0,007  - -
- 0.005 0.005  - 0,007  - -
0.455 0.419 0.332  0,4<XI  0,384  - -
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
0,201  0,225  - 0.366  - 0,262  0.064 0,034 0,11  0,062  0.084 0,043  0.253 p.242 0.235  0,217 0.234  0.217  0.175 
- - - - - 0.077 0.145 0,067 0.09!  0.062 0.105 0.172  0.147 0.141  0.146 0.168 0,124 0,167 0.178 
- - - - - - - - - - - 0.057 0.063  0.047 0.056 0.045 0.060 0.045  -
- - - - - 0,015  0,016  - - 0,041  - - 0.011 0.02E  0.012  0.021 0,037 0.013  0.030 
- - - - - - 0,016  - - - - 0.043  0.045  0.02"<  0.024  0.041  0,062  0.046 0.037 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0,009 O,OlC  0.002  - 0.002  0.001  0.002 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.032  .0.03E  0,002  - 0.375 0.001  0,001 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.016 0,01(  0,006  0.003  0,007 0.005 0.002 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 0,003  - 0.001  - 0.003  0.005 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0,002  0,002  0,001  0.006  0,005 0.005  -
- - - - - 0.01!  - - - - - - 0,016 0,00  0.007 0.004  0.008 0,008 0.003 
- - - - - - - 0.017  - - - - 0.023  0.021  0.024  0.029 0,032  0.021  0.014 
0.201  0,225  - 0.366  - 0.355 0.241 0.119 0.22!  0,166 0,189 0.258 0.610 0,59(  0.507 0.546 0.932  0.547  0.492 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
- - - 0,044 0,050 0.100 O.l7l 0,058  0.177 0.201  0.192  0.160 0,176 
0,797  - - 0.177 0,126  - 0.081  - 0.149 0,16(  0.128  0.115 0,145 
- - - - - - - 0.058  0,051 0,06(  0.044  0.054 0,038 
0.797  - - 0.022  - 0.067  - 0,117  0,024 0,023  0,024  0.017 0,023 
- - - - - - 0.04  - 0.037 0,03(  0.036 0,040 0,031 
- - - - - - - - 0,002 0.00  0.002  0.006  -
- - - - - - - - 0,053  o •.  03C  - 0.044  -
- - - - - - - - 0,006  0,()().4  0.012  0.006 0,004 
- - - - - - - - 0,005  - - - -
- - - - - - - - 0.001  - 0.002  - -
- - - - - - - - 0.004 0.000  0,004  0.006 0,006 
- - - - - - - - 0,013 0.01  0,015  0.012 0,015 
1.594  0  - 0,243 0,176 0.167  0.30  0,233  0,522 0.53E  0.457 0.46C 0,438 C.  Comparative Table  of  underground  group accidents  (see  (1)  below) 
years  1960-(9 
Germany  Belgium  France 
(excl.  Provence)  Italy  Netherlands  Community 
C  A  U  S  E 
(1960-1965) 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and 
supports 
5)  ~alling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires 
10)  Inrushes of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other causes 
TOTAL 
(1966-1969,1 
1960  1961  1962 
llabNablia 
2  2  10  1  1  6 
2  2  1(  4  63~ 
1966  1967  1968 
1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962 
Nab  Na  bNabNabllab  Na 
1  2  6 
2  5  14 
- 1  4  8  - - -
2  5  14 1  4  8  1  2  6 
1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968 
1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
N  a  Nab Nab  Nab  Nab !lab  Nab  Nab  llabNab llab  !Ia  b  Nab llab  lla  bllab !lab  lla  b  !lab  Nab  Na  bN  ab  Na  NabNabNabHab 
1  7  1  6  2  2  10 1  7  3  3  18 
2  5  14 
- - - - - 2  - 33- 3  62~  - - - 3  4  41 
-,-
2  33- 1  7  1  6  2  2  10 1  1  6 6sj35  2  5  14 3  4  41 
1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  l968  1969  1970  1971 
N  a  b  II  a  b  N a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  II  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  II  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  II  a  b  If  a  b  11  a  b  N  a  b  !I  a  b  ll  a  b  11  a  b  !I  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  II  a  b  II  a  b  N  a  b  N  a·  b  N ·a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and 
supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust 
2  52  - - - 1  - 17  - 1  6  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires 
10)  Inrushes of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other causes 
TOTAL  2  52  17 
(1)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualities of  type  (a). 
(N)  Number  of  group accidents. 
(a)  Casualties were  unable te resume  work  below  ground  for at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
6 
- 3  1121  - - .  1  - 17  - - -
3  1121  1  17 27 
D.  RECAPITULATION:  COMMUNITY  OVERALL 
Serious  Fatal- Serious  Under- Million  injuries  Fatal- Serious 
Extrac- ities  injuries 
tion  ground  man- Fatal- (disable- ities  injuries 
Year  hours  ment  for  per  per m.  per  per m. 
( 1)  o .m. s.  ities 
(kg.)  worked  8  weeks  m.tons  tons  m.  man- man-
or over)  hours  'hours 
1958  252.278  1,634  1.260  770  17,074  3.052  67.68  0.610  13.551 
1959  240.602  1,788  1,122  622  14,539  2.585  60.43  0.590  12.950 
1960  239.967  1,958  1..037  526  13,,459  2.192  56.09  0~507  12.986 
1961  235.848  2,100  962  527  12,729  2 ..  ~35  53.93  0.548  13.227 
-- r----···-··· -·-----·-----··-·----··- ·---------·-----·------~---
1962.  233.233  2,229  901  840(2~  12,418  3.602(2)  53.24  0.932(2)  13.781 
541(3;  2.320(3)  0.60Q(3) 
--~-·---- --------··· ·-·---·------------· 
1963  229.769 2,331  849  465  11,686  2.024  50~86  0.547  13.761 
1964  235.007 2,395  841  411  11,726  1.749  49.89  0.493  13.860 
1965  224.24~ 2,461  784  410  10,595  1.828  47.25  0.522  13.506 
1966  210.189 2,611  698  374  9,247  1.779  43.99  0.536  13.242 
-----· -·-------1--------~-----f----- -- ·-
1967  189.484 2,824  587  269  7,781  1.420  41.06  Q.457  13.246 
1968  181.170 3,065  522  240  7,501  1,326  41.44  0.460  14.370 
1969  176.900 3,265  476  209  7,222  1.181  40.82  0.438  15.160 
1970 
1971 
( 1)  Net  extraction,  slurry and dust. 
(2)  Incl.  Luisenthal explosion. 
(3)  Excl.  Luisenthal explosion. GRAPHS 
OF  FATAL  AND  SERIOUS  CASUALTIES 
IN COMMUNITY COALMINES 
KEY 
to  Roman  figures  in Graphs 
Falls  of ground 
II  Haulage  and  transport 
Ill  Movement of personne.l 
IV  Machinery,  handling  of  tools and  supports 
V  Falling  objects 
VI  Explosives 
VII  Explosions of firedamp  or coal  dust. 
VIII  Sudden  outbursts of firedamp,  suffocation  by  natural gase~ 
IX  Fires  and  underground combustion 
X  Inrushes of water 
XI  .  Elttctricity 
~II  Other causes E. 
Per '000.000 man-hours  8  1.344 
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')CASUALTIES DIED WITHIN  EIGHT WEEKS 31.089-. 
F.  CASES OF SERIOUS INJURY BELOW  GROUND  1)  IN  THE 
COMMUNITY, BY  CAUSES  OF  ACCIDENT 
per '000.000 man-hours 
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1)  CASUAL  TIES WERE UNABLE TO RESUME WORK 
BELOW GROUND FOR AT LEAST EIGHT WEEKS in% of total 
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SECTION  III 
IMPLEMENTATION  OF  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Annex  9  shows  the measures  taken with regard to the Recommendations1  opi-
nions1  directives and reports which  have  been prepared by  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission since it was  set up  and transmitted to governments  for  appropriate 
action. 
The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission was  last informed of these measures 
i'n  a  summary  dated  1  January  1968  and published in the Fifth Report. 
This Report  provides a  summary  as at  1  January  1970~  using  a  traditional 
classification. 
With  regard to the earliest Recommendations,  featured in groups  A to C, 
the latter dating back to 1966,  an  improved degree of  implementation of  the Recom-
mendations  can be  noted  in 69  instances as  compared with the position at  1  January 
1968,  both in the technical  and  human  factors  sphere. 
It could be  said. that  implementation is at present  at  its  optimum  level, 
the Recommendations  not  promulgated as regulations having  been reducedto a  minimum, 
which  is accounted  for  by  ~ocal mining  conditions. 
With  regard to the practical conclusions referred to in group  D on the 
application of the ventilation stabilisation theory,  adopted by  the Mines  Safety 
and Health Commission  ln 1968,  it should be  noted that  these are only  being put  in 
hand  now;  the replies received indicate the  importance attached to ·this question by 
the mining  inspectorates in close collaboration with mining  concerns. ANNEXES COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  1969 
ANNEX  I CONTENTS 
1.  Common  statistical summary  of underground accidents at mines  in 1969 
(Annex  I) 
2.  Terms  of reference of the various Working Parties of the Mines  Safety and 
Health  Commission 
(Annex  II) 
3.  Composition of the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  and its Working Parties 
(Annex  III) 
4.  Seventh Report  concerning the organisation of Rescue  arrangements  for  1967 
and  1968 
(Annex  IV) 
5.  Report  on  the characteristics and electrical protection of cables supplying 
mobile  machines  (coal-cutters, loading machines etc.)  used underground  in 
coal-mines  in the various Community  countries  · 
(Annex  V) 
6.  Opinion on  the use underground of  foamed  urethane  in coal mines 
(Annex  VI) 
7.  A  new  measurement  and testing method  for  ropes used  in shafts and  roadway-
haulage  systems  and  for  guides  in shaft- and  rQadway  haulage  installations 
(Annex  VII) 
8.  Report of work  in connection with coal-dust neutralisation and anti-explosion 
barriers 
(Annex  VIII) 
9.  Implementation of recommendations  of  the Mines  Safety and  Hea~th Commission 
(Annex  IX) Year: 
Country: 
1969 
Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Ruhr  (Land  North Rhine/ 
Westphalia) 
Number  o·f  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  (b)  decimal  decimal  as  under  below  below  place)  place)  dents  (a)  - under  (b) 
1)  Falls of ground  974  35  4,99  0,18  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  406  26  2,08  0,13  - - - . 
716  11  3,67  o,o6  .3)  Movement  of personnel  - - -
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools  271  9  1,39  0,04  and supports  - - -
5)  Falling objects  804  9  4,12  0,04  - - - ....  .. 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - o,o1  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  1  o,o1  dust  - - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  -- 1  o,o1  suffocation by  natural  - - - - - gases 
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  6  1  0,03  0,01  - - -
12)  Other causes  86  4  0,44  0,02  - - -
TOTAL  3 266  96  195  050 7.00  16,74  0,49  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  balow.ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types. (a)_, and/or  (b). ' 
Year: 
Country: 
1969 
Germa.D7  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal  field  - .  . Aachen  (Land North 
a)  Rhine/Westpha1i 
-Number  of  Number  o·f 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
menta as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third  under  (a) 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  152  a  3,56 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  82  5  1,92 
.3)  Movement  of personnel  125  2  2,93 
4)  Machinery,  handlin~ of tools 
44  1,03  and supports  -
5)  Falling objects  115  3  2,70 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - -
9)  Underground· combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0,02 
12)  Other causes  18  2  0,42 
TOI'AL  531  20  42  656  829  12,58 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a),and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  ablements  acci- ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place)  (a)  . 
0,19  - - -
0,12  - - -
0,05  - - -
- - - -
0,07  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - -
0,04  - - -
0,47  - - -
H  • Year:  1969 
Country:  Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  TBI  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Saar 
Humber  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C AU  S  I  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
menta  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  132  8  27  941  021  4,723 
2),Haulage and transport  95  1  "  3,399 
.3)  Movement  of personnel  62  2  ..  2,218 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  28 
It  1,002  and supports  -
5)  Falling objects  153  1  "  5,474 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - "  -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
"  dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  .. 
suffocation by  natural  - - - gases 
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - "  -
10)  Inrushes of water  - -
ft  -
11)  Electricity  - - "  -
12)  Other causes  3  -
n  0,107 
TarAL  473  18  27  941  021  16,923 
(a)  Casualties were unable to resume  work  below ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types- (a)·. and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as under  as 
place)  dents  (a)  - under  (b) 
0,286  - - -
0,250  - - -
0,072  - - -
- - - -
0,036  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - -- -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -
0,644  - - -
H  . 
"' Year:  1969 
Country:  Germany  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Total 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group- accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  (b)  decimal  decimal  as  under  below  below  place)  place)  dents  (a)  . under  (b) 
1)  Falls of ground  1 258  51  - 4,74  0,19  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  583  38  - 2,19  0,14  - - -
.3)  Movement  of personnel  903  15  - 3,40  o,o6  - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
343  9  1,29  0,04  and  supports  - - - -
5)  Falling objects  1  072  13  - 4,04  0,05  - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  2  - - o,o1  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  1  dust  - - •  - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
1  suffocation by  natural  - - - 0  - - - gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  7  1  - 0,03  •  - - -
12)  Other causes  107  6  - 0,40  0,02  - - -
TOTAL  4  276  134  265 648  850  16,10  0,50  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a), and/or  (b). 
....  .. Year:  1969 
Country:  Eelgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDESTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Borinage/Centre 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  (b)  decimal  decimal  as under  below  below  place)  place}  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1)  Falls of  ground  85  2  16,790  0,395  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  29  - 5,728  - - - -
.3)  ·Mov~ment of personnel  9  - 1,778  - - - -
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools  28  5,531  - - - - - and supports 
5)  Falling objects  19  - 3,753  - - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - •  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  - - - - - - - dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  - - - - - - - gases 
9)  Underground combustion  and  fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - - - - -
12)  Other causes  - - - - -·  - -
TOTAL  170  2  5 062  640  33,580  0,395  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  at  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a).and/or  (b). 
H  .. Year:  1969 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Coal-field-:  Char1ero  i/Namur 
\ 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  67  2  5,873 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  44  3  3,857 
.3)  Movement  of personnel  14  - 1,227 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  2,980  and  supports  34  -
5)  Falling objects  18  - 1,578 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal  1  o,o88  dust  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  - - - gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  5  - 0,438 
TOTAL  183  5  l1 408  424  16,041 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types.(a),and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place}  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0,175  - - -
0,263  - - - - - - -
- - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0,438  - - -
H  . 
(J) Year:  1969 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Liege 
Number:of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  .as  under  (b) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci- ablements  ities as 
below  (b)  decimal  decimal  dents  as  under · under  (b)  below  place)  place)  (a) 
1)  Falls of ground  33  4  4,357  0,528  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  39  - 5,149  - - - - .  16  2,112  .3) ·Movement  of personnel  - - - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  17  2,244  and  supports  - - - - -
5)  Falling objects  5  - 0,660  - - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - - - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal  - - - - - - - dust 
. 8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp,  - - - - - - - suffocation by  natural gases. 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  1  1  0,132  0,132  - - -
12)  Other causes  2  - 0,264  - - - -
TarAL  113  5  7  574  888  14,918  o,66o  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  invo.lving more  than five casualties of types. (a)! a~d/or (b). 
H  .. Year:  1969 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Campine 
-_]'lumber  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  ac~idents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci-
ablements  ities as 
below  (b)  decimal  decimal  dents  as  under  under  (b)  below  place)  place)  (a) 
1)  Falls of  ground  76  3  2,775  0,110  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  51  2  1,862  0,073  - - -
.3)  Movement  of personnel  22  - 0,803  - - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  42  1,534  and supports  - - - - -
5)  Falling objects  22  - 0,803  - - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  - - - - - - - gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - - - - -
12)  Other causes  2  - 0,073  - - - -
TOTAL  215  5  27 386128  7,850  0,183  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground  for  at  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types.(a),and/or  (b). 
H  .. Year: 1969 
Country: Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: Total 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
i>  Falls of ground  261  11  5,075 
2)  Haulage  and transport  163  5  3,169 
.3)  Movement  of personnel  61  - 1,186 
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools  121  2,353  and supports  -
5)  Falling objects  64  - 1,244 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  1  0,019  dust  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural  - - - gases 
9)  Underground combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  1.  1  0,019 
12)  Other causes  9  - 0,175 
TarAL  681  17  51  432 080  13,240 
(a)  Casualties were unable to resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving aore than five casualties of types  (a),aod/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities  decimal  as under  as 
place)  dents  (a)  . under  (b) 
0,214  - - -
o,097  - - - - - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -· 
- - - -
- - - - - - - -
0,019  - - -
- - - -
0,330  - - -
H  .. Year: 1969 
Country: Fr.ance  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
-Number  rif  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  (b)  decimal  decimal  as  under  below  below  place)  place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1)  Falls of ground  341  14  4,057  0,166  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  93  18  1,106  0,214  - - -
.3)  Movement  of personnel  203  - 2,415  - - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  207  2,462  and supports  - - - - -
5)  Falling objects  184  - 2,189  - - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0,012  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - - - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  1  0,012  suffocation by  natural  - - - - - gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  - 0,012  - - -
12)  Other causes  29  - 0,345  - - - -
TarAL  1  058  34  84  059136  12,586  0,404  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground  for  at  least eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died  wi~hin eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types.(a),and/or  (b). 
....  .. Year:  1969 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Lorraine 
Number  o-f  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  121  6  4,020 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  67  3  2,226 
3)  Movement  of personnel  165  1  5,482 
4)  Machinery,  bundling of tools 
59  1,960  and  supports  -
5)  Falling objects  84  1  2,791 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  - 0,033 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  - - - suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  1  - 0,033 
TOTAL  498  11  30  100  040  16,545 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  b~low ground for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types.(a),and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of dis- of  fatal~ 
(to third  acci-
ablements  ities as 
decimal  as  under 
place}  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0,200  - - -
0,099  - - -
o,033  - - -
- - - -
0,033  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
0,365"  - - -
H  .. Year:  1969 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field-:  Centre-Midi  (exo1.  Pro-
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
vence) 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  (b)  decimal  decimal  as  under  below  below  place)  place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1)  Falls of  ground  107  1  4,029  0,038  - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  59  5  2,221  0,187  - - -
.3)  Movement  of personnel  86  1  3,237  0,038  - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  166  6,249  and supports  - - - - - ..... 
5)  Falling objects  89  1  3,350  0,038  - - - .. 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  5  - 0,188  - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - - - - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  - - - - - - - gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  2  - 0,075  - - - -
12)  Other causes  11  1  0,414  0,038  - - -
TOTAL  525  9  26  564  176  19,763  0,339  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable ·to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a),and/or  (b). Year:  1969 
Country:  France  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDESTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Total  (exclo  Provence) 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per milliori 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal·  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  569  21  4,044 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  219  26  1,556 
_3)  Movement  of personnel  454  2  3,226 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  432  3,070  and  supports  -
5)  Falling objects  357  2  2,537 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes.  7  - 0,050 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  - 1  - suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  2  1  0,014 
12)  Other causes  41  1  0,291 
TOfAL  2 081·  54  140 723  352  14,788 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a).and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
as under  (b) 
per million Number  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0,149  - - -
0,186  - - -
0,014  - - -
- - - - t-t  .. 
0,014  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
o,oo7  - - -
- - - - - - - -
o,oo7  - - -
o,oo7  - - -
0,384  - - -Year:  1969 
Country:  Italy  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  oF·  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Sulcis 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  ac~idents  .  casualties  disablements  fatalities  as under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
C AU  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hourS'  man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci- ablements ities as  (b)  decimal  decimal  as  under  below  below  place)  place) 
~ents  (a)  under  (b) 
1)  Falls of ground  5  - 3,656  - - - -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  - - - - - - -
.3)  Movement  of personnel  2  - 1,462,  - - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  11  8,043  and supports  - - - - -
5)  Falling objects  5  - 3,656  - - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - -·- - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  - - - - - - - dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp,  - - - - - - - suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground combustion  and  fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - -
~  - -
11)  Electricity  - - - - - - -
12)  Other causes  - - - - - - -
TOTAL  23  - 1  367  618  16,817  - - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a),and/or  (b). 
H  .. Year:  1969 
Country:  Netherlands  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Limburg 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Group  accidents 
casualties  disablements  fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
Man- as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours  man-hours  of  of dis- of  fatal-
under  (a)  as under  (to third  (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  (b)  decimal  decimal  as  under  below  below  place)  place)  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1)  Falls of  ground  47  1  2,737  0,058  - - -
2)•Haulage and  transport  44  - 2,562  - - - -
3)  Movement  of personnel  20  1  1,165  0,058  - - -
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  29  2  1,689  0,117  and  supports  - - -
5)  Falling objects  19  - 1,106  - - - -
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  - - - - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal  "  - - - - - - - dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  - - - - - - - suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground combustion_and fires  - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - - - - -
12)  Other causes  2  - 0,116  - - - -
TOTAL  161  4  17  173  976  9,375  0,233  - - -
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  di~d within eight weeks.  1 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
1-4  -CAUSE. 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and transport 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of 
and  supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp, 
or  coal dust 
Comparative  table of  number  of  persons 
incapacitated by  underground accidents for  eight  weeks  or  longer 
in 1969 
per million man-hours 
Germany  Belgium  France  (1)  Italy 
4.736  5.075  4.044  3.656 
2.195  3.169  1.556  -
3.399  1.186  3.226  1.462 
tools  1.291  2.353  3.070  8.043 
4.036  1.244  2.537  3.656 
0.007  - 0.050  -
0.004  0.019  - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp  - suffocation by  natural  - - - gases· 
9)  Underground  combustion  and 
fires  - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.026  0.019  0.014  -
12)  other causes  0.402  0.175  0.291  -
TOTAL  16.096  13.240  14.788  16.817 
(1)  Excluding Provence. 
Netherlands  Community 
2.737  4 .492. 
2.562  2.118 
1.165  3.023 
1.689  1.965 
1.106  3.185 
- 0.019 
- 0.004 
- -
- -
- -
- 0.021 
0.116  0.333 
9.375  15.160 C  A  U  S  E 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and transport 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp, 
or coal dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and 
fires 
10)  Inrushes  of  water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other causes 
TOfAL 
(1)  Excluding  Provence. 
Comparative table of accidents 
resulting in death within eight  weeks 
in 1969 
per million man-hours 
Germany  Belgium  France  (1) 
0.192  0.214  0.149 
0.143  0.097  0.186 
0.056  - 0.014 
0.034  - -
0.049  - 0.014 
- - -
- - -
0.004  - 0.007 
- - -
- - -
0.004  0.019  0.007 
0.022  - 0.007 
0.504  0.330  0.384 
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
- 0.058  0.176 
- - 0.145 
- 0.058  0.038 
- 0.117  0.023 
- - 0.031  .....  .. 
- - -
- - -
- - 0.004 
- - -
- - -
- - 0.006 
- - 0.015 
- 0.233  0.438 TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  OF  THE  VARIOUS  WORKING  PARTIES 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
ANNEX  II II,  3 
I.  Working  Party  on Electrification- Chairman  Mr.  LOGELAIN 
A.  Terms  of  reference 
1.  Comparing  adopted safety and accident  prevention provisions relating to: 
a)  electric shock, 
b)  fire hazard, 
c)  explosion hazard. 
2.  Ascertaining the present  position in Community  countries with regard to 
safety regulations  on underground electrical networks  of  low  and  medium 
voltage  (up to 1,100 V)  and  feeder  cables for movable  equipment,  with 
due  regard to the specifications for the said cables. 
3.  Reporting  on  steps to be  taken when  work has to be  carried out  on elec-
trical equipment  under  voltage. 
4.  Studying the deleterious effects on electrical equipment  used  underground 
of  moisture  in salt pastes and salt pastes used  in dust  suppression. 
5.  Studying the construction of  high-tension cables  (of  up to 6,000 V)  used 
underground,  and protective equipment. 
6.  Comparison  of  safety provisions relating to underground electric  locomo-
tives,  with  emphasis  on  the possibility of  reducing the  frequency  of 
trolley wire sparking. 
7.  Study  of  over-voltage caused by  lightning and the problem of stray cur-
rents. 
B.  Preliminary work undertaken  by  the Secretariat 
1.  Periodic reports  on  oil-powered contactors used  in gassy  environments. 
2.  Investigations of  the use  of  remote-control circuits in automated mining 
operations. 
II.  Working  Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements,  Fires and  Underground  Combustion-
Chairman  Mr.  HELLER 
A.  Resc~e Arrangements,  Fires and  Underground  Combustion 
General Terms  of  reference  (Section  7  of  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Com-
mission's Terms  of  Reference) 
Exchange  of  information  on  rescue work  and fire-fighting in connection with 
accidents  of  interest to the Working  Party. 
B.  Rescue  work 
I.  Standing terms  of  reference 
1.  Communication  of  the annual reports  issued by  the rescue stations and 
regular discussion  of  these documents. 
2.  Convening  meetings  on special occasions  (accidents  from  which  new  infor-
mation  can  be  gained,  technical  innovations  in materials,  equipment,  etc.). 
3,  The  publication every  two years  of  a  report  outlining in particular the 
state of  rescue arrangements  in the Community  and the United  Kingdom, II~  4 
II.  Terms  of  reference 
1.  Improvements  in respirators used  by  rescue workers. 
2.  Improvements  in CO-filter self-rescuers. 
3.  Drawing  up  a  list of  experts  on drillings in connection with rescue work 
and  the apparatus to be  used. 
4.  Examination  of  the technique  for  rescuing trapped miners  by  means  of  large 
boreholes with  a  v.iew  to formulating the rules based  on  experience  gained 
in different countries  and  submitting practical regulations to the mining 
authorities. 
5.  Studying of  the  Community  criteria for fireproof  clothing and  general 
requirements. 
6.  Examination of  the need to draw  up,  alongside traditional alarm procedures, 
plans for  sending help in the event  of disaster. 
7.  Drawing  up  a  synoptic comparison  of  the rules  and  regulations relating 
to rescue and  medical attention as drafted by  the mining authorities of 
the  Community  and  of  the United  Kingdom. 
C.  Underground fires 
I. Standing  terms  of  reference 
Exchanging  views  on  the reopening  in the  Community  and  the United  Kingdom 
of fire zone  stoppings and  where  necessary adapting regulations already 
drafted. 
II. Terms  of  reference 
1.  Continuing the study  of  the  problem of  sealing off fire and  ventilation 
stoppings as well as  roadway  walls,  by  means  of  urethane  foam.  Examining 
this question so that,  if appropriate,  suitable proposals  may  be  submitted 
to the  Mines  Safety and Health  Commission. 
2.  Continuing the study  of  the problem of fire-fighting in very  deep pits, 
if necessary with the help of  small-scale model tests and  full-scale ex-
periments,  should a  favourable  opportunity arise. 
3.  Continued study  of  specifications and test conditions applicable to fire 
resistant fluids  (3.a)-c)  by  the experts  on  hydraulic fluids): 
a)  comparing test results so as to prevent  products being differently 
assessed; 
b)  where  necessary,  adapting test criteria to technological progress; 
c)  in addition,  examining to what  extent it might  be possible to relax 
these criteria and test methods  so that  the said products  may  be  more 
easily assessed and  approved. 
4.  Continued  study  of  the stabilisation of  ventilation in the event  of  pit 
fires  in  accordance with Professor Budryk's theory .(4.a)-h)  by  the venti-
lation experts): 
- Problems  outstanding within the framework  of  the former  terms  of refer-
ence: 
a)  the extent  of  instability in diagonal  ventilation roadways, 
b)  the effects of  a  fire on descensional ventilation systems, 
c)  means  of  guarding against  the danger of  explosion during fire-fighting. I I,  5 
Extension of this term of  reference to general ventilation problems  in 
view  of  their importance,  especially to fires: 
d)  assessment  of  the danger  of  explosion  in  a  fire area during its isola-
tion by  means  of  stoppings, 
e)  effects of  auxiliary ventilators  on  pit ventilation in the event  of  fire, 
f)  ventilation tolerances  (where  the object  is to study  problems  of stabil-
ity:  measurement  of  wind  speeds,  air flow  and  pressures), 
g)  possibilities of  early detection and  technical measurement  of  parasitic 
air currents, 
h)  use  of  fire regulators and fire doors. 
5.  Early detection of  underground fires,  especially smouldering fires,  and 
assessment  of  combustible  gases  (remote control installations for the early 
detection of  CO). 
6.  Measuring  instruments enabling ventilation to be  checked  (oxygen deficiency 
warning devices):  Exchange  of  information on the practical use  of  oxygen 
deficiency warning devices,  especially those which  were  singled out  for 
special mention  in the competition organised by  the High  Authority  (conclud-
ed  in December  1967). 
7.  Sealing off  abandoned  underground workings  by  means  of  dams. 
B.  Generation  of fire in means  of  transport  and  other  long  installations  (con-
veyor belts,  air ducts,  piping,  guides,  etc.)  and  propagation of  fire by 
means  of  these  installations. 
9.  Synoptic comparison  of  rules and  regulations on fire prevention and fire-
fighting  in mines,  worked  out  by the mining authorities of  member countries 
and  of  the United  Kingdom. 
III.  Working  Party  on  Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft Guides- Chairman  Mr.  MARTENS 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Follow-up of  progress  made  in the electro-magnetic testing of  winding ropes 
so as  to obtain information on their use  in Community  mines. 
2. ·Testing of  couplings  for circular and flattened winding  ropes. 
3.  Arrangements  for  the installation of  capels. 
4.  Control of  shaft  guides  by  means  of  automatic decelerometers. 
5.  Maintenance  required to ensure safe operation of  winding  ropes  and balance 
ropes. 
IV.  Working  Party  on  Mining  Accident  Statistics- Chairman  Mr.  KOCH 
Terms  of  reference 
Examination of  the methods  used  in Community  countries for  establishing mining 
accident  statistics. Particular examination of  the criteria applied  in defin-
ing the term "Mining accident"  and  the criteria used  in classifying the acci-
dents  according to cause,  duration of  stoppage and,  possibly,  position of  the 
injuries. 
With  the  exact  definition of  these criteria as  a  basis,  establishing differences 
between the statistical elements  assembled  in each country and  ways  of  taking 
these differences  into account  in comparisons  on  a  Community  level. II,  6 
v.  Working  Party  on  Combustible Dusts- Chairman  Mr.  CHERADAME 
The  detailed terms  of  reference  given by  the Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission 
to this Working Party are as  follows: 
To  carry out  a  study  of  precautions against  dust  combustion,  particularly: 
- dust  neutralisation  (dust  control in situ,  stone-dusting,  spraying,  dust 
fixation by  spreading salts and coagulating pastes,  etc.), 
- dust  barriers  (different types  of  dust barriers,  their construction,  siting, 
etc.), 
taking into account: 
a)  the mechanism of  dust  combustion and  of  flame  propagation 
b)  factors,  such as  these  listed below,  which  may  affect  ignition and  the pro-
pagation of  the dust  explosion:  -
nature of the coal and/or the volatile matter content 
fineness  of  the coal 
concentration of  dust 
methane  content 
cause  of  ignition 
effect  of moisture 
geometrical features  of  the  roadway. 
The  Working  Party may·  make  any  suggestions for research  work  considered neces-
sary to advance the knowledge  of  the  phenomena  studied and to promote safety 
in these fields. 
In its meeting  of  10.10.1968 the  Mines  Safety and Health Commission clarified 
and  extended certain items  ip the terms  of  reference,  as  follows: 
1.  The  Working  Party must  take account  of  the fact  that  methane  is frequently 
involved  in explosions.  In particular: 
a)  the  "aide-memoire"  to investigators shall be  extended to methane  explo-
sions and  reports thereon shall be distributed in the same  way  as  reports 
on accidents due to dust  explosions; 
b)  the study  of  the mechanism of  the initiation and  propagation of  the ex-
plosions and the factors affecting  them,  as set out  in the terms  of ref-
erence,  shall take into account  the  involvement  of  methane  in the  phenom-
enon; 
c)  with regard to dust  barriers,  to halt  dust  explosions,  mixed  dust/methane 
explosions  and  pure methane  explosions,  the Secretariat shall follow  up 
the results of tests in hand  and,  at the proper time,  assemble  for  the 
use  of  the Working Party the information required to work out  a  practical 
draft  recommendation. 
2.  The  study  of  the neutralisation of  dusts shall include: 
the comparative analysis of  the regulations and  instructions applied in the 
Community  countries and  in the United  Kingdom; 
the  v~rious methods  of application:  the nature of  the substance,  frequency 
of  spreading,  frequency  of  inspection,  and the detailed justification of  the 
sampling method  used. 
VI.  Working  Party  on Health  in Coal  Mines- Chairman  Mr.  VANDENHEUVEL 
Studying,  from  the standpoint  of  technical prevention and  industrial medicine, 
the prevention of  environmental risks to the health of workers  in coal mines. II,  7 
A.  Terms  of  reference 
1.  Where  necessary,  making  recommendations  on  means  of  dust  control,  and 
general measures to reduce dustiness in underground workings,  recognised 
as being to some  extent effective  (wet  drilling,  water  infusion,  spraying, 
special attachments to winning machines,  pulsed-infusion shotfiring, 
etc.); 
2.  Where  necessary,  making  recommendations  on the organisation of  specialis-
ed dust-control services. 
B.  Preliminary work to be undertaken by  the Secretariat 
The  assembling of  documentary  material and  comparison of  legislation in the 
various  Community  countries with reference to: 
1. General rules covering the prevention of  dust  in respect  of the design 
and use  of winning machines. 
Standards to be  observed to ensure minimum  dustiness arising from the 
use of these machines. 
2.  Dust  measurement  (methods,  frequency,  measuring points,  conclusions to 
be  drawn etc.)  and where  necessary establ1shing a  scale of  comparison 
of the various.methods  employed. 
3.  Establishment  of  dustiness thresholds.  Definition of categories of  per-
missible dustiness.  Steps to be  taken when  faced with various categories 
of dustiness. 
VII.  Working  Party  on Effects of Working  Time  on  Safety at Work,  especially in Dif-
ficult  or Unhealthy  Conditions  - Chairman  Mr.  VANDER  HOOFT 
Provisional terms  of  reference  (definitive text to be  submitted to the Restrict-
ed  Committee): 
Number  of hours worked  in wet  working points.  Determining  in what  cases  a  work-
ing point  is to be  considered wet  and the precautions to be taken. 
VIII.  Working  Party  on  Psychological  and  Sociological Factors affecting Safety-
Chairman  Mr.  SCHNASE 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Safety  campaigns. 
2.  A draft  recommendation  on the employment  of  foreign  and  young workers. COMPOSITION  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY 
AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION  AND  ITS  WORKING  PARTIES 
(AS  AT  31.12.1969) 
ANNEX  III III,  3 
A.- MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  Representatives 
Ministerialrat  w.  SCHNASE,  Referat  III A 1,  Bundesministerium fur  Wirtschaft, 
53  Bonn 
Ministerialdirigent Dr.-Ing.  K.  HELLER,  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und 
Verkehr  des  Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Employers'  Representative 
Dr.-Ing.  F.  BENTHAUS,  Bergassessor a.D.,  Steinkohlenbergbauverein,  43  Essen, 
Frillendorferstr.  351 
Workers'  Representative 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter.des Sachgebietes Arbeitsschutz,  IG-Bergbau  und  Energie, 
4630 Bochum,  Alte Hattingerstr.  19 
Technical  Advisers 
Ministerialrat  K.  PALM 1  Ministerium  fUr  Wirtschaft1  Mittelstand und  Verkehr 
des  Landes ·Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Oberbergamtsdirektor  K.  HVBNER,  Leiter der Unterabteilung Montanwirtschaft,  Ministe-
rium fur Wirtschaft,  Verkehr  und  Landwirtschaft,  66  SaarbrUcken,  Hardenbergstr.  8 
BELGIUM 
Government  Representatives 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur Generaal  van  het  Mijnwezen,  Ministerie van economische 
Zaken  en Energie,  24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles 4 
Employers'  Representative 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du  Centre de  coordination de  sauvetage du  bassin de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Kiewit-Hasselt 
Workers'  Representative 
J.  OLYSIAEGERS,  Secretaire national  de  la Centrale  syndicale  des travailleurs des 
mines  de  Belgique1  F.G.T.B.,  Koolmijnlaan 1,  Houthalen 
Technical  Advisers 
L.  BOULET,  Directeur general du  Fonds  national de retraite des  ouvriers mineurs, 
Ministere du travail et de  la prevoyance sociale,  6,  place Stephanie,  Bruxelles III,  4 
E.  VANDENDRIESSCHE,  Secretaire general  de  la Centrale des  francs-mineurs, 
26-32,  avenue  d 1Auderghem,  Bruxelles 4 
FRANCE 
Government  Representatives 
L.  KOCH,  ingenieur  en chef des rnines,  Direction des  mines,  Ministere de  l'industrie, 
97,  rue  de Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
D.  PETIT,  Ingenieur  des mines,  Direction des mines,  Arrondissement  de  Metz, 
1,  rue  Eugene  Schneider,  57-Metz 
Employers'  Representative 
A.  PROUST,  Directeur general des services techniques des  charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  Se 
Workers'  Representative 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale des syndicats chretiens des  mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  Paris 5e 
Technical  Advis~rs 
J.  POREBSKI,  247,  bd  de  la Victoire,  Annequin  (Pas-de-Calais) 
ITALY 
Government  Representatives 
Dott.  Consigliere B.  COLUCCI,  Direzione generale dell'emigrazione,  Ministero degli 
affari esteri,  Roma 
Dott.  Ing.  M.  MARRA,  Ispettore generale delle miniere,  Ministero dell'industria e 
commercia,  via Veneto 33,  Roma 
Employers'  Representative 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  Istituto Arte Mineraria della facolta d'Ingegneria,  Piazza d'Armi, 
Cagliari  (Sardegna) 
Workers'  Representative 
Dott.  G.  CRAVIOTTO,  Segretario generale della Federestrattive,  via  Isonzo 42,  Roma 
Technical  Advisers 
Dott.  c.  MICHELAZZI,  Ispettore generale del Ministero del  lavoro e  della previdenza 
sociale,  via Flavia 6,  Roma 
Dott.  R.  PURPURA,  Direttore generale al Ministero del  lavoro,  via Flavia 6,  Roma LUXEMBOURG 
Government  Representatives 
A.  SCHUSTER,  Ingenieur-directeur du travail et des  mines,  inspection du travail et 
des mines,  19,  av.  Gaston Diderich,  Luxembourg 
Employers'  Representative 
A.  RAUB,  Directeur a  l'A.R.B.E.D.,  Luxembourg 
Workers'  Representative 
N.  PASCOLINI,  President  de  la delegation ouvriere d'Arbed-Mines,  90,  rue des  Fleurs, 
Schiff  lange 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  Representatives 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS,  Inspecteur-generaal der  Mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen, 
Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Drs.  D.C.  VANDERHOOFT,  Hoofd  van  de Directie Mijnwezen,  Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken,  Bezuidenhoutseweg 30,  's-Gravenhage 
Employers'  Representative 
Ir. G.B.  DEBETS,  Directeur,  Oranje-Nassau  Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Workers'  Representative 
J.M.  WEIJERS,  Vice-Voorzitter van  de  Nederlandse  Katholieke  Mijnwerkersbond, 
Seringenstraat  9  te~,Passart-Zuid 
Technical  Adviser 
H.L.  GROND,  Chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst1  p/a Orange-Nassau  Mijnen1  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Government  Representative 
H.S.  STEPHENSON,  H.M.  Chief  Inspector of  Mines,  Ministry  of Power,  7  Millbank,  Thames 
House,  London  S.W.l 
Employers'  Representative 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLET,  Deputy  Director-General of  Production,  National Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London  S.W.l Workers'  Representative 
.s.  BULLOUGH,  Vice-President  of  the National  Union  of  Mineworkers,  c/o Miners' 
Offices,  Barnsley  I  Yorkshire 
INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  ORGANISATION,  GENEVA 
A representative .of  the  International Labour Office sitting as  an  observer. 
B.- RESTRICTED  COMMITTEE 
The  Restricted Committee  consists of  the Government  members  of  the Mines  Safety and 
Health Commission. 
C.- WORKING  PARTIES  ON  TECHNICAL  QUESTIONS 
I.  Working  Party on Electrification 
- Members  of  the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Oberbergrat  W.  SCH5TTELNDREIER~  Oberbergamt~  46  Dortmund~  Goebenstr.  25 
Dipl.  Ing.  L.  GEBHARDT~  Steinkohlenbergbauverein~  43  Essen 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN  (1),  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
Ro  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.J.A.  COOLS,  Divisiedirecteur van bet  Mijnwezen,  24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot, Bruxelles  4 
FRANCE 
N.  TRETIAKOW 1  Ingenieur  en chef  au  service exploitation des  charbonnages  de  France1 
9 1  avenue  Percier1  75-Paris Se. 
F.  VIN 1  Minist~re de  1 1industrie1  service de  1
1hygiene et  de  la securite  mini~re 1 
971  rue  de  Grenelle~  75-Paris 7e 
P.  FLINOIS1  Houill~res du  bassin  du  Nord  et  du  Pas-de-Calais1  service technique  du 
fond1  201  rue  des  Minimes1  Douai/Nord 
(1)  Chairman  of  the Working  Party as representative of  the RestrictedCommittee. III,  7 
Dott.  Ing.  c.  MACCIONI,  ENEL,  Compartimento Cagliari,  Sett.  tecnico,  Piazza Deffenu  21 
Cagliari 
LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  Ingenieur civil des mines  l  1 1ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  E.A.R.  HOEFNAGELS,  Inspecteur der  Mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollo-
laan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
P.H.  GIESBERTZ,  p/a Staatsmijn Emma/Hendrik te Hoensbroek,  Hoensbroek/Heerlen 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
M.B.J.  BURKLE,  H.M.  Principal Electrical  Inspector of  Mines  and  Quarries,  Thames 
House,  Millbank,  London  S.W.l 
- Experts  on  cables and  leads 
Dr.  J.  UELPENICH,  Land- und  Seekabelwerke,  Niehler  Strasse  100,  50  Koln-Nippes 
H.  GOBBE,  Directeur a  la division c4blerie des  A.C.E.C.,  Charleroi 
M.  OSTY,  Directeur  technique a  la societe industrielle de  liaisons electriques, 
64bis,  rue. de  Manceau,  Paris  Be 
M.  PAINDAVOINE,  lngenieur  au  CERCHAR,  Verneuil-en-Halatte  (Oise) 
Y.  EYRAUD,  Chef  du  laboratoire d
1etudes generales des ctbles de  Lyon,  170,  avenue 
Jean-Jaures,  Lyon  (Rh~ne) 
Ir.  F.  GOEDBLOED,  Nederlandse  Kabelfabriek,  Delft 
Ir.  W.L.  BAER,  N.V.  Hollandse  Draad- en  Kabelfabriek,  Amsterdam 
II.  Working  Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements  and  on  Fires and Underground  Combustion 
-Members of.the Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Ministerialdirigent Dr.-Ing.  K.  HELLER  (1),  Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand 
und Verkehr,  Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
Dipl.  Berging.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des  Steinkohledbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEW~,:.Technischer Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,Schonscheidtstr.  28 
A.  VAN  GEMBER,  Erster Bergrat  a.D.,  Direktor der Grubensicherheitsabteilung der 
Saarbergwerke  AG,  66  Saarbrllcken,  Trierer Strasse  1 
(1)  Chairman  of  the Working  Party as  representative of  the RestrictedCommittee III~  8 
Ministerialrat  K.  PALM,  Ministerium fur  Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und  Verkehr, 
Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  DUsseldorf,  Haroldstr.  4 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur general des mines,  Ministere des affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.  LOGELAiN,  Inspecteur general des  mines,  Ministere des  affaires economiques, 
24-26,  rue J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  Directeur  du  centre national beige  de  coordination des  centrales de 
sauvetage,  17,  rue  Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du  centre de  coordination de  sauvetage du  bassin de  Campine, 
Kempische  Steenweg  555,  Kiewitt-Hasselt 
FRANCE 
G.  CHAMPAGNAC,  Directeur  aux houilleres  du  bassin  de  Lorraine,  57-Merlebach 
R.  GRISARD,  lngenieur des mines,  charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue Percier,  75  -
Paris  8e 
G.  ROGEZ,  Directeur  du  poste central de  secours des  mines  du  Nord  et  du  Pas-de-
Calais,  rue  du  Bois,  Lens  (Pas-de-Calais) 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  poste central de  secours,  BELLE-ROCHE,  57-
Merle  bach 
H.  BONARDOT,  Ingenieur  en chef,  houilleres du  bassin de  la Loire,  9,  rue Benoit 
Charvet,  42-Saint-Etienne 
LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  Dipl.-ing.,  ingenieur civ.  des  mines  a  l'ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse, 
Esch-sur-Alzette 
ITALY 
Prof.  Ing.  P.  PIGA,  Titolare della  cattedra· di Arte  Mineraria della facolta di 
Ingegneria di  Roma,  via Eusossiana,  Roma 
Dott.  Ing.  c.  MACCIONI,  ENEL,  Compartimento Cagliari,  Sett.  tecnico~ Piazza 
Deffenu  2~  Cagliari 
Dott.  lng.  G.  FORTE,  Distretto minerario,  via c.  Battisti 10,  Trieste 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  D.J.  KNUTTEL,  Hoofdinspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen,  Apollo-
laan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Prof.  Dr.  W.  MAAS,  Chef  van  de Veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus  65,  Heerlen  (L.) 
H.L.  GROND,  Chef  van  de  Veiligheidsdienst,  p/a Oranje-Nassau Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) III,  9 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLETT,  Deputy  Director-General of  Production,  National Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London  S.W.  1 
lo  Experts  on  Aspects  of Fires in Deep  Shafts 
GERMANY 
Dipl.  Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungsleiter,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH,  46  Dort-
mund,  Tremoniastr.  13 
Dipl.  Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer  Leiter der Hauptstelle  fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
des Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.-Ing.  K.  RENNER,  Forschungsstelle der Grubenbewetterung des  Steinkohlenbergbau-
vereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Frillendorferstr.  351 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  w.  SCHMIDT,  Westfalische Berggewerkschaftskasse,  Prllfstelle fUr  Gruben-
bewetterung,  4630 Bochum,  Herner Strasse 43 
BELGIUM 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  Directeur  du  centre national belge de  coordination des  centrales de 
sauvetage,  17,  rue  Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur du centre de  coordination de  sauvetage du bassin de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Hasselt 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a  l'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue J.A. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I.  This  report  is concerned with  progress  in the organisation of  rescue arrangements 
in the  Member  Countries and  in the United  Kingdom  for  1967  and  1968.  As  in pre-
vious  years,  developments  in this field have  been closely  linked with the general 
situation in the coal mining  industry.  This is however  not  so clearly reflected 
in the overall numbers  of  rescue stations in existence and  of  rescue  personnel 
employed. 
At  31.12.68,  the number  of  rescue stations had  dropped  from  204  in  1966  to 
203  and  the number  of  rescue workers  employed  had fallen  from  11,580 in 1966  to 
11,198.  The  fact  must  however  be  borne  in mind  that,  for France,  the report  in-
cludes  for the first time  22  rescue stations and  774  rescue workers  in the  Cen-
tre-Midi coal-field,whilst  up to and  including the Sixth Report  only the two 
main coal-fields,  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  and  Lorraine,  had  been reflected in the 
figures. 
Taking these changes  in the data into account,  the number  of  rescue workers 
per thousand underground workers  in the  Community  and  in the United  Kingdom  rose 
from  16.6  in 1966  to 20.5  in  1968,  which  represents an  appreciable  increase of 
23  %. 
II.l.  In the course of their periodic exchanges  of visits,  rescue station supervisors 
have,  during the period under  review,  visited the rescue stations at  Lens 
(Nord/Pas-de-Calais),  Friedrichsthal  (Saar)  and  Merlebach  (Lorraine). 
·  They  have thus been able to gain  information at first hand  on current  pro-
gress in the organisation of  rescue arrangements  in these areas and to extend 
their knowledge  on  special procedures  employed to prevent  and fight  fires. 
The  following  practical problems,  among  others,  were studied: 
- Procedures for reaching trapped men 
- Rapid  means  of  checking  on the danger  of  explosion in gas mixtures  by  means 
of  a  new  type of  explosimeter 
- Telemetering of  hot  spots in galleries in which there is a  danger  of fire 
- Reopening  a  section,  examined with reference to a  practical instance 
- Employment  of  the hydromechanical  process devised for the erection of  plaster 
stoppings  and the advantages  of  this process. IV,  6 
2.  The  terms  of  reference of  the experts  on  rescue matters mentioned  in the In-
troduction to the Fifth Report  on the organisation of  rescue arrangements 
have since been  extended as  follows: 
- Comparative survey  of  regulations and directives concerning rescue arrange-
ments  and  medical  drawn  up  by  the mining authorities in the Member  Countries 
and  the  United  Kingdom  and  analysis of  experience gathered  in these fields 
Study  of the standards to which  fireproof clothing must  conform in the vari-
ous  Member  Countries  and  requirements  of  a  general nature. 
The  annual  reports  of  the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  give detailed 
information on the progress  of  this work  (1). 
(1)  The  latest  (Sixth)  Report  was  published  in June  1969  and  - like the Reports  on 
the organisation of  rescue arrangements  - can be  obtained free  of  charge  from 
the Secretariat  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  Commission  of  the European 
Communities,  29  rue Aldringer,  Luxembourg. A.  1)  ORGANISATION  OF  KINE  RESCUE  SERVICES 
Position as  at:  31.12.1968  Rescue  Stations  and  Rescue  Workers 
Country  German  Federal  Republic  France 
/  Nord/Pas- Centre- Coal-field  Ruhr  Aachen  Saar  de-Calais  Lorraine  Midi 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
a)  Central  Rescue  Essen-Kray  H8ngen- Fried- Lens  MGrlebach  (*) 
Station  Mariadorf  richsthal 
(responsibilities)  1,2,4,5,6  1,2,4  1,2,3,4,6  1,2,4,6  1,2,3,4,6 
b)  Number  of  rescue  69  stations  6  10  43  9  22 
c)  Number  of rescue  3  961  men  311  632.  601  579  714 
d)  Total  underground  127  470  12 123  18  556  52  603  17  792  18 173  personnel  employed 
e)  Rescue  men  per 1000  31,0  25,7  34,1  11,4  32,5  42,6  underground workers 
( +)  Centre-Midi 
(**)  Netherlands 
1  there is no central rescue  station in  the  Centre-Midi. 
1  there  is no  central rescue  station in  the  Limburg coal-fields. 
Belgium  Italy  Netherlands 
United  Total 
Charleroi  Kingdom 
Borinage  Namur  Liege  Cam pine  Sulcis  Limburg 
(8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
Frdmeries  Ntarcinelle  Glain  Hassel  t  Miniera  (**)  (***) 
Seruci 
1,2,4,5,6  1,2,3,4  1,2,3,4  1,2,4,6  1,2,4 
1  1  1  6  1  8  A  = 13  203  B = 13 
67  184  155  291  }6  357  3  250  11  198 
2  609  10  551  5  518  18  423  830  12  757  250  000  547  405 
25,7  17,4  28,1  15,7  43,4  28,0  13,0  20,5 
(***)  United  Kingdom  :  Each  rescue  station usually serves mines within a  15-mile  radius.  They  are  subdivided into  "Plan  A"  Stations  and  "Plan  B"  Stations. 
Resoonsibilities 
Reference  number  1  a  Organisation of  rescue  services 
2  Supervision  of rescue  men  and  rescue  stations 
3  c  Permanent  rescue  brigade 
4  "'  Training 
5  =  Co-ordination  of  safety equipment 
6  c  Research  on  rescue  work 
"Plan  A"  Stations  1  those  having  (in addition  to  a  manager,  an assistant manager  and 
a  team  of  instructors)  their own  permanent  rescue  brigade,  whose 
members  live  on  the station or nearby.  They  are  assisted by  a 
number  of  part-time  rescue  men  in  the  mines  served  by  the  station. 
"Plan  B"  Stations  those  having  a  m~ager, an assistant manager  and  a  team  of instruc-
tors,  but  which  do  not  have  their own  rescue  brigade  living on  the 
station or  nearby.  These  stations use  part-time  rescue  personnel 
employed  in  the  mines  served  by  the  station,  who  are  organised in 
brigades. Position as at:  31.12.1968 
Country  German  Federal Republic 
Coal-field  Ruhr  Aachen  Saar 
(1)  (2)  0)  (4) 
~pe of apparatus 
a)  Dr!ger  BG  160 A  625  10  183 
b)  Drager  BG  170/400  660  22  -
c)  Drlger  BG  172  754  19  29 
d)  Drager 174  99  27  }6 
•)  Drlger  KG  210  - - -
f)  AUER  MR  ll/32  - 2  -
g)  AUER  MR  54/400  }6  1  -
h)  AUER  MR  56/400  56  1  -
i)  FENZY  56  - - -
j) Pire1li 45  - - -
k) Pirelli 205  - - -
l)  BB.U:  Aerecheon  - - -
m)  BBJI  Aerophor  - - -
n)  Proto  - - -
o)  Sa  vox  - - -
p)  Normal air  - - -
q)  Aeror1ox  - - -
r) 
Total  22}0  142  248 
Par group of 100 
rescue men  56,1  45,7  39,2 
A.  2)  ORGANISATION  OF  MINE  RESCUE  SERVICES 
Catalogue  of equipment  including closed-circuit breathing apparatus 
operating for a  period of at least two  hours 
France  :Belgium 
Nord/Pas- Centre- Charleroi/ 
de-Calais  Lorraine  Jlidi  Borinage  Namur  Liege 
(5)  (6)  (1)  (e)  (9)  (10) 
- 100  - 24  14  24 
- - - - 6  6 
- 31  - 20  }0  20 
- 81  - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
400  - 308  - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - 2  - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
400  226  'OS  46  50  50 
66,5  39,0  39,8  68,6  27,2  32,2 
Italy  Netherlands 
United  Total  Kingdom 
Cam pine  Sulcis  Limburg 
(11}  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
84  34  55  - 1  221 
40  9  - - 743 
14  - 48  - 971 
2  - - - 245 
- 13  - - 13 
- - 10  - 12 
- - 68  - 105 
00 
- - - - 57 
5  - - - 713 
- - - - -
2  - - - 2 
2  - - - 4 
- - - 200  200 
2  - - 800  802 
- - - 150  150 
2  - - - 2 
2  - - - 2 
155  56  181  1  150  5  242 
53,1  155,0  51,0  }5,4  4b,8 Years:  1967  und  196e 
Cause  Firedamp  or dust 
Coal-field  a)+  b)++  c)+++ 
( 1)  (2)  0)  (4) 
1.  Ruhr  l  - 13 
2.  Aachen  - - -
3·  Saar  - - -
4·  Gl!!RMANY  1  - 13 
5·  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  - - -
6.  Lorraine  - - -
1·  Centre-Midi  1  - .39 
e.  FRANCE  1  - .39 
9·  Borinage  - - -
10.  Char1eroi-Namur  - - -
11. Liege  - - -
12.  Cam pine  - - -
13.  BELGIUM  - - -
14.  ITALY  (Sulcis)  - - -
15.  NETHERLANDS  (Limburg)  - - -
16.  UNITED  KINGDOM  - 1  100 
17.  CO:MMUNI'I'Y  +  2  1  152  UNrrED  KINGDOM 
•  Rescue  of personnel. 
•  Rescue  of materials. 
B.  NUMBER  OF  RESCUE  OPERATIONS  PERFORMED  BY  MEN  WEARING 
CLOSED-CIRCUIT  BREATHING  APPARATUS 
Outburst of  Pit fires  Underground  Opening-up of 
natural gas  combustion  stop  pings 
a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++ 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (e)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
- }  224  - 4  432  - 17  4  201  - 14  2  919 
- - - - 1  31  - - - - - -
- 8  57  - 2  10  - 3  26  - 3  212 
- 11  2el  - 1  47}  - 20  4  227  - 17  3  131 
- - - 1  1  20  - 1  10  - - -
- 1  6  - 2  .3.32  - - - - - -
1  1  36  - - - - 10  894  - - -
1  2  42  1  3  352  - 11  904  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
1  - 4  - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - 3  297  - - -
- - - - 1  4  - - .,.  - - -
1  - 4  - 1  4  - 3  297  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - 3  21  - - - - - -
- - - - 3  1  220  - 12  700  - 2  150 
2  13  327  1  17  2  070  - 46  6  128  - 19  3  2e1 
a)+ 
b)++ 
c)+++  •  Number  of air-purifying cartridges used in these operations. 
Miscellaneous 
causes  Total 
a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++ 
(17)  (1e)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22) 
- 2e  545  1  66  e  334 
- 3  19  - 4  50 
- - - - 16  305 
- .31  564  1  e6  8  689 
- - - 1  2  30 
1  1  10  1  4  348 
- 1  5  2  12  974 
1  2  15  4  18  1  352 
- - - - - -
- 1  3  1  1  7 
- 1  16  - 10  313 
- - - - 1  4 
- 8  19  1  12  324 
- - - - - -
- - - - 3  21. 
3  5  94  3  23  2  264 
4  46  692  9  142  12  650 IV,  10 
C.  ACCIDENTS  TO  RESCUE  MEN  DUE  TO  THE  WEARING  OF  GAS-MASKS 
1967  and 1968 
Serious  accidents  During practice 
C 0 A L  - F  I  E L D 
not fatal  fatal  not fatal  fatal 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1. Ruhr  - - - -
2.  Aachen  - - - -
3.  Saar  - - - -
4·  GERMANY  - - - -
5·  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  - - - -
6.  Lorraine  - - - -
1·  Centre-Midi  - - - -
a.  FRANCE  - - - -
9·  Borinage  - - - -
10.  Charleroi-Namur  - - - -
11.  Liege  - - - -
12.  Cam pine  - - 1  -
13.  BELGIUM  - - 1  -
14.  ITALY  (Sulcis)  - - - -
15.  NETHERLANDS  (Limburg)  - - 1  -
16.  UNITED  KINGDOM  - - - -
17.  COMMUNITY  + 
2  UNITED  KINGDOM  - - -IV,  11 
D.  COMMENTS,  ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION  AND  IMPORTANT  CHANGES 
IN  RELATION  TO  1965/66 
I.  FEDERA~ REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
1.  Essen-Kray  Main  Rescue  Station 
a)  Re  A.l)  Rescue  stations and  rescue workers 
The  number  of  rescue stations associated with the Essen Main  Station re-
duced  to 69  as the result  of  new  rationalisation measures applied in the 
Ruhr  collieries.  The  number  of  rescue workers  has  for  the first time 
fallen below 4,000,  i.e. 3,981 representing 3.1% of  underground  personnel. 
b)  Re  A.2)  Closed-circuit breathing apparatus 
The  number  of  closed-circuit  devices  was  reduced to 2,230.  Most  of these 
are  now  of  the type with  a  reserve  oxygen capacity of  400 litres. The 
percentage  of  the total now  accounted for  by  closed-circuit breathing 
apparatus is 72  %. 
c)  Re  B)  Number  of  operations 
During the  period under  review,  there was  a  drop  in the number  of  opera-
tions  involving rescue teams. 
In  1968 there was  a  serious firedamp  explosion which  cost  the  lives of 
17  miners.  Among  them were  4  members  of  rescue teams,  who,  however,  were 
not  present  as  rescue workers. 
The  percentage  of  operations concerning mine  fires and  explosions is in 
sharp decline.  More  than 60% of  operations  concerned the  inspection and 
reopening  of  fire areas  and  operations  in foul air. 
Operations to reopen fire areas sometimes required extensive preparatory 
measures  and,  in many  cases,  extended  over  a  fairly  long  period.  All these 
operations have  been  commented  on at  length  in the annual  reports of  the 
Main  Station at  Essen,  which  have  been sent  to the members  of the working 
party for their information. 
d)  Results  of  research and  development  work 
Breathing apparatus 
During the  period under  review,  tests have  been carried out  on accessories 
for  breathing apparatus.  It is worthwhile mentioning  in particular the 
tests carried out  on an air coolant  for closed-circuit  oxygen apparatus 
and  on  a  new  alkali coolant,  Drager  9  x  18 -28,  from which  improved yield 
is obtainable thanks to the use  of  a  larger  number  of filters. 
The  research programme  undertaken by  the Commission  of  the  European  Com-
munities to improve breathing apparatus is practically complete.  The re-
sults are being analysed  in conjunction with the  Main  Station at Hasselt 
(Belgium)  and the University  of  Liege. 
CO-filter self-rescuers 
The  Essen  Main  Station has  completed the approval tests on the Drager 
filter self-rescuer,  model  810.  The  apparatus has already received offi-
cial approval  for use  in German  mines  by  the German  Mine  Rescue  Commission, 
and  its application has  been authorised by all the Oberbergamter. IV,  12 
In  1967  and  1968,  the filter self-rescuers were  used as escape devices 
in  11  instances  (mine fires and  explosions)  by  a  total of  210 miners. 
Firefighting and fire prevention 
The  section of  the Essen  Main  Station concerned with  prevention of  fire 
has assisted in the drafting of "Directives for the closure of  mine  work-
ings  and  closure by  damming  of  abandoned workings". 
For the first  time  powder  extinguishers have  been constructed underground 
to protect against'fire hydraulic installations which still operate with 
mineral oil. The  design of  these devices has  been approved  by  the  Main 
Centre. 
Attempts  have  been  made  in conjunction with a  number  of  mining  companies 
to utilise the ash from electrostatic dust  separators as a  compression 
material for the dams.  This material proved,  on  the whole,  to be  suitable 
for this purpose. 
Moreover,  during the last quarter of  1968,  the first tests on  the "Blitz-
dammer"  packing material were  carried out.  It will not  be  possible to say 
whether this material is suitable for  the purpose until the tests have 
been  concluded. 
Moreover,  in neighbouring workings,  the material "Anhydrit"  has  been  used 
in dams  to seal off  mine  workings  and  for  dams  in roadhead areas. 
2.  Friedrichsthal Main  Rescue  Station  (Saar) 
a)  Wider  responsibility 
At  the end  of  1967,  the area of  responsibility of  the Main  Station was 
extended to protection against  explosions  and  to underground  dust  control. 
b)  Regulations,  plans  and  instructions 
During the period under  review,  the following regulations,  plans and  in-
structions concerning rescue  and  protection against  fire and  explosion 
were  modified  or redrafted. 
- Principles for the organisation of  rescue services in coal-mines  of 
9.5.67 
- Measures to prevent  the spread of  coal dust  explosions  in underground 
coal-mines  of  8.12,67 
- Measures to prevent  flooding  or escapes  of  poisonous  gas  of  12.12.67 
-General rescue plan,  position at  15.7.67 
- Directives of  the Oberbergamt  of  the Saar and Rhineland-Palatinate 
concerning the use of  flame  cutting torches;  welding  equipment, 
welding torches  and  corrective devices  in coal-mines,  of  20.7.68 
-Directives of  the·Oberbergamt  of the Saar and  Rhineland-Palatinate 
for the use  of  devices  for  the measurement  and detection of  CO  in 
coal-mines,  of 20.7.68 
- Plan for the training of  specialised overmen  in protection against  ex-
plosion 
- General  plan,  position at  1.9.68 
- Instructions for  overmen specialising in protection  against  explosions, 
of 30.5.68 IV,  13 
-Instructions for personnel  in ·charge  of  stone-dusting,  application of 
anti-dust  products  and  construction and  maintenance  of  dams  against  ex-
plosions,  of  16.7.68 
c)  Improvement  of  alarm systems 
During the period under  review,  all rescue  and  gas  control teams  of  Saar-
bergwerke  AG  were  equipped with a  UHF  radio alarm system.  The  rescue  teams 
are grouped  into  15  alarm sectors.  A total of  560 UHF  alarm receivers 
without  intercom and  40 with  intercom were  installed in the homes  of  mem-
bers of  rescue teams.  The  alarm is broadcast  from  a  central UHF  transmit-
ter located  in a  high  position at  the Main  Rescue  Station. 
d)  Results of  research and  development  work 
CO  measurement  and detection devices 
The  large-scale test  on underground  CO  measurement  and  detection devices 
was  successful. 
Hydro-mechanical  process for the erection of  plaster dams 
The  hydro-mechanical process for the erection of  plaster dams  was  develop-
ed  for  possible industrial use.  At  the end  of  1967  and at  the beginning 
of  1968,  tests were  effected in conjunction with the Versuchsgrubenge-
sellschaft mbH,  Dortmund;  two plaster dams  1.50 m in thickness withstood 
several violent  explosions.  As  a  result,  the Oberbergamt  of  the Saar  and 
Rhineland-Palatinate approved  for  protection against explosions dams  erect-
ed  in Saaralit plaster having  a  minimum  thickness  of  1.50 m manufactured 
by  the hydro-mechanical  process for galleries up to 16  sq.  m in section. 
Since then,  the hydro-mechanical  process has  given very  good  results both 
for  dams  erected against fire  and  for  dams  used for the routine sealing 
·off  of  mine  workings  (temporary  dams). 
II.  BELGIUM 
Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen,  Hasselt 
a)  Re  C)  Accidents suffered by  rescuers  due  to the wearing of  gas  protection 
.apparatus 
pne  rescue worker  got  into breathing difficulties during. an exercise with  a 
"Drager  BG  170/400"  breathing device. 
It emerged,  during  individual  inspection before the exercise,  that,  when  the 
rescue worker  emptied the breathing bag  each time he  breathed in,  the left-
hand wall  of  the bag,  instead of aligning itself normally,  was  drawn  in be-
neath the plate on  which the control  lever for  extra air on  demand  was  locat-
ed. 
The  fold  created produced an  additional thickness which  prevented the demand 
control  lever  from being depressed sufficiently. The  automatic  feed  mechanism 
did not  function at all or at  least  only when  very  powerful suction was  set 
up  in the breathing bag. 
As  a  result  of this incident,  various measures were  taken: 
1.  During the  individual inspection before the exercise,  both the apparatus 
and the  wearer~s lungs must  be rinsed with oxygen.  For this,  when  the 
oxygen  cylinder is open,  the wearer will breathe in from the apparatus 
and  breathe out  to the atmosphere  through the nose.  At  this point  the 
operation of  the automatic admission should be  clearly heard.  After that 
the breathing bag is filled by  pressing the additional feed button so 
that the bladder is fully distended. IV,  14 
2.  The  personnel responsible for the maintenance  of the apparatus  must  ensure 
that  the breathing bags  placed in the devices  and those kept  in reserve 
are properly distended,  so that  no creases are formed  in them. 
b)  Results  of  research and  development  work 
Breathing apparatus 
The  joint work  on  improving the physiological conditions for the wearing of 
breathing apparatus has  been  concluded. 
Underground  use  of  polyurethane foam 
The  programme  of tests on  flame  spread over the surface of  a  pulverised 
urethane coating on the walls of  a  gallery with  a  view to the use  of this 
material underground  use has also been brought  to a  conclusion.  The  Coordina-
tiecentrum Reddingswezen  has  drawn  up  a  detailed report  which it has  supple-
mented  by  incorporating in it the results of tests carried out  by other bodies. 
III.  FRANCE 
a)  General 
During the period under  review the seven  Centre-Midi collieries  (1)  were 
concentrated into a  single complex,  and  the present report  contains for the 
first  time  information concerning rescue work  in the Centre-Midi  mines. 
b)  Re  B)  Number  of operations 
With  regard to the Lorraine coal-field,  operations for the salvage of mate-
rial during fire outbreaks  included that  at  the Folschwiller colliery from 
2nd to lOth April  1967,  which  involved the erection of three plaster dams 
and  required 327 air purifying cartridges. 
The  two  operations arising from  "other causes"  both took  place above  ground, 
one at St.  Charles  on  9.9.68,  for  a  case of  poisoning in a  quarry gallery, 
the other on  15.3.68,  for  an electrical fire outbreak. 
With  regard to the  Centre-Midi  coal-field,  the operations to be  noted are 
the  one  following the accident  at the Charles pit  on 3rd  May  1968,  for which 
a  special report  has  been submitted to the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commis-
sion,  and  one  in the Dauphine  to rescue the victim of  a  sudden outburst  of 
firedamp. 
Finally,  nine  of  the ten operations for mine fires  took place at  the  Houil~ 
leres d'Aquitaine and  ~equired the use of  882  air purifying cartridges. 
VI.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
a)  General 
Since 1st April  1967,  the National  Coal  Board has  organised rescue services 
on  a  national basis.  The  26  rescue stations and their staff are under  the 
control and direction ·of  the National Rescue  Service,  responsibility for 
which  has  been entrusted to the Assistant General  Manager  for Production 
(special functions). 
The  country is subdivided into 7  areas,  each one under the control of  an 
Area  Manager  for Rescue Stations.  Those  in charge of  the stations in each 
area report  to the Area  Manager. 
(1)  Loire,  cevennes,  Blanzy,  Aqui~aine,  Provence,  Auvergne  and  Dauphine. IV,  15 
In order to provide close  links between the National Rescue  Service and  the 
collieries,  7  Area  Rescue  Committees  have been set up.  They  include the As-
sistant Area  Manager,  the  Production Managers  and the Colliery  Managers, 
under the chairmanship of  the Assistant General  Manager  for  Production. 
'b)  Results of  research and  development  work 
Heat  exchanger self-rescuers 
In  1968,  the National  Coal Board decided to place an  order  for  a  suitable 
number  of self-rescuers  (with heat  exchanger)  so that  every  man  working under-
ground would have his own  self-rescuer.  It is expected that  every miner will 
be so equipped by  March  1970.  When  a  colliery is equipped with  self-~escuers, 
it is forbidden for anyone to go  underground without  his apparatus. 
"Aerolox  Liquid Oxygen"  apparatus 
Towards  the end  of  1968,  the "Aerolox  Liquid Oxygen"  device passed the offi-
cial approval tests of the Ministry of  Power.  The National  Coal  Board ordered 
550 devices and these will be delivered during the second half of  1969  and 
beginning of  1970. 
Use  of  polyurethane foam  underground 
In  1968,  the National  Coal Board  prohibited the use  of  polyurethane foam 
underground  and  instituted stringent  control over the coating materials used 
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1.  Explanation of  the terms  of  reference 
The  Mines  Safety  Commission  approved  on  the 8th April  1960 and  on  the 
27th/28th April  1964 the two  Recommendations  set  out  below  : 
a)  "Protection of  underground electrical networks against  the risk of electrocu-
tion'i  (1); 
b)  "Protection of  underground electrical networks  against  fire and  firedamp-explo-
sion risks"  (2). 
In order to arrive at  a  more  precise formulation  of certain conclusions 
from these two  Recommendations  the Safety  Commission  empowered  the Working  Party 
on "Electrification" to investigate the practical measures  adopted to ensure safety 
of the systems  and to prevent  accidents  by  electrocution,  fire risk or firedamp-
explosion risk  (see Third Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  page 38,  point 2). 
In the  framework  of this investigation the first task imposed  upon  the 
Working  Group  was  defined as  follows:  "To determine the present state in the vari-
ous  Community  countries  of  the existing devices  for  ensuring the safety of under-
ground  networks  carrying  low- or medium-tension current  (up to 1  100 V)  and  of  the 
cables supplying mobile  machines,  taking into account  the characteristics of  such 
cables"  (Mines  Safety  Commission  in its session of  24th April  1967). 
The  Working  Party herewith  presents  a  report  covering that  part  of the task 
which  appears to involve the greatest risk to safety,  namely the supply cables to 
machines  which  are moved  - in the face  or  during  roadway  drivage - while still be-
ing supplied with current  and  which  have  for the most  part  a  high  current  carrying 
capacity.  The  protective measures to be taken are seen to be  particularly important 
because· of  the hazards that  can arise. 
2.  Characteristics and electrical protection of  cables supplying mobile  machines 
(coal-cutters,  loading machines  etc.)  used  underground  in coal-mines  in the various 
Community  countries. 
Initially the Working  Party drafted a  classification of  the movable  machines 
used  in coal-mines  (portable,  mobile,  machines  which  can  be advanced  or flitted, 
and  semi-stationary machines,  see Annex  I). 
The  present  report refers to the machines  entered in this classification as 
mobile  (machine  group  II),  which the Working  Party considered of  priority  impor-
tance in their work. 
On  .the basis of  the  information tabled by the different delegations the 
various  documents  annexed  and discussed here were  prepared.  In doing this,  the 
attempt  was  made  to give precise definitions  of  certain concepts which differ from 
one  country to another.  These  documents  are 
a)  a  classification of  the cables supplying mobile machines,  and  including  a  de-
tailed description of  these cables  (see Annex  II). 
This classification also includes the cables which are to be  introduced 
into service in the  near future.  Certain older types  of  cable,  which  are still 
used while stocks  last,  were  not  included. 
This classification is not  intended to affect the normal  use  of  the cables, 
nor  the regulations  in force  in the  individual countries. 
(1)  See  Second  Report  of the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  P.  11. 
(2}  See Third Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  p.  379. v,  6 
b)  an  explanation of  the concept  "screening of electrical cables",  which  lists 
the various types  of  screen and  defines their functions  (see  Annex  III). 
c)  a  description of  the main  electrical devices used to protect  cables supplying 
mobile  machines  (see Annex  IV).  In this description the devices are classified 
on  the basis of the principle on  which  they  operate,  which  is illustrated by 
circuit diagrams. 
d)  a  table of the most  important  electrical protective devices for  cables supply-
ing mobile  machines  (see  Annex  V). 
This  table indicates the protective devices  used  in the  individual coun-
tries for the various types  of  cable.  It also shows  how  protection against  the 
different  types  of  fault  which  have  been recorded is provided.  The  component 
or  components  of  the protective device appropriate to each type of  fault  is 
indicated.  The table also shows  to what  extent  the protection which  can be  given 
depends  on  the type of  cable  in use.  It can  be  seen that,  in certain cases, 
several protective components  can  come  into action for the  same  type  of fault. 
The  investigation shows  the  present  state of  the most  important  protective 
devices  used  in the  Community  countries.  These protective devices  make  it possible 
to ensure electrical protection of  the  supply  networks  feeding  mobile  machines 
according to the types  of  cable  in use. 
This  study  makes. it possible to.conclude that  appropriate choice of the 
type  of  cable and  of the associated protective equipment  makes  it possible to 
provide protection against  the majority  of  types  of  fault  which  can  occur with 
these cables. A.  Machin~ 
group 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v,  7 
Annex  I 
Classification of  Movable  Machines 
B.  Category 
portable 
mobile 
machines  which 
can be  advanced 
or flitted 
semi-stationary 
C.  Definition  D.  Examples 
held or guided by  hand drills 
hand during ope-
ration 
moved  during oper-
ation  (while ca-
bles are live) 
(with 
(inte-
(gral 
(winch 
coal-cutters(with 
(sepa-
(rate 
(winch 
continuous  miners 
shuttle cars 
loading machines 
drilling jumbos 
heading  machines 
E.  Essential fea-
tures demanded 
of  supply 
cables 
flexibility and 
light weight 
flexibility and 
robustness 
advanced at  irre- afc driveheads  mechanical 
gular intervals  monorail-suspend- strength is of 
during operation  ed transformers  the first  impor-
(while cables are and  gate-end boxes  tance 
still live)  (relays etc.) 
advanced with 
current  switched 
off,  but  cable 
connected 
roadway trans-
formers,  gate-
end  boxes 
(relays etc.) 
mechanical 
strength is of 
the first  impor-
tance v  1  9 
Annex  II 
Classification of  the  Ca~les for  Mobile  Machines V,  11 
Explanation of the symbols  used  (1) 
Capital letters  : 
A  cables with a  single collective screen  (A.2  and  A.3)  or a  mass  conductor which 
serves at  the same  time as  a  single collective screen  (A.l). 
B  cables with  individual metallic screens for  each core  (B.2  and  B.3)  or a  di-
vided mass  conductor serving at  the same  time  as  individual screens  (B.l). 
C  cables with the  combined characteristics of  groups  A and  B. 
D  cables with  individual semi-conducting screens in which  good  longitudinal 
conductivity is guaranteed(D.l,  D.2  and D.3). 
Indices  : 
1  cables with  a  mass  conductor serving at the  same  time as  a  collective screen 
or as  individual core screens  (A.l,  B.l,  C.l and D.l). 
2  cables with a  single mass  conductor set asymmetrically with respect to the 
phase  cores  (A.2,  B.2  and  D.2). 
3  cables with  a  mass  conductor divided into three cores set  symmetrically with 
respect to the  phase  cores  (A.3,  B.3  and D.3). 
Description of the cables 
A.l  cable with 3  phase  cores  and  1  concentric mass  conductor which  serves at the 
same  time  as collective screen. 
A.2  cable with  4  cores,  one  serving as  a  mass  conductor,  with  a  collective screen. 
A.3  cable with 3  phase cores,  a  mass  conductor  divided into 3  cores set symmetri-
cally,  and  a  collective screen. 
B.l  cable with 3  phase cores,  with  a  mass  conductor divided into 3  parts serving 
at the same  time as  individual core screens. 
B.2  cable with 4  cores,  one  serving as  mass  conductor,  and with  individual core 
screens. 
B.3 
C.la 
C.lb 
D.l 
cable with 3  phase  cores,  a  mass  conductor divided  into 3  cores set  symmetri-
cally,  individual core screens. 
cable with 3  phase cores,  a  concentric mass  conductor serving at the same  time 
as  a  collective screen and  individual screens. 
cable with 3  phase  cores,  a  mass  conductor divided  into 3  parts serving at the 
same  time  as  individual core screens,  and  a  collective screen  (2). 
cable with 3  phase  cores,  a  concentric mass  conductor serving at the same  time 
as  a  collective screen,  and  individual  core screens of  semi-conducting material. 
(1)  See note at the end  of  page V,  12  and  the  illustrations of cable types  on page V,  13. 
(2)  In the Netherlands,  to ensure better continuity of  the masses,  use is made  of the 
4th core which  is electrically connected over its whole  length with the 3  indi-
vidual mass  screens.  In cable C.lb,  it is central. v,  12 
0.2  cable with  4  cores  one  of  which  serves as  a  mass  conductor,  with  individual 
screens of  semi-conducting material. 
D.3  cable with 3  cores,  a  mass  conductor divided into 3  parts set  symmetrically, 
with  individual core screens of  semi-conducting material. 
N  0  T  E 
All the cables may  have  a  certain number  of  cores or pairs of auxiliary 
cores  which  are  insulated and·  can  be  used as  pilot  cores  or monitoring cores. 
The  collective screen or the mass  conductor which also serves as  a  collec-
tive screen may  in some  cases also act  as  armouring. 
The  various possible ways  of  using these screens are set  out  clearly in 
Annex  III. 
In Great  Britain the mass  conductor is usually referred to as the earthing 
conductor. v,  13 
Cables for mobile machines 
Types In  service or to be Introduces (1) 
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Legends 
0  Phase core 
~  Mass  conductor 
Annex II 
--- - Mass conductor serving as  collective or Individual screen (1) 
- - - - - Concentric or Individual metallic screen (I) 
-----···--· Semi-conducting screen (1) 
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(1)  This diagram does not take Into account the possible use of auxiliary conductors (polarised conductors and 
pllote conductors) 
(I) See Annex Ill VJ  15 
Annex  III 
Explanatory  notes  on the concept  of  "screening of electrical cables" 
The  "screen"  on  a  cable is understood to mean  a  conducting envelope sur-
rounding  one or several insulated main  conductors. 
The  screens are made  either of  metal or of  semi-conducting elastomer or 
plastomer material,  in which  one or several copper  conductors are embedded to ensure 
good  longitudinal conductivity. 
The  screen is collective when  it is set concentrically around all the con-
ducting cores. 
The  screen is individual when  it is set separately round  an  individual con-
ducting core. 
The  main function of  a  screen is to allow for the detection of  an  insula-
tion fault  on  main  conductors,  this detection being based  on the production on the 
screen of  a  fault  current to earth.  For this reason the screen is generally electri-
cally connected to the mass,  which  is in turn earthed. 
In certain cases,  the screen is not  directly connected to the mass  but  is 
polarised.  In this instance,  it still serves the same  main  purpose but  also makes  it 
possible to have constant  electrical monitoring of  the cable  in respect of  damage 
caused by the penetration of  any  conducting object  which  may  be  connected to the 
mass  or to earth. 
When  a  collective screen has  a  sufficient degree  of conductivity,  it can 
also serve as  a  mass  conductor.  The  same  is true of  the individual screens,  when  the 
totality of  these screens has sufficient copductivity.  In Germany  the terms screen 
("Schirm")  is then replaced by  two different  terms,  respectively "concentric protec-
tive lead"  ("konzentrischer Schutzleiter")  or "protective lead in the form  of  an  · 
individual core sheath"  ("Schutzleiter als Einzeladerhtille"). 
When  a  collective screen has  a  high degree  of  mechanical strength,  it can 
also serve as  an armouring which  protects the cable against  mechanical damage. 
In the Netherlands,  use  is made  of  cables fitted with individual screens 
of high conductivity which also play  a  part  in the structure,  se~ving as "safety 
armouring"  ("veiligheidsscherm"). v,  17 
Description of  the main electrical protection equipment  for 
cables supplyini mobile machines 
Annex  IV V,  19 
ELECTRICAL  PROTECTION  OF  FLEXIBLE  CABLES  SUPPLYING  MOBILE  MACHINES 
The  protection devices  concerned ensure that the electrical network is au-
tomatically isolated from its supply source  in the event  of  a  fault  which  constitutes 
a  risk for  the workers  or for  the mine  itself. 
The  main devices  involved  can  be classified as  follows,  according to the 
principle  on  which  they  operate,  each  group being designated by  a  symbol. 
1)  CB  •.•••  Devices  based  on  amperometric  detection of the  homopolar  current. 
By  means  of  a  magnetic torus  (called in England  "core-balance",  hence  the 
symbol  CB),  these devices detect  the vectorial resultant  of  the three currents 
flowing  in the three  phase  cores,  this resultant being  known  as the  "homopolar 
current". 
The  fault  current  between the  phase  and  the  mass  is restricted to a  certain 
maximum  value  by  an  impedance  between the neutral point  and  the mass  (diagram  I 
indicates the principle of  this system). 
Since it is possible to put  in  a  core balance  on  each  line in the network, 
only  the  line where the fault  occurs will actuate the device,  selectivity being 
assured as  long as the  impedance  between the neutral point  on  earth is not  too 
high. 
An  application in a  network with  a  weakly-insulated neutral point  utilised 
in the Netherlands  is shown  in diagram II. 
·In this system,  all the  live elements are set  inside a  "safety armouring" 
(known  as "veiligheidsscherm"  in the Netherlands),  which  is earthed,  the intention 
being to ensure  integral protection of  the elements contained therein. This  armour-
ing consists essentially of  the  armoured  protection and  screens of  the electric 
cables as well as  the metal  sheathing of all the equipment  in the installation. 
The  entire system has  a  very  low  electrical resistance. 
This safety armouring is connected to the neutral point  of  the supply trans-
former  by  a  reactance winding,  the  impedance  of  which is determined  by  the  maximum 
fault-current  intensity which  occurs  in the event  of  an  insulation fault  between 
the phase  and  the mass  (earth). 
In underground workings  where  the methane  content  generally does  not  exceed 
1.5 %,  this maximum  permitted intensity is not  more  than 30 A  (1).  In underground 
workings  covered  by  an  exemption allowing a  methane  content  up to 2  %,  this maximum 
permitted value does  not  exceed  10 A. 
From  these values it is possible to calculate the minimum  value for the 
impedance  of  the reactance winding for the various voltages. 
(1)  In order to ensure protection against  electrocution,  making  due  allowance for 
the normal  operating conditions of  voltage,  resistance and fault  current,  all of 
which  are variable,  in all cases 
IfRa is maintained ~  42  volts with 
If  maximum  value  of fault  current which  may  not  be  cut  off 
R  resistance of  the entire system of  safety armourings.  a The  following  values are used 
500 volts 
865  volts 
V,  20 
CH
4  <::  1,5 % 
9  or 29  ohms 
16  or  50 ohms 
CH
4  <  2% 
29  ohms 
50 ohms 
In the case of  a  short  circuit between  phase  and  mass,  the current  is cut 
off from the installation by the core-balance relay. 
The  response intensity,  independent  of  the normal  operating intensity,  is 
3  A.  Cutting-off  of  the current  is achieved  in less than 300 ms.  Where  selective 
time-lag protection is provided,  cutting-off of  the current  must  be obtained with-
in a  period  less than  1  second. 
In order to ensure this cutting-off even where  it may  not  have  been  achieved 
by  means  of  the core-balance relay,  a  back-up relay  (1)  is added to the reactance 
winding,  and this back-up relay cuts off the  HT  current  in this event. 
This  core-balance  system is supplemented  by  a  control and  monitoring system 
(diagram XI)  based  on  a  principle similar to that described under  point  4  on  page 
V,  21  (BS  ..... safety block). 
Each  phase  core of all the types  of electric cables supplying mobile  machines 
of all kinds  is surrounded  by  an  individual earthed screen,  electrically connected 
to an  additional  mass  conductor,  the whole  being surrounded  by  a  collective polarised 
screen. 
2)  CBT  •.•••  Devices  based  on  amperometric and directional detection of the homopolar 
current  (diagram III) 
This system is capable  of  application in networks with strongly-insulated 
neutral points.  In the event  of  a  fault  in such a  network,  the fault  current  is 
the  sum  of  the capacitative currents of all the non-faulty phases. 
A homopolar  current  thus arises in each  line and the principle adopted for 
the networks  with weakly-insulated neutral point  can  no  longer  be used. 
But  this fault  current,  which  goes  back to source via the faulty  line,  is 
more  intense - in absolute terms  - that  the direct  capacitative currents and  is 
of  opposite sign. 
The  vectoral sum  of  the voltage  U2  and  the voltages U1  and  -U1  thus allows 
of  determining the direction of  flow  of  the homopolar  currents and  - by  means  of 
a  galvanometric relay and  once  the sensitivity threshold has  been reached  - of 
causing the actuation of  the circuit-breaker on the faulty  output  or initiating 
the signal. 
If the  network is short,  it is,however,  necessary to provide  a  sensitising 
capacity between the neutral point  and earth. 
3)  CI  ..•••  Insulation-monitoring devices  (diagram  IV  and  V) 
Using  a  continuous  or rectified current,  these devices continuously monitor 
the total resistance which exists between the entire network and the mass  circuit, 
i.e. the insulation value  of  the network.  Their operation is thus  independent  of 
the  network  capacities. 
(1)  The  back-up relay is an amperometric  relay with a  time  lag,  which actuates the 
primary side of  the supply transformer,  when  the core-balance relay on the secon-
dary side does  not  trip. This. device will be  indicated by  the symbol  "BU". v,  21 
The  source  of  continuous rectified current  is connected,  first to one  phase 
of  the network  or to the neutral of  the network  (diagram IV),  or  possibly to an 
artificial neutral  (diagram V),  and  secondly,  to the  mass  circuit. 
A measuring  device  in series with the source  indicates the  insulation val-
ues.  In addition,  the voltage variation at  the terminals of  a  resistance,  propor-
tional to the current  variations,  can after being amplified control a  relay which 
actuates an acoustical optical signal,  or both,  once the warning threshold has  been 
reached,  as well as  a  second relay which  provides  protection by  separation of  the 
network  from the source when  the insulation drops  below  a  second threshold,  known 
as the tripping threshold  (only  one  of  these relays is shown  in diagrams  IV,  V, 
VII,  VIII  and  IX  by  the symbol  Rl)• 
The disturbing effect  of alternating currents and  of transitory  phenomena 
must  be eliminated by  means  of  a  filter. This consists of  a  capacity which,  in the 
event  of  the detection of  a  fault,  produces  a  delay equal to the charging time  of 
the capacity.  This delay time varies as  a  function  of the difference which exists 
at the moment  of detection between the network  insulation values before and after 
the occurrence of  the fault.  Allowance  must  generally be  made  for  a  delay of  100 ms, 
sometimes  200 ms,  this being the delay  required to allow the necessary time for 
measurement.  Certain devices are,  in addition,  provided with an  adjustable time-
lag device,  but  it is desirable that these time delays should be  kept  to a  minimum. 
Where  used  in combination with  a  CBT  type  device which  operates rapidly,  a  certain 
time-lag in the  insulation-monitoring device  may  be acceptable and  even desirable. 
These  systems  may  be  provided with  a  device which  makes  it possible to in-
sert an artificial fault  of  a  known  value.  If the network is isolated at the moment 
of  measuring the artificial fault,  all other conditions being maintained the same, 
particularly the feeding  of  the continuous voltage  into the network,  this makes  it 
possible to check at will the  accuracy  of  the  indications given by  the measuring 
device. 
The  measuring  range  of  these devices  is very wide,  and  adjustment  of  the 
warning  and  actuating thresholds  is simple.  The acoustic signal  (1)  must  be capa-
ble of  being switched off,  but this is not  true of  the optical signal. The  latter 
should go  out  only  when  the fault  has  been detected,  in which  case the acoustic 
signal should be  restored automatically to its operating position. 
An  important  feature  of  these devices is that  they  can monitor the network 
even  when  it is not  live,  so that  there is no switching-on of  faulty  lines. 
4)  BS  ·~···Safety block  (diagrams  VI,  VII,  VIII,  IX  and  XI) 
The  devices  so designated are  intended in particular to protect  a  flexible 
cable supplying the mobile  machine,  by  cutting off the current  in the following 
cases 
a)  Contact  between  a  polarised element  of  the flexible  cable  (screen,  pilot core 
or monitoring core)  with the mass. 
b)  Contact  between  a  polarised element  or the  mass  and  a  phase. 
c)  Breakage  of  the mass  conductor. 
d)  Breakage  of the monitoring conductor or  of  a  pilot  core  intended to break before 
the phase  cores when  the cable is under  physical stress. 
e)  Breaking of  the  interlocking circuit of the connectors. 
f)  Double fault  between  a  phase  and  the mass  conductor and  between another  phase 
and the polarised screen. 
(1)  The  acoustic signal is no  longer used  in Germany. V,  22 
The  device illustrated in diagram VI  comprises  two relays  : ·control relay 
R2  and  a  fault  relay R3.  When  relay  R3  functions,  relay R2  is short-circuited and 
energises the bobbin  of  the contactor with which  the block is associated,  causing 
it to open.  The  block is connected to the monitoring conductor or to the screen, 
which  is in turn connected at the cable end to the mass  by  means  of  a  resistance 
and  a  diode.  In diagram VI  this system is called "block B".  The  device so consti-
tuted is actuated if cases  a)  to e)  above  occur.  In the event  of  faults a)  and b), 
switching-off  in the block occurs  in two stages  :  firstly R3  is actuated,  and then 
R2  cuts out.  However,  for eventuality b),  protection is achieved  only if theca-
pacity of  the network  is sufficiently high;  however,  this protection can always 
be  ensured  by  the  insulation-monitoring device which  is normally  employed  in con-
junction with this device. 
Diagram VII  shows  an  insulation-monitoring device with relay R1  and  a  BS 
block with  2  relays  :  relay R2+3  for  control and faults,  and  a  double-fault  relay 
R4 •  This  combined  insulation- monitoring  and  safety-block device operates if any 
of  the eventualities a)  to f)  occur,  relay  R1  for fault  b)  and  relay  R2+3  for 
faults  a)  and  c)  to e). 
If relay  R1  is provided with  a  time-lag,  relay R4  operates the switching-
off if a  fault  of  category f)  occurs,  i.e. if there is a  double  fault  between  phase 
and  mass  on  the  one  hand,  and  phase  and  polarised screen on  the other. 
Diagram VIII  (1),  also shows  an  insulation-monitoring device  CI  with relay 
R1  and  block BS  with  two  relays,  one control/fault relay R2+3  and  one  double  fault 
relay  R4•  This  combined  insulation-monitoring and safety-block device  is actuated 
for faults  a)  to f).  The  time-lag relay R1  operates if there is a  fault  between 
phase  and  mass  conductor  or  phase  and  polarised screen.  Relay  R2+3  operates with-
out  delay if there is a  fault  between  phase  and  polarised screen and  in the event 
of faults a)' and  c)  to e) occurring. 
The  use  of  a  time delay  on  relay R1  with respect  to relay R2+3  provides 
selective cutting-off  of  the flexible cable in the event  of  a  fault  between  phase 
and  polarised screen. 
Relay  R4  causes cutting-off  in the event  of  a  fault  between  phase  and  po-
larised screen if the capacity  of the networks  is sufficiently high.  In addition, 
it causes cutting-off  in the event  of  occurrence of  a  double  fault,  between  phase 
and  mass  on the one  hand  and  between  phase  and  polarised screen  on  the other. 
Diagram  IX  corresponds to diagram VII  but  without  relay  R4 . 
These  systems are incorporated in the gate-end boxes  and  provide electrical 
protection of flexible  cables for mobile  machines,  such as cutter-loaders,  at the 
same  time  as  providing remote control for these machines. 
They  require the use  of  a  cable with at  least  5  cores,  including a  collec-
tive screen or a  set  of  individual screens or both. 
If the cable is provided  only with  a  single collective screen,  this may  be 
connected to the mass  or may  be  polarised.  If individual screens are provided, 
these are polarised if there is also a  collective screen connected to mass.  If 
there is no collective screen,  the individual screens  may  be either polarised or 
connected to the mass.  These screens are made  of metal or of  semi-conducting 
plastomers  or elastomers;  in the  latter instance,  copper  cores  must  be used to 
ensure  longitudinal conductivity. 
The  preceding remarks  show that the various types  of  protection which  can 
be  given  by  a  safety block vary with the type  of  cable used. 
(1)  A more  detailed explanation of  this point  is given  in the annex to document 
No  5693/2/67 under the title "Explanation of  diagrams  VIII  of  the  combined  insu-
lation-monitoring and safety-block type". v,  23 
A.  With  cables having  a  single-collective screen connected to the mass  the follow-
ing categories of  protection can be achieved  (1)  : 
1.  Switching-off when  the  insulation between  phase  and  mass  or  phase  and screen 
drops  below  a  certain preset value. 
2.  Switching-off when  the  insulation between polarised element  and  screen drops 
below  a  certain value. 
3.  Switching-off  in the event  of breakage of the monitoring conductor  or the 
mass  conductor or in the event  of  breakage  of· the screen if this serves as 
a  mass  conductor. 
4.  Safe disconnection of  plug- and  socket-connectors. 
5.  Prevention of  unwanted starting-up of  the machine  by any fault  in the cable. 
B.  If the single collective screen is polarised,  the categories of  protection listed 
under  A are provided,  with the addition of  protection against  penetration into 
the cable of  any  conducting object,  as  soon as this object  touches the screen 
and  provided that it is connected either to the masses  or to earth.  Protection 
is also provided in the event  of  breakage of the screen  (2). 
C.  If the single polarised collective screen is replaced by  individual polarised 
screens,  then,  in addition to the categories of  protection listed under  A and  B 
protection is provided against  impedance short-circuits between  phases.  Protec-
tion in the event  of  breakage  of  a  phase will generally be  assured since this 
fault  rapidly brings about  contact  between  phase  and screen  (3). 
D.  If the  individual screens are  connected to the mass,  the categories of  protec-
tion listed under  A and  C are  provided,  but  not  the category  listed under  8  in 
connection with the penetration of  a  conducting object  into the cable. 
E.  If the cable is provided with a  collective screen connected to the mass  and with 
individual polarised screens,  all the categories of  protection listed under A, 
5)  DDI 
B  and  C are ensured.  In addition,  there is also protection against  penetration 
into the cable  of  any  conducting object,  even if this object  is not  connected 
to the masses  or to earth,  as soon as this object touches  two screens  (4). 
Impedance-fault  detectors  (diagram X) 
Originally intended to detect  short  circuits of  limited amplitude  (impedant 
faults),  the impedance-fault  detector compares  the current  intensities of  the phases 
in a  balanced three-phase network and  causes the current to be cut  off if a  pre-
determined rate of  unbalance occurs;  it thus supplements the normal categories of 
protection which  are not  suitable for this purpose. 
Diagram X shows  an  example  of  such  a  device  :  the three voltages  flowing 
to the secondaries of  three identical transformers connected to the network phases 
are rectified at certain point  and  compared  in a  relay-balance circuit which is 
tripped if the difference between the voltages reaches  a  predetermined,  adjustable 
threshold value. 
The  relays of  the balance system monitor  a  switching-off circuit which is so 
arranged that the asymmetrical  features  of the transitory conditions  (switching-on 
under  load,  starting-up of motors)  have  no effect. 
(1)  See  annex  II,  cable types A.l,  A.2  and A.3. 
(2)  See  annex  II,  cable types A.2  and A.3. 
(3)  See  annex  II,  cable types 8.2,  8.3,  D.2  and  D.3. 
(4)  See  annex  II,  cable types  C.la·and D.l. v,  2~ 
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Table  showing the main electrical protection equipment  for 
cables supplying mobile  machines 
Annex  V v,  44 
Legend to the table showing the main devices for electrical 
protection of  cables supplying mobile  machines 
The  classification and  the terms  described in the cables and  given  in the 
first  line of  the table correspond to the concepts defined in Annex  II. 
The  protective devices  indicated by  symbols  in the third line of the table 
are described  in Annex  IV. 
a)  CI 
b)  BS 
c)  amp. 
d)  Rl 
e)  R2 
f)  R3 
g)  R2+3 
h)  R4 
i)  CB 
j)  BU 
k)  CBT 
1)  DDI 
The  symbols  used  in the table have the  following meanings  : 
- insulation-monitoring device  (see  Annex  IV,  page  V,  20) 
safety-blocks  (see  Annex  IV,  page  V,  21) 
amperometric  relay 
relay for  insulation-monitoring device 
relay for control current 
relay for fault  current 
combination of  the two  relays  R2  +  R3 
double-fault  relay  (1) 
core-balance relay  (see Annex  IV,  page  V,  19) 
Back-up relay  :  amperometric relay with time-lag,  which cuts off the 
supply transformer  on the primary side when  the  core-balance relay  on 
the secondary side does  not  operate  (see Annex  IV,  page V,  20) 
deviced based  on  amperometric  and directional detection of  homopolar 
current  (see Annex  IV,  page  V,  20) 
=  impedance-fault  detectors  (see Annex  IV,  page V,  23) 
If the detection of  a  fault  is simultaneously provided  by  two  relays,  the 
symbols are  connected  by  a  +  sign.  The  dash  indicates if this point  is not  applicable, 
the  symbol  0  indicates that the device does  not  operate. 
(1)  In Germany  this double-fault  relay is used because up to 1st October  1971  work 
can  go  on  for  8  hours  when  there is a  fault.  This relay R4  then eliminates the 
danger  of  occurrence of  a  double fault  (fault between  phase  and earth accompanied 
by  a  fault  between  phase and·monitoring conductor). Table  showing  the  main  devices  for electrical protection of cables supplying mobile machines 
Ctble  type  A.l  A.2  A.3  B.l 
Collective 
Screen(s)  Collective  Collective  polarised  Individual  mass 
mass  conductor  screen  to  mass  conductors  screen  (3) 
Protective device  CI  +  BS  CI  +  BS  CI  +  BS  CI  +  BS 
Diagram  (1)  (IV or V)  +  VI  (IV or V)  +VI  (IV or V)  +  VI  (IV or V)  +  VI 
1)  Phase  to phase  amp.  amp.  amp.  R1  +  amp. 
2)  Phase  to mass  (2)  Rl  Rl  Rl  ~ 
3)  Phase  to polarised screen{s)  or to concentric 
~  ~  Rl  +  ~  Rl  mass  conductor 
4)  Phase  to polarised conductor  (3)  ~+~  Rl  +  ~  - Rl  +  ~ 
5)  Double  fault  (4) 
a)  Phase  to mass  conductor or earthed screen  - - - - ....  b)  Another phase  to polarised screen  (3)  .... 
"'  "'  .... 
.... 
0  6)  Polarised screen  (3)  to mass  conductor  R3  - - - II> 
""  t: 
7)  Polarised  conductor  (3)  to  mass  conductor  ~  R3  - R3 
8)  Breakage of polarised conductor:(3)  or of 
polarised screen  (3)  or of mass  conductor  R2  R2  R2  R2 
(breakage of  interlocking circuit) 
9)  Penetration into the cable of  a  metallic object  0  0  ~  0  connected  to mass  and  touching only the screens 
10)  Penetration into the cable of a  metallic object 
insulated from  mass  and  touching only the screens,  0  0  0  0 
or possibly also  the concentric conductor 
Symmetry  of mass  conductor  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Application in  (name  of country)  Belgium  Belgium  France  Germany 
Belgium 
(1)  See  Annex  IV. 
(2)  ~n France, certain installations are also equipped with CBT  and  DDI  devices  (see  Annex  IV,  pages V,  20  and  v,  23  respectively). 
~n Germany  and  Belgium,  efforts are made  to fit the installations with  CBT  type  devices. 
(3)  Polarised screen or polarised conductor = screen or conductor under monitoring voltage. 
(4)  Only  for delayed  switching-off  by  CI  (see  Annex  IV,  page  V,  20)  with respect  to BS  or if the CI  device is switched off. 
B.2,  D.2  B.3,  D.3 
Individual  Individual 
polarised  polarised 
screens  (3)  screens  {3) 
CI  +  BS  CI  +  BS 
(IV or V)  +  VI  (IV or V)  +  VI 
~+ll;j +amp.  ~  +~+amp. 
~+~  Rl  +  ~ 
~+~  Rl  +  ~ 
- -
- -
R3  ~ 
- -
R2  R2 
R3  ~ 
0  0 
No  Yes 
Belgium  France  France 
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C.lb  C.la,  D.l  C.la,  D.l  C.la,  D.l 
Individual  mass 
conductor &  Collective mass  conductor and 
collective pola- individual polarised screens  (3) 
rised screens  (3) 
CB  +  BS  +  BU  CI  +  BS  CI  +  BS  CI  +  BS 
II +XI  VII  VIII  IX 
CB  +  amp. 
Rl  +  R2+3  Rl  +  R2+3  Rl  +  R2+3 
+amp.  +  amp.  +  amp. 
CB  +  BU  Rl  +  R2+3  Rl  +  R2+3  Rl  +  R2+3 
CB  +  BU  Rl  +  R2+3  Rl  +  R2+3  Rl  +  R2+3 
CB  +  BU  +  R3  - Rl  +  R2+3  ·-
- R4  R4  -
R3  R2+3  R2+3  R2+3 
R3  - R2+3  -
R2  R2+3  R2+3  R2+3 
R3  R2+3  R2+3  R2+3 
R3  R2+3  R2+3  R2+3 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Netherlands  Germany  Germany  Italy ANNEX  VI 
OPINION 
ON  THE  USE  UNDERGROUND  OF  FOAMED  URETHANE  IN  COAL  MINES VI,  3 
I.  The  Working Party's study  of this subject  has  its or1g1n  in the desire recorded 
by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  in  1963  that  increased attention should 
be  given to the application of  polyurethane  foam after one  of  the member  coun-
tries had successfully sealed the stoppings  in a  fire area with  foamed  urethane, 
and after urethane  foam  stoppings  had  been used  in two further serious cases -
the  Mines  Inspectorate having  issued an  exemption  in view  of the urgency  of  the 
case. 
The  Working  Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements~ Fire and  Underground  Combustion 
has  since then  followed  with  great  interest the tests carried out  by  various 
technical institutions on  foamed  urethane for  use  in coal mines. 
The  Working  Party has,  in particular,· obtained regular reports  from 
Mr.  Hausman,  Director of  the Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen  van  bet  Kempische 
Steenkolenbekken,  Hasselt,  on the  research and tests carried out  by  his Centre. 
In  October  1968,  Mr.  Hausman  presented the Working  Party with a  report  surveying 
the work  carried out  at his Centre  and the results so far available from tests 
carried out  by  other institutes in  Community  countries and  the United  Kingdom. 
II.  The  Working  Party dealt  at  length with this report  at  its meetings  on  29.1 and 
30.10.1969  and,  after carefully examining  the matter,  came  to the following  con-
clusions: 
1.  Foamed  urethane  in its hitherto known  formulation  is a  plastic which  is out-
standingly suitable for sealing operations,  works  fast  and  has  exceptionally 
good  insulation properties,  for which there are  a  great  many  uses  in mining. 
This material is thus  particularly suitable as  a  sealant for use  in the 
erection of  stoppings  of all kinds  and  - especially in winning  roadways  - for 
the sealing of  faces  against  ventilation losses and  undesirable emission  of  CH4. 
Its good  insulation properties,  as  already  pointed out,  can help to  improve  the 
pit  atmosphere.  The  great  advantage  of  urethane plastic in its capacity to shrink 
to about  one  thirtieth  of  its original volume  and  to form  a  hard  foam  which 
adheres  extremely well,  although only to a  dry  base,  and  is almost  gastight. 
Foamed  urethane  is a  durable material which  generally speaking behaves  very elas-
tically under  the  influence  of  rock  movements  and  pressure.  So far  no  other plas-
tic has  been discovered which  has  such  favourable  properties. 
2.  Foamed  urethane,  in the formulation  known  to date,  consists of  a  blend of 
diis6cyanates with  polyether resins and  polyol. 
This blend  of  plastics has  severe disadvantages  from the point  of  view  of 
mines  safety.  It may,  if applied  in too thick layers,  ignite spontaneously be-
cause  of  inadequate dispersal of  reaction heat.  Some  types  of  polyurethane  foam, 
of·  course~  do  not  normally  lend themselves  to rapid fire spread,  when  they are 
used  on fire or air dams  as sealants  on  a  limited area  of  dam  surface.  If they 
are used  for  a  section of  cylindrical surface  on  the other hand there is a  danger 
of  rapid fire propagation  on  the surface  (tunnel effect),  which  may  lead to an 
extraordinarily fierce fire. 
Experience has  shown  that  in the very fierce  combustion  of  foamed  urethane 
the  combustion  gases  show  only  very  little oxygen  content.  This  may  under certain 
circumstances  lead to loss  of  life,  even with the use  of  filter-type self-rescuers. 
The  fire risk inherent  in foamed  urethane  may  of  course  be  reduced  by  various 
devices,  for  example  by  coating with  a  flame  retardant  material or by  applying 
a  plaster layer,  provided the section of  roadway  thus treated cannot  be  reached 
by  a  fierce fire.  Some  of  these coatings of  course  lose their effectiveness over 
longer  periods  by  flaking off  under  the effects of  rock  pressure  and  as  a  result 
of  prolonged  exposure to flame.  Also they  can  only  be applied  on  one  side,  namely 
the accessible side of  the stopping. 
A further disadvantage  is the  low electrical conductivity of  foamed  urethane, 
due to which  there is a  possibility of  electrostatic build-up and  hence  of  sparks VI,  4 
being  produced which  may  lead to combustion.  This  disadvantage  is,  however,  neu-
tralised by  applying  a  plaster coating to the entire surface. 
3.  Consideration of  the advantages  and disadvantages of  using foamed  urethane 
leads to the conclusion that this plastic in its hitherto known  composition can-
not  be declared suitable for  use  in mines  without  reservation. 
The  favourable  sealing properties,  however,  indicate that it would  be  in-
advisable  in principle to reject its use  in mining. 
Ways  and  means  should therefore be  found  of altering the  composition  in 
such  a  way  that  its positive advantages are to a  large extent  preserved while 
the disadvantages at  present  inherent  in its use are considerably  lessened. 
The  improvements to be  aimed at  in any  development  of  foamed  urethane or 
other comparable plastic - with the object  of  creating the conditions which 
would  make  possible its unrestricted use  in underground mining  - would  need to 
be  concerned with the following properties: 
3.1.  The  plastic and  the devices  required for its application must  be  designed 
in such  a  way  that  they  can  be  used  and  handled at  any  time  by  colliery person-
nel and  do  not  require recourse to specialist firms  each time  they are used. 
3.2.  It should be  possible to apply  the plastic in a  single operation,  even  on 
damp  surfaces. 
3.3.  The  plastic should,  after its application,  not  be  subject  to any  dangerous 
build-up of electrostatic charges. 
3.4.  The  composition  of  the  compound  must  not  show  any  deficiency with regard 
to its hygienic properties. 
3.5.  The  foam,  once it has set,  must  not  be  easily  inflammable  and,  if ignited, 
must  not  continue to burn even  on  a  cylindrical surface  (tunnel effect) without 
application of  heat.  The  individual constituents must  also not  be  slow to ignite. 
3.6.  In the event  of  fire it should  not  be  possible for the use  of  filter-type 
self-rescuers,  to be restricted through  lack of  oxygen  or through the products 
of  decomposition of  the plastic. 
4.  The  use  of  polyurethane  foam  in its hitherto known  composition  in mine work-
ings  varies  from  one  country to another.  Nowhere  it is subject  to comprehensive 
regulations,  however. 
5.  The  Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  considers it desirable that  the pro-
ducers  of the  foamed  urethane plastic should further develop the compound  at 
present  available in such  a  way  that,  while retaining unchanged  the positive 
properties which it now  has,  it satisfies the requirements set  out  under  3  above. 
The  coal mining  industry  of  the countries of  the  Community  is keenly  in-
terested in this continued development  of either polyurethane  or  a  comparable 
plastic in view  of  the  improvement  in mine  safety which this may  bring about. A NEW  MEASUREMENT  AND  TESTING  METHOD  FOR  ROPES  USED  IN 
SHAFTS  AND  ROADWAY-HAULAGE  SYSTEMS  AND  FOR  GUIDES  IN 
SHAFT- AND  ROADWAY  HAULAGE  INSTALLATIONS 
by  Dr.  Engineer Hartmut  ARNOLD 
SeilprUfstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschaftskasse - Bochum 
Institut  fUr  Fordertechnik und  WerkstoffprUfung 
(Approved  by  the Mines  Safety  Commission 
at its Plenary  Session of  26  February  1970) 
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1.  Introduction 
The  constantly increasing demands  placed upon  haulage ropes,  especially as 
a  result  of the concentration of  collieries,  and the manifold and to some  extent 
very high,  demands  placed on the haulage cables used  in roadway-haulage  installa-
tions frequently  lead to premature failure of the ropes.  It is therefore necessary 
to institute exhaustive  investigations into the factors which affect the working 
life and functional  capacity of these ropes. 
At  the Seilprufstelle,  Institut fur Fordertechnik und Werkstoffprufung der 
WBK  Bochum  (Rope-testing Station)  a  selection was  made  from the multiplicity of 
factors which affects the resistance in time  of  the ropes,  to concentrate on  the 
important  categories of  kinetic stresses which have not  yet  been  included  in the 
methods  of  computation used  in the selection of the type  of  rope  and the dimensions 
of  ropes. In addition,  diagrammatic  representations were  set up  of  the functional 
relationships between the principal parameters which affect  the working  life of 
ropes,  from  which it is possible to predict  the way  in which  the rope will stand 
up to static,  heaving  and heaving/bending stresses as well as to the transmission 
of  forces  between the rope  and the drive pulley,  together with other factors. 
The  prerequisite condition for this exhaustive testing of  the suitability 
of the ropes  was  the establishment  of  new  rapid testing processes  and measuring 
methods  to determine the capacity of the rope to resist the stresses  imposed,  so 
that  on  the  one  hand it was  possible to obtain quantitative data  on the  important 
individual  loading factors  and  on the other hand possible to apply  continuous 
checks  of  the test results obtained. 
The effects of the state of the guides  in main  and staple shafts and the 
quality of  the rope  guides  in roadway-haulage  installations on  the working life 
of  the ropes  was  also taken into account. 
2.  Winding  ropes  - Selection on the basis of static and  kinetic factors. 
In  a  shaft-winding installation the winding  ropes  and the braking system 
are the elements which  must  receive particular attention for  reasons of safety. 
In installations with drive pulleys,  factors  of  equal  importance are the  lining 
of the drive pulley and the  lubrication of  the  rope,  which are  intended to ensure 
transmission of the forces  from the drive pulley to the rope  and  vice versa with-
out  any slip. Fig.  1  gives  a  summary  view  of  the multiplicity of the other factors 
which  must  work together harmoniously  in a  high-capacity,  safe winding  installa-
tion. This classifies the essential factors  which affect the working life of  a 
rope.  These  factors  must  be  given maximum  possible attention in selecting ropes 
which will fulfill most  efficiently the requirements  placed upon  them. 
2.1.  The  important  group of  kinetic stresses in a  winding installation,  in partic-
ular the heaving  and  heaving/bending stresses on  winding  ropes,  will be  more 
closely examined  in what  follows. 
The  effect  of  changes  in the stress in a  winding  rope  is a  factor which has 
only recently been  given  the attention which it deserves.  The  range  of those 
rope stresses which act  upon  a  given cross-section of  rope during  a  wind must 
not  be  allowed to exceed  a  maximum  value,  if the danger  of  a  premature failure 
of  the rope  is to be eliminated.  This  observation is true not  only for winding 
ropes  but  also for  any  type  of  rope which is subjected to dynamic  loads,  such 
as e.g.  bridge,  dredger,  crane  and cable-railway ropes,  etc. 
2.1.1.  The  range  of quasi-static heaving stresses is the difference in stress 
which occurs  in a  rope  above the attachment  point,  when  the empty  con-
veyance  in the shaft  landing is loaded  and then raised to pit-bank 
level.  In this operation,  there occurs  - in addition to the increase 
in stress due to the payload being carried -·an increase in stress 
caused  by  the rising weight  of  the rope  raised  ~uring the wind,  Fig.  2. VII,  4 
The  range  of quasi-static heaving stresses is increased or  changed  by 
the accelerations and decelerations which  occur during the wind.  The 
range is in this case  a  dynamic  magnitude,  Fig.  3. 
In addition to the quasi-static and  dynamic  heaving stresses  (tensile 
stresses)  in the ropes  in  a  winding  installation in a  shaft,  geometric 
bending stresses occur as the rope  runs  over  the drive  and  guide  pulleys, 
and  these become  added as  normal  stresses to the tensile-heaving stres-
ses.  The  total of  these two types  of  normal  stress will be  termed the 
heaving/bending stress and  is the difference between  the  maximum  and 
minimum  values of  the range  of  heaving/bending stress. As  in the case 
of  pure  heaving stresses,  we  distinguish between quasi-static and  dy-
namic  values. 
2.1.2.  In  addition to the heaving/bending stresses,  there is also an additional 
load,  which  is caused  by  the transmission of  forces  between the rope 
and  the driving pulley.  This additional  load consists of  displacements 
and twistings,  which are  inter alia produced  in the whole  rope  by 
transmission of the frictional force  from  the bearing surface in the 
lining of  the rope  pulley.  Since the stresses caused  in the rope  as  a 
result  of  these  loads are  not  pure  normal  stresses,  they  must  be  sepa-
rately treated in considering the  load picture. 
The  heaving/bending  loads  occurring in the course of  force transmission 
occasion the heaviest  loads  on  the rope  in the zones  of acceleration 
and deceleration,  a  fact  which  is clearly shown  in Fig.  4  by  the con-
centrations of  broken wires  in these zones.  Consequently,  this type  of 
loading must  receive special consideration in the test method. 
Figs.  2  and  3  show the types  of stress just described,  using the  example 
of  a  tower-mounted  winding  installation with  a  deflector pulley.  The 
quasi-static and  dynamic  ranges are indicated by  appropriate symbols 
of  vibration.  It  can  be  clearly seen that the  ranges  of  the dynamic 
heaving/bending stresses can reach high values  during acceleration. 
2.1.3.  In Figs.  2  and  3,  the calculations carried out  apply  only to stresses 
for  uniform running and  for  accelerated movement.  To  get  a  picture of 
the trend of  the heaving/bending  load during  a  whole  wind,  Fig.  5  shows 
the average tensile stresses  (heaving stresses)  of  the ropes  in  a  tow-
er-mounted  four-rope  winding  installation without  deflector pulleys 
in five  phases  of  the winding  operation. 
In this presentation,  in order to simplify the recognition of  the 
ranges  in the vicinity of  the driving pulley during various  phases  of 
acceleration and deceleration,  the superimposed geometrical bending 
stresses - as well as the supplementary stresses occurring with  power 
transmission- have  been  left out. 
Whereas  the tensile stresses in the rope  increase with  increasing ac-
celeration,  they fall off with  increasing deceleration,  pass  through 
a  value of zero and  reverse their direction,  then reaching at  a  value 
of  a  = - 3.0 m/s2  the value which  corresponds  approximately to the 
range at  the driving pulley before starting.  In the  zone  of  decelera-
tion the  load on  the rope is thus  lower then in the zone  of accelera-
tion.  Since,  however,  witb  a  twinstrand winding  system the zones  of 
acceleration and deceleration alternate,  the  loading  on  the rope  is 
approximately  equal  in these zones,  as  can  be  seen from the distribu-
tion of  frequency  of  breaks  in the wires  (Fig.  4). 
The  average  value  of  the ranges  of  variation in main shaft winding 
installations in the Ruhr  is at  present  around  15.3  kp/mm2,  the peak 
value reaching  18.0 kp/mm2.  These stresses,  which  occur  in association 
with the quasi-static ranges  (and are simple to determine)  are only 
comparative values against  the very  much  higher  dynamic  ranges  in the 
vicinity of  the driying and deflector pulleys. VII,  5 
2.2.  The  types  of stress described above,  which  occur  in mining  ropes,  can  be 
simulated in a  new  dynamic  rapid testing method  developed  by  the Seilprilf-
stelle der  WBK,  in such  a  way  that  precise determination of  the effects on 
rope life of  the following  factors  can be  made: 
a)  heaving stresses 
b)  heaving/bending stresses without  transmission of  forces  and 
c)  heaving/bending stresses with transmission of  forces. 
Changes  in the pulley  linings,  the  lubrication of  the  rope,  the shape  of 
the  pulley  grooves  etc.,  made  while maintaining all other test conditions 
constant,  can be  used to determine  the influence  of  those factors which  have 
an effect  on  the working  life of the ropes. 
The  static measurement  and testing methods  (technical tests)  for wire  ropes 
for  most  types  of  application have  been  developed both  on  the national and 
the international  level to such  a  point  that  they still require only  small 
changes to bring them up to date with  latest  developments.  On  the other hand, 
the kinetic measurement  and testing methods  for wire  ropes  have  been strongly 
developed  only  in certain directions.  In most  of  the cases  requiring investi-
gation of  the whole  rope,  the tests are of  long duration and  involve assessing 
various part  zones  of  the rope  loading.  There  is therefore an  urgent  need to 
subject the kinetic  loadings  - which  are at the very  least  of  equal  importance 
and  in many  cases of  overriding  importance  for the working  life of  the  rope  -
to analysis  in a  system which  is capable  of  giving rapid  information about 
the  interactions of  the various  individual parameters. 
The  new  dynamic  rapid testing method  uses  a  pulsator device attached to one 
end  of  the rope,  together with  a  three-roller unit  which  undergoes  transla-
tory  movement  within the  clamped  ends.  The  drives for the pulsation device 
and the three-roller unit  are  independent,  so that  no  limits of  any  importance 
for the tests are  imposed  on  the combinations  of  frequencies  (Fig.  6). 
A magneto-inductive  examination of  the state of  the rope  in the straight 
and  bent  sections along its length serves,  together with  a  device  for  measur-
ing stretch,  to give  continuous supervision of  the test  process.  Facility 
for automatic switching-off  at  pre-determined values  of  stretch ensures re-
liable measurement  values at  the  end  of  the test.  Careful temperature  moni-
toring  keeps  the tests within conditions which  closely  resemble  practice. 
The  advantage  of  the dynamic  rapid test device,  which  can be set  up either 
horizontally or vertically,  consists  in: 
1)  the possibility of  obtaining - during and after a  test operation - the 
characteristic curve  of  reduction  in the breaking strength of  the rope 
for  several types of  loading  and  stages; 
2)  the adaptability of  the device to special cases  of  loading,  e.g.  for 
main- and  staple-shaft  ropes,  hauling ropes  for  cable  railways,  scraper 
ropes,  dredger  ropes,  roadway-haulage  ropes,  etc. 
3)  the  large  amount  of  information available  from the results of  the test 
for  an  outlay which  is  low  in  comparison with what  was  possible hitherto. 
In Fig.  7  the possibilities of this method  are set out,  using the three-
roller device together with magneto-inductive testing,  in schematic  form. 
Thefactorswhich affect the working  life of  the rope are classified in groups. 
The  geometrical magnitudes  of  a  winding  installation,  such as  pulley diameter, 
angle  of  deflection of  the rope,  shape  of  the pulley  groove  etc.  are simulated 
in the three-roller device.  We  distinguish between  two  systems  of  three-
roller device.  With  system 1  (Fig.  8)  the  pulley diameters are different.  In 
such  cases the section of  rope tested is rolled only  once  over the pulley at 
one stroke.  With  system 2  (Fig.  9)  the rollers are similar with respect to 
groove  shape,  diameter and material.  In contrast to system 1,  in this instance 
the sections of  rope  are rolled twice  or three times  over the pulley during 
a  stroke. VII,  ~ 
System  1  serves for the investigation of  the effects of the various  curva-
tures of  the ropes  under static and kinetic  loadings  on the working  life of 
the rope. 
System 2  with similar rollers,  resulting in multiple rolling of single sec-
tions of  the rope,  makes  it possible to determine the reduction in the break-
ing strength of the rope  on  a  single test piece. 
Since the test  rope  - clamped  firmly at  one  end  and  pulsated at  the other -
also contains sections which  have  not  been rolled over,  tests on  individual 
wires will give  a  complete  curve of  reduction in  breaking strength of the 
rope.  This method  thus offers the possibility of studying the state of  the 
rope for  a  given  predetermined range  in relationship to alternate bending. 
The  varying degrees  of stretch occurring within the rope  give,  in the  individ-
ual sections of  the rope,  various temperatures  caused  by  the  loading due  to 
rolling over.  Since the three-roller device  produces alternate bending  in 
zones  of  low  and  high  rope stretch,  the effect  of  rope  temperature  and  rope 
stretch on  the working  life of  the rope  can be  determined  simultaneously. 
Rope  breakage  in the zone which  is rolled over three times during  one  stroke 
is a  further  measuring  point  in the general diagram,  which gives the trend  of 
the breaking strength of  the  rope  - in relationship with the frequency  of 
rolling over  (alternate bending)  where  there is 
a)  a  rise in the  heaving stress or 
b)  an  intensification of  the bending of  the rope. 
This  type  of  representation makes  it possible to provide  in various forms 
1)  determination of  the zones  in which  give satisfactory results and 
2)  comparisons  between the various types  of  rope  design under the sets of 
loading conditions which  have to be  studied. 
If one  of  the rollers is driven or braked  (Fig.  10),  the  loading  on  the rope 
with transmission of  forces  can  be  simulated.  This  makes  it possible to study 
on  one test  rope the effect  of 
heaving stresses, 
heaving/bending stresses without  transmission of forces  and 
heaving/bending stresses with transmission of  forces. 
The  multiplicity of results obtainable  from  a  single sample,  together with 
the great  deal  of  information which  can be obtained,  makes  the  method  a  re-
search and  testing tool which  is very  economical,  and  which  makes  it possible 
to carry out  investigations in the broad  framework  of static,  kinetic and 
geometrical  loadings  on the rope  on  a  basis which  has  not  been  previously 
developed. 
2.3.  Diagramatic system for the assessment  of  the results of  the  new  dynamic  rapid 
testing method  of  the SeilprUfstelle der  WBK  (Fig.  11). 
It is advisable to investigate in the first place  one  design of  rope  under 
various  dynamic  and  geometrical test conditions and to plot  the results in a 
diagram with  the combination of angles  of deflection on the ordinate and  the 
alternations of  bending  on the abscissa,  the heaving stress being the  para-
meter  (diagram group 1/1),  Fig.  12.  Following this,  it is necessary to select 
the type  of  diagram which  uses  the heaving stress as the ordinate and the  com-
bination of  angles  of deflection the parameter  (diagram group 11/1),  Fig.  13. 
These  two  groups  of  diagrams  make  it possible to get  a  good  picture of the 
dynamic  and  geometrical zones  in which  the rope  design being tested will fail. 
The  rope designs  shown  by this method to be suitable are  compared with  one 
another,  making  use  of  the  forms  of  representation 1/2 and  11/2. VII,  7 
These  two  groups  of  diagrams,  which  have  the design of the rope as the 
parameter,  make  it possible to select the right  rope  clearly  (Fig.  14  and  15). 
3.  Comparison  between the newly-obtained test results and  operational assessment  of 
the  ropes  by  means  of  the  improved  Bochum  formula  for  rope work  in main  and staple 
shafts. 
In order to be  able to carry out  continuous comparison results obtained and 
the new  measuring  and testing method  with those  obtained  in practical opera-
tion,  statistical control methods  were  worked  out  for  those cases where the 
outlay has  prevented the development  of  comparative testing facilities based 
on  actual operation;  these statistical checks  provide  continuous  asse~sment 
of  the difference between the test results and  the way  in which the ropes 
stand up to use. 
In the  improved  Bochum  rope  work  formula  - used to determine the work  done 
by  the rope  - appropriate attention is paid to the static,  kinetic,  geometri-
cal  and technical factors. 
The expression W for the work  done  is multiplied by  a  loading factor  KH(B)• 
this factor allowing for the special conditions  in a  main  or staple-shaft 
winding  installation  (Fig.  16). 
The  factor  KH(B}  comprises  data dependent  on  the installation and  on the 
operational characteristics,  and which  have  an effect  on the working  life of 
the  rope. 
If  KH(B}  ~  1,  this signifies that  the total of  factors  dependent  on the 
installation exerts  less favourable  effects on  the working  life of  the rope 
than is the case over the average  of all Ruhr  pits in main- or staple-shaft 
winding  installations. 
If  KH(B}  <: 1,  the total of all the factors affecting the working  life of 
the rope  is better than the Ruhr  average. 
The first  bracketed expression in the square brackets for  KH(B)  reflects 
the  loading  on the rope  under the transmission of  forces  on  the driving pulley 
and the effect  of  acceleration,  deceleration and abrupt  loadings during wind-
ing.  The  acceleration factor  a  and the factors  s  and  b  are taken from tables 
prepared by  the SeilprUfstelle der  WBK.  These tables are constantly checked. 
·The second expression  in brackets is an  index  of  the bending stress on  the 
rope  in the winding  installation. 
The  term s  is an  empirical factor allowing for the  number  of  rope  and  de-
flector pulleys and their D/d  ratio. 
The third expression in brackets reflects the surface area pressure between 
the rope  and the  lining in the pulley  groove  on  the driving pulley  in relation 
to the average  value for  Ruhr  pits. 
The  factor  b  indicates the  embedment  of  the rope,  i.e. the shape  of  the rope 
groove  and the material in the groove  in the driving pulley and  rope  pulleys  .. 
If factors  a  and  s  are not  known,  they are replaced by  the figure  1. 
Comparison  of  the results obtained with the  new  dynamic  rapid testing method 
with those obtained  from the formula  for the  assessment  of  the rope  in practi-
caloperation makes  it possible to check the factors a,  s  and b.  If proper cor-
rection of  the factors  is applied the difference  between  predicted and actual 
performance  in operation will be  reduced. VII,  8 
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4.  New  measurement  method  for shafts and  shaft  guides. 
Measurement  methods  have  been developed  in order to throw  light  on the re-
lationships between the state of  shaft  and  rope  guides  and the additional 
forces  caused thereby;  these methods  indicate the relation between faults· 
and the forces  which  they  produce.  The  knowledge  of  this additional forces 
is required,  on the  one  hand,  as  an  important  factor  in the dimensioning  of 
the shaft  guides  and,  on the other hand,  to provide  an accurate estimate of 
the  loadings  which  are superimposed  on the basic stresses in the winding  rope. 
·A  new  combined  measurement  device,  developed  by  the SeilprUfstelle der  WBK, 
not  only  saves  time  but  also yields measurement  results which  give  more  infor-
mation than was  the  case with methods  used hitherto.  The  device  is made  up 
of several individual basic measurement  appliances  and  can  be  used  in first, 
second  or third order  combinations  (Fig.  17). 
These  new  measurement  methods  can firstly be  used to determine the forces 
arising between the  conveyances  and the  guides  and  secondly,  and  simultaneous-
ly,  to indicate the faulty  guide joints and measure  the wear  on  the  guides at 
full or  reduced winding  speed  and at full  load.  At  lower  speeds,  the  geomet-
rical characteristics of  the guides  and  any tilt which  they  may  have  undergone 
can  be  established.  In  addition,  with the  conveyances stationary,  it is pos-
sible using two  laser alignment  devices with suitable measuring tables  con-
nected with geometrical measuring bodies,  to determine the position in space 
of  the  guides  and  other shaft  furniture.  By  the use  of  accelerometers  or 
force  measurements  in the suspension  gear,  the additional forces  acting  on 
the winding ropes  are determined  and their dependence  on the geometrical di-
mensions  of  the shaft  guides established. 
Fig.  18  shows  a  combined  measuring  device  of this type,  although there is 
no  indication of  the  accelerometer,  which  is set  up  on  the roof  of  the  con-
veyance  or  on  any  of  the decks  in the conveyance. 
Fig.  19  shows  one  half of  the measurement  device with measuring table  and 
laser alignment  device. 
5.  Classification of  rope-driven  roadway  haulages  and  the  loading  on  the hau·lage  ropes. 
5.1. Difficulties in determining the time  at which  a  rope  should  be  removed;  the 
purpose  of  a  rope atlas. 
The multiplicity of factors which affect  the working  life of  a  rope  - e.g. 
by.reason of  the different  designs  of  roadway  haulage system- makes  the de-
termination of  the  proper time to discard the  rop~a task which  cannot  be 
carried out  without  a  knowledge  of  the behaviour of the rope  under  the action 
of  dynamic  and  geometrical parameters. 
A rope  atlas repaired  by  the Seilprlifstelle der  WBK  for  rope-driven  roadway-
haulage  conveyances  is therefore not  capable  of  dealing fully with all the 
questions which  arise in connection with establishing the correct  point  in 
time  to discard  a  rope.  It should rather be  considered as  an  aid for the rope-
tester and  for all persons  responsible  for the  construction and  operation of 
such types  of  roadway-haulage  installation. 
Since it is possible in only  a  small  number  of  cases where tests have  to be 
carried out  to determine  by  the naked  eye,  the permissible falling-off  in 
breaking strength,  it becomes  obligatory to have  available completely satis-
factory  information regarding the  properties of the ropes  under  the types  of 
loading to which  they are subjected.  This  information is provided  by  the rope 
atlas  on the basis of  systems  of  diagrams  representing the falling-off  in 
breaking strength under the effect  of  major  influencing factors,  together 
with illustrations of  the different states of ropes,  corresponding to the 
diagrams.  Moreover,  the continual development  of transport  systems  makes  it 
necessary to carry out  continuous  checking of  the basic information material 
in assessing the discarding time  for haulage  ropes  for  roadway  haulage  systems, VII,  9 
supplementing this information,  or ·replacing it,  by  new  data appropriate to 
the changes  which  have  occurred. 
In preparing the  rope atlas,  particular attention was  paid to working  out 
the characteristic curves  of  reduction in breaking strength for the various 
designs  of  rope to be  studied,  these curves  showing the beginning and the 
trend of  failure  under  various types  of  loading.  This  seemed to be  necessary, 
since it is often  impossible to recognise the  permissible  15  % limit  of  reduc-
tion  ~n the breaking strength,  so that  without  such  an  aid it is impossible 
to assess the risk level accurately. 
In spite of  the assistance given by  the  rope  atlas,  the rope-tester is in 
a  very  large  number  of  cases  overburdened,  since heavy dirtying of  the rope 
surface,  very  great  lengths  of  rope  (in individual cases  over  10 km),·various 
running  times  of  different section of the  rope with  varying  zones  of  loading, 
worn  places  on  the  rope etc.  make  the work  of testing far more difficult than 
usual.  In this connection,  it is,  inter alia,  necessary to supplement  the 
tests by  magneto-inductive  rope-testing methods. 
The test results recorded  in the  rope atlas were  obtained from several in-
dependent  testing methods,  so that  any  effect  due to a  particular process  is 
recognised  and  can be  eliminated  (Figs.  20 and  21).  A further  guarantee  of 
the results is obtained  from tests on  rope-testing beds,  installed in the 
basement  at the Seilprufstelle der  WBK  in the testing range  for  rope-driven 
roadway-haulage  conveyances  (Fig  ..  22) . 
In assessing the state of  the  rope it is necessary,  in order to estimate 
how  much  further  use  can be  safely given to the  rope,  to have  a  knowledge  of 
the degree  of  risk in the  installation.  With a  level haulage  installation, 
different criteria with  respect to the  frequency  of  rope  checks  can  be  applied 
from those applied to haulage  installations in inclined roadways,  and  in 
which the position and  magnitude  of  the  inclinations can give rise to danger-
ous  situations in the event  of  a  rope  breaking. 
The  assessment  index  for the  rope  loading  and the degree  of  risk give the 
"degree  of  difficulty"  of  the  complete  installation; this factor will be  ex-
plained  in what  follows. 
5.2.  Classification of  rope-driven roadway-haulage  installations from  the viewpoint 
of  the  loading of the haulage  ropes. 
In order to obtain with simple  means  full  information regarding the degree 
of difficulty and  the operational condition of  a  rope-driven roadway-haulage 
installation,  it is necessary  - because  of  the changes  in the management  of 
the roadway,  e.g.  changing the track of  the haulage installation,  effects of 
rock pressure etc.  - to use  other measuring methods  than those applied  in 
fixed  shaft  installations. 
The  rope  constitutes the central point  of  these considerations,  being sub-
jected to risk and  having  a  time-affected strength.  By  reason of  the  limited 
space available,  the  roadway  management  conditions  (which  are often difficult) 
and  the varying states of  the rails used to brake the conveyances  in the  event 
of  a  rope  break,  it is at  the present  time still difficult to construct  brakes 
which  are reliable and  not  excessively harsh  in operation.  Consequently,  in 
unfavourable track conditions,  the safety  of  the  installation is particularly 
dependent,  in the first  place,  on the reliability of the drive  rope  and  only 
in second  place  on  the braking devices  used. 
The  loading  of  the haulage  rope  depends  not  only  on  the  payload  and  dead 
weight  to be transported but  also on the  length  and  type  of  the  roadway  and 
on  the pre-tension.  Curves,  rising or falling sections of  road,  the degree 
of  precision of  laying the rail tracks  and  rope  guides,  the type  of  drive, 
the  pre-tensioning of  the rope at  the  return pulleys,  the method  of  operation 
etc.  cause  the basis stress in the rope to be  overlaid by  heaving stresses 
which  cause additional kinetic  loading of  the  rope.  These  heaving  forces  - to-
gether with geometrical factors,  such as e.g.  the deflection angles  of  varying VII,  10 
magnitude,  the different diameters  of drive pulleys  and  rollers in the rope-
guide  and  drive systems  - lead to marked differences in the working  life of 
the rope.  In addition to these conditions,  governed  by  the designs  of  the 
plant  and the operating circumstances,  and all of  which affect  the rope's 
working  life,  there is also the suitability of  the design of the rope  for 
these special operating conditions. 
In order to get  more  detailed information  regarding the magnitude  of  the 
differences  in heaving force,  the Seilprilfstelle der  WBK  developed electrical 
and  mechanical  measuring devices  and  methods.  With  stress measuring  and  clas-
s.ifying devices  on  the drive machine,  on  the tensioning trolley,  on the  con-
nection between the tensioning trolley and  the transporter attachments,  at 
the return stations,  on  the support  attachments,  and  at  particular points 
along the drive  rope,  the  force  conditions in the haulage  system were  recorde~ 
to obtain data about  the functional  relationship between the  individual types 
of  loading  in the  roadway-haulage  system  (Figs.  23  and  24). 
5.2.1.  Loading  of  the  haulage  ropes  by  dynamic  and  geometrical  factors  (assess-
ment. 
The  classification of  heaving stresses of  the haulage  ropes  should pref-
erably be  expressed  in terms  of  15  % of  the breaking strength of the 
rope  (basic stress). 
The  rope safety prescribed·by the  Mines  Inspectorate in respect  of  rope-
driven roadway-haulage  installations is 6-fold for materials transport, 
and  as  a  rule 9.5-fold for man-riding.  For materials transport  the  max-
imum  permissible stress of  the rope  would  therefore be  approximately 
17 % of the breaking strength of  the  rope. 
The  various stresses occurring during  a  haul  are  converted  into kinetic 
loading figures,  and the geometrical dimensions  of  ~he rope drive  and 
the  rope  guides  into geometrical  loading  figures,  by  means  of  tables 
(Fig.  25  and  26).  For  purposes  of  checking,  the ~wo loading figures  are 
transformed  - by  means  of  a  table prepared  by  the Seilprilfstelle der 
WBK  - into kinetic geometrical  loading figures  a  k  and  a  g· 
5.2.2.  Calculation of  the work  done  by  the rope. 
The  classification magnitude  Kstr  for  rope-driven  roadway-haulage  in-
stallation is developed  from  the kinetic  and  geometrical  loading fac-
tors  a  k  and  a  g·  The  classification magnitude  Kstr  is the  com-
ponent  of  the  new  rope  work  formula  for  roadway-haulage installations 
which takes  into account  the special conditions with respect  to rope 
loading.  The  rope  work  formula  itself consists of  the work  term W re-
lated to 1  kp  of  rope,  this expression being multiplied  by  the classi-
fication magnitude  Kstr  (Fig.  27).  The  conversion of the dimensionless 
classification magnitude  Kstr  into rope  loading groups  is carried out 
on  the basis of the  values  in the table in Fig.  28.  The  haulage  instal-
lations are here classified in five  permissible  loading groups  IK  - VK 
and  a  non-permissible  range  ~VK. A value  of  Kstr  greater than  1.1 
indicates that  the track causes  rope  consumption  above the average, 
while the  value  for  Kstr  below  0.9  indicates  a  value  below  average. 
With  one  and  the  same  design  of  rope it can therefore be  expected  in 
the second  case that  the rope will have  a  longer working  life - i.e. 
do  more  haulage work  than in the first  instance. 
The  degree  of  danger  in the event  of  a  rope  break is also classified 
in the table in Fig.  28  into five  permissible.groups In- Vn  and  a 
non-permissible  zone  ~  Vn.  The  explanatory  loads to the  individual 
groups  are  shown  in the table in Fig.  28. 
The  average  of  the class  index  of the  r.rrope  loading group"  and  the 
class  index  "degree  of  risk in the  event  of  rope  break"  gives  the  in-
dex  of the degree  of difficulty of the  installation VII,  11 
e.g. 
IlK +  VD 
=  index  of  degree  of difficulty  2 
6.  Rope state reports  showing falling-off  in rope strength for the  assessment  of  the 
behaviour  of  ropes under the effect  of different  factors  (standard sheets for 
ropes  used  in roadway-haulage  installations). 
6.1.  As  in the case of main- and staple-shaft ropes,  rope tests are carried out 
to determine  the working  life of suitability of  the  ropes  in testing-machine 
using pulsation and  a  three-roller apparatus  (with equal  or different roller 
diameters),  this latter device being given  an upwards  and  downwards  transla-
tory-movement  (Fig.  28).  The  resulte of  these tests are  recorded  in standard 
sheets which  show  the most  important test data.  In addition to the identifi-
cation in the top-right-hand corner  of  the sheet,  the test data  and results 
are entered in the appropriate boxes  below the  rope state pictures. 
Explanation of  the  identification: 
First  row  (from left to right) 
a)  roman  figure  Identification number  of  the  rope  design 
Identification letter for the rope  manufac-
turer 
b)  capital roman  letter 
c)  arabic  number  Angle  a  of  rope deflection on the outer 
rollers with  equal roller diameter 
d)  arabic  number  Amplitude  of  vibratio~ produced  by  the pul-
sator  a a  (kgf/mm2J 
Second  row  (from  left to right) 
Diameter  of  the upper,  middle  and  lower rollers in the bottom of  the groove. 
The  photographs  show the sections  of  rope after the tests 
a)  Top  left illustration: 
Section of  rope  subjected only to dynamic tests in the testing machine 
(scale  1.5  :  1) 
b)  Bottom  left-hand illustrations: 
Cross-section of  the  rope  samples  (scale-3.0  1) 
c)  The  central illustrations: 
A section of  the  rope  rolled over  once  per stroke of  the three-roller ap-
paratus  (1 alternate bending  per stroke),  (scale of  upper  illustration: 
1.5  :  1,  scale of  lower  illustration:  2.7  :  1) 
d)  Right-hand illustrations: 
Section of  rope  rolled twice  per stroke of  the three-roller apparatus 
(2  alternate bendings  per stroke),  (scale  of  upper  illustration:  1.5  :  1, 
scale of  lower  illustration:  2.7  :  1). 
The  boxes  below the three  groups  of  illustrations contain the  loading data 
and the test results of  the sections of  rope  illustrated above.  The  informa-
tion given  in each  case  comprises: 
Top  left  Maximum  and  minimum  force  on  the  rope  in kp 
Top  right  Minimum  and  maximum  stress in the rope  in kp/mm2 
Top  centre  Measured  maximum  rope  temperature  in  oc 
Top  right  Geometric  reflections of the rope  on the rollers in  g 
(degrees  on the 400°  circle) Right  centre 
Bottom right 
VII,  12 
Number  of  corresponding alternate bendings  produced  by  the 
three-roller apparatus 
Number  of  corresponding changes  of  loading between  minimum 
and  maximum  force. 
The  diagram given  below shows  the falling-off  in rope  force  in relation to 
the alternate bendings  (numbers  of times  the  rope  is rolled over  in the three-
roller apparatus).  The  rope  force  of  each section of  rope  is calculated from 
the tensile tests of  the  individual wires  according to the  geometrical  and 
dynamic  loadings acting. 
The  standard sheets  can also be  prepared as transparent  photocopies,  so 
that  by  superimposition they  can  be  used to compare  the different  character-
istic curves  of  breaking strength to provide  a  comparison  of  the effects of 
various degrees  of  loading  and types  of  rope  designed. 
The  standard sheets illustrated in Figs.  29  to 34  represent  a  choice  from 
some  of  which it will be  clearly seen  how  difficult it is to determine the 
point  in time at which  a  rope  should be  discarded,  in the  case  of  ropes with 
high  kinetic  and  geometrical  loadings.  The  other group shows  illustrations 
of  the state of  the  rope  under  low stresses.  In this case the  assessment  of 
the correct  time  for discarding a  rope  is easier,  and  in addition these  ropes 
can still absorb  a  fairly  large number  of  alternate bendings  before breaking. 
7.  Conclusion 
Only  after a  long  period of  investigation will it be possible to define 
the  limits of  the  new  testing process with respect to its expression  of  the operat-
ing conditions and  the clear separation of  the various factors affecting the work-
ing life of  the rope.  The  investigations carried out  to date at  the SeilprUfstelle 
der  WBK  constitute a  step along the road to a  rapid  and  fully  informative method 
of  dynamic  rope testing.  The  possibility of effectuating a  rapid analysis of  the 
factors  taking effect  offers a  new  aid in the assessment  of  ropes  and  the selec-
tion of  ropes.  It is particularly  important  for the success of the new  testing 
method to adapt  the methods  used  for  checking the operational suitability of  ropes 
to the testing method  in such  a  way  that  the differences between prediction and 
operational behaviour are clarified and  reduced.  Observation of  the trend of  these 
differences  make  it possible to  improve  the testing and  checking methods,  so leading 
to the  development  of  functionally satisfactory rope  designs. s· 
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Static conditions as rope stress with a tower-mounted .driving pulley system 
with a deflector pulley 
ICJ N C! r  Pit-bottom  -.  - . 
•C1usta 
C:S T  - Stress caused by dead weight 
CSN  - Stress caused by payload 
CSs  - as, + <:Ssz- Stress due to rope weight 
Geometrical bending stress at driving pulley 
------------·- --------
Geometrical bending stress at 
deflection ooints 
Additional stress on transmission of 
sources from driving pulley to rope 
Gu sla - Minimum value of the static heaving 
stress above the capel (pit bottom) 
Static heaving stress before running 
off the driving pulley 
~  Maximum value of the heaving stress 
OHJfa  •  above the capel (pit-bank) 
2GaJfa-
<Sobrsta-
CSubrsta-
Static range above the capel 
Maximum value of the static heaving/ 
bending stress in running off the driving pulley 
Minimum value of the static heaving/bending 
stress in running off the driving pulley 
crubrJta  - aobrsta- aN 
2CSabTJia •  Static range in the vicinity of the 
driving pulley  2 CSabT .sfa •  aN 
CSobRsla  •  Maximum value of heaving/bending stress 
in the vicinity of the deflector pulley 
S/11  •  Sta =Quasi static Fig. 3 
CSobrKdyn 
<Sobrdyn 
CSobRdyn 
Static and dynamic conditions as rope stress with a towermounted 
driving pulley system with a deflector pulley 
Pit-bank  ------
Pit-bottom 
<Su dvn •  Minimum value of the dynamic heaving 
J'  stress above the conveyance capel (pit bank) 
(Only during starting-up empty conveyance) 
Dynamic heaving stress before running off 
the driving pulley 
CS DH dvn •  Maximum value of dynamic heaving stress 
J  ·  above the capel (pit bank) 
2 ts.a drv.n •  Dynamic range above the capel with 
'J"  a minimum value of 
aobrdyn· 
aubrdyn· 
2CSabrdyn• 
Cfusla  = ar 
Maximum value of dynamic heaving/bending 
stress when running off the driving pulleys 
Minimum value of the dynamic heaving/ 
bending stress when running off the driving 
pulleys 
Dynamic range in the vicinity of the 
driving pulley 
CiubrKdyn~ (fubrdyn  + a K 
C1obrKdyn • CSobrdyn  + aK 
aobRdyn  • 
Maximum value of the heaving/bending 
stress in the vicinity of the deflector pulley 
CJobrK dvn  •  Maximum value of the heaving/bending stress 
J  ·  in the region of  the driving pulley with 
transmission of forces 
G I  Q  •  Quasi static Fig. 4 
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Phase 2 
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Large three-roller testing apparatus with magneto-in...,_• inspection 
of the state of the rope for dynamic rope tHts Fig.  7 
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Groups of factors affecting working life of rope 
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Fig. 8 
.  Kinetic  Static 
stretch movement  stretch movement · 
Hub= stroke 
Fig. 9 
Kinetic~ 
stretch movement 
H~b  =stroke 
--I 
Three-roller apparatus with similar rollers 
Rope sections rolled 1 to 3 times 
for one stroke 
Static 
stretch movement Fig. 10 
Continuous and shock-type braking and drive of ~ne roller 
(partlcal view of a three-roller apparatus) 
Side view of the 
pulsation-producing 
device 
Drive of one roller 
,_  1-~ 
Section of a  Side view of the 
three-roller apparatus  brake arrangement Fig. 11 
Diagram system for the assessment and selection of ropes 
which are· subject to heaving/bending stresses 
Group classification 
Group I.  Group II. 
Type of presentation 
Abscissa  Alternate bending  Alternate bending 
Ordinate  Combination of deflection angles  Rope stress 
Parameter  Rope stress  Combination of deflection angles 
Part groups 111  Part groups of 1111 
1.  Comparison of the rope designs 
and manufactures under 
different loadings  111/M u  designs  11/1/M u  designs 
111/F u  manufactures  1111/F u  manufactures 
Parameter  Rope designs manufacture  Rope designs/manufacture 
Part groups of 112  ·  ·  Part groups of 1112 
2.  Comparison of different rope 
designs and manufactures under 
similar loading  1/2/M/mK = Schm-Z  1112/M/o:/Schm-Z 
112/F/oK = Schm-Z  1112/F/a/Schm-Z 
--
Schm-Z = lubrification state 
m.K.  = with transmission of forces  a  = Combination of deflection angles 
o.K.  = without transmission of forces Fig.  12 
Assessment of the suitability of two-rope designs under 
varying geometrical and dynamic loadings 
Parameter = range 
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1F+6{1 + 6  + (6 + 6)} 
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cs8 = 160 kpfmm 2 Assessment of two-rope designs under varying geometrical 
and dynamic loadings 
Parameter = combination of deflector angles 
Fig. 13 
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Assessment of the suitability of the various rope designs 
under varying combinations of deflection angle and range 
from + and - 5 and + and -15 kp/mm2 
1  O'ob dyn (15) 
20'a =  ±.15,0kp/mm 2 
___.,+-~ 
II 
2ua= !S,o  -4r  I 
kp/mm2  II  O'ob d~n (5) 
10%von 0'9 :O"'ubdyn  --- O'a.  =!5kplmm
2 
-- O'o. =!15kplmm1 
Seale  Warrington  Warrington  Filled-in wire 
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Assessment of various rope designs under varying heaving/bending stresses 
and combinations of deflection angles 
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Part group 11/1  a 17,34 and 17 9 
Diameter of rollers: 92 mm 
Diameter of rope:  13 mm 
Part group 11/2 a  =  9,18 and 9 g 
Diameter of rollers: 92 mm 
Diameter of rope:  13 mm 
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z 
Zm 
qs 
D/dmH = 
D/dms = 
a 
Ropework formula for main- and staple-shaft ropes allowing 
for technological and dynamical loading 
z · Zm  [  tkm/kg  rope ]  old 
W dynH(B) =  . KH(B) 
1000 · qs  [  Mpkm/kg rope]  new 
Loading factor in main and staple shafts. 
[( S1  )  (  D/dmH(B)  )  (  Pm  )~  KH(B)= 1 +  - · a - 1  ,30  +  · s - 1  +  · b - 1 
S2  D/dm  Pm 
.  H(B) 
Number of winds 
The average rope tension in the loaded drum 
Weight of the rope in kp/m 
100, average ratio of driving pulley diameter 
to rope diameter in mainshaft 
60, average ratio of driving pulley to rope 
diameter in staple shaft 
Acceleration factor, type and magnitude 
of acceleration or deceleration allowed for 
St/S2 
s 
b 
PmH 
Pm8 
Ratio of rope forces, fully-loaded 
rope to unloaded rope 
Factor allowing for the number of rope pulleys 
and the diameter of the rope pulleys 
Bedding factor for driving and rope pulleys 
15 kp/cm2,  average,surface pressure in main 
shaft winders of rope and driving 
pulleys/rope and rope pulley 
25 kp/cm2,  average surface pressure 
in staple shafts of rope and driving 
pulleys/rope and rope pulley Fig. 17 
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Basic measurements 
of First Order 
i  of Second Order 
Measurements on shaft guides and winding ropes 
Surveying of shaft by 
light alignment 
methods 
(2 laser devices) 
Electrical plumb 
measurements 
on shaft guides 
Plumb, track and 
wear measurements 
on guides 
Geometrical 
and optical 
shaft surveying 
Geometrical 
measurements 
on shaft guides 
(guide track and 
wear of  gui~es) 
Geometrical 
measurements 
of gu.ides and force 
measurements 
(system I) 
Geometrical surveying 
of shaft guides and 
force measurements 
(system II) 
Measurement of the 
forces between guides 
and conveyances 
Co.mparison between 
geometrical and force 
measurements and 
accelerometer 
measurements 
Measurement of the 
horizontal and vertical 
accelerations of the 
conveyance (excursion) 
Geometrical 
surveying of  shaft 
guides and 
accelerometer 
measurements 
E--------------------------------~--------~r---------~~--------~--------~ 
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of Third Order  .. 
Geometrical and optical 
shaft surveying and force 
measurements between 
guides and conveyances 
Accelerometer 
measurements 
on conveyances 
As well as rope force 
measurements above 
the capel 
Measurement 
of rope forces 
a) above the capel 
b) by vibratory 
excitation Methods for making measurements on  shaft guides and in shafts 
Fig. 18 
View in direction A 
CD 
Laser alignment measurements  ~ 
Geometrical measurement of shaft guides 
with electrical measurement of apparent 
@ 
perpendicular 
Laser alignment device 
@  Centering plate 
® 
Angle measuring device  @  Electrical apparent vertical 
3  @ 
Measure table with device 
for measuring coordinates 
Conveyance ·  ®  Datum plane 
CD  Measuring rod  ® 
Measurement of forces Fig.  19 
One half of the combined 
shaft-guide measuring 
device  with  geometrical 
measurements of guides, 
force measurements bet-
ween guides and 
conveyance,andsu~ 
veying of shaft and 
guides with laser align-
ment device Fig. 20 
Three-roller apparatus subjected to translatory movement, 
for dynamic tests of roadway-haulage ropes Rotating rope and roller test-brake for roadway/haulage ropes 
Fig.  21 E 
t",. 
N  -
Fig. 22 
Elevation 
Plan 
Testing area for rope-driven roadway conveyances in the basement 
of the Seilpriifstelle 
-_- ----- T' -=-- -==--:--·:..___:_ :_----------
Braking test rig 
A 
c 
• = Measurement points on track B  - =  Measurement points on track C. 
Rope testing track 
Conveyance, roller, rail and support test track 
Braking track with adjustable launching incline, 
support-testing track Fig. 23 
Electrical heaving-stress measurement device for rope-driven 
roadway-haulage installations Fig. 24 
Stress measurement and classification device for ropes used 
in roadway/haulage installations Fig. 25 
Geometrical co-efficient 
Table to determine the geometrical and kinetic loading 
indices a9.  and ak of ropes used for roadway haulage 
~  values 
Kinetic co-efficient 
~  Non permitted  I 
========;:::======::;:=========::;:==~======= 
Angle of 
deflection  [g) 
return roller 
0/d ratio: 
Only for return rollers 
100~200g 
Only for deflection rollers 
0-10g 
20-309 
40-509 
50-609 
0  /d30 
u 
2,5 
1,1 
2,3 
3,7 
0  /d 3Q-40 
u 
OA/d 7-9 
2,0 
1,0 
2,1 
3,3 
> 0  /d40 
u 
OA/d >9 
1,5 
0,9 
1,95 
3,05 
4,2 
In .excess of basic stress  Loading co-efficient 
u  = 15%u 
Gr  8  1,0 
<40%=21 %u 
8  1,3 
40-80% = 27%u
8  2,3 
Multiplication factors for the 
geometrical co-efficients 
Condition of the groove  Deflection from plane 
·Good  0,95  1,0 Fig. 26 
Example of the determination of the kinetic and geometrical 
loading indices ak and ag 
Kinetic loading index: 
3 
f Number of changes of force in a region  x  Corresponding kinetic co-efficient 
rolled-over length of rope in metres 
[~,3] +- new co-efficient 
= 47  · 1  ,3 + 14 · 2,3 + 5 · 3,3 = O  21  [0 20]  corrected 
520  t  '  '  loading index 
co-efficient lies above 
the permissible limit 
Geometrical loading index: 
co-efficient for 
rolling round 
\ 
co-efficients for deflection 
multiplication factor for 
deflection from the plane 
~~ 
3 . 2,5 + 12 . 2,1  + 9 . 3,3 + 2 . 4,2 . 1  '1 
=  0,29 
rolled-over length of rope = 520 m Fig. 27 
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z 
mStr 
qs 
6 
The rope work formula for rope-driven roadway-haulages 
z  · Zm Str  [  (  6  )  (  [Dr/d]m 
W  Str=  .  1 +  S  . ak - 1  +  Dr/d  . a g - 1000 · q 5 
in  Mpkm/kp 
Work term W 
w 
= Total number of winds 
(outward and return) 
= Average vatue of rope winds in the fully-loaded 
and unloaded strands 
= Weight per metre of the rope 
Pr~scribed rope safety index for roadway 
conveyances wtien hauling m~terials 
Classification magnitude Str 
s  = Existing rope safety index 
ak  = Kinetic rope loading factor 
ag  = Geometrical rope loading factor 
Dr  = Diameter of·driving pulley 
d  = Rope diameter 
[DT/d]  = Average value of the ratio DT/d in roadway 
m  rope haulages in the Ruhr Fig. 28 
Loading indices 
Kinetic  -----
geometrical-----
Loading factors ak and a
9 
Classification 
magnitudes 
l 
Table to determine the degree of difficulty in the ro~e-drlven  · 
roadway haulage from the degree of rope loading and 
the degree of danger in the event of rope break 
Value calculated by the· 
SeilprOfstelle der WBK 
0,8  0,9  1,0  1,1 
<0.7  0,7.0,9  0,9-1,1  1,1-1.3 
1.2 
1,3-1,5 
Degree of rope loading  1 K 
11
K 
Degree of difficulty 
of the install&tion 
Example 
Degree of danger in the event 
of rope break 
R =  Curve in space  · 
88.-88888 
'o 
Level, throughs up  to 
59• adequate recovery 
length 
"o 
Level to stretches 
inclined to 10g. 
adequate recovery 
·distance 
1110 
up to 20g 
~ 
R 
Stretches Inclined 
up to 20g, a~uate 
recovery distance 
IV
0  VD 
up to 30g  'up.to 5og 
~  '"'  R  R 
Stretches inclined 
upto30~.  Inclined up to 509, 
recovery distance  recovery distance 
not adequate  not adequate Fig. 29 
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Standard sheet for rope atlas Nr.  VI- B- 25- 15 
Rope design: filled-in rope 
Type of lubrication 
Type of impregnation 
10000 
1 F+6  [1 +6+6+12  J 
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9J6  Alternate bending (3-roller apparatus) 
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Rope design:  filled-in rope 
Type of lubrication 
Typ~ of impregnation 
l 
1/ 
I 
Standard sheet for rope atlas Nr.  VI- B-9- 5 
1 F+6  [1 +6+6+12  J 
Wire-¢  0,9  0,9  0,4  0,85 
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Rope design:  Seale 
Type of lubrication 
Type ~- impregnation 
1F+6  [1+9+9  J 
Wire-cf>  1  ,3  0,6  1  ,05 
Standard sheet for rope atlas Nr. Ill-B-25-5 
92-92-92 
f 
J 
~~ 
i j 
15 
1-•7 
13</» 
Groove: 
a)  smooth 
i~ 
~ i  101---..... 
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Rope design:  Seale 
Type of lubrication  Oegreased 
Type of impregnation 
10000 
Standard sheet for rope atlas Nr.  Ill-B-9-10 
89-89-89 
1F+6  [1+9+9  J 
Wire -4>  1  ,3  0,6  1  ,05 
20000  ~000 
b) run-in 
Depth of the 
structure 
mm 
50000 
----- Alternate bending (3-roller apparatus) 
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0 Fig. 33  Standard sheet for rope atlas Nr.  IX -A-25 - 15 
Rope design:  Warrington  1F+6  [1+6+6+6  J 
Wire-q,  0,95  0,95  0,95  0,70 
Type of lubrication 
Type of impregnation 
10000  20000  JOOOO  0 
690  --~-~  Alternate bending (3-roller apparatus) 
92-92-92 
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Rope design:  Warrington 
Type of lubrication 
Type of impregnation 
Standard sheet for rope atlas Nr.  IX - A - 9 - 5 
1F+6  [1+6+6+6  J 
Wire-<P  0,95  0,95  0,95  0,70 
92-92-92 
13</> 
a) smooth 
~~~~~~~~~+J,.-+--~-.t=--+-----i~~+--+---4~~~---~  b) run-in 
Depth of the 
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'E 
E  ......  a.  =.. 
Q) 
b 
~--~------~--~---------.----------.----------P--~------~~0  0  10000  20000  JOOOO  soooo 
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Further  investigation of  the dust  and  firedamp  explosion hazard was  felt 
to  b~ necessary  following  the Luisenthal disaster,  when  dust  explosions  raged through 
7.2  km.  of  roadway  despite barriers and wet  zones at  many  points  in the mine. 
Before setting up  a  Working  Party,  the Restricted  Committee  and the  Commis-
sion instructed the Secretariat to make  a  preliminary study to enable attention to 
be  concentrated  on certain major  practical aspects,  including in particular dust  con-
trol by  means  of  neutralization and  of  barriers. 
One  important  point to be  ascertained was  how  far the results of  experi-
ments hitherto carried out  in test galleries of  comparatively  small dimensions  could 
be  extrapolated with respect to the very  long and  large-section roadways  common  in 
actual operations.  In addition,  the Secretariat was  to find  out  the position in each 
country  regarding means  for arresting an  explosion in its initial stages,  and  means 
for arresting it after it had  developed to sizeable proportions  over  some  distance. 
A questionnaire  on  neutralization and barriers was  issued to the different 
countries  (Doc.  N°  5521/1/63,  of  November  20,  1963),  and  a  summary  compiled of the 
replies  (Doc.  N°  4082/64,  of  June  17,  1964). 
The  respective positions were  briefly as  follows: 
a)  in Britain neutralization only  was  employed,  but  the matter had  been  intensively 
restudied since  1960 in the  light of  accidents  and  of  practice in different  coun-
tries,  and the value of barriers had  been  acknowledged  following explosions  in 
which  neutralization had  proved  in~ffective; 
b)  in Italy the view was  taken that  neutralization was  sufficient to halt  a  dust  ex-
plosion without  barriers as well; 
c)  in the other E.c.s.c.  countries,  on  the other hand,  it was  agreed  (with  some  minor 
variations of  opinion on  points  of  detail)  that  both were  necessary,  and  mines 
were  required or  recommended to employ  a  combination of the two.  At  the same  time 
it was  clear that there was  still debate as to the best  way  of  positioning bar-
riers,  both main  and  auxiliary,  the choice  of  type  of  barrier,  where  to install 
them  ,  and so on. 
The  Commission  then set up  a  Working  Party  on  Combustible Dusts to study 
the subject,  with  terms  of  reference initially laid down  in Doc.  ~o  928/66,  and  sub-
sequently'amended at the meeting  on  April  24-25,  1967,  in line with the Working  Par-
ty's own  views  as expressed  on  February  2. 
The  amended  terms  of  reference are as follows: 
"The.Working Party shall study  protective measures  against  dust  ignition, 
with special reference to 
1)  neutralization  (on-the-spot  dust  control,  stone-dusting,  water  spraying,  "laying" 
by  means  of salt pastes and coagulants,  etc.); 
2)  barriers  (different  types  of  barrier,  their construction,  positioning,  etc.), 
having  due  regard to 
a)  the mechanism  of dust  ignition and  flame  propagation, 
b)  factors  relevant  of  the detonation and  propagation of  the dust  explosion such 
as 
.  nature and/or V.M.  content  of  the coal, 
•  fineness  of the coal, 
.  dust  concentration, 
.  amount  of  firedamp  present, 
•  cause  of  ignition, .  influence of  moisture, 
•  geometry  of the  roadway, 
.  etc. 
VIII,  8 
The  Working  Party  may  propose any  research it considers  likely to be help-
ful  in furthering  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  concerned and  contributing to improved 
safety in this connection." 
X 
X  X 
The  Working  Party held its first meeting  on February 2,  1967  and  after 
hearing the views  of  each delegation decided to give priority to the study  of  stone-
dust,  water  and  trigger barriers.  Two  sub-committees were  then set up. 
Sub-Committee  1,  consisting of  representatives of  the three countries with 
substantial experience  in this field,  was  asked to note  instructive points suggested 
by  accident  reports.  From  these it could also prepare  an  aide-memoire  for use at  fu-
ture accident  inquiries,  listing relevant  points to note  on  such  occasions,  with  a 
view to assembling as  much  information as  possible concerning the performance of 
barriers. 
The  Sub-Committee  was  directed 
a)  to select typical cases; 
b)  to consider each  incident entirely without  reference to the human  or  personal el-
ement  or to any  aspect  relating to responsibility; 
c)  to deal  only  with  incidents since  1950,  except  in instances of  special relevance. 
The  rapporteurs were  to be  Messrs.  Hoyle,  HUbner  and  Rebiere. 
Sub-Committee  2,  consisting of  heads  of  testing stations,  was  to determine 
the position with regard to 
a)  knowledge  definitely established from  past  experiments,  with particulars of  the 
conditions under  which  these were  effected; 
b)  experiments  in hand; 
c)  experiments which  could usefully be  undertaken to remedy  existing deficiencies. 
Suggestions for future activity should  be  confined to experiwents  likely 
to produce  concrete results at  an  early date,  more especially concerning 
1)  the comparative merits of the Polish and  the German  type  of barrier; 
2)  the preferability of using several types  (heavy,  light,  intermediate)  or only  one 
suitable for all occasions,  if available; 
3)  the  minimum  distance of the first barrier from  the possible point  of  ignition, 
and the type of this advance barrier. 
The  rapporteurs were  to be  Messrs.  Loison,  Steffenhagen  and  Woodhead. 
A  mee~ing of  the  two  sub-Committees,  presided over  by  Herr  Schneider,  the 
Chairman  of  the  Working Party,  was  held  on  June  16.  The  meeting,  which  was  also at-
tended,  in addition to the rapporteurs,  by  two  observers,  Messrs.  Demelenne  and  Maas, 
discussed the various  papers requested  by  the  Working  Party. 
X 
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The  Working  Party  met  again  on  September  22,  when  it considered the papers 
prepared by  the rapporteurs  and  drew  up  a  set  of  proposals  and  conclusions to be 
laid before the  Commission. 
Aide-Memoire  of  Relevant  Particulars for  the Study  of  Dust-Explosion Accidents 
(Doc.  N°  436/2/67) 
The  Working  Party  recommended  that the  Commission  arrange for this document, 
which it considered to be of  value technically,  to be circulated in appropriate quar-
ters.  It should be borne  in mind  that 
a)  the document  was  not  in the nature of  an  instruction,  since it in  no  way  altered 
the existing national-level obligations in the matter  of  accident  inquiries; 
b)  it was  intended as  a  guide to assist  investigators,  who  after all had  a  great 
many  things  on their minds  at  such times; 
c)  it was  to be used  by  them  for  reference  in assembling  particulars which  had  proved 
relevant  in the explanation of  accidents  and  might  form helpful background material 
for the planning of  future  study  and  research work. 
Dust  Explosions  in Germany,  France and  Britain  (Doc.  Nos.  4005,  4009  and  4010/67) 
Comments  on  Dust  Explosions  which  have  occurred in the  Community  and  in Great  Britain 
(Doc.  N°  545/67) 
The Working  Party  proposed that  the  Commission  have  these  documents  circu-
lated in the  same  way  as the Aide-Memoire.  It was  to be  noted that 
a)  no  accidents prior to 1950 were  considered,  in view  of  the changes  in operating 
conditions since then; 
b)  only accidents both  1)  typical,  2)  adequately  documented  and 3)  presenting in-
structive features were  considered.  Recent  accidents still under  investigation 
were  excluded.  (There  had  been  some  typical accidents  concerning which  adequate 
information was  forthcoming,  but  also many  where  the particulars were  incomplete: 
the object  of  the Aide-Memoire  was  to remedy  this state of affairs.) 
The  Working  Party further  proposed that  similar records  be  compiled  and 
circulated in future with respect  not  only  to dust  explosions but  also to firedamp 
explosions  (not  firedamp  ignitions),  whether  or not  barriers came  into the picture. 
These,  supplemented  in accordance with the Aide-Memoire,  would  be  sent to the  Commis-
sion at  the  same  time  as the final reports,  and  could then be circulated at regular 
intervals, (to be  fixed  by  the Commission),  with all personal elements expunged. 
Bibliography  of  French Experiments  in Connection with Barriers and  Control  Equipment 
in the Vicinity  of  the Workface:  Cerchar,  M.  Loison  (Doc.  N°  546/67) 
Research to Date  on Barrier Protection against  Firedamp  and  Coal-Dust  Explosions: 
Dr.  Steffenhagen  (Doc.  N°  7475/66) 
Ministry  of  Power.  Safety  in Mines  Research  Establishment:  British contribution 
(Doc.  Nos.  723  and  724/67) 
The  Working  Party  proposed that the  Commission  arrange for the circulation 
of  these documents  in accordance with the demand  in each  of  the countries concerned. 
It was  to be  noted that  they  showed  the position as at the following  re-
spective times  of  writing: 
German  paper  (7475/66),  May  1966; 
French  paper  (546/67),  January  1967; 
British paper  (723/67),  January  1967. 
Since these dates,  however,  much  important  work  had  been done  at  the re-
search establishmentsJwhich needed to be taken into account  as it might  affect  and 
would certainly add  to the findings  recorded.  In Germany  in particular a  large  number 
of  explosions had  been carried out  at  Tremonia  and  the disused  Kaiserstuhl pit. VIII,  10 
Research was  also in progress  into the functioning  of  barriers and  the use 
of  extinguishing powders.  In addition,  experiments were  being conducted  into possible 
ways  of  arresting firedamp  explosions. 
Draft Study  Programme  on Barriers  (Doc.  N°  3243/67) 
The  Working  Party  emphasized that this was  a  schedule of  research objectives, 
not  of  actual projects. 
It considered the programme  extremely valuable.  It wished to draw  the  Com-
missions's.attention to the very  large  number  of matters still calling for study,  and 
urged the  Commission to take the  programme  into account  in planning future studies. 
At  the same  time,  since the research in question would  be  long and  costly 
and the  industry  had  fallen on  hard times,  it expressed the hope  that the  present 
co-operation among  research establishments would  be still further  intensified in this 
field where  it was  so eminently necessary. 
Skeleton Framework  for  Recording Results  of  Experiments with Barriers.  Summary  of 
Work  in Connection with  Coal-Dust  Neutralization and Anti-Explosion Barriers  (Doc. 
NO  3244/67) 
The  Working  Party urged the Commission to recommend  this document,  which 
was  not  intended to be  exhaustive but  was  offered as  guidance with  a  view to securing 
uniform presentation of  the results of  future  experiments. 
X 
X  X 
It  was  observed that,  though  the Working  Party  had  concentrated more  espe-
cially on the subject  of  barriers,  a  number  of  other  important  matters  had  also been 
raised;  attention had  been  drawn to the origins of  dust  explosions,  which  were  very 
commonly  firedamp  explosions. 
The  Working  Party recognized that it had  not  been able to tackle all the 
points  listed in its remit,  nor all the points  liable to bring about  dust  explosions. 
From  the wealth of  instructive material before it, its conclusion was  that, 
although  in some  cases barriers had  functioned satisfactorily - which  was  encouraging 
for the future  - there had also been  numerous  failures,  calling for  prolonged further 
research. 
In the present state of  knowledge,  the  Working  Party felt  it would  be  pre-
mature to submit  to the Commission  any definite draft  recommendations  for the atten-
tion of  managements. 
It had at  any rate been able to draw  an  Aide-M~moire for accident  investi-
gators,  and  to contribute in some  measure to closer co-operation among  research estab-
lishments  by  drafting proposals for  a  joint study  programme  and  a  joint  framework  for 
recording research results. AIDE-MEMOIRE  OF  RELEVANT  PARTICULARS  FOR  THE  STUDY  OF 
DUST-EXPLOSION  ACCIDENTS VIII,  13 
1  Location of  explosion zone 
11  Description of  working  or workings  affected 
Designation of  seams,  workings,  cross-cuts. 
12  Coal  semi-bituminous,  bituminous  or high-volatile bituminous;  volatile-matter 
content. 
2  Working  conditions  in explosion  zone 
General  information 
Explosion occurred during  preparatory work  in a  district,  a  working,  during 
coal-getting,  advancing  a  heading;  workings  in operation at time  of  explosion, 
workings  not  in operation. 
22  Coal-winnings:  working  advancing to the rise or  on  a  gradient,  advancing  or re-
treating working,  method  of  stowing,  length,  dip and thickness of coal-face. 
23  Transport  details,  e.g.  coal  conveyor,  roads,  stowage material  and  supplies 
haulage  roads, rail,  conveyor  or monorail  haulage. 
24  Types  of  support  used 
Cross-section in affected zone,  in m2: 
- at the face, 
- in the gate-roads, 
- in the cross-cuts,  etc. 
3  Ventilation conditions  in explosion zone  (1) 
31  Main  air stream,  auxiliary air streams,  air streams  in the workings  and  t·hose 
by-passing the workings,  zones  of  unstable ventilation. 
32  Intake airways,  return airways 
Auxiliary exhaust  or  forced ventilation. 
33  Air quantities in m3  per min.  or sec. 
At  seat  of  explosion,  in the ventilation district  (air intake,  air return), 
at  foot  of the coal-winning,  etc. 
34  Air velocity  in metres  per second 
At  seat  of  explosion,  in ventilation district  (air intake,  air return),  at  foot 
of  the coal-winning,  etc. 
35  Rate  of  emission  of  methane  in  m3  per min.  For  coal-winnings also rate of 
emission of  methane  in  m3  per ton of  production. 
~36  Methane  content  of air stream at seat  of  explosion. 
Results  of  last measurements  before  incident  in explosion zone  (methanometer, 
flame  safety  lamp). 
37  Any  methane  accumulations;  details of  location and  amounts  of  accumulations. 
Layers  of  methane  at the roof;  details of  location and size of  layers. 
38  Humidity  and barometric pressure. 
(1)  This  information should preferably be  supplemented by  a  plan showing the direction 
of the ventilation and  the quantities of air,  the siting of the barriers and  zones 
treated with stone-dust  or salt pastes,  the points at which  the  main  mechanical 
and  thermal effects were  noted,  and  the positions of the casualties. VIII,  14 
381  Hygrometric  readings  of air in%  (or dry  and  damp  temperature). 
382  Barometric  pressure before and  during explosion. 
39  Any  disturbances  of  ventilation immediately before incident. 
4  Coal-dust  in explosion zone and  preventive measures  supposed to be  taken 
41  Sources  of  dust  produced:  coal-getting machines,  shotfiring,  falls of  coal,  etc. 
42  Quantity  of  dust  deposited  (large,  medium,  slight): 
421  At  the foot  of  the face. 
422  In  the  return airways. 
423  In the  conveyor  and  haulage roads  (air intake). 
424  At  the  conveyor transfer and  delivery points. 
425  In the various affected roadways. 
426  Degree  of  humidity  of  floor,  sides  and  roof  of the roadways  (dry,  damp,  very 
damp). 
43  Coal-dust  prevention and  suppression. 
431  Preventive measures  supposed to be  taken. 
4311  At  the face:  water  infusion of  the solid coal,  spraying,  sprinkling of  coal-
getting machines,  etc. 
4312  In the affected roadways:  sprinkling,  spraying,  salt crusts,  removal  of  dust 
by  shovel or suction,  spreading of  stone-dust,  salt pastes,  etc. 
432  Checks  before  incident  to ascertain whether  preventive measures  under  431  were 
taken: 
- methods  of  dust  sampling and  measurement, 
- frequency  of  checks,  period since last  check, 
- place where  samples  were  taken, 
- result  of  checks  (quantities of  dust,  rate of  stone-dusting,  degree  of  damp-
ness,  etc.). 
433  Preventive measures  actually taken,  as established after the explosion. 
4331  In the affected coal-winnings. 
4332  In  the affected roadways. 
5  State of barriers  (stone-dust  or water)  before explosion 
51  Methods  of  barrier construction. 
511  Stone-dus~ barriers. 
5111  Main  and  auxiliary barriers  (heavy,  light,  mixed). 
5112  Types  of barrier: 
- German  Dortmund  barriers, 
-Polish barriers  (planks  in direction of  roadway), 
- other types. VIII,  15 
5113  Constructional material,  dimensions  and  arrangement  of barrier shelves  (length, 
width,  position in cross section of  roadway). 
5114  Description and  dimensions  of  supports  and  shelf  components  which  ensure their 
collapsibility. 
5115  Number  of  shelves,  distance between shelves. 
5116  Type  of·stone-dust,  theoretical maximum  loading  in  kg  or  litres: 
- per metre  of  shelf, 
- per shelf, 
-per m2  of  roadway  cross-section  (state area of  cross-section). 
5117  Period since last  loading of  shelves. 
5118  Any  special features  of barriers as actual constructed. 
5119  Quantity  and  quality  of  stone-dust actually used  (effect  of  humidity). 
512  Water  barriers. 
5121  Description of water  barriers. 
5122  Theoretical and actual quantity of  water. 
52  Neutralization zones  served by barriers. 
53  Position of  barriers concerned. 
531  Position of  barriers closest to seat  of  explosion,  their distance from seat 
of  explosion,  from workings,  junctions or right-angled bonds  in roadways. 
532  Location  of other  barriers,  distances between them  and distance from  roadway 
junctions. 
6  Course  and  effects of  explosion 
61  Presumed  origin of  explosion. 
611  Presumed  (or most  probable)  cause of  ignition. 
612  In the case of  explosions started by  ignition of  methane,  presumed  volume  of 
methane  accumulation or  layer. 
62  Part  played by  coal dust. 
621  Sources  of  large-scale dust  production or  large deposits  of  dust  between seat 
of  explosion and first barriers. 
622  Presence and  location of  carbonized coal dust. 
6221  Quantity  of  carbonized coal dust  deposited. 
6222  Nature  of  carbonized deposits:  crusts,  granula,  dust. 
6223  Presence  of  coke  beyond first barrier. 
63  Mechanical effects. 
631  Pressure and blast  (stake and  dynamic  pressures). 
6311  Any  slow ignition in zone  of  spread of  explosion  (without  pressure). 
6312  At  seat  of  explosion,  pressure in  kg  per  cm2  where this can be  calculated or 
estimated.  Direction of blast. VIII,  16 
6313  Damage  to supports,  ventilation doors,  materials,  transport  installations, 
caused  by  pressure or blast. 
6314  Effect  of pressure or blast upon personnel.  Pulmonary  lesions,  serious injuries. 
Number  of persons killed by  mechanical effects. 
632  Speed  of  propagation of  explosion  (calculated or estimated). 
6321  In zone  of  spread of  explosion. 
6322  Close to barriers. 
64  Thermal  effects. 
641  Roadways  affected by  flame. 
6411  Effects of  flame after explosion,  e.g.  coke,  colour  changes,  scorched material, 
beatings,  smouldering fires,  open fires,  effects on electric cables. 
6412  Places  showing signs  of  persistent  combustion  of  a  rich gas  accumulation,  e.g. 
heavily charred timber. 
6413  Places where  signs of  medium-scale  combustion were  observed. 
6414  Places where  combustion was  established by  laboratory microscope  examinations. 
6415  Overall  length of  roadways  affected by  flame. 
6416  Number  of  persons burned,  number  of fatalities resulting from burns at  the 
time  or  later. 
642  Point  of  extinction of  flame  and  cause: 
a)  absence  of  combustible matter 
b)  natural dampness 
c)  adoption of  preventive measures  listed under  431 
d)  operation of barriers. 
6421  Estimated  volume  of  gas  presumed to be  pure methane  which  burned. 
65  Action of  fumes  and  smoke. 
651  Casualties resulting from  poisoning in return air of  explosion.  Number  of  per-
sons  killed and  number  of  persons otherwise  poisoned.  co2  haemoglobin rate. 
652  Casualties resulting from  poisoning in air intake or other ventilation districts. 
6521  Due  to explosion penetrating into other ventilation districts.  Number  of  per-
sons killed and  number  of  persons  otherwise poisoned.  C~ haemoglobin rate. 
6522  Due  to reversal of ventilation.  Number  of  persons killed and  number  of  persons 
otherwise  poisoned.  C02  haemoglobin rate. 
7  Effectiveness of barriers: State in respect  of  each barrier whether its opera-
tion was: 
71  Effective.(shelves dislodged,  flame  extinguished within zone of barrier or at 
a  short distance from barrier). 
72  Partially effective  (shelves dislodged,  flame  not  extinguished  and barrier 
passed  by  flame,  or some  shelves not  dislodged). 
73  Ineffective  (shelves not  dislodged,  although flame  passed barrier). 
74  Unnecessary  (flame  was  arrest·ed before reaching barrier). VIII,  17 
8  General conclusions 
81  State roadways  in which application of stone-dust,  spraying,  salt pastes,  etc. 
was  effective or ineffective. A RECORD  OF  TYPICAL  ACCIDENTS  DUE  TO  COAL-DUST  EXPLOSIONS 
OVER  THE  PAST  TEN  YEARS,  WITH  A COMMENTARY 
Comments  on  dust  explosion which 
occured  in the  Community  and  in Great Britain VIII,  21 
I  - General  remarks 
The brief  notes  attached concern accidents  in which  dust  explosions  occurred, 
the accidents themselves  being of  a  nature  likely to provide  information regarding 
the effectiveness of  stone-dust barriers. 
A standard questionnaire has  been  prepared for  the collection of  valuable 
information to be  found  in reports describing dust  explosions.  This  document  comprises 
questions  on  the design  of  a  stone-dust  barrier,  the situation of  the barriers in the 
mine  and the part  they  played during the explosion.  Other questions again deal with 
preventive measures  and with ignition sources,  and  thus  go  beyond  the strict limit of 
stone-dust barriers.  There  are,  however,  two  reasons  for  which it seemed  valuable to 
include them: 
- firstly,  in order to be  able to judge  the conditions of  effectiveness of 
barriers,  it is helpful to know  all the factors which  may  have affected the  intensity 
of  the explosion; 
- secondly,  the records  prepared  in this way  for the different  explosions 
could subsequently  be  used for other purposes  than the  investigation of stone-dust 
barriers,  e.g.  to examine  the effect  of  stone-dusting or  of salt-paste spraying on 
the  propagation of  the explosions. 
This questionnaire,  in its final  form,  constitutes the attached memorandum 
which  is to be  submitted to the authorities who  will have to report  on the dust  ex-
plosions.  It is clear that  there is no  thought  of  imposing  a  strict framework  on these 
authorities,  our  purpose  being  only to remind  them  of all the information which it is 
desirable to provide for  each case,  because  of  the value these data may  have  for  a 
more  general  investigation of  dust  explosions. 
Among  the  information collected in this way  regarding  past  accidents,  we 
have  noted below the behaviour  of  different  stone-dust  barriers situated in the  zones 
affected by  the explosions.  This  makes  it possible to group the stone-dust barriers 
in three categories: 
- those which  did not  function,  because the flames  stopped for  some  other 
reason before reaching them; 
- those which actually did halt  the flames; 
- those which did not  stop the flames. 
In  actual fact,  it is sometimes difficult to draw  a  distinction between the 
two  latter categories.  The  furthest  point  reached  by  the flame  can be  established 
only  by  the presence  of  observed effects of  heating.  Hot  gases  remaining for  a  fairly 
long  period  in an  explosion zone  may  produce effects similar to those  of  the flame 
proper when  it is travelling very  fast.  But  traces of  combustion  (and  not  simply  of 
fusion)  are definitely an  indication that  the flame  has  passed that  point.  One  must 
~also be  very  cautious  about  drawing  conclusions  from  very  light  objects showing traces 
of  combustion,  as these objects may  have  been carried a  long way  by  the force  of  the 
explosion,  for  example,  carbonized coal-dust  or small  pieces of  paper. 
On  this point,  it would  be useful to know  what  has  been  observed  in experi-
mental  roadways,  and  to lay  down  clearly what  should still be  studied in order to 
establish criteria which will make  it possible to determine with certainty and  in 
every  case the furthest  limit  of  the flame's travel. 
II  - Explosions  in Great  Britain 
The  two  dust  explosions which  occurred  in Great  Britain are very  clear from 
this point  of  view.·The  stone-dust  barriers effectively stopped the flames. VIII,  22 
1st  case  - The  barrier was  situated in  a  level belt-road  9  m  (10 yds)  from  the foot 
of  a  rise heading  in the coal,  70 m  (76  yds)  in  length and  containing  a  shaker con-
veyor.  The  barrier was  of  Polish design,  of  the mixed  type,  consisting of  10 heavy 
platforms  and  6  light  platforms. 
Heavy  platforms:  length  1,80 m  (6'),  width 0,50 m  (1'  8"),  weight  of  un-
treated  limestone dust  135  kg  (300  lbs) 
Light  platforms:  length  1,80 m  (6'),  width 0,35  m  (1'  2"),  weight  of  un-
treated  limestone dust  55  kg  (120 lbs) 
Total weight  3720 lbs  (approximately  1.700 kg). 
The  platforms were  spaced at  1,80 m centres.  They  were  set  in the upper 
third of  the  roadway,  which  had  a  cross-section of  5,5  m2  in the vicinity of  the dust 
barrier. 
Before the accident,  all the routine analyses  showed  stone-dust  levels 
above  75  %,  but  no analysis  had  been  carried out  in the rise heading.  After  the  ex-
plosion,  a  sample  of  dust  taken at  floor  level showed  42,8% of  incombustible matter, 
while  the  samples  taken  from the roof  or  roadway  walls  showed  from  79  to 96  %. 
The  explosion was  caused  by  a  round  of shots fired  in the rising roadhead, 
which  ignited an  accumulation  of  firedamp  estimated to be  5  m3  of  pure  CH4.  In the 
rise heading the  explosion was  not  very  violent,  but  it was  intensified at  the junc-
tion  of  the rise heading  and  the  level road.  The  blast  effects were slight,  but  the 
stone-dust  barrier whose  frontage  was  9  m further  away  from this point  was  completely 
disturbed, 
The  flame  covered  170m of  the  roadway.  The  clearest traces of  combustion 
were  found  in the vicinity of  the junction.  In the  level road,  towards  the heading 
face,  the flame  went  out  of  its own  accord,  the last signs  of  its passage  being  some 
60  m from  the junction.  In the other direction,  the signs of  the flame's  passage 
stopped virtually at  the barrier;  beyond this point,  there was  nothing  but  the wreck-
age  of  the stone-dust  barrier,  slightly charred,  and  a  little carbonized dust  on  the 
metal  roadway  arches, 
To  sum  up,  in the case  of this relatively light  explosion: 
- the stone-dusting in the rise heading  was  not  sufficient  to stop it, 
- as  against  this,  the stone-dust barrier was  completely effective. 
2nd  case  - This  occurred during  a  period when  all work  in the mine  had  stopped.  Sev-
eral stone-dust  barriers were  located  in the district,  only  one  being affected by  the 
flames;  this  one  had  stopped the explosion effectively. 
The  stone-dust barrier was  225  m away  from  the heading face  in  an  intake 
airway.  It  was  a  light Polish barrier consisting of  8  2,10 x  0,35  m platforms  each 
loaded  with  90  kg  of  limestone dust  (giving  a  total of  720 kg).  The  cross-section of 
the  intake airway  was  approximately  12m2,  giving 60  kg  of  dust  per  m2.  The  distance 
between  centres of  the platforms  varied  from  1,35 to 2,25  m,  In addition,  the road-
ways  were  dusted with  limestone dust. 
Since  no  work at all was  going  on  in the mine,  the origin of the explosion 
is not known with certainty.  It is thought  that  an  electrical discharge  caused  by  a 
storm caused the  ignition of  the firedamp  which  had  accumulated  in the heading.  In 
the vicinity of·the heading face,  the mechanical effects were violent  (roof falls had 
occurred).  The  stone-dust barrier,  situated 225m away,  was  completely upset.  As 
against this,  another  light barrier - of  German  design  and  comprising  4  platforms, 
situated 390m from  the heading face- remained almost  intact.  It was  also observed 
that  violent  effects had  occurred  in two cross-cuts linking the heading faces  of  the 
parallel intake and  return airways.  A  barrier in the return airway  had  been partially 
upset. VIII,  23 
The  flame  went  only  20m past  the first barrier in the  intake airway.  Be-
yond this nothing was  found  but  coke-dust.  The  flame  did not  penetrate into there-
turn airways  but  stopped  in the cross-buts. 
The  fact  that  dust  was  involved  in this explosion is quite certain,  but  it 
was  not  predominate.  The  stone-dust  barrier acted effectively. 
III  - Explosions which  occurred  in Germany 
In Germany  stone-dust barriers are built  according to the Dortmund  regula-
tions.  In the examples  investigated certain stone-dust  barriers were effective and 
others were  not. 
Pit A- The  accident appears to have  been  due  to the  ignition of  firedamp 
emitted  in-con8equence of  ground  movements,  the source of  ignition being  a  heating 
behind the  lagging.  Two  stone-dust barriers situated one  on  each side of  the  ignition 
point,  respectively  10m and  50 m away,  did  not  stop the flame,  and this was  doubt-
less due to the fact  that  the explosion had  not  yet  attained a  sufficient degree of 
violence.  As  against  this,  a  further stone-dust  barrier failed to stop the explosion 
which  by  now  had  become  too violent.  One  barrier acted effectively and  others were 
not  involved,  since the flame  was  stopped before it reached  them. 
Pit  B  - The  explosion was  caused  by  a  round  of  shots fired  in  a  heading, 
which  was  closed off  by  a  pressure-resistant barrier 327  m from the heading  face.  A 
secondary  stone-dust barrier was  140 to 150 m from the heading face  and  a  main  stone-
dust  barrier at  270/300 m.  The  most  marked  mechanical effects were  observed  from  the 
point  185  m from the heading  face  up to the barrier.  Between the  heading  face  and 
the barrier there were  signs of  heating effects.  The  thermal and  mechanical effects 
hardly  managed  to pass the barrier,  although  a  gap had  been  left  open  in the  latter 
(the victims died of  poisoning).  The  stone-dust  barriers were  upset,  no  firedamp  was 
present,  and  the explosion was  due  solely to coal-dust. 
Pit  C - Here  again the explosion was  caused  by  a  round  of shots fired  in  a 
heading.  A-secQndary  stone-dust barrier was  sited 90 m from the heading face.  The 
flame,  stopped by  the barrier,  did not  exceed  110 m.  There were  four  other stone-dust 
barriers  in the same  road at  intervals varying  from  40 to 100 m.  Out  of  a  total of 
44  platforms,  35  were  upset,  but  the flame  did  not  reach  as far as these barriers. 
Pit D- The  source of  ignition was  a  heating in a  goaf,  whilst  the  mine 
was  idle.  One  stone-dust barrier in a  top road  was  not  reached  by  the flames.  In the 
bottom road the flame  travelled a  distance of  40 m.  A secondary  barrier situated at 
the point ·was  not  considered to have  been affected. 
Pit  E  - The  explosion  occurred at the foot  of  a  rise heading,  driven  in 
the  seam from-i cross-measures drift.  The  rise heading was  undoubt~dly full of fire-
damp  after a  stoppage  of  several weeks'  duration. 
The  ignition may  have  been due to an  impact  or to friction.  There  were  two 
stone-dust barriers  in the cross-measures drift,  one  on  each side of  the entry to the 
rise heading;  the secondary barrier was  situated between  36  and  52  m away,  and  a  major 
parrier between  134  and  166  m.  The  thermal effects were  noticeable over  a  distance 
of  83  m on the side  towards  the  secondary  stone-dust  barrier. There is doubt  as to 
whether  dust  was  involved  in the explosion,  but  if it were  then the barrier would 
seem to have  operated effectively. 
Pit  F  - In this accident,  the flame  reached  33  major  stone-dust barriers 
and  3  secondary barriers. 
The  barrier nearest  to the explosion did not  function,  as the  explosion 
started from  a  long  layer of  firedamp,  some  10  em  thick,  lying behind the supports 
under the roof. 
The  explosion covered 4.800 m of  roadway,  slowing  down  several times but 
then  continuing with  renewed  violence.  The  authorities carried out  a  very  precise 
investigation of  these  phenomena,  determining the position of  each stone-dust  barrier VIII,  24 
before the explosion and its influence on the development  of  the explosion.  This  study 
showed that: 
- 10 stone-dust barriers functioned  properly.  There may  have  been  some 
traces of  heating or the passage of  a  blast  of  hot  air beyond these barriers,  but 
the flame  did not  go  very far  past  them. 
of  these: 
- 5  major barriers and  2  secondary barriers did not  function effectively; 
- 3  major barriers and  1  secondary barrier were doubtless  not  sufficiently 
loaded with stone-dust. 
- 2  major barriers and  1  secondary barrier were  not  able to function  because 
of  the excessive speed  of  the explosion. 
- 1  stone-dust  barrier did  not  act  effectively because  of  the presence  of 
a  firedamp  layer  in the roof  (this was  the  layer which  caused the explosion). 
- 17 major barriers and  1  secondary barrier were  not  involved since the 
flame  was  extinguished before it reached  them  (e.g.  because  of  the presence  of  mois-
ture). 
Normally  the  roadways  were  stone-dusted,  but this was  found  to be either 
inadequate  or ineffective. 
Pit G  - The  explosion was  due  to the presence of  a  firedamp  layer 30 m 
long,  whic~  ignited by  a  round  of  shots fired during heading  a  bottom road which 
was  70 m ahead  of  the face.  The  secondary  stone-dust  barrier at  the entrance to the 
fast  end  near the face  did not  function  effectively,  either because the quantity  of 
stone-dust  was  not  sufficient to extinguish the flame  or because the explosion was 
too weak.  As  against  this,  2  major stone-dust  barriers in the bottom.road functioned 
properly.  The  explosion passed  through the face,  and  2  other stone-dust  barriers were 
not  able to stop it in the top road,  undoubtedly  because  of  the  large cross-sectional 
area of  the roadway.  It was  the moisture in the top road  beyond the stone-dust  barri-
ers which  extinguished the flame. 
Pit  H - When  a  fan  in  a  rise heading was  switched  on after being stopped, 
methane  became-concentrated  in a  cross-measures drift carrying a  trolley-loco line. 
The  firedamp  ignited when  a  locomotive  passed the point.  There  is no doubt  that the 
degree to which dust  was  involved was  only slight.  Three  stone-dust  barriers were 
situated in the cross-measures drift,  one  150m away  towards  the intake airway,  the 
two others respectively 450  and  500 m away  from the return airway side.  All three 
functioned.  On  the  intake airway  side,  the flame  extended  only 3  m beyond  the stone-
dust barrier. 
The  investigation of  these eight  dust  explosions which  occurred in Germany 
produced  various results in respect  of  the efficacity of  stone-dust barriers as  a 
means  of halting explosions. 
In pits  C - E  - H the system of  inert stone-dust barriers functioned per-
fectly satisfactorily.  These accidents  can therefore not  be .used to draw  any  special 
conclusions.  In other  instances,  the explosion was  stopped  by  the stone-dust barriers, 
but  certain barriers did not  function at all or functioned  only partially  (pits A -
B- D- F- G).  The failure of  the barriers was  not  always  discovered.  The  flame 
passed certain stone-dust barriers because they were  too near the point  of  ignition 
starting the explosion.  In this case,  the explosioQ,  being in its initial stages, 
probably did not  produce pressure necessary to upset  the barriers  (e.g.  pits A - D 
and F).  In the case  of  other barriers,  the fact  that  the roadways  were  of  large 
cross-section  (over  10m2)  contributed to their failure  (pits F  and G).  For  some  of 
the stone-dust barriers,  the quantity  of  dust  was  insufficient to extinguish the 
flame,  so that  it was  not  halted although the barrier was  upset  (e.g.  pit F).  Finally, 
some  barriers did not  act  effectively,  probably because of the  inert dust  was  not 
suitable,  either because of  some  human  error or because of  the climatic conditions 
in the pit  (e.g.  pit F).  In  none  of these cases could it be  demonstrated that  stone-
dusting  on top of the coal-dust to ·bring the combustible matter  content  below  50 % 
had  achieved its purpose. VIII,  25 
To  sum  up,  it can  be  concluded  from these facts that  the system of  stone-
dust  barriers normally used hitherto in Germany,  and the process  of  stone-dusting, 
are both faulty.  The  stone-dust  barriers did act  as  a  good  means  of  halting the ex-
plosions of  coal  d~st.  But  past  explosions also teach us that  stone-dust barriers 
are not  an  infallible measure.  It is not  satisfactory to have  observed that stone-
dust.barriers act  in a  reasonably  predictable manner,  put  not  with complete regular-
ity.  In consequence,  the system of barriers using  inert dusts should be  improved  and 
extended,  so as to present  the maximum  probability of  avoiding failure.  The  following 
suggestions are advanced to this end: 
1)  Increasing the  number  of barriers in gate-roads 
Up  to the present,  German  regulations  have  prescribed only  a  single. stone-
dust  barrier in each  gate-road.  Now  an  increased  number  of barriers in gate-roads 
is considered necessary,  as  soon as the roads  exceed  a  certain length  (the barriers 
being set at  prescribed intervals).  It is proposed that  a  second stone-dust barrier 
should be  added  once  the distance between the face  and  the first stone-dust  barrier 
exceeds  200 m,  and  that  further barriers should be  installed every  500 m where  the 
gate-road reaches  a  length of  500 m or more.  This  arrangement  is suggested to elimi-
nate the possibility of  an  explosion reaching a  speed which  is too high for the bar-
riers to act effectively,  because  of  the excessive distance between the first stone-
dust barrier and the centre of  the explosion,  or  an  excessive interval between  two 
stone-dust  barriers.  In addition,  this guarantees that  other stone-dust  barriers are 
situated in the roadway,  in  c~ses where  the first stone-dust  barrier is situated near 
the centre of  the explosion  and  the flame  is able to pass it, because,  being  in its 
initial stages,  the explosion has  not  built up sufficient  pressure to upset  the bar-
rier.  The  increase in the  number  of  stone-dust barriers seems to be particularly nec-
essary  once the roadways  have  a  larger cross-section than used to be  the case. 
2)  Application of  plastic platforms  instead of  wooden  platforms 
Permission should be  given to use  platforms made  of  plastics in place of 
wooden  platforms,  in the construction of  stone-dust barriers,  provided that  these 
platforms have  been subjected to the necessary tests. This would  make  the erection 
of  stone-dust barriers easier,  and  would  ensure better dispersion of  the dust  because 
of  the way  in which  they  are destroyed when  the barrier is upset.  Naturally,  these 
substances should not,  when  heated,  emit  toxic gases which  cannot  be dealt with  by 
self-rescuer filters. 
3)  Installation of water barriers instead of stone-dust  barriers 
Pits should be  left free to use water barriers instead of  stone-dust  bar-
riers.  However,  in one  particular road or district only  one  sort ·of  barrier should 
be used.  Water  barriers should be set  in gate-roads at  intervals of  200 m. 
Water barriers completely eliminate the climatic problems  which are caused 
by  the humidity  of  the air.  In addition they  do  away  with  human  errors because it is 
so simple to inspect  them.  Moreover,  the use  in water barriers of vessels made  of 
plastics makes  them easier to erect  and  increases their effectiveness. 
4)  Use  of the salt-paste method 
Since stone-dusting of  mine  roadways  does  not  eliminate the danger  of  coal 
dust  explosions,  the salt-paste method  should be  used  more widely.  This method  makes 
it possible to immobilize the coal-dust with  a  high degree  of  certainty.  The  return 
airways  from  faces  should be treated with salt-paste over their whole  length.  On  the 
intake airway side of the workings,  it is advisable to have  properli-treated salt-
paste zones  of  about  150 m in length,  since  less dust  is deposited  on the  intake .air-
way  side. 
IV  - Explosion which  occurred in France 
Two  accidents were  given special attention.  Other dust  explosions  occurred 
in the French mines, but provided no  information on the effectiveness of stone-dust 
barriers.  In fact,  there were either no stone-dust barriers at all or the  flame  did 
not  reach those which were  present. VIII,  26 
Accident  No.  1  - The  origin of  the ignition is said to have  been  a  com-
pressed-air blower  in the upper part  of  a  face where  there might  have  been  a  small 
accumulation of  firedamp.  However,  dust  played the predominant  part  in the explosion. 
Eight  stone-dust barriers were upset. 
The first stone-dust barrier in the return airway  from the face  was  180 m 
away.  Thermal effects were  observed up to the point  where  a  roof  fall had  occurred, 
60 m behind the stone-dust  barrier,  and  were  especially marked  between the barrier 
and  the fall.  Beyond  the fall,  there was  a  stretch of  roadway  of  some  length without 
any  signs  of  burning.  In particular,  a  barrier 420 m from  the top of the face  had 
been upset.in the direction towards  the return airway without  any  signs being found 
that  a  flame  had  reached that  point.  On  the other hand,  the thermal effects show  them-
selves again  in the vicinity of  the junction with another return airway  500 m from 
the top of  the face. 
It  has  been  assumed  that  the hot  explosion fumes  were still combustible and 
reignited when  they  encountered the oxygen-containing air in the other return airway. 
If this explanation is correct,  it will be necessary to examine  the cooling effect 
which  stone-dust  barriers seem to have. 
In the bottom road to the face,  the thermal effects were  very  marked  but 
they  stopped well before the first barrier,  at  160 m from  the bottom of  the face.  It 
would  seem that the explosion was  stopped  by  the stone-dusting there. 
Accident  No.  2  - This  explosion was  certainly caused by  shot  fired in the 
heading  in a  bottom road,  30 m ahead  of  the face.  In  essence,  this was  a  dust  explo-
sion,  possibly  locally reinforced by  small quantities of  firedamp. 
In the bottom road,  there was  a  secondary barrier situated 100 m from  the 
heading face.  The  thermal effects were  not very marked  up to the barrier and  were  even 
less clear beyond it. The  platforms constituting the barrier were  upset,  but  had  not 
been seriously damaged  and  some  were  even still hanging  in place.  The  explosion  in 
the bottom road  cannot  therefore have  been very  violent~ 
In the face,  there were  no mechanical effects and the thermal effects were 
slight.  In the top road,  there were  only slight traces of  heating.  Some  signs were 
found  in a  cross-measure drift  in which the top road terminated;  the mechanical ef-
fects were  fairly violent  here.  In this cross-measures drift there was  a  barrier 
165  m from  the top of  the face  (1  bend  in the road)  or 340 m from the starting-point 
of  the explosion.  The  thermal effects stop before the barrier,  which  was  supplemented 
by  a  stone-dusted zone containing between  88  and  93  % of  inert material.  This barrier 
was  smashed. 
It would  seem therefore that  on  one  side the  flame  was  stopped by  the first 
stone-dust  barrier and  on  the other side before it reached the first barrier.  However, 
clear traces of  combustion were  observed  in the vicinity  of  the district  loading-
point,  towards the  intake airway,  140m beyond  the barrier in the bottom road  (paper 
bags,  notebooks,  cloths).  Moreover,  4  of  the victims killed were  in this zone and 
their bodies  were  badly  burned.  The  question therefore arises as to what  is the real 
part  played  by  the barrier,  since places of  combustion were  observed well  beyond it ? 
Perhaps the explosion was  too weak  ? 
V - Conclusions 
There  is no  doubt  that detailed investigation of accidents  can provide use-
ful  information.  The  very full reconstruction of  events worked  out after the disaster 
at  Luisenthal shows  that  such an  investigation is very valuable.  Unfortunately,  it is 
not  a  very  simple matter because the  information available to determine the cause  of 
the explosion  comes  from  only  a  few  signs  (mechanical and thermal effects)  and  because 
the situation before the accident  is not  always  known  in detail. 
In particular,  it is frequently difficult to draw  a  distinction between the 
effect  of  firedamp  and that  of  dust  in an  explosion~ The  presence of  a  few  particles 
of  carbonized dust  is not  sufficient to support  the conclusion that dust  was  involved, 
since it is quite usual for the firedamp  flame  to cause partial distillation of  such 
particles. VIII,  27 
Moreover,  one  sometimes  hesitates to express  an  opinion regarding the ef-
fectiveness  of  a  barrier.  In fact,  in certain instances when  the flame  is halted in 
the vicinity of  the barrier,  the question arises as to whether this halt was  brought 
about  by  the barrier or by  some  other cause,  since there are a  number  of  factors 
which  can bring about  a  slowing  down  of the explosion  (bends  in the road,  variations 
in cross-section,  variation in the quantity and quality  of deposited dusts,  variation 
in the intensity of stone-dusting). 
In other cases the thermal effects,  or even the traces of  combustion,  have 
clearly gone well past  the barrier or reappear at  a  certain distance beyond that bar-
rier. Here the question arises as to the true effectiveness of  the barrier and as to 
the conditions in which  the fumes  were  cooled down  by  the inert dust  discharged by 
the barrier. 
Numerous  investigations carried out  in experimental  roadways  have  certainly 
provided valuable  information regarding these phenomena,  but it is advisable to bring 
them together to make  fuller use  of  them  in examining the actual accidents.  Moreover, 
the complexity  of the  phenomena  which  occur during accidents of  this kind is such 
that the conventional tests in experimental  roadways  represent  conditions only  imper-
fectly.  This  is what  gives value to certain new  experiments which  have  been very care-
fully  prepared,  in spite of  their high cost  (e.g.  in abandoned  pits)  in order to re-
produce conditions as  close as  possible to those in actual collieries. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES  ON  RESEARCH  WORK  CARRIED  OUT  ON  BARRIERS  IN 
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1.  Introductory remarks 
At  the meeting  in  Luxembourg  on  the 2nd  February,  1966  of the Working  Party 
on  "Inflammable Dusts"  of the Permanent  Commission  on  Mines  Safety,  one  particular 
decision taken was  that it was  necessary to bring together  and  make  full use  of 
the  work carried out  by  research institutes in the field of  safety barriers against 
explosions.  To this end,  the present  document  reports  on  the research carried out 
and the experience gained  by  the research institutes of  West  and  East  Germany,  as 
well as those of Austria,  Czechoslovakia and the United States of  America.  Illus-
tration of  the text  is not  envisaged at  present. 
The  report  covers the period  from the beginning of this century to the end 
of  1965.  For the sake  of clarity we  have  omitted those research projects which  are 
of historical interest  only,  as well as all details of  secondary  importance.  The 
author asks the reader who  wishes  for  further details  to refer to the publications 
listed in the Bibliography at  the end  of this report,  the items  in which are  iden-
tified by  numbered  references  in the text.  The  origin and  development  of  explosions, 
as well as the multiplicity of  factors which  determine the character of  an  explo-
sion,  have  been dealt  with  only to the extent that  they  are directly related to 
the effectiveness of  safety barriers. 
It  is necessary to point  out  that this report  deals solely with safety 
barriers,  out  of all the anti-explosion measures which are applied  in collieries. 
The  prevention and elimination of  accumulations  of  firedamp,  dust  suppression  in 
the winning  and transport  of  the coal,  measures to neutralise the deposits of coal 
dust  by  stone-dusting,  by  wetting or  by  hygroscopic salts are not  dealt with in 
this document. 
However,  it does  seem necessary to conclude these  introductory remarks  by 
saying that,  taking into account  the body  of results obtained from the research 
work  completed hitherto and  that  obtained  from  the practical experiments,  none  of 
these measures  is sufficiently effective to make  the conventional safety barriers 
unnecessary,  let alone superfluous.  This holds  good  for the deep mines  where  the 
coal is won  and  transported by  the normal European methods.  A different  judgment 
may  be  justified in pits where  the working  conditions are entirely different,  as 
e.g.  in the United States. 
2.  Research carried out  in the German  Federal Republic 
2.1.  General  remarks 
Taking as  a  basis the trials carried out  and safety measures applied in 
the French,  British and American pits,  German  researchers started at  the 
beginning of  the century to investigate the effectiveness of  anti-explo-
sion barriers in coal mines  (1,2,3).  The  first tests were carried out  on 
the surface,  in  long steel tubes.  Beyling reported on this work  in  1919 
(4).  In order to be able to perform these experiments  on  the industrial 
scale,  the experimental mine  - located at  the time at the Hibernia pit 
at Gelsenkirchen- was  brought  into service in 1927.  The  decision to set 
up the experimental mine  was  taken when  it became clear that the mine 
was  necessary to make  it possible to reproduce  explosions  in roadways  in 
the conditions actually met  with in European pits,  with natural trans-
mission of the heat  from  the surrounding rock and  in the conditions of 
pressure and  relaxation which  occur when  a  shock wave  is propagated at 
great  depth  in underground workings  of  considerable  length and  of rela-
tively small cross-section  (25). 
Since  1942,  the Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH  at  Dortmund  used the Tre-
monia  pit for its trials and,  of  recent  years,  has also been able to 
carry out  many  explosion tests in other uneconomic pits which  have  been 
closed. 2.2. 
2.21. 
2.211. 
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Up  to the end  of  1965,  approximately  600 full-scale explosion tests were 
carried out  within the framework  of  the investigation of safety barriers. 
The  conditions of  these tests were  very diverse,  and  were  varied over _a 
wide  range;  one  variable was  not  modified,  so as to maintain  comparabilit~ 
i.e.  the type  of  coal-dust  used for the trials.  Use  has  always  been made 
hitherto of  a  standard dust  known  as "standard Derne dust",  i.e. a  bitum-
inous  coal-dust  containing approximately  25  % of volatile matter,  with 
an ash  content  of about  5  % (more  recently with variations in ash content 
up to 14  %)  and  a  size analysis such that  93  to 96  % passes through  a 
0.075 sieve  (DIN  1171). 
While  the explosion tests carried out  over the last  few  decades  were  pri-
marily concerned with trials of  stone-dust barriers,  in the last three 
and  a  half years the emphasis  has  been  on  the investigation of water bar-
riers.  Dust  barriers are now  used  only for  purposes  of  comparison. 
Research  in the field of  measures  against  firedamp  and  coal-dust  explosions 
has  not  yet  completely explored the whole field.  We  do  not  as yet  have 
enough  information on certain questions of detail. 
Stone-dust barriers 
Present  research results 
Effectiveness of  stone-dust  barriers against  firedamp  explosions proper 
The  term "firedamp"  is applied to an explosive mixture  of  mine  gas  methan 
(CH4)  and air.  At  normal temperature and  pressure,  the explosive  limits 
of  this mixture  lie at approximately  5.5 - 15  % CH4. 
The  stochiometric mixture which  causes  the most  violent  ~xplosions con-
tains 9.5 % CH4.  The  results given below  in general to firedamp with a 
CH4  content  of  9  to 10 %,  as  long as there is no  explosion of the  layers 
of  gas  near the roof  obtained  by  the  introduction of  concentrated fire-
damp  into the explosion chamber. 
Theoretically,  a  barrier can  produce  a  genuine extinction effect  on  an 
explosion only if it is reached  by  the shock wave  which  precedes the flame, 
and  struck sufficiently strongly and early enough to ensure that the ma-
terial with which the barrier was  filled forms  a  sufficiently dense  cloud 
in the  roadway. The  ignition of  a  firedamp mixture is propagated so rapid-
ly  - at the speed  of  a  detonation - from  one  molecule  of  gas to another 
that it cannot  be  stopped  by  a  dust  barrier.  This  was  shown  by  earlier 
tests,  which also convinced us  that  no type  of  barrier can  prevent  the 
combustion of all the  gas  present. 
It is for this reason that  a  barrier completely  enveloped  in an  accumula-
tion of  gas will  always  be  ineffective if the gas  is ignited and  can 
never  prevent  the propagation of the explosion. 
The effect is different when  the barrier lies outside the zone  where  the 
gas  has  accumulated but  is still within the area traversed by the flame 
following the explosion when  it undergoes its normal expansion,  which 
corresponds to a  multiple of  the initial volume  of the gas.  In this case, 
the time  which  elapses between the moment  when  the shock wave  reaches the 
bar~ier and  the moment  when  the flame  reaches it may  be sufficiently long 
to allow adequate dispersion of  the material with which the barrier is 
filled across the  roadway,  so that the dispersed material can offer to 
the flame  a  degree  of  mechanical resistance sufficiently high to cause 
considerable shortening of  the latter.  In this case,  too,  all the gas 
will burn,  but  the shortening of the flame will make  it much  less likely 
that the explosion will be transmitted to the coal-dust.  From this point 
of  view,  the barrier also offers a  certain degree  of  protection against 
firedamp  explosions proper. VIII,  35 
This partial success  had  been duly  confirmed  by  a  series of trials  (24, 
25,  27,  33). 
2.212.  Protection against  coal-dust  explosions  by  means  of  stone-dust barriers 
2.2121.  Fundamental data regarding the operation,  design and  types  of  stone-dust 
barriers 
The  initiation of  a  coal-dust  explosion requires  a  much  more  intense heat 
source than the explosion of  a  concentration of  firedamp.  Whereas  a  spark 
is sufficient to set off  a  firedamp  explosion,  coal-dust  becomes  ignited 
only when  it is in a  cloud and when  this cloud is affected by  a  shotfiring 
flame,  an electric arc or a  flame  emanating  from  a  firedamp  explo~ion. 
The  possibility of restricting the spread of  a  coal-dust  explosion by 
means  of  a  cloud  of  stone-dust  is much  greater than is the case with the 
firedamp  explosion;  the  phenomenon  in question is not  one  of the propaga-
tion of  ignition from  one molecule  of  gas to another,  but  the transmission 
of  the  ignition of  one  coal-dust  particle to another by  radiation,  which 
can be  screened off  when  a  particle of  stone-dust  forms  a  barrier inter-
posed between the particles of  coal  (20,  25).  In addition,  a  cloud  of 
stone-dust  cushions  the shock wave  which  - by  reason of  its laminar  and 
turbulent  flow  - stirs up  and maintains  a  cloud  of  coal-dust  in front  of 
the  flame.  However,  in order  for  a  dust  barrier to be effective,  the shock 
wave  ahead  of  the flame  must  be  sufficiently strong to tip over  the plat-
forms  forming  the barrier and to produce  a  dense  cloud of  the material 
filling the barrier,  and  for  the shock wave  to be  ahead  of  the flame  of 
the explosion by  an  appropriate time  interval.  When  this time  gap is too 
small,  the stone-dust  is not  able to form  a  sufficiently dense  cloud be-
fore the  flame  arrives;  when  the time  gap is too  large,  a  considerable 
portion of  the stone-dust  can already have  settled on  the floor  by  the 
time the flame  arrives,  and  the effect  is therefore not  strong  enough. 
It frequently  happens  during the tests that the flame  is extinguished 
only  a  considerable distance behind the barrier because the stone-dust 
is carried along by  the explosions  shock wave  and  is unable to form  a 
dense  cloud until some  way  beyond the zone  where  the barrier is situated. 
But  in a  case such as this it can also be  argued that  the barrier is in 
fact  totally effective;  if a  sufficiently  long observation zone  is arrang-
ed  beyond the barrier,  it can  be  observed  in each case whether the flame 
was  stopped  by  the stone-dust  or whether it became  extinguished because 
it was  no  longer  kept  supplied with coal-dust.  Each  explosion pushes 
before it a  sufficiently large quantity  of  coal-dust  for the flame  - in 
the event  of  failure of  a  stone-dust  barrier - to become  propagated con-
siderably further than when  the  stone-dust acts effectively some  distance 
beyond the barrier zone. 
Since  1926,  stone-dust barriers have  been  obligatory  in German  pits.  The 
location and  design  of  these stone-dust barriers is governed  by  the infor-
mation available.  A certain number  of  fundamental  ideas will be  described 
here,  an examination of  the details being  made  in the subsequent  chapters. 
A stone-dust barrier cannot  exert its full effect  except  at  a  certain dis-
tance  from the ignition point,  when  the shock wave  ahead  of the flame  has 
become sufficiently strong to tip the barrier over.  Since the whole  of 
the shock wave  must  reach the barrier,  allowance  may  be  made  when  siting 
the barrier for the  local conditions,  e.g.  marked variations in roadway 
cross-section,  curves,  roadway  junctions.  It is  necessary to ensure that 
the fittings installed in the roadways  do not  hinder the free dispersal 
of  the stone-dust  on  the barriers.  Since it may  happen  that  an  explosion 
traverses  a  zone  protected by  a  barrier,  the measures  against  explosions 
must  be based  on  a  system comprising several successive barriers at  cer-
tain intervals. 
In addition,  it has  been  found  advisable to set up barriers to isolate 
certain districts from  each  other to prevent  the propagation of  an  explo-
sion. VIII,  36 
For this purpose,  the workings  are grouped  in ventilation districts. 
Apart  from  this,  the main  shafts,  the preparatory  roads  in the stone  and 
in the coal,  and the different workings  in a  winning district,  are  pro-
tected by  barriers  (12,  36)  (1). 
As  regards the construction of  the barrier,  it has  been  observed  in the 
past  that it is very  important  that  a  blast of air should be able to 
cause the free dispersal of  the stone-dust.  Box-type  dust  containers have 
not  given  good  results.  Previous trials with platforms heavily  loaded 
with dust  failed  (24,  25).  The  effectiveness of  the barrier is all the 
more  reliable the easier it is to tip over the barriers.  It is important 
to find  in each case the best  solution,  which  allows  of  storing the nec-
essary quantity of  dust  in the available  (and  often restricted) section 
of  roadway  on  platforms which  are as  light  as possible. 
2.2122.  Varying effectiveness of  stone-dust  barriers as  a  function  of  the pres-
sure  and  the speed  of  propagation  of  the explosion 
We  give here  some  general  information  on  the relationship existing be-
tween the effectiveness of  the barrier on  the  one  hand  and  the  pressure 
exerted by  a  coal-dust  explosion and  the speed of  propagation of  the 
flames  on  the other.  Detailed examination of  this question has  been  kept 
for  later chapters  in this report,  as  there is a  close relationship with 
other experimental conditions  (minimum  distance of  the barriers from the 
ignition point,  type  of  barrier,  geographic  and  technical conditions), 
for  which  reason it is necessary to reproduce the experiments  using  ex-
plosions which  have  different  pressures and  speeds  of  propagation. 
2.21221.  Explosions  of  average  intensity 
The  boundaries  between coal-dust  explosions  of  weak,  average  and  great 
intensity are  not  at all clear,  so much  so that it is  po~sible only to 
give approximate  numerical  values to define  them.  Explosions  of  average 
intensity exert  an air pressure  (dynamic  pressure)  lying between  200 and 
400  p/cm2  (2),  and  are associated with  a  static overpressure  (on all sides) 
of  between  1.5 and  3  kgp/cm2,  while the speed of  propagation of  the flames 
is generally of  the order  of  magnitude  of  the speed of  sound  (330 metres/ 
sec).  With  such explosions,  it has  been  observed that  the probability 
that  the barriers will be  of  maximum  effectiveness is particularly high. 
The  air pressure is constantly sufficiently great  to tip over the barrier 
and to cause  good  dispersion of  the stone-dust  in the roadway.  Similarly, 
the interval of  time  between the shock wave  and the point  of  the flame 
is,  in such  explosions,  most  frequent~y between 0.1  and  0.2 seconds,  so 
that it is neither too  long nor too short to guarantee that  the dust  cloud 
has  a  satisfactory effect  on  the flame  (33,  37). 
2.21222.  Very  weak  explosions 
In the initial stage or after considerable attenuation,  coal-dust  explo-
sions frequently  produce  an air pressure of  no  more  than  approximately 
20 to 100 P;  the static overpressure is frequently  below  1  kgp/cm2,  and 
the speed  of  propagation of  the flames of  the  order  of  100 metres/sec  (it 
is difficult to take  precise measurements  in the initial stage).  In the 
extreme  case,  the  phenomenon  is restricted to a  deflagration with  no ap-
preciable pressure  phenomena  associated with  a  speed  of  propagation of 
the  flames  of  only  some  10 metres/sec  (26).  The  observations have  shown 
that  not  only the accumulations  of  firedamp  (layers at the roof)  but  also 
the· coal-dust  whirled up  by  a  current  of air can  burn relatively  slowly 
over  a  certain distance.  · 
(1)  When  mention  is made  of  the regulations of  the Dortmund  Chief  Mines  Inspectorate, 
the regulations apply,  with due  allowance  and  with certain unimportant  modifica-
tions,  for all the pits in North  Rhine/Westphalia  and the other Lander  of the 
Federal Republic. 
(2)  Translator's Note:  p  =  pound. VIII,  37 
The  weak explosions referred to here  have  been studied with particular 
attention in recent  years  in the Federal Republic  of  Germany  (29,  35,  37, 
38,  39). 
These explosions  give rise to particular difficulties in respect  to the 
use  of barriers,  difficulties which  have  not  yet  been  completely  over-
come.  This  problem is worthy  of  continued study,  since when  making  the 
effort to apply  effective preventive measures  in the initial stages of 
an  explosion,  allowance must  be  made  for the fact  that  a  short  way  away 
from the  ignition point  the pressure and  speed of  propagation of  the  ex-
plosion are.still very  low. 
Trials with dust  barriers using very  weak explosions  have  given  d~vergent 
results,  without  making it possible to determine the  causes of  the failure 
in each  individual case.  The  general conclusion hitherto obtained is that 
with very  weak  explosions  one  cannot  be as sure as  is the  cause with 
stronger explosions that  the barriers will provide the desired effective-
ness,  if the blast  of air does  not  exert  the minimum  pressure necessary 
to tip over the dust  platforms and to provide adequate distribution of 
the extinguishing substance,  so that  the barrier fails to be  effective 
and the  flame  can  be  propagated beyond the barrier zone. 
2.21223.  Very  heavy  explosions 
A powerful initial effect,  e.g.  the ignition of  a  large quantity of fire-
damp,  or  on  the other hand  a  long  "run-up"  path and  the presence of  a  sub-
stantial quantity of  coal-dust are conditions which  can  give rise to a 
very  powerful explosion.  In certain trials of  explosions  of this type, 
air pressure of  as  much  as  some  1  kgp/cm2,  and static overpressures  of 
as  much  as  8  kgp/cm2  and  flame-propagation  speeds  of  more  than  1000 metres/ 
sec were  observed.  It became  clear that  the stone-dust  barriers are inef-
fective against  such powerful explosions  (25,  27,  28,  33,  35).  The  barri-
ers were  not  effective with  flame-propagation  speeds  of  600 metres/ sec 
and  over.  It has  been  impossible to date to establish with any  degree  of 
accuracy the position of  the precise  limit  of effectiveness of  stone-dust 
barriers.  The  observations  made  seem to show that  in the case  of  such 
heavy  explosions  the time  interval between the shock wave  and the tip of 
the  flames  becomes  smaller and  smaller until it falls below 0.1 second, 
or  even to only  a  few  microseconds,  so much  so that the stone-dust  barri-
er is,  it is true,  tipped over but  can  no  longer  produce sufficiently 
quickly the cloud of  dust  necessary  to cause extinction of  the flame. 
Another  explanation could  be  that,  when  intense explosions  occur,  the 
mechanical  resistance of  the cloud of  dust  is not  sufficient to prevent 
the  flame  traversing the barrier zones. 
2.2123.  Minimum  distance between the stone-dust barriers and the possible point 
of·ignition 
Numerous  tests have  been carried out  in recent  years to determine the 
distance  from the point  of  ignition at  which  the shock wave  from  an  ex-
plosion can trip a  stone-dust barrier  (27,  29,  37).  The  results were  in-
conclusive;  it will probably  be  impossible to establish a  precise figure 
for the distance.  In general terms,  it may  be  assumed  that  a  stone-dust 
barrier can halt  an  explosion if it is situated at  least  50 metres  from 
the ignition point;  numerous  cases  of failure of  stone-dust barriers 
have  been recorded where  the distance has  been  less than this.  Coal-aust 
explosions which  are weak at  the beginning frequently require  a  distance 
of  60 metres to build up  a  sufficient intensity to cause the stone-dust 
barriers to be tipped over.  The  very  important  point  in this question is 
the fact  that  a  coal-dust  explosion may  have  a  low initial potential 
(e.g.  a  firedamp  explosion beginning with  a  simple deflagration)  or  a 
powerful initial impulse  (e.g.  a  heavy  firedamp  explosion  or the firing 
of  a  shot  causing ignition). VIII,  38 
It is necessary to settle whether  one  can  expect  in practice that  the 
firedamp will be  ignited or whether direct  ignition of  the coal-dust  sus-
pended  in the air will occur.  In German  pits,  it is considered that the 
ignition can  occur at  any  point  in a  working where  coal  is won  or trans-
ported.  The  most  threatened zone  comprises the winning workings  and  the 
extremities of  the gateroads. 
When  an  explosion which takes  place in a  winning district  becomes  propa-
gated into the gateroad,  it loses part  of its energy as  a  consequence  of 
the  change  in direction and  normally  has to cover  a  certain distance 
along the gateroad before recovering sufficient energy to tip the safety 
barrier over.  An  explosion which  occurs at  the heading face  in a  gateroad 
also has to have  a  certain "run-up"  distance.  This is why  it is recommend-
ed  that  a  certain interval should  be  maintained  between the foremost  dust 
barrier and  the points where  the winning workings  open  into the gateroads. 
The  old regulation of the Dortmund  Chief  Mines  Inspectorate laid down  a 
distance of  25  metres  (12).  The  new  regulation stipulates a  minimum  dis-
tance of  50 metres  and  a  maximum  distance of  150 metres to guarantee,  as 
far  as  possible,  that  the  foremost  barrier is affected by  the explosion. 
In addition,  the  new  provisions require the  installation of anti-explo-
sion barriers every  200 metres  in roads  leading to faces  and  every  400 
metres  in other roads  (36). 
2.2124.  The  importance  of  local conditions 
It is only  recently that it has  been  observed that the cross-sectional 
area of the  roadway  has  a  considerable  influence  on the effectiveness of 
the barrier.  The· precise information obtained on  the effectiveness to the 
dust  barriers during the tests carried out  in the Tremonia  experimental 
mine,  in roadways  with  a  cross-sectional area  of  8  to 10 m2,  remained 
partly unconfirmed  when  similar trials were  carried out  in  roadways  with 
a  cross-sectional area of  12.5  m2.  Here  the pressure and.the speed  of 
propagation of  an explosion of  coal-dust  once  again  become  of  decisive 
importance. 
There  is no  reason to doubt  the effectiveness of  dust  barriers in the 
case of  explosions  of  average  intensity,  even  in workings  with  a  consider-. 
able cross-sectional area.  During trials with  very  weak  explosions,  it 
was  however  noted that  the dust  barriers in roadways  of  12.5  m2  cross-
section did not  always fulfil their taskL  whereas  the trials carried out 
in identical conditions  in the  8  to 10  m~ cross-section roadway  at  the 
Tremonia  experimental  mine  were  always  successful  (37). 
From this one  may  deduce that  when  the shock of  the very weak  explosion 
tips over the dust  barrier without  causing sufficient dispersion  of  the 
sterile dust,  the  flame  which  follows  behind the shock  wave  can  pass 
through the barrier zone  more  easily in a  roadway  of  large cross-section 
than  in a  smaller  one.  It  goes without  saying that  in a  roadway  of  large 
cross-section the flame  can  more  easily "push its way"  through  the dust 
cloud than  in a  narrow working.  It is for this reason that the results 
obtained  in the experimental  roadways  of  small cross-section or in steel 
tubes  can  be applied only with considerable reservation  to the normal 
type  of  roadway  found  underground  nowadays,  with  a  cross-section of  12  m2 
and  more.  As  against  this,  there is much  less risk of  committing an  error 
in assuming that  information obtained during trials carried out  in  large 
roadways  is equally applicable to small-section roadways. 
Another  problem which  has  for  a  long time  preoccupied the experimental pit 
is the propagation of  coal-dust  explosions along paths where  they  encoun-
ter major variations in seam thickness,  curves,  crossovers  and  forks etc., 
bearing in mind  the consequences with regard to the effectiveness of 
stone-dust  barriers.  Up  to the present  it has  not  been  possible to carry 
out  a  large number  of trials of this kind  in actual conditions.  There  is 
every  reason to think that  explosions are little affected by  curves which 
involve  a  change  of direction which  may  be as much  as  90°  in roadways  of 
constant  cross-section,  and that  no appreciable  reduction in pressure or VIII,  39 
in speed of  propagation is brought  about.  It must  be  expected that there 
will be  a  considerable weakening  of  the force  of  the explosion at  forks 
and  crossovers. 
On  the basis of  the data obtained,  a  subsequent  recommendation  of the 
experimental  mine  laid down  that  stone-dust barriers should  not  be  in-
stalled less than  25m from  curves  or  crossovers  (25). 
The  regulations of  the  Chief  Mines  Inspectorates  (Dortmund)  dated  1/7/53, 
and still in force,  laid down  that  stone-dust  barriers must  not  be  install-
ed at  crossovers  in roadways,  nor at  curves  or other points where  - as 
had  been  found  from experience  - the  shock wave  of  the explosion may  be 
weakened to such  an extent that  the barriers are not  affected.  In prin-
ciple it is necessary to have  a  rectilinear section 75  m long up to the 
point  where  the barrier is set  (17).  The  new  mining  regulations  lay  down 
that  anti-explosion barriers must  be installed at  a  minimum  distance of 
50 m and  a  maximum  of  75  m from  forks  and  crossovers  in roadways  (36). 
This stipulation is the  one  which  is closest  to the  information obtained 
by trials in the meantime. 
2.2125.  Effectiveness  of  different types  of  stone-dust barrier 
During the last  few  decades,  the experimental  mine  has tested a  number 
of  stone-dust  barriers of  different types  (4,  24,  25).  Some  of  the fun-
damental  experiments carried out  in this field have  already been referred 
to  (2.2121.).  The  essential principle discovered is that  there must  be  no 
hindrance whatsoever to the free discharge of  the stone-dust.  Neither 
box-type containers nor  planks with  low  borders have  proved satisfactory 
(25,  27). 
Developments  have  been  marked  by  the fact  that  planks carrying a  heavy 
load  of  dust  were  replaced by  lighter designs  - in the  light  of  the test 
results - without  losing sight of  the need  of  limiting the barrier zone 
to a  short  section of  roadway.  The  results was  the combination of  heavy 
and  light dust-carrying structures made  of  planks,  as  laid down  in the 
Dortmund  Chief  Mines  Inspectorate directives of  1/7/53  (17).  These  in-
structions envisaged the use of  "main barriers" with a  load of  400  kg  of 
stone-dust  per  m2  of  roadway  section and  "secondary barriers" with  100 
kg/m2.  New  measures  by  the Dortmund  Chief  Mines  Inspectorate,  modified 
in a  number  of  respects,  and  dated 21/11/65  (40),  are touched  upon  in the 
present  report  only  insofar as it is necessary to mention the  new  infor-
mation obtained by  the research which  led  to modification of  the official 
directives. 
(Practical results from  the trials carried out  with the  new  types of  mod-
ified barrier became  available only  from the beginning  of  1966  and  have 
not  yet  been  included in the present report.) 
With  the experimental explosions,  the stone-dust barriers were  regularly 
employed  as  "main barriers" with a  load of  400  kg/m2  and  designed,  in 
accordance with the regulations,  as  "Dortmund  platforms"  intended for  a 
maximum  charge  of  300 kg  and  as "platforms"  consisting of  a  single plank 
capable of  carrying a  charge of  100 kg  of dust,  the latter being arranged 
in twos  or threes at the beginning and end  of  the barrier  (17).  Experience 
having demonstrated that  "secondary barriers" with  a  charge of  100 kg/m2 
of  roadway  cross-section were  not  reliably effective,  the new  instruction 
no  longer  provides for this type of barrier and  lays down  a  charge of 
400 kg/m2  for  each barrier  (40). 
Tests carried out  recently with  a  Polish type of barrier  (29),  for the 
sake for comparison with the German  type  (Dortmund  platform)  were  of 
particular interest. The two types differ by the position and  length of 
the planks and by  the type of  platform support.  During the trials,  the 
Polish platform was  found  to tip over more  easily than the Dortmund  plat-
form,  although  less easily than a  single-plank single-support  platform. 
The  single-plank platform with two supports and the Polish platforms VIII,  40 
behaved  in the same  manner  with the same  weight  of dust.  The  Polish bar-
rier seems  to react slightly more  easily to very slight explosions.  The 
length  of  the supports used for the platform also ensure that there is 
slightly more  clearance in the roadway.  The  new  German  regulations  (40) 
allow of  two types: 
a)  Type  1  corresponds in principle to the older type  of barrier made  up 
of  "Dortmund  platforms",  and consists of  heavy  platforms  (carrying a 
charge  of  150 to 300 kg  and  having  a  maximum  width of 60 mm)  and  light 
platforms  (with  a  charge  of  50 to 100 kg  and  having a  maximum  width of 
35  em),  one-quarter of  the quantity of dust  being distributed on  the 
light  platforms at the beginning and  end  of the barrier zone,  one-half 
at  each end. 
b)  Type  2  resembles the Polish type;  it is distinguished by  higher  plat-
form  supports than type  1  and  is also made  up  of  heavy  and  light plat-
forms  (one-quarter of  the dust  being on the light  platforms);  the max-
imum  load  on  the heavy  platforms  is  lower than in type  1,  since the 
width  of  the platforms  must  not  exceed  50 em,  the charge being fixed 
at 60to 70  kg  of  dust  per metre  of  length  of  the platform.  Light  plat-
forms  of this type,  like those  in type  1,  can be  35  em  in width  and 
can  carry a  load  of  30 to 35  kg/m. 
The  instructions mentioned  contain many  other details regarding the  con-
struction of  platforms based  on  the experience  gained during the trials. 
Particular emphasis  was  placed  on  having as rigid a  design as possible 
for  the  platform supports,  experience having  shown  that  the effectiveness 
of the barrier is very  considerably reduced if the supports  can  oscillate. 
According to the instructions in force  platform supports  and  the attach-
ments  holding them to the rock or the roadway  supports  must  be sufficient-
ly rigid to ensure that  "a force  of  54  kgp acting on  the platform supports 
at  the  level of  the uprights  and  along the axis of  the roadway  cause  a 
minimum  displacement  of  1  em." 
Numerous  tests carried out  in recent  years  were  devoted to experiments 
with  special designs using different  type  of  platform,  trough and  bag 
which  are  employed  as  envisaged  in proposals or patented techniques  from 
Germany  and  abroad  (25).  For certain of  these types,  the tripping of  the 
barrier is performed  by  a  special mechanical device.  Overall these trials 
did not  give sufficiently good  results to justify the use  of  such designs, 
which  are slightly more  complicated  and are also dearer.  It was  found 
that  the danger  of  non-functioning of  the barrier increases with the com-
plication of  the barrier design.  This is true in particular of  the tripping 
devices which  can  in certain circumstances be displaced by  movements  of 
the rock  or of  the roadway  supports,  or can be affected by  climatic in-
fluences  (rust),  so much  so that it may  even happen that  the barriers can 
no  longer be relied on to operate at the decisive moment  if they  have  been 
in place for  some  time. 
2.2126.  Making  allowance for technical requirements 
Stone-dust  barriers must  be  arranged  in such  a  way  that they receive the 
full force  of  the shock wave  of  an  explosion and  can react  to it without 
any  hindrance.  Moreover,  it is inevitable that  allowance  must  be  made  for 
the winning  equipment  etc.,  when  the barriers are being set up.  Many 
trials have  been carried out  in respect  of the problem posed  by  the ar-
rangement  of  compressed-air  lines,  water  pipes and electric cables,  duct-
ing,  trolley wires etc.  without  hindering the effectiveness of the bar-
riers.  Mining regulations in force  up to the present  have  contained cer-
tain indications regarding the installation of  stone-dust barriers in 
roadways  where  the free cross-section is reduced  by the equipment  install-
ed  there  (17).  The  regulation envisaged that "barriers must  be arranged 
in such  a  way  that their operation cannot  be hindered by  other equipment, 
ducting,  etc.".  The  new  inspection regulations provide that  "the air doors 
and  other fittings  in the roadway,  e.g.  suspended conveyors,  ducting, 
pipes etc.,  must  not  hinder the operation of the stone-dust barriers"  (40). VIII,  41 
In particular,  it is important that  in the  event  of  an  explosion the 
cloud  formed  by  the stone-dust  discharged  from  the barrier should  not 
allow any  passage  of  the  flame.  Consequently,  the  nex  regulations require 
that the charge  of  stone-dust  on  each  platform should cover at  least two-
thirds of  the widest  section of  the  roadway,  almost  symmetrically with 
respect to the axis  of  the  roadway. 
2.2127.  The  effect  of  other factors  on  the effectiveness of  stone-dust  barriers 
2.21271.  Properties of  the stone-dust 
Within the  framework  of  efforts made  over  many  years to develop fully 
the protection against  explosions  by  means  of  stone-dust barriers,. it was 
also possible to define  the requirements to be  met  by  the  stone-dust  in 
order to perform its task as well  as  possible without  raising a  health 
risk for  the workers.  Four  conditions were  precisely defined  in the 
"Dortmund  Chief  Mines  Inspectorate measures  in respect  of the  inspection 
of  stone-dust to determine  its quality for  use  in stone-dust barriers" 
(18).  Among  the detailed provisions,  we  shall simply  refer here to the 
fact  that the stone-dust  must  be  of  very  fine  grain,  in order to have  the 
maximum  possible extinction effect  on  an  explosion,  and that  it must  be 
capable  of  completely free  movement  at  any  time.  One  considerable disad-
vantage  of  the stone-dust  barrier technique  is that  the dust  may  become 
caked relatively quickly  in  large workings  where  the air is very moist, 
so that  the dust  can  no  longer  run  freely.  It is true that special chem-
ical treatment  can  make  the dust  strongly hydrophobic;  however,  this 
treatment  considerably  raises the cost  of  the  process.  Up  to the present, 
the replacement  of  the stone-dust  by  other  hydrophobic materials  has  not 
progressed beyond  the stage of  a  few  limited trials. Another  requirement 
to be  met  by  the stone-dust  is that  it must  not  contain more  than  3  % by 
weight  of  inflammable matter.  This  is the reason for the great  precautions 
necessary  in practice to ensure that  the dust  placed on the platforms  is 
not  excessively polluted by  deposits  of  coal-dust.  It is also important 
to guarantee that  the stone-dust  has  no effect  on  the health of  the work-
ers.  Consequently,  it must  have  a  very  low  content  of  elements  which  con-
tain silicic acid and  must  not  contain appreciable quantities of  corrosive 
substances. 
2.21272.  Importance  of  the climatic conditions 
We  have  already  pointed out  in the  preceding chapter that  high humidity 
of  the ventilation air may  considerably reduce the effectiveness of  the 
stone-dust.  On  the other hand,  the deposited coal-dust' is moistened  by 
the ventilation air,  so that it becomes  less free-running  and  thus re-
duces the risk of  explosion.  But  of  course the coal-dust  becomes  safe  in 
the event  of  an  explosion only  if it has  a  very  high moisture  content. 
It may  even  happen  that  an  explosion in a  roadway  is only  somewhat  weaken-
ed ·by  moist  coal-dust  and  may  even  become  more  dangerous  when  advancing 
with reduced force  than if it had sufficient force to trip the nearest 
stone-dust barrier with fully effect. 
The  relative humidity  of  the ventilation air generally varies between 
50 and  90 %.  The trials carried out  have  not  yet  made  it possible to 
establish whether the moisture content  can  have  an  appreciable  influence 
on  the course  of  a  coal-dust  explosion and  on the extinction effect  of 
a  cloud  of  stone-dust.  The  temperature variations observed  in collieries 
certainly have  no effect  in this respect. 
In the majority  of  cases,  the explosion tests were carried out  up to the 
present  with ventilation stopped,  particularly when  firedamp  was  used to 
provide the initial ignition.  In point  of fact,  if it had  not  been  done 
there was  a  risk that  the tests would  be abortive,  because the firedamp 
would  have  been cleared away  prematurely  by  the ventilation current.  The 
question therefore arose  of  determining whether tests carried out  with 
ventilation in operation would  give different results.  However,  simple 
reference tests were  made  and  no  appreciable effect  due  to the ventilation VIII,  42 
was  observed.  It will also be  clear that,  in an  explosion which  is being 
propagated at  a  velocity  lying between  100 and  1,000 metres  per second, 
the fact  that  the mass  of  the  air in the underground workings  may  or  may 
not  have  moved  by  a  few  metres  during that short  period is hardly  likely 
to be  of  importance.  · 
2.21273.  The  effect of  stone-dusting on top of  deposited coal-dust 
In addition of  being used  in stone-dust barriers,  stone-dust  is also used 
in  large quantities for dusting deposited coal-dust.  It is well  known 
that this technique does  not  give particularly good results.  Experience 
has  shown  that several layers of  stone-dust  cannot  stop well-dried coal-
dust  from  contributing to the propagation of  an  explosion. It is for this 
reason that  the permissible content  of  non-combustible elements  in the 
quantity of  dust  deposited has  been  changed  by  the  new  Dortmund  Chief 
Mines  Inspectorate instructions from  50 % to 20 %.  In gateroads,  the use 
of techniques which  produce agglomerations  of  the coal-dust  by  means  of 
hygroscopic salts is obligatory  (36).  There is no  doubt  at all that  these 
measures  at  least  produce  a  damping  of  the explosion and  prevent  coal-
dust  explosions  from  becoming too intense to be  extinguished by  anti-ex-
plosion barriers  (see 2.2122).  This  is the way  in which  stone-dusting is 
used to strengthen the effectiveness of stone-dust barriers. 
Stone-dusting  on  top  of  coal-dust  may  even  have  a  negative effect,  when 
it weakens  a  coal-dust  explosion to the point  where it no  longer upsets 
a  stone-dust barrier With  sufficient force,  but  rather passes  through 
the barrier zone at  low  pressure.  Previous  observations had  indicated 
the possibility that this phenomenon  might  occur  (24,  25).  Precise ob-
servations of this subject  have  not  yet  been  possible  in the explosion 
trials carried out  hitherto. 
Other  information  obtained in the meantime  has  shown  that  it is not 
impossible that stone-dusting may  have this disadvantage ·on  occasions. 
A proof  of this is the fact  that,  if during  explosion trials,  a  mixture 
of stone-dust  and  coal-dust  is scattered in the zone  lying between the 
ignition point  and  the barrier,  the coal-dust  explosion develops  only 
weakly  and,  sometimes,  is not  even  strong enough to bring the barrier 
into full operation,  but  only  ignites the coal-dust after the barrier 
zone  has  been  passed.  The  risk that  an  explosion  may  thus  pass the bar-
rier zone  could arise primarily when  stone-dusting has  been  badly  and 
inadequately carried out,  so that  the explosion,  as it passes through 
the  inadequately stone-dusted area,  again  comes  into contact  over the 
whole  of  this part  of  its path with a  certain quantity of  coal-dust.  Per-
fect  neutralisation obtained by the use  of  stone-dust  or hygroscopic 
salts would  in general be  considered  a  good  complementary measure against 
explosions,  while it would  be  a  very valuable accessory  measure  when 
combined with the use  of  stone-dust barriers.  The  probability that  stone-
dusting on top of  the coal-dust  would  prevent  an  explosion from  becoming 
excessively intense,  and therefore that the stone-dusting technique  could 
ensure the effective  operation of  the barrier,is certainly much  greater 
than the possibility of the neutralised coal-dust  causing a  reduction in 
the  pressure of  the explosion such that  the pressure lies inside the 
dangerous  limit  zone  or that  the explosion can still be  propagated,  but 
be  no  longer  capable  of  tipping over the barrier with sufficient force. 
2.21274.  Variations  in the quantity  of  stone-dust 
During the tests carried out  in the last ten or twenty  years,  it has  been 
observed that,  in order to stop coal-dust  explosions which  have  reached 
their full intensity,  it is necessary  in general to use  400  kg  of stone-
dust  per  m2  of  roadway  cross-section  (25).  This result  was  also confirmed 
by  subsequent  experiments carried out  up to the present  day.  Trials with 
weak  explosions  in their initial phase  have  however  also shown that,  in 
particular,  the "very  light single-plank platforms"  of  the Dortmund  type, 
charged with  only  100 kg  per platform,  reacted particularly well to weak VIII,  43 
explosions  and were  frequently  able to stop such  explosions  even with  a 
stone-dust  charge  of  80 to 100 kg/m2  (25). 
Consequently,  earlier mining  regulations required the  installation of 
secondary barriers with  a  charge  of  100  kg/m2  in roadways  linking two 
winning workings  in one  panel,  at  points where  a  main barrier could fre-
quently not  be  installed because there was  insufficient  room  and  at  places 
where  the barrier would  have to be  moved  frequently.  More  recent  experi-
ments  have  however  shown  that the utilisation of  only  100 kg/m2  does  not 
provide sufficient  control of  the explosions,  in particular when  they 
reach  a  relatively high  intensity in the initial phase.  This  is why  the 
Inspectorate regulations  in force  (36)  require every stone-dust  barrier 
to have  a  charge  of  400  kg/m2  of  roadway  cross-section. 
The  recent  experiments  have  shown  that  those explosions which  are charac-
terised by  very  high  pressures and very high speeds  of  propagation of 
the  flame  can traverse zones  protected by barriers with  a  charge of  400 
kg/m2  (see  2.21223).  It  would  be  interesting to investigate whether  in 
such  an  extreme  case the results could  not  be  improved  by  the use  of  an 
even  larger quantity  of  stone-dust.  However,  such experiments  have  not 
yet  been possible. 
2.2128.  The  limits of  the effectiveness of  stone-dust barriers  (summary) 
A brief examination of  the results of  the  research carried out  to date 
in the Federal Republic  of  Germany  leads to the following  conclusions: 
The  Inspectorate directives regarding the arrangement  and  design  of  stone-
dust  barriers take  into account all the information gained regarding the 
course  of  methane  explosions  and  coal-dust  explosions,  and  developments 
in measures  against these  phenomena.  The  stone-dust  barriers built accord-
ing to these  instructions and  correctly sited in the underground workings, 
again  provided that  they  are charged with  a  sufficient quantity  of  stone-
dust,  can  be  relied upon to stop coal-dust  explosions  by  stopping the 
propagation of  the  ignition of  the  dust  suspended  in the air. 
In the event  of  methane  explosions  proper,  the stone-dust  barriers can of 
course not  completely  prevent  the combustion  of  the  gas which  is present; 
however,  when  the barriers are situated outside the  gas  accumulation  zone, 
the mechanical resistance of  the cloud  of  stone-dust  reduces  the range  of 
the flame  so that  the barriers may  be  able to stop the ignition being 
transmitted to the coal-dust. 
Provided that  full attention is paid to ensuring that the stone-dust.-
which  may  have  lost its free-running  properties because  of  the humidity 
or  which  may  have  been heavily  polluted by  the coal-dust  - is replaced 
by  fresh  dust  and  that free discharge of  the barriers is not  hindered  by 
any equipment  installed in the  roadways,  the effectiveness of  a  dust  bar-
rier is maintained in practice for  an unlimited period. 
When  the coal-dust  explosions are very  weak  and  do  not  generate the air 
pressure necessary to cause sufficient dispersion of  the stone-dust  on 
the barrier in the cross-section of  the  roadway  before the explosion flame 
reaches the barrier zone,  the barrier cannot  operate.  This is particularly 
what  may  happen  in the initial phase  of  an  explosion. 
In the  limit  zone  of  very  intense coal-dust  explosions,  with very  high 
propagation speeds,  which  may  develop where  there is an  intense initial 
ignition or where  the explosion is propagated over  long distances  in dust-
laden galleries,  it may  happen that  the stone-dust  barriers do  not  fulfil 
their task.  According to the  information obtained hitherto,  the  time  inter-
val between the shock wave  of  the explosion and  the point  of  the  flame 
which  is following it is too short  for  the stone-dust  from the barrier 
to be  dispersed across the  roadway  in good  time. 2.22. 
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Present  programme  of trials on  stone-dust barriers 
Other  investigations of  the effectiveness of  stone-dust  barriers are not 
included  in the present  programme  of  urgent  work  being done  by  the exper-
imental  mine,  except  for  comparative trials - within the  framework  of 
very detailed experiments with water barriers - carried out  occasionally 
with stone-dust barriers. 
In this same  work,  trials are under  way  with the  intention of  continuing 
at the Tremonia  experimental pit,  as well as at  other collieries,  the 
investigation of  very  weak  explosions  in  roadways  of  different  cross-
sections.  Moreover,  the present  programme  of  work  includes trials with 
explosions  having  long  ignition paths,  the special preparations for  which 
are  made  at  Tremonia  and at  another  Dortmund  pit,  The  course  of  these 
explosions  and  the measures  against  them  in special topographic  conditions 
(curves,  forks)  are being  investigated by  means  of  explosion trials in a 
pit  at  Essen. 
Proposals  for the continuance  of  research work with  a  view to obtaining 
all necessary  information regarding  stone-dust  barriers 
Bearing  in mind  present  knowledge,  the German  research work  into anti-
explosion measures will probably  be  oriented for  some  time  yet  towards 
water barriers.  The  question  of  reliable effectiveness  limits,  of  the 
best  possible design and  of  the most  suitable arrangement  of  these bar-
riers in underground  workings will require  a  large  programme  of  work, 
Comparative trials with stone-dust  barriers will always  be  necessary,  The 
dust  barriers are  listed only  in the annex to the  programme  and  it is 
therefore unnecessary to deal  in detail with  the future research work  here; 
this will be  examined  in detail in chapter 2,34 devoted  to water barriers, 
and  analogies  can  be  drawn  with respect  to stone-dust  barriers, 
Water  barriers 
Introduction 
Water  barriers are older than stone-dust  barriers,  Since  1910 research 
work  has  been concentrated  on the utilisation of  water containers as 
protective arrangements against  explosions  and their application in Ger-
man  and  foreign pits is known  (33). 
In  the twenties,  inspection and  maintenance  of  the wooden  and steel con-
tainers raised considerable difficulties,  and  for this reason stone-dust 
barriers have  been  exclusively used  in Germany  and  in other countries, 
The  experimental mine  at Gelsenkirchen,  and  later the mine  at  Dortmund, 
carried out  some  time  ago trials with water barriers and  reached  some 
very  favourable  conclusions  (4,  25,  33).  But  until recently,  water bar-
riers have  been  used  only  in isolated cases  by  reason  of  the technical 
difficulties,  and  because  of  certain objections  of  principle.  It was  only 
when  the  limits of  the effectiveness of  stone-dust  barriers were  clearly 
established in a  precise manner  by  the trials,  and also as  a  result  of 
certain explosions,  that  the question  of determining whether water bar-
riers were  not  in fact  capable  of  offering a  better protection against 
explosions  became  topical again.  The  idea of  carrying out  new  detailed 
investigations  into this subject  was  encouraged  by  the fact  that  almost 
all the colliery roadways  had  in the meantime  been fitted out  with water 
pipes  and  that  modern  plastics are very suitable for making the containers. 
About  3  1/2 years  ago the Tremonia  experimental  mine  began  new  series of 
tests into the use  of  water barriers,  testing a  very varied range  of  tech-
nical conditions and  types  of application. 
In the meantime,  many  coal-mines  in the Federal Republic  of Germany  had 
replaced stone-dust barriers with water barriers,  with the  permission of 
the  Mines  Inspectorate.  The  new  Inspectorate regulations  (36)  provide for 
the use  of  water barriers or stone-dust barriers for protection against , 2.32. 
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explosions.  Up  to the present,  no decisions for  approval for  general use 
of water barriers containing detailed provisions regarding design have 
been issued. 
Present state of  research 
Effectiveness of water barriers against  firedamp  explosions 
Explosion trials carried out  with firedamp  and  without coal-dust  have 
shown  that,  like the stone-dust barriers,  the water barriers considerably 
reduce the range of  the explosion flame  by  reason of  the mechanical re-
sistance of  the extinction material used.  In certain trials,  the results 
obtained with the water barriers were better in that the propagation of 
the flame  was  stopped  even  more  rapidly than in the case of stone-dust 
barriers  (25,  33).  But,  on the whole,  remarks  made  on  the effectiveness 
of stone-dust barriers in the case  of  firedamp  explosion proper  (2.211) 
are equally applicable to water barriers. 
2.322.  Protection against  coal-dust  explosions  by  the use of water barriers 
2.3221.  Fundamental data regarding the effectiveness and  optimum design of water 
barriers 
The  first trials carried out  more  than fifty years  ago with water con-
tainers as  a  means  of  protection against  explosions  (33)  were  based  on 
the fact  that  the water,  for  physical reasons,  was  expected to be better 
for this purpose than stone-dust.  In fact,  water  has  a  thermal capacity 
five  times greater than that  of  limestone dust  and  can therefore absorb 
more  of  the heat  of the explosion flame.  In addition,  part  of the water 
becomes  evaporated  and,  by  reason of  its high evaporation rate of  539 
kcal/kg at  l00°C,  it absorbs additional quantities of  energy,  which weak-
ens  the flame  to a  corresponding extent.  Moreover,  the disadvantage of 
the stone-dust  that it cakes  in the presence of high  humidity  and  loses 
its free-running properties is avoided with the use  of water. 
In the past  it was  feared that the water,  being  vaporised  by  the shock 
of  the explosion,  would  remain  suspended  in a  cloud for  a  very  much 
shorter time than stone-dust  and  would  fall to earth more  quickly,  losing 
all its effectiveness  (4). 
Many  investigations showed  that this fear was  without  foundation.  The 
principle of  the effectiveness of water barriers as  a  means  of  protection 
against  explosions is no  longer doubted at all. 
The  experimental mine  has  on several occasions  proposed,  particularly 
during the  last three years,  to investigate water barriers and to carry 
out  at Tremonia  and  in several idle pits explosion trials in normal  work-
ing conditions.  The.appreciably more  expensive trials carried out  in these 
other pits were  subsidised by  the High Authority of  the European  Community 
for  Coal  and Steel,  and also to some  extent  by  the North Rhine/Westphalia 
Authorities  and  by  the Steinkohlenbergbauverein at  Essen.  All these trials 
confirm that  the results obtained with water barriers containing 200 litres 
of  water  per  m2  of  roadway  cross-section were  comparable with those obtain-
ed with stone-dust barriers with a  charge of  400 kg/m2.  As  the bulk den-
sity of  the  limestone dust  is very little different  from  the density  of 
water,  this is a  fundamental  and essential advantage  of water barriers 
with regard to their practical utilisation;  they require  only  one-half 
of  the extinction material required by  stone-dust barriers and,  conse-
quently,  occupy  only half the space  in the roadway.  The trials carried 
out  with water barriers which  gave the results set  out  in the following 
chapters consistently made  use  of  200 litres of  water  per  m2  of cross-
section. 
In addition,  the fundamental  ideas  listed in the chapter  on  "stone-dust 
barriers"  (2.212'1)  hold  good  for water barriers in respect of their range 
of  application,  design  and  optimum situation in the underground workings. VIII,  46 
2.3222.  Varying  effectiveness of  water barriers as  a  function  of  the pressure 
and  speed  of  propagation of  the explosions 
As  for the  investigation of  the stone-dust  barriers,  only  a  few  general 
results of the water barrier trials - with different  explosion intensities 
and  different  speeds  of  propagation -will be  mentioned  here.  Detailed 
information will be  given  in the  subsequent  chapters which  successively 
deal with the other parameters  in the trials. 
Reference should  be  made  to the definitions and  general  remarks  regarding 
average-intensity,  very  weak  and  very strong explosions  which  occur  in 
chapter  2.2122. 
2.32221.  Explosions  of  average intensity 
During the trials with water barriers it was  observed that,  as  for  the 
stone-dust  barriers,  explosions  of  average pressure and  speed of  propaga-
tion create conditions which  particularly favour  the effectiveness of  the 
barriers.  The  effectiveness of  the water barriers with such  explosions 
can  be  briefly described as  follows:  not  only are the water barriers as 
effective as the  stone-dust  barriers,  but  in many  cases  they  were  more 
effective and  more  thorough  in their action than the  latter  (25,  27,  28, 
33,  37,  38,  39).  The  flame  of  the explosion was  frequently  extinguished 
by  the water after it had  covered  a  shorter distance than  in the  case  of 
the stone-dust  barrier,  the extinction having  frequently  occurred  only 
a  few  metres  inside the barrier zone.  Water  barriers with  a  charge  of 
200  litres/m2  of  roadway  cross-section can therefore  be  considered as 
having  a  very  high degree  of  safety in the  case  of  coal-dust  explosions 
of  average  intensity. 
2.32222.  Very  weak  explosions 
In the case  of  coal-dust  explosions  producing very  low  pressures,  trials 
with water barriers  produced  the  same  problems  as with stone-dust  bar-
riers.  It fairly frequently  occurred that  the shock wave  was  not  strong 
enough  to cause  good  distribution of  the extinguishing material across 
the roadway,  so that the  flame  passed through the barrier zone  and  ignited 
the coal-dust  beyond it. Comparative tests carried out  in the  same  condi-
tions with stone-dust  barriers also gave  inconclusive results. 
In consequence,  particularly intensive studies have  been  carried out  re-
cently in the critical field  of  weak  explosions  (29,  37,  38).  During the 
trials,  very  weak  explosions  were  obtained by  choosing  a  short  distance 
between the ignition point  and  the barrier,  or by  mixing  or  covering the 
scattered coal-dust  with stone-dust. 
In general terms,  it was  observed that  the effectiveness of  the water 
barriers,  when  used  with weak  explosions,  clearly depends  very  much  on 
the cross-section of  the  roadways  in which the barriers are set  up.  This 
point will be  discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.3224.  Over  the 
whole  series,  confirmation was  obtained for the observation that  the bar-
rier can  be  ineffective when  the pressure  of  the explosion is too weak 
to cause sufficient dispersion  of  the extinguishing material across the 
roadways.  The  investigation of  water barriers from this viewpoint  is 
continuing.  But  in general,  water barriers were  certainly not  found  to 
be  less effective than stone-dust  barriers within the range  of  weak  ex-
plosions. 
2.3223.  Very  heavy  explosions 
In the case  of  very  heavy  experimental explosions,  the  water barriers 
were  on  several occasions  found  to be  superior to the stone-dust  barriers, 
since with very  high  speeds  of  propagation of  the  flame  the water barri-
ers operated effectively,  whereas  the stone-dust barriers no  longer  had 
any  effect  in similar conditions  (25,  27,  33,  38).  While  the  limit  of 
effectiveness of  the stone-dust  barriers seems to be at  flame-propagation VIII,  47 
speeds  of  some  600 metres/second,  in several cases the water barriers 
were still effective in dealing with explosions  producing speeds  of  prop-
agation of  some  1000 metres/second.  This  value also apparently determines 
the  limit  of  effectiveness  of  water barriers with  a  charge  of  200 litres 
of  water  per  m2  of  roadway  cross-section.  As  it is difficult  and  expen-
sive - and  moreover  highly dangerous  - to produce  explosions  of this in-
tensity for testing barriers,  it has  not  been possible to carry  out  many 
trials of this kind.  · 
2.3223.  Minimum  distance between water barriers and  the  possible point  of  ignition 
With  regard to the  running-up distance which  is necessary for  a  coal-dust 
explosion to cause  a  water barrier to operate with  maximum  reliability, 
the general observations  made  in the chapter  on  stone-dust barriers 
(2.2123)  apply  by  analogy.  During the many  trials carried out,  no,differ-
ence  was  noted  in this respect  between water barriers and  stone-dust  bar-
riers  (28,  29,  37).  It was  very  evident  that  the minimum  distance between 
the barrier and  the  ignition point  depends  to a  large extent  on  the force 
of  t~e initial ignitions.  Whereas  in the case where  the explosion was  set 
off  by  a  strong ignition of  firedamp,  a  distance of  less than  50 metres 
was  frequently  sufficient  to produce  a'shock wave  sufficiently strong to 
guarantee effective operation of  the barrier,  a  distance  of  70  or  even  90 
metres  was  insufficient  when  the  explosion was  set  off  by  a  weak deflagra-
tion of  gas,  apart  from  exceptional cases. 
2.3224.  The  importance  of  local conditions 
Reference  has  already been  made  to the marked  influence exerted by  the 
roadway  cross-section on  the effectiveness  of  barriers,  when  dealing with 
the stone-dust barriers  (2.2124);  this is what  became  particularly clear, 
although it is true exclusively  in the case  of  very  weak  explosions,  dur-
ing the trials with water barriers.  In the tests with  explosions  of  aver-
age  intensity,  the effectiveness of  the water barriers was  the  same  in 
roadways  of  8  to 10  m2  cross-section and  also - in the extreme  cases  -
in  roadways  of  22m2  cross-section  (2~,  28,  38).  But  in the case of  ex-
plosions  producing  very  low  pressures  and  very  low  propagation speeds, 
the water barriers frequently  did  not  operate  in  roadways  12.5  m2  in 
cross-section,  whereas  at  the Tremonia  mine  they  completely fulfilled 
their task  in a  roadway  8  to 10m2  in cross-section  (29,  37).  From these 
observations it is clear that the flame  traversed the barrier zone  in the 
centre  of  the roadway  - in the  case  of  the greater cross-section - at  some 
0.5 to 1.0 metres  from  the  roadway  floor. 
Consequently,  in the  case  of  water barriers,  great  prudence  is required 
in drawing  from the experience  gained  in  roadways  of  small cross-section 
conclusions applicable to larger-section roadways.  In the  event  of  poor 
distribution of  the water where  the shock  wave  is too weak,  in a  roadway 
of·sufficiently large cross-section the explosion flame  can fairly easily 
make  its way  through the barrier zone,  to re-initiate the coal-dust  ex-
plosion with greater force  on the other side. 
In the case  of  coal-dust  explosions against  water barriers,  explosions 
which  are  propagated  in sections  of  roadway  characterised by  marked  va-
riations  in cross-section and  with  forks  in the  roadway,  it was  observed 
that,  as  was  thecasewith the stone-dust  barriers,  the shock waves  are 
propagated without  attenuation along  a  rectilinear course  from  the ex-
plosion;  the effects in the side roads  were  different.  In  certain tests, 
considerably pressures were  observed  in the branch roads  even  when  they 
formed  an  angle  of  more  than  90°  with the  line of  direction of  the ex-
plosion  (37);  in other  cases,  the explosions were  propagated  in such 
branch roads with considerably reduced pressure,  so that  it was  not  suf-
ficient  to cause  a  barrier to tip over.  However,  when  a  water barrier 
was  located at  50 metres  from  the fork,  the explosion could  once  again 
build up until it reached the barrier and  cause full operation. 
Tne  Mines  Inspectorate instruction already referred to,  providing that VIII,  48 
anti-explosion barriers must  be  installed at  a  minimum  of  50 metres  and 
a  maximum  of  75  metres  from  forks  and  crossovers  (36),  holds  good  for 
both water barriers and  stone-dust barriers. 
2.3225.  Various  types  of water barriers and their effectiveness 
In the  fundamental  researches  into water barriers,  use has  regularly 
been  made  of  recent  years  of  water containers  in the  form  of  rectangular 
open  troughs  containing 80 litres and measuring approximately  70 x  50 x 
35  em.  One  empty  trough weighs  some  2.5  kg.  A trough of this size can 
be  handled easily,  allows  of  adequate concentration of water without 
excess  in the barrier and  can easily be  installed in  roadways  of  normal 
cross-section.  In main  roadways with larger cross-sections,  water troughs 
with  a  maximum  capacity of  100 litres are considered more  suitable. 
The  examination of  particularly weak  explosions  has  recently  shown  that 
it is advisable  not  to arrange the 80-litre troughs - as  used to be the 
case - so that their longitudinal axis is parallel to the axis of  the 
roadway,  but  to set  them across the  roadway,  so that they offer one  long 
side to the force  of  any  explosion which  may  occur.  In the case of  very 
weak  explosions,  this ensures that there is a  greater  likelihood that  the 
air pressure will still be sufficient to upset  the trough. 
The first  experiments  led to the idea that  the material of  which the 
troughs were  made  should break as easily as  possible,  so that  they should 
break up  immediately under the effect  of  the explosion and discharge the 
water.  A relatively fragile  PVC  material was  therefore  considered most 
suitable  (39).  But  more  recent trials have  shown  that  the easy-breaking 
properties of  the material are apparently not  so critical a  factor.  In 
the event  of  an  explosion  of  average  intensity, all types  of  troughs are 
immediately  broken  up;  when  however  a  weak  explosion affects  a  trough, 
it tips it over  rather than destroying it,  even if it is.made  of  very 
fragile material;  this was  observed  in the  most  recent  experiments.  Con-
sequently,  some  stronger material will therefore  probably  be  equally 
suitable for constructing water barriers. The  use  of stronger materials 
will have  the practical advantage of  making  damage  during transport  less 
likely. 
In addition,  there is far  from  being sufficientunderstandingof the prob-
lem of  how  a  trough behaves  under the effect  of  a  very  weak  explosion 
shock,  but  it is a  question of  considerable interest  because special at-
tention must  be  paid to the  limit  value of  explosions.  The  experimental 
mine  is investigating this phenomenon at  the surface in  a  shock-wave  tube 
50  em  in diameter,  and the experimental  roadway  at  Dortmund-Derne,  au-
thorised by  the North Rhine/Westfalia  authorities,  is studying the be-
haviour of different water containers under different air pressures which 
are measured with great  accuracy  (20 to 300 p/cm2),  these air pressures 
being set  up  by  weak  firedamp  explosions  in a  steel tube  2  m2  in cross-
section.  The  results of this research are  not  yet  known. 
A clearance of  some  15  em  between the water containers and  the  roadway 
supports is considered advisable to ensure that  their movement  is not 
hindered,  although  good  results were  obtained in one trial where  the 
troughs were  placed directly under  the roof-bars  (27).  As  a  precaution, 
a  certain gap should  however  be  left  in view  of  the possibility that  a 
very  weak  explosion which  might  tip the troughs  over without  causing them 
to break. 
On  the basis of  the experience collected,  water barriers are arranged  in 
such  a  way  that  the various platforms,  each carrying several troughs, 
are approximately  1.5 to 3  metres apart  measured  along the roadway  axis. 
Actually the effectiveness of  the barrier is not  reduced when  the series 
of  platforms  is interrupted at  one  point  by  a  maximum  interval of  10 
metres,  which  is inevitable in certain circumstances.  In this case,  the 
quantity of  water available should not  be  less than 50 litres/m2 of  road-
way  cross-section. VIII,  49 
The  long bars  (platform supports)  on which  the troughs are supported 
should not  be  more  than 40  em  apart.  It is not  necessary for  them to be 
movable;  they  can be  rigidly  linked with the roadway  supports by  means 
-of  brackets,  provided that  the troughs  can  move  freely  by at  least  15  em 
with respect to the supports.  It is very  important  to ensure that  the 
platforms  occupy at  least two-third  of  the maximum  width  of  the roadway 
in order to provide  a  guarantee that  when  the barrier is tipped  over the 
water will be distributed over the whole  roadway  cross-section. 
In several explosion trials,  use  was  made  of  other types  of water  con-
tainers than troughs,  namely  small bags,  bag-shaped rolls of  plastic. 
The  results were  very satisfactory,  but  in order to assess the full value 
of this type  of  container,  it would  be  necessary to test  them under  the 
effect of  very weak explosions. 
2.3226.  Making  allowance  for technical requirements 
The difficulties resulting from  making  due  allowance  for  the  equipment 
installed in  roadways  when  setting up barriers without  interfering with 
the anti-explosion protection and without  infringing safety regulations 
have all already been discussed when  dealing with stone-dust barriers 
(2.2126).  The  use  of  water barriers makes  it possible to satisfy these 
two  conditions slightly more  easily.  Frequently water containers can be 
installed more·  efficiently in the restricted cross-section of  a  roadway 
than can  planks  loaded with dust.  For  the water barriers,  precisely as 
with the stone-dust  barriers,  it is important to ensure that all the ex-
tinction material is distributed as completely as  possible in the road-
way  cavity when  an  explosion occurs;  however,  the experience gained  in-
dicates that  this is no  less likely if the water troughs  allow certain 
gaps to occur  in the roadway  cross-section.  The test results  lead to the 
conclusion that  the arrangement  of  the water troughs  on  a  platform should 
ensure that  there are  no  gaps  wider  than  1  metre. 
Frequently,  materials transported in the  roadways  are carried out  by 
means  of  suspended transporters which  require "free passage".  To  meet 
this situation,  a  certain number  of trials were carried out with  a  major 
part  of  the water stored in small 30-litre  troughs set  along the axis 
of  the  roadway  and  touching  one  of  the walls.  In certain trials, all the 
water was  placed  in such troughs set all around  the roadways.  The  results 
obtained hitherto are  promising.  However,  other trials will be  necessary, 
in view  of  the difficulty in providing effective protection against  very 
weak explosions with special arrangements  of this  typ~. 
The  technical difficulties might  perhaps  be  reduced,  as  a  result  of  the 
trials which  have  sought  to replace troughs set  on  platforms  by  a  suitable 
type  of  suspension.  In the shock-wave  tube trials,  and  in certain under-
ground  explosion trials,  the troughs were  suspended  from  the four  corners 
by ·plastic cord or fixed  by  means  of  twofolded-over  edges slipped over 
bars.  This  method  of  fixing was  satisfactory and will be  tested in further 
experiments. 
2.3227.  The  influence of other factors  on the effectiveness of water barriers 
2.32271.  Importance of  climatic conditions 
Water  barriers have  the particular advantage  of being  less affected by 
the climatic conditions which  obtain underground.  The  humidity  of  the 
ventilation air does  not  affect  them at all; evaporation alone  plays  some 
part,  especially in relatively dry  and  hot  pits. There is certainly no 
difficulty,  although there is a  certain amount  of  labour,  in filling the 
containers by  means  of  a  hose fitted to any  one  of  the water taps avail-
able  everywhere  in the pit. 
Moreover,  the supervisory  personnel must  constantly check the water  level. 
Special studies were  therefore put  in hand  to find  out  how  evaporation 
of  the water  could best  be  prevented.  Covering the surface of  the water VIII,  50 
in the open  container with a  thin film of oil or  some  other suitable chem-
ical did not  give  good  results,  because the coal-dust  is deposited  on it 
and  destroys the protective film.  It would  be desirable to use troughs 
closed by  a  lid or membrane  of  plastic material. Trials of  such covers 
gave  good  results  (28,  38),  but  the information obtained hitherto does· 
not  allow of  drawing final conclusions. 
The  reader is asked to refer to the remarks  on  the influence of  climatic 
conditions  made  when  dealing with stone-dust barriers  (2.21272). 
2.32272.- The effect  of  stone-dusting on  top of  deposited coal-dust 
Reference has  already been  made  (2.21273)  to the various factors and  gen-
eral experience regarding the influence stone-dusting  on  top of  the de-
posited coal-dust  may  have  on the effectiveness of  the barriers.  These 
remarks  hold  good  by  analogy  for the water barriers. 
It remains  simply to add that  the use of  hygroscopic salts  (CaC12  or 
MgCl2),  in paste or  powder  form,  is better in combination with water bar-
riers than with  stone-dust  barriers.  When  spreading this powder  or paste 
it is difficult to avoid  some  of this material falling on  the dust  plat-
forms,  where  it pollutes the surface of  the stone-dust,  which  has settled 
down  in place,  and  reduces its free-running  properties.  This disadvantage 
is not  likely to occur with water barriers. 
2.32273.  Variations  in the quantity  of  water 
The  basic observation - frequently  confirmed  - that  water barriers with 
a  charge  of  200 litres of water  per  m2  of  roadway  cross-section provide 
an  optimum quantity  stemmed  from  the  fact  that,  in previous trials,  a 
quantity of  100 litres per  m2  was  found  to be sufficient,  in several 
cases,  to restrain the explosions  and that  200 litres per  m2  gave better 
results than stone-dust  barriers with  a  charge of  400  kg  per m2.  In ad-
dition,  a  further  increase  in the quantity offered no extra advantage; 
in fact,  during a  series of  tests where the water barriers with  a  load 
of  200 litres per  m2  did  not  operate because the shock wave  produced  by 
the very  weak explosion was  too weak,  it was  found  impossible to obtain 
better results by  using  a  charge  of  400  litres/m2,  all other factors re-
maining  unchanged  (29).  It has  not  been  possible to investigate hitherto 
whether  - in the case  of  extremely  intense explosions,  when  the 200 litres/ 
m2  barriers remain  ineffective - a  larger quantity of  water  would  extin-
guish the  flame. 
2.3228.  Limits  of  effectiveness of  water barriers  (as  against  stone-dust barriers) 
(Summary) 
To  supplement  the brief remarks  on  the effectiveness of  stone-dust  barri-
ers  (2.2128)  and  for the sake  of  comparison,  we  give the following assess-
ment  of  water barriers on  the basis of  information collected hitherto: 
In the  "normal  version"  using troughs with  a  charge  of  80 litres and  200 
litres of water  per  m2  of  roadway  cross-section,  water barriers are un-
doubtedly as reliable as stone-dust barriers;  in several trials they were 
even  found  to be superior to stone-dust  barriers.  When,  in exceptional 
experimental conditions,  the water barriers did not  function,  stone-dust 
barriers were also ineffective. 
In the case of  firedamp  explosions  proper,  without  coal-dust  being  involv-
ed,  the water barriers  can no more  prevent  the complete  combustion  of  the 
gas  present  than can stone-dust  barriers.  As  far as the reduction of  the 
range  of  the flames  - due  to the mechanical resistance of the extinction 
material distributed - is concerned,  water barriers have  in many  trials 
even been  found  to be  somewhat  superior;  in no case were  they  less effec-
tive. 2.33. 
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In the case of  coal-dust  explosions  in the initial phase or very  strongly 
attenuated,  it may  happen  - with water barriers as with stone-dust bar-
riers - that  the shock wave  of  the explosion is not  sufficiently strong 
to cause the production in the roadway  of  a  sufficiently dense  cloud  of 
extinction material.  It has  not  yet  been  proved sufficiently reliably 
that there is a  difference of  degree  between the two  types of  barrier 
in this respect.  Up  to the present  nothing gives any  reason to suppose 
that  the stone-dust barriers could still be  effective where water barriers 
no  longer  operate effectively.  In the case of  explosions  involving very 
high  pressures and  very  high speeds of  propagation,  the two types  of 
barriers tend to become  ineffective.  However,  one series of trials did 
show that  the water barriers are slightly superior in this respect  to 
stone-dust barriers,  since on several occasions they were  able to stop 
explosions with propagation speeds  of  approximately  1000 metres/second, 
when  the dust  barriers had  no effect at all. 
The  economic  advantages  of  water barriers,  and  the fact  that they are 
simple to handle,  install and  move,  the small  amount  of  maintenance work 
required and the ease of  inspection are all advantages  from the safety 
point  of  view;  in fact,  the difficulties arising from the arrangement  of 
the site,  from faults  in design or from  inefficient  inspection can be 
avoided or eliminated more  easily  in the case of  water barriers,  so that 
there is a  guarantee of  more  reliable protection against  explosions. 
Present  programme  of trials of water barriers 
At  present  efforts are being concentrated  on  new  trials of  water barriers 
under the effect  of  very  weak coal-dust  explosions.  To this end,  research 
being carried out  on the surface  on the behaviour of water  troughs under 
the effect  of  very  weak  explosions is being continued both in the experi-
mental  roadway  of  the Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft  as well as at  the 
Tremonia  experimental pit  (cf  2.3225). 
In addition,  other trials are under  way  in a  pit at  Essen;  the  purpose 
of  these trials is to investigate the behaviour  of  coal-dust  explosions 
when  they run along curves  and side roads,  and to deduce  the effect  they 
have  on  water barriers. 
Efforts have  been  made  in this connection to clarify the important  tech-
nical problem as to how  far water barriers which  provide "free passage" 
for  the transport  of  materials i.e. a  barrier where the water  troughs are 
set symmetrically  in the  roadway  cross-section,  can be accepted without 
reducing effective protection against  explosions.  The tests also continued 
to cover suspensions for troughs  in place of  arrangements  on  platforms. 
Finally,  preparatory work is in hand with  a  view  to continuing the  inves-
tigation of  particularly heavy  coal-dust  explosions characterised by  a 
long  "run-up"  distance. 
Proposals for the continuance of  research work with  a  view to obtaining 
all necessary  information regarding water barriers 
The  preceding remarks  have  already given  some  clear indication of  the 
gaps  which exist  in present  knowledge  regarding the best  possible protec-
tion against  explosions,  gaps  which  cannot  be filled except  by  means  of 
new  research work,  the  programme  for  which  is set  out  in the systematic 
summary  which  follows: 
1)  Very  weak  coal-dust  explosions  (with an effective static pressure of 
1  kgp/cm2  maximum  and  a  short  distance between the ignition point  and 
the barrier), 
2)  Coal-dust  explosions  of  average  intensity  (with an effective pressure 
of  approximately  1.5 and  3  kgp/cm2), 
3)  Very  heavy  coal-dust  explosions  (with effective pressures  of  more  than 
3  kgp/cm2·and  a  particularly long  "run-up"  distance), 2.4. 
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4)  Weak  and  moderate  coal-dust  explosions which,  along the path they 
follow,  encounter considerable variations in roadway  cross-section, 
curves,  cross-overs and  side roads. 
To  carry out  these four  principal groups  of trials,  it would  be desirable 
to vary the following  parameters: 
a)  the roadway  cross-section  (between  8  and  some  18  cm2)  to the extent 
that suitable underground workings  are availablej 
b)  the quantity of water  (between  200 and  400 litres/m2 of  roadway  cross-
section,  especially in the case of  very  heavy  explosions), 
c)  the arrangement  of  large and  small water  containers across the roadway 
cross-section and  along the roadway  axis,  taking into account  the clear-
ance  necessary for working  operations, 
d)  the method  of  arrangement  or suspension of  the water  containers, 
e)  measures  to counteract  evaporation of  the water, 
f)  the quantity of  coal-dust  in the explosion  roadway  (between  300 and 
900  grams/m3  of  roadway), 
g)  the relative humidity  (comparative trials with very  dry  and  more  or 
less humid  workings,  to the extent  that  local conditions allow). 
Special attention should be  paid to groups  1  and  3,  which still give rise 
to particularly difficult safety problems,  and to the  parameters  a  and  c 
which  are of particular importance for safety as  well  as  for practical 
working operations.  It  would  also be desirable to change  the  kind  of  coal-
dust  used for the explosion trials,  although this could be  put  off  for 
the  time  being. 
Comparative trials with stone-dust  barriers in all these series of tests 
would  make  it possible to study  more  precisely than hitherto the differ-
ences  in the applicability and  effectiveness of  the different types  of 
barriers. 
To the field of  weak  explosions,  it would  be advisable to investigate 
carefully the relationship between stone-dusting on  top of  the deposited 
coal-dust  or the use  of  hygroscopic salts and the effectiveness of the 
barriers. 
In explosion trials with a  long "run-up"  distance,  it is parti-cularly 
important  to know  if the time interval between the shock wave  and the tip 
of  the flame  becomes  smaller as  a  function of the distance covered  by  the 
explosion in the  roadway  (and  of its intensity?),  or whether the  speed 
of the shock wave  and  of  the flame  becomes  constant  - from  which  one  might 
also deduce  a  constant  time  interval between the  two  phenomena. 
Finally,  an  important  purpose  of the research would  consist  of  investigat-
ing the possibilities of  extinguishing firedamp  explosions at  the earliest 
possible moment  and,  in consequence,  preventing them from transmitting the 
explosion to the coal-dust. 
Rapid barriers  (stone-dust  or water) 
Provisional results of  research 
To  round  off the  report  of  the research carried out  in the Federal Republic 
of Germany  into anti-explosion barriers,  it is necessary to deal briefly 
with the "rapid barriers",  which  are used  predominantly during operations 
destined to isolate mine  fires where  there is a  danger  of  an  explosion, 
or  in headings  in stone as  a  protective measure against  explosions which 
may  be set off  by  shotfiring.  These  "rapid barriers" are thin superimposed 2.42. 
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wooden  planks arranged in a  wooden trame  and  loaded with stone-dust;  they 
protect  almost  the entire roadway  cross-section.  More  recently,  such bar-
riers have  been  made  up  of  superimposed 30-litres plastic troughs set  in 
a  metal  frame  or  suspended  from  chains. 
Such devices  have  given  good  results during explosion trials both in the 
form  of stone-dust barriers  (25)  and of modern water barriers which  can 
be transported,  installed and filled easily and  rapidly.  Several tests 
were carried out  in collaboration with  the  Mines  Rescue Station at  Essen, 
during which rapid barriers of this kind comprising 30-litres troughs 
were set  perpendicular to the axis of  the roadway  on  superimposed  planks; 
these barriers stopped coal-dust  explosions set off  by  firedamp  explosions 
at distances respectively 20,  30 and  40 metres  from  the ignition point 
(28,  38).  The total quantity of water  used was  50 litres/m2 of  roadway 
cross-section.  Equally  favourable  results were  obtained during trials 
where  the  same  troughs  were  suspended  from  chains,  36 metres  from the 
ignition point  (29). 
Further  programme  of trials of  rapid barriers 
The  operation of  isolating a  fire is almost  always  associated with  a  cer-
tain risk of  explosion,  and it therefore  seems  valuable to continue the 
researches  into the effectiveness of  rapid water barriers which  can  be 
easily transported,  and  to seek to choose the best  method  of  suspension. 
Up  to the present,  rapid barriers have  only  been tested with explosions 
having  a  relatively short  "run-up"  distance. 
Since the operation of  isolating a  fire is frequently carried out  at  a 
considerable distance from the seat  of  the fire,  it is to be  expected 
that  the rapid barriers are equally  likely to be affected by  explosions 
which  have  already covered  a  considerable distance  in the roadway.  It is 
therefore intended to test rapid water barriers in such conditions as 
well. 
3.  Anti-explosion barriers in East  Germany,  Austria and  Czechoslovakia 
A report  on anti-explosion barriers in East  Germany,  in Austria and  in 
Czechoslovakia can easily be summarised  by  reason  of  the fact  that  research into 
the utilisation of  such barriers in these three countries goes  back to the same 
source.  In  1910,  Padour,  an Austrian,  proposed the use  of water containers to stop 
explosions;  his proposal envisaged flat metal receptacles of  18  litres capacity. 
In  1913,  two other Austrians,  Czaplinski  and Jicinsky obtained·good results with 
water barriers during trials at  Rossitz  (Moravia)  (33).  Following  a  serious ex-
plosion which  occurred  in the lignite mines  in Bohemia,  Mayer  (14)  carried out 
intensive researches  in a  drift  near  BrUx  and  observed that  water barriers con-
sisting of  wooden  troughs were superior to stone-dust barriers.  On  this basis, 
water barriers were  prescribed by  the Austrian  Mines  Inspectorate and  proved their 
complete effectiveness during an  explosion which  occurred  in  1959  in the Fohnsdorf 
mine  (Styria)  (19).  A quantity of  water  of  200 litres per  m2  of  roadway  cross-sec-
tion was  provided for the isolation of  the districts,  and  the  isolation of  each  of 
the separate workings  was  provided  by  barriers with  a  100 litres/m2 of  cross-sec-
tion.  Hanel  (of  the experimental  roadway  at Freiberg),  starting from the trials 
at Brux,  observed  in experiments with water  and stone-dust barriers that  the two 
types  of  barriers were  equally effective  (23).  In the little experimental  roadway, 
the trials used  only 60 litres of water  or  60  kg  of  stone-dust  per  m2  of  cross-
section.  Thus  the experience obtained in the Austrian trials were  also put to good 
use by  the East  German  pits. 
The  regions of Austria mentioned are today  part  of  Czechoslovakia.  Water 
barriers have  been maintained in use there,  with  a  charge of  200 litres of water 
per m2,  this provision being still in force. 
The  East  German  pits  (Soviet  zone)  have also continued the use of stone-
dust barriers and water-trough barriers.  The  present  regulation  (30)  contains pre-
cise provisions regarding the arrangement  and construction of  these barriers. The VIII,  54 
dust  platforms  have  a  maximum  width of  60 em,  and  exist  in two types which  are 
very  like those used  in Western Germany.  Wooden  or plastic water-troughs are used 
in six different sizes and  contain from  25 to 130 litres of  water.  As  a  protection 
against  evaporation,  silicone oil must  be used.  The  suspension devices  which  allow 
of  a  swinging movement  of the platforms are forbidden  by  regulations.  The  other 
instructions agree  largely with the Dortmund  Chief  Mines  Inspectorate instruction. 
The  experimental  mine  at  Dortmund  has  a  copy  of  a  report  of  the Ostrava-
Radvanice  Mining  Research  Institute which  mentions  an  explosion which  occurred  in 
1963  when  a  fire was  being sealed off  in the  Marshal  Koniev  pit  (in Northern  Bohe-
mia)  fitted with water barriers  (41).  In  1964,  coal-dust  in suspension in the air 
exploded at  the  Kolumbus  mine.  Detailed information regarding the two accidents 
and  the effectiveness of  the water barriers are expected. 
4.  Research  into anti-explosion barriers in the United States of  America 
The  United States Bureau  of  Mines  has  carried out  very  large research pro-
jects on  stone-dust  barriers during the last  ten or twenty  years  (5-11,  24,  25). 
Between  1912  and  1918,  Rice  investigated experimentally stone-dust  barriers 
of  the Taffanel type at the Bruceton  experimental pit,  near  Pittsburgh,  in an  ex-
plosion gallery 395  metres  long and  5.4  m2  in cross-sectional areas.  The  platforms 
consisted of  planks  1.6 metres  long  and  0.35 metres wide  bolted to the  roadway 
walls.  The  barriers did not  always  have  the desired effect,  and this was  probably 
due  in particular to the rigid method  of fixing the planks to the supports  (24). 
Faulty operation was  observed  in particular when  the explosion pressure was  less 
than an  effective value  of  0.7 kg/cm2.  Subsequently,  in about  1932,  the same  re-
search institute developed  a  barrier consisting of  planks  some  50  em  wide  simply 
resting on  a  beam  (this was  known  as the "tipping platform");  each platform was 
loaded with  a  charge of  109  kg  of  stone-dust.  During tests with this type of bar-
rier it was  observed that it was  not  sufficiently "sensitive"  and that  where  weak 
explosions  occurred,  the dust  was  not  adequately distributed.  · 
Other  research was  directed towards  experiments with  "suspended  platforms". 
These  platforms were  hung  from  the roadway  crown  by  means  of metal  bars fitted 
with rings,  so that the platforms  could oscillate freely.  When  the swinging  move-
ment  was  sufficiently strong,  the platforms  became  detached  from the suspension.  · 
In addition,  various types  of  box-design barriers were tested;  these are wooden 
boxes  of  which the bottom is kept  in place  by  a  system of  bolts which  open under 
the effect  of  a  shock wave.  These  boxes were  2.25 x  0.6 x  0.25  m and  had  a  capacity 
of  approximately 350 kg  of stone-dust.  In general terms,  these types  of barriers 
were  not  very  effective and  were  not  used  for  very  long. 
A number  of trials spread  over several years were  devoted to the study of 
V-trough barriers. These  comprised triangular-section wooden  containers,  laid in 
notches  made  in the wooden  supports;  these barriers were tipped over  even  by  the 
effect  of  a  weak explosion,  thus discharging their contents. 
Very  good  results were  obtained with several variants of this type  of  bar-
rier. 
In the course  of  the last ten years,  suggestions have  been  made  in the 
u.s.A.  to use  bags  of stone-dust as anti-explosion protection,  so as to save the 
expense  of  complicated barriers.  The stone-dust  is stored in paper bags,  then  put 
into plastic bags  and  hung  from  cords under the roadway  crown.  Trials with these 
"bag barriers" did not  however  get  the results expected  (16,  21,  22,  25). 
In  1919 the Bureau of  Mines  tested water barriers,  which  gave generally 
satisfactory results.  However,  as  in other countries,  the use  of  such barriers 
was  abandoned  in practice because it was  thought  that it would  be too difficult 
to keep the water containers  in  good  condition underground. 
According to the information available,  there is at  present  no interest in 
new  investigations or in the use  of  anti-explosion barriers in pits in the United 
States,  because the use  of  stone-dust  or water barriers is not  thought  to be VIII,  55 
advisable,  bearing in mind the normal  method  of  working there,  which  gives rise 
to a  very  much  branched system of  roadways.  In principle,  stone-dusting is carried 
out  as  a  protection against  the propagation of  possible explosion. VIII,  56 
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Bibliographical survey  of  French tests 
and 
methods  of  combatting  expl~sions near the coalface VIII,  61 
This  paper has  been written at  the  request  of  the Working  Party  on  "Inflam-
ma~le Dusts"  which  reports to the Permanent  Commission  for Safety  in Coal  Mines.  The 
object  is to draw conclusions  from certain test results on  explosion barriers.  By 
"explosion barriers" we  mean  any  physical means  of  combatting explosions  of  coal-dust. 
CERCHAR  has  been  asked to prepare a  memorandum  on: 
- French tests with stone-dust  and water barriers, 
- methods  of  combatting accidental explosions near the face:  bags  contain-
ing water or stone-dust  dispersed  by  explosive or other means;  water-atom-
izing devices;  activated  (triggered)  barriers. 
I.  FRENCH  TESTS  ON  STONE-DUST  AND  WATER  BARRIERS 
Taffanel's tests at  Lievin  and  Commentry  primarily  highlighted  the factors 
involved  in the spread  of  dust  explosions:  volatile matter content,  concentration 
of  stone-dust,  the size distribution of  coal and  rock characteristics of the source 
of  ignition,  the roughness  of  the  roadway  walls,  the effect  of  reflected waves  on 
the flame  when  the tests are carried out  in an  open  roadway. 
1.1.  The  Lievin tests  (1909  - 1910) 
The  experimental  roadway  was  230m  long,  with  a  cross-section of 2.8 square 
metres.  The volatile content  of the coal was  30%  (net  basis)  and the ash 
content  varied between  6  and  12 %;  different  size consists of  coal were  used 
in order to vary the proneness to flame  propagation. 
Coal-dust  placed  in front  of  a  mortar was  whirled up  and  ignited by  the 
firing of  240 grams  of  blasting gelatine. 
The barriers were  improved during the tests.  Initially,  the stone-dust  form-
ed  a  pile which  obstructed 34  % of the section over  a  length of  10 metres. 
During the subsequent tests the stone-dust  was  placed  on  superimposed shelves, 
located along the  roadway  walls.  In the final tests,  the barriers were  con-
structed of  fixed  shelves,  set transversely  in the  roadway,  and  on  which water 
troughs  or stone-dust  were  placed. 
The  intensity of the explosion was  varied by  adjusting the fineness  or den-
sity of  the coal-dust  deposit.  This  gave results showing  flame  velocities 
running  from  20 to 860 m/sec.  Various  suppressants were  tried out:  flue ash, 
shale,  sand,  water;  they were  tried in different  quantities. 
The  following  conclusions  can be  drawn  from these tests: 
- it was  possible to establish for  the first  time  that  barriers could sup-
press explosions  in different  conditions; 
- the coal-dust  explosions which  are most  difficult to suppress  by  barriers 
are of  the pulsating type,  i.e. the slowest  explosions; 
- since the shelves were  fixed  - a  fact  not  conducive to effective disper-
sion of  the stone-dust  - the amounts  of  non-inflammable dust  were  very 
large.  Yet  even with an  indifferent extinguishing agent,  70 litres of 
stone-dust  per square metre  of  gallery were  adequate to stop - at distances 
between  150 and  170 metres  from their source  - slow explosions whose  flame 
speeds are between  20 and  40 m/sec.  270 litres per square metre  of  ash 
were  enough  for violent  explosions,  whose  flame  speeds  reached approxi-
mately  500 m/sec.  The  amounts  of  stone-dust here are  less than those 
required by  the safety regulations of  the various countries; 
- the tests,  taken as  a  whole,  suggest  that water  is  the suppressant to be 
preferred. VIII,  62 
1.2.  The  Commentry  tests  (1912- 1913) 
The  roadway  was  1115  metres  long;  it was  open at  both  ends  and  contained 
curves,  angular turns  and  a  sloping section.  The  cross-sectional area was 
between 3.5 and  8.7 square  metres  and the  roadway  was  fully  timbered. 
The  coal  was  identical with  that  used  at  Lievin. 
The  explosion  source  was  in a  6-metre deep cross-drift,  near the middle  of 
the roadway.  Whirling-up and  ignition of  the coal-dust  was  induced  by  the 
firing of  400 grams  of  black powder  in a  mortar  and  of  600 grams  of  naphtalite 
"rock and  methane"  explosive suspended  above.  The  stone-dust  barriers consist-
ed  of  shelves  resting on  fixed  supports.  Each  of  the  15  shelves  was  60  em  wide 
and  160  em  long,  the  gap  between  each shelf being 60  em;  each  was  loaded with 
100 litres of  ash.  The  water barriers consisted of  two  troughs  each  holding 
650 litres of water,  and  this water was  discharged  over  a  period  of  several 
seconds,  following  on  the  passage  of  the  pressure wave. 
Such tests as were  carried out  at  Commentry  confirmed,  in roads  of  large 
cross-section,  the  previous  results with regard both to barriers  in general 
and  to water  as  a  suppressant. 
The  main  body  of  our  knowledge  of traditional barriers was  gained  as  the 
results of  the Taffanel test. 
More  specifically,  they  led to the achievement  of  the suppression  of  wea~ 
explosions,  where  the air current  is not  always  able to disperse the suppres-
sant  effectively. Nevertheless,  the Taffanel tests on  neutralisation showed 
that  it was  capable  - if properly carried out  - of  suppressing weak  explosions 
even  without  recourse to barriers.  A tenable conclusion is that stone-dusting 
and  barriers provide jointly a  satisfactory solution. 
II.  RELATED  METHODS  OF  COMBATTING  EXPLOSIONS 
There  is always  every reason to suppress  explosions  as  soon  as  possible. 
Tests  on barriers throughout  the world  haven,in fact,  shown  that  it could  be 
very difficult  indeed to halt  explosions with  flame  speeds  in excess  of  800 m/sec. 
Traditional methods  used  in development  work  - so  many  dust  explosions did, 
in fact,  start as  a  result  of  shotfiring in development  workings  - have  been 
stone-dusting as  close as  possible to the faces  and  barriers  placed at  an  optimum 
distance  from  the face. 
Other  methods  of safeguarding development  roadways  can  be  envisaged.  Since 
the initial explosion  can  be fairly  weak  and,  consequently,  the dispersion  of  the 
suppressant  by  the air current  may  be  inadequate,  studies  have  been  made  of  vari-
ous  devices  which  might  perhaps  improve  the protection  of  development  roadways: 
these  have  included devices  which  would  most  effectively disperse the suppressant. 
Such dispersion may  be carried out  either,  in a  systematic way  prior to shotfir-
ing  (shotfiring being  one  of  the most  prevalent  causes  of the initiation of  coal-
dust  explosions),  or  by  a  device  for detecting the explosion;  the latter method 
having the  advantage  of  giving protection against  every  known  cause of  explosion. 
The  following sections will review  each  of  these  two  methods  of  protection 
in turn. 
II.l.  Methods  applied systematically during shotfiring 
These  methods  are used  as  close as  possible to the shotfiring area,  only 
a  few  metres  away,  so that  the  atomization of  the suppressant will,  if 
possible,  prevent  the ignition of  the  inflammable air-firedamp-dust  mixtures 
which  may  exist  or may  arise during shotfiring near the face. 
The  following  devices will  be studied in turn: Vlll,  63 
- water  bags  or stone-dust  bags dispersed  by  an  explosive charge, 
- water  atomizing sprays set  in operation before shotfiring takes  place. 
II.l.l. Water  and stone-dust  bags 
F.  Otasek was  the first  person to perfect  a  process  for eliminating the 
danger  of  shotfiring with "rock"  explosive in gassy  and  possibly dusty 
workings.  The  process consists of water  stemming,  coupled with water atom-
ization obtained by  exploding  one  or more  plastic water bags,  by  means 
·of an  explosive charged  ignited 0.5 to 1  sec.  before shotfiring. 
The tests were  carried out  in a  roadway  2  metres  in diameter.  The  shot-
holes were  simulated by  a  mortar containing 500 grams  of  "rock"  explosive. 
The barrier consisted of  two  bags,  each of which contained 7  litres of 
water with an explosive  charge,  placed  1.50 metres  in front  of  the mortar 
nozzle  and  1  metre  above  its axis.  The  coal-dust  was  spread out  in front 
of  the mortar  nozzle.  Without  water,  the shotfiring always  ignited the 
dust.  In the presence  of  atomized water,  the dust  was  either not  complete-
ly  ignited,  or the resultant  flame  was  significantly shorter.  Similar 
tests were carried out  on  the prevention of  firedamp  explosions,  which 
very often transmit  the shock  from the explosive,  so causing a  dust  ex-
plosion. 
As  a  result  of this,  similar tests were carried out  by  Soviet  research 
workers at  MAKNII.  An  attempt  was  made,  in a  roadway  of  3.2 sq.  metres 
cross-section,  to suppress the  ignition,  either of  a  firedamp mixture, 
or  of  a  coal-dust  cloud,  or  of  a  mixture  of  air,  firedamp  and  coal. 
The tests differed from those of  Otasek in that  the water was  dispersed 
by  two electric detonators. 
Prof.  Cybulski  must  be credited with a  large number  of tests in very dis-
similar conditions,  but  always  in  a  gassy  environment  and  without  coal-
dust. 
- He  used  roadways with cross-sections from  2.9 to 11 sq.  metres  of  vary-
ing shape. 
- Ignition was  caused either by electric detonators,  or by different  ex-
plosive charges  in the mortars  and angle-shot  mortars  placed  in differ-
ent  locations in the gallery. 
- His studies  included the  influence of  the time-lag between the disper-
sion of  the water or the  limestone dust  and the i.nitiation of  a  firedamp 
explosion  - 0  to 2,000 ms. 
- In addition,  he  varied the character,  location and quantity of  the sup-
pressant  (30 to 120 litres of water;  7.5 to 120 kg  of  limestone dust). 
- The  water  and dust  bags  were  dispersed equally by  detonators or explo-
sives. 
At  the Freiberg research station the flame  produced by  a  "rock"  explosive 
in a  mortar,  with water  bags dispersed by  explosive,  was  photographed to 
try and  assess the  optimum  location of  the bags  (1 metre)  and the pre-
ferred time-lag between dispersion and shotfiring  (23  ms). 
The  following  conclusions can  be  drawn  from the  body  of tests made  at the 
different research establishments  on bags  of water  and stone-dust: 
The  method  can be  recommended as  a  useful additional precaution in cases 
of  instantaneous shotfiring or short-delay shotfiring,  which  supplements 
conventional methods  of neutralisation and barriers,  providing additional 
safety by  preventing the occurrence of  explosions  in a  large number  of 
cases.  Unfortunately,  this method  is liable to be vitiated in cases where 
there are recesses which  cannot  readily be  reached by the suppressant  -
corners  of  rectangular roads,  stable-holes,  etc.  or when the ignition of VIII,  64 
firedamp  takes  place sometime after shotfiring - ignition by  a  detonator 
or deflagration explosive,  a  cartridge smouldering under  the spoil.  The 
test results with the angle-shot  mortar  seem to indicate that  the method 
is not  always effective when  the firedamp  is likely to be  ignited by  a 
bared shot;  this drawback is not  serious because the method  is scarcely 
applied with delay shot-firing. 
From all these tests we  can  conclude that  the  most  favourable  conditions 
are these: 
- bags  placed between  1  and  3  metres  from the face, 
- time-lags  between dispersion and firing of between  50 and  500 ms  in 
the case of water  bags,  and  between  50 and  1000 ms  with  limestone dust, 
- the amounts  of water required are between  3  and  13  litres per square 
metre  of  cross-section,  depending  on the conditions, 
- the type  of  explosive  in the bags  has  little effect  on  the result, 
- safety is increased when  the rock-breaking explosive  is placed  in a 
water sheath. 
This method  has  already been used when  shotfiring in rock  with  "rock" 
explosive  in very  gassy workings. 
11.1.2. Tests with water atomizers  near the face 
The  tests were  intended to develop atomizers  in order to suppress dust 
explosions starting in dead  ends at  the moment  of  firing.  The  atomizing 
sprays are started systematically several seconds  before firing. 
Three  roadways  were  used:  one,  144  metres  in length and  2.5 sq.  metres  in 
cross-section;  a  second,  45  metres  long  and  10 sq.  metres  in cross-sec-
tion;  the third,  at Tremonia,  was  275  metres  long  and  between  8  and  10 
square metres  in cross-section,  where  Dr.  Meerbach's tests were carried 
out.  The  dust  explosions were  set  off either by  firedamp  ignited by  ex-
plosive - as  a  strong source  - or black powder  igniters - as  a  weak 
source  - or  by  using  explosive to ignite a  previously-formed dust  cloud. 
The  dust  deposit  was  made  up  of  pure coal or partially stone-dusted coal 
- Montrambert  coal at  Verneuil,  standard coal at Tremonia. 
Tests  in the 45-metre  roadway  assessed the effectiveness of  atomizers 
against  a  roof  layer of  firedamp  extending  on  both  sides of  the atomizer. 
The tests used  simple jets and different types  of  atomizer mostly directed 
towards  the far  end  of  the gallery.  The  distance between the atomizer  and 
the face  varied between  10 and  21  metres.  Atomization was  usually carried 
out  5  sees before firing,  but  in the case of  the roof  layer of  firedamp 
the time-lag was  increased to 30 sees. 
The  flow  of water  varied between  40 and  260  litres/min/sq.  metre,  a  range 
within the  compass  of  everyday mining conditions. 
The tests showed  that: 
- the larger the cross-section,  the  larger  becomes  the  amount  of water 
required per square metre  of cross-section to suppress  a  violent  explo-
sion.  A quantity of  1200 litres/min was  insufficient for  a  cross-sec-
tion of  10 sq.  metres  - an  amount  which  is already hard to provide  in 
actual mining conditions.  In such a  cross-section,  of  flow  of  500 to 
600 litres/min is unable effectively to arrest  explosions other than 
those set off by  a  weak  source.  Since these are unable to disperse  a 
simple jet in a  suitable way,  the only devices which  are relatively 
effective are those which  produce  a  mist  of  small droplets. 
- All other things being equal,  explosions which  were  not  arrested in the 
45-letre roadway,  were  not  arrested in the 275-metre roadway  either. II.2. 
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This difference is due to the expansion waves  being reflected on  to the 
mouth  of the short  roadway,  creating turbulence which favours  the pro-
pagation of  the explosion. 
- In the case of  roof  layers of  firedamp,  atomization of water creates 
air currents which  carry  away  and dilute the methane;  the flame  weakens 
or stops when  it meets this diluted zone. 
It is instructive to compare  the methods  with water  bags  and atomizing 
sprays:  the atomizers have  the advantage  of  acting for several seconds 
before and after firing,  while the water  from  bags is effective only for 
about  half  a  second  on  being dispersed  from the bag. 
On  the other hand,  while it is difficult to keep  more  than  10 litres of 
water  suspended  in the air at  any  given moment  with atomizers,  there is 
no  reason why  one  should  not  have  several dozen  litres suspended with the 
water ·bag  method. 
Triggered barriers 
An  activated  (triggered)  barrier consists of  two separate parts:  a  dis-
persing device and  a  detector-trigger device. 
The  ideal dispersing device should enable the suppressant  material to be 
sprayed into the entire cross-section,  and  as  uniformly as possible;  dis-
persion must  be  rapid,  so as to be  completed before the arrival of  the 
flame  of  a  rapid explosion,  and  should last  long  enough to suppress  the 
flame  of  a  slow explosion. 
The  dispersion must  be  of  a  reproducible type. 
The  detector-trigger device consists of  a  detector sensitive to the pres-
sure wave  or to the flame  of  the explosion.  Such  a  detector must  be selec-
tive,  so as not  to react to a  pressure wave  due  to firing or to stray 
radiation.  The trigger receives the signal from the detector and activates 
the operation of the dispersing device. 
French,  British,  Soviet  and  American tests will be  reviewed  in turn. 
II.2.1. The  Montlugon tests on  triggered barriers 
This study was  carried out  in. a  150-metre roadway,  2.5 square metres  in 
cross-section. The  coal-dust  used - dispersed at  a  ~ate of  500 grams  per 
cubic metre  - contained between  25  and 30% volatile matter,  and  had  a 
specific surface area of  between 450 and  700 square metres per  kilogram. 
Six  igniting sources  of different strength set off the explosion:  either 
a  variable  volume  of  a  9  % air-methane mixture  ignited by  200 grams  of 
black  powder,  or by  fusion of  an  electric wire,  or a  dust  cloud ignited 
directly by  1100 grams  of black powder. 
A first series of tests involved  gases  and  vapours.  The  substances used 
were: 
Phosphorus  oxychloride 
Carbon tetrachloride 
Carbon  dioxide 
Sulphuryl chloride 
(POC13) 
(CCl4) 
(C02) 
(SOC12) 
The  distance between the barriers and the source varied between  40 and 
75  metres. 
The  dispersing device alone was  studied and not  the detector.  The  only 
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30,000 litres - of  carbon dioxide gas,  released  in 3.5 sees  from  three 
cylinders equipped with rapid-release valves.  The  only explosions arrested 
were  comparatively slow ones,  with flame  velocities of  about  50 metres/ 
sec.  In addition,  this type  of  barrier would  not  be  very  practicable in 
current  mining use. 
Later,  tests with  (stone)-dust  barriers were  carried out  - using dusts 
of: 
Sodium chloride 
Cryolite 
Clay  -
the barriers being placed between  20 and 30 metres  from  the face.  The 
tests led to the design  of  a  trigger device which  enabled violent  explo-
sions to be  arrested in a  large number  of  cases,  where  flame  velocities 
reached several hundred metres  per second. 
The  selected device was  as  follows:  the detonators for dispersing the 
dust  were  incorporated into the secondary circuit of  a  200-6  V transformer. 
The  primary circuit,  which  comprised  a  tin foil placed  12  metres  from  the 
far  end  of  the roadway,  was  fed  by  a  0.3  amp  current.  The air current  from 
an  explosion broke the tin foil,  the primary current  was  suddenly broken, 
and the current  induced  in the secondary circuit set tripped the detonators. 
Sodium chloride and cryolite seemed to be  equally effective:  in fairly 
small quantities - 2  kg  per square metre  - they  were able to arrest vio-
lent  explosions. 
Unfortunately,· the trigger device did not  operate reliably at  this stage. 
Development  on it, halted in 1939,  was  only  resumed after the  Montlu~on 
Research  Station moved  to Verneuil.  It should  be  pointed out  that disper-
sion by  means  of  explosives can  have  certain dangers  for the  worl~en in 
the event  of  ill-timed triggering. 
Recent  technical advances  in electronics have  opened  up  new  prospects of 
developing a  trigger device.  Some  months  ago  CERCHAR  resumed  work  on  a 
detector. 
11.2.2. British tests on  triggered barriers 
In  1954  the Buxton Research Station became  interested in different  types 
of detectors.  Among  the flame  detectors  examined,  studies were  undertaken 
of  fusible wires,  inflammable materials,  thermistors,  air thermometers, 
and  ionisation and  radiation detectors.  The best  results were  obtained 
with a  fusible  nylon thread and with an air thermometer with  a  reaction 
time  of  15  ms.  Laboratory tests were  made  on  an  air-velocity detector 
whose  operative threshold was  preset.  Unfortunately,  these tests did not 
yield practical results. 
Some  years  later research work  was  resumed  on triggered barriers,  the 
emphasis this time being  on  the dispersion method. 
Work  was  done  on  the type  of  conditions in which  a  dust  explosion could 
be arrested 62  metres  from the far  end,  using atomizers covering the en-
tire cross-section of the roadway,  or by  means  of  a  single water jet. 
The  roadway  was  1.22 metres  in diameter  and  100 metres  long.  The  finely-
crushed coal contained 35 % volatile matter and was  used in its pure form 
or blended with  limestone dust.  The  ignition sources  produced either a 
weak  explosion - 30 metres/sec - or a  violent  explosion - 180 metres/sec. 
The  factors studied were the design and  location of  the atomizers and 
jets, the requisite water  flow,  the necessary sprinkling time before the 
arrival of the flame  at that  point,  and the violence of  the explosion. 
The  water flow  required was  considerable:  500 litres/min or more  - a  very 
high figure  in view .of  the small cross-section.  In practice it would  be VIII,  67 
very difficult to obtain the ·same  amounts  per square metre of cross-sec-
tion in a  large roadway. 
The  tests showed that  to be effective,  atomization need only  precede the 
explosion by  a  few  tenths of a  second. 
II.2.3.  Soviet tests on triggered barriers 
Maknii  have  developed  a  barrier controlled by  a  photoelectric cell. This 
·cell, which  is sensitive to infra-red rays,  gives a  signal which  controls 
the firing of  a  detonator,  releasing a  spring which activates the troughs 
of  a  barrier.  During the tests,  the barrier was  placed between 20 and 60 
metres  from the far  end  of  the roadway.  The  cell was  placed between 5  and 
7  metres  from the same  end.  The  detonator was  set off 2  or 3  ms·after the 
flame  passed the cell. The  suppressant material was  either inert dust, 
at  a  rate of  50 kilograms  per square metre of  cross-section,  or water. 
Water  proved to be  less effective with slow explosions.  It would  appear 
that the  optimum distance between the far  end  of the gallery and the first 
trough was  between  20 and  25  metres. 
By  1962  this type of barrier was  already  used  in over 300 workings  in the 
Donbass. 
11.2.4. Triggered barriers in the u.s. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A triggered barrier,  designed by  Fleming  and  Thomson  in 1949,  has not,  as 
far as we  know,  led to any test results being published. 
The  U.S.  Bureau of  Mines  reported  on  the state of its researches  on trig-
gered barriers to the Sheffield Conference  in  1965.  The  flame  detector is 
a  photovolt  cell using treated silicon,  giving a  signal which,  relayed 
via  a  detonator,  releases  carbon dioxide  from  a  sealed container,  thus 
discharging  23  kilograms  of  potassium oxalate powder  into the atmosphere. 
The  tests showed  that the device  could arrest the ignition of  43  cubic 
metres  of  a  9  % air-methane mixture.  Tests are planned for  improving the 
barrier and testing its performance  in a  coal-dust  environment. 
Conventional water  or inert dust barriers: 
- These  have  been  proven under mining conditions;  they are simple,  robust,  typically 
"mining"  solutions,  relatively easy to maintain. 
- They  do  not  afford protection against the full range  of  accidental explosions, 
particular~y very slow or rapid explosions;  their deployment  is not  always  easy. 
- Their capacity for dispersing the suppressant material might  well still be  improved, 
as also the composition of  the suppressant  and  our understanding of  the best  loca-
tion. 
Arresting methods  close to the face: 
- These  guard against  the ignition of  dust  and even methane,  or arrest the propagation 
of  such ignition at  an early stage;  they  provide a  satisfactory dispersion at the 
moment  of  maximum  risk. 
They  do  not  give  protection in certain cases,  especially if the explosion starts 
at  a  point  other than at the face,  or at  a  time other than when  shotfiring.  Unlike 
water atomizers,  water or dust  bags  do  not  afford protection when  the explosion is 
initiated a  few  moments  after firing,  as is the case,  e.g.  when  a  cartridge is burn-
ing under the excavated material.  Their cost price is considerable and their opera-
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- They  cannot  repiace the traditional barriers but  should be  used  in conjunction with 
them,  and  - together with neutralisation - provide  a  considerable measure  of  addi-
tional safety. 
Triggered barriers 
- A sound  type  of triggered barrier should - at  the right  moment  and  for an  adequate 
period - provide  good  dispersion,  which  should enable  one to use  small  amounts  of 
suppressant materials;  one  could then use  combustion  suppressants which will be 
more  effective than water or  limestone dust. 
- The  application of  such barriers would  be particularly valuable several dozen metres 
from the face,  when  the explosion has  not  developed sufficiently to disperse readily 
the material carried on  a  conventional barrier. 
- It is however  a  solution which  is not  a  "mining"  solution,  and which is expensive 
and  complicated;  it is not  sufficiently tested as yet;  the development  of  a  selec-
tive detector,  which  would  cut  out  ill-timed triggering,  is not  easy. 
- Yet  this is perhaps the means  which  we  may  hope will bring the greatest  improvement 
of safety in the future. VIII,  69 
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Synopsis 
A brief review is given  of  the developments  and experiences  leading up to 
the provision of  stone-dust barriers in the mines  in Great  Britain.  Some  of the dif-
ficulties met  with in the installation and  maintenance  of barriers in present-day 
mining  practice are discussed,  and modifications and alternatives to the present  sys-
tem of  stone-dust barriers are described. 
The  need for further research and  development,  and the facilities.now made 
available by  the commissioning of  the new  large-scale coal-dust  explosion gallery at 
the Buxton Station of  s.M.R.E.  are discussed. 
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THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  STONE-DUST  BARRIERS 
Although the widespread  introduction of stone-dust barriers into British 
mines  is of  comparatively recent  date,  the  idea of  using such devices to arrest  a 
coal-dust  explosion was  under  investigation in the early years  of this century,  first 
by  Taffanel in France and  later by  Rice  in America  and Beyling  in Germany.  It was, 
of  course,  already well  known  that  a  progressive dust  explosion could be  prevented 
by  strewing  on  the roof,  sides and floor sufficient  incombustible dust to render the 
cloud  of  mixed  dust that  could be raised in the air incapable of  propagating an ex-
plosion,  and  the  idea of  a  concentrated barrier of  incombustible d"st  appeared attrac-
tive. 
The  considerable measure  of  success  achieved  in these early researches  led 
to the introduction of barriers in a  number  of  countries,  and  to further  investiga-
tions which  have  continued to the present;  much  of the recent  work has  been carried 
out  in Germany,  by  Schultze-Rhonhof,  and  in Poland,  by  Cybulski.  A fascinating and 
detailed review of  the researches  up to 1952  has  been  published by  Dr.  H.F.  Coward. 
During the course of the early work  on  barriers a  considerable  insight  into 
the principles of their operation was  gained  and  a  wide  variety of  types  of barriers 
was  tried before the designs  now  current were  developed.  Thus it was  soon established 
that  a  barrier of  dust  on  longitudinal shelves fixed to the roadway  sides,  though 
possibly the most  convenient  arrangement,  was  ineffective,  and that  transverse shelves 
must  be  used;  and also that  the use of  fixed shelves to hold the dust  was  unsuccess-
ful  except  in the case of  a  violent  explosion.  Shelves  hung  from  the roof also proved 
of  doubtful efficacy as they  tended to swing  in the blast  rather than allow the dust 
to be rapidly dispersed. 
These  findings  led to the examination of barriers constructed of units which 
could be  so disturbed  by  the blast ahead  of the explosion flame  as to facilitate good 
dispersion of  the dust  they carried. 
Dr.  Coward's  paper  gives detailed descriptions of  well over twenty different 
designs  of self-operating barriers on  which  tests were  made,  including shelf,  box  and 
trough types,  and certain so-called concentrated barriers.  Of  these,  the ones  found 
most  generally successful and practicable were the German  Dortmund  barrier and the 
Polish  improved barrier.  Although both in Germany  and  in  Poland it had  been  found 
that barriers of  the American  V-trough  type,  and  in particular the modification with 
loose boards tried by  Cybulski,  were  very  promising,  in  practic~ the shelf types were 
preferred - possibly because  of their simpler construction. 
In the course of  these researches  a  number  of  observations of general sig-
nificance had  been  made.  It was  found  that although explosions  of moderate  violence 
were  readily arrested by barriers,  very weak  explosions were  often difficult to stop, 
as were also extremely violent  explosions.  With  very weak  explosions the blast ahead 
of the flame either did not  disturb the barrier sufficiently or did not  cause the 
dust  to be  properly dispersed before the flame  arrived.  Very  strong explosions,  in 
which the flame  had  almost  caught  up the blast,  again did not  allow the dust  to be 
sufficiently dispersed before the arrival of the flame. 
The  successful operation of  a  barrier was  therefore a  question of obtaining 
the correct relation between the sensitivity of the barrier and the characteristics 
of the explosion,  and since these latter varied with the progress of the explosion 
the siting of  a  barrier in relation to the source of  the explosion was  important. 
Thus,  although it was  clearly desirable to stop an explosion as early as possible, 
barriers placed too near to the source of  an  explosion were  frequently  unsuccessful. 
To  be sufficiently sensitive to blast the barrier units should be of  light construc-
tion and  of relatively small dust  capacity.  Schultze-Rhonhof  suggested that barriers 
sited at some  distance from the expected source of  an explosion should contain some 
units or shelves more  lightly  loaded than the rest.  Although it was  expected that an 
explosion would usually have  become  violent  by the time it reached the barrier,  there 
could be  occasions when  it was still relatively weak,  and the  lightly-loaded shelves VIII,  76 
were  intended to provide for such occasions.  There was  also general agreement  that 
the units of  a  barrier should  not  be too close together and that  they  should be so 
arranged that  the free flight  of  the boards  should not  be  impeded.  The  importance 
is now  recognised  of  adequate dispersal of  the barrier material and  of  the production 
of  a  dense  cloud of material capable of  being well maintained in suspension. 
Although  research had  been mainly  concerned with self-operated barriers of 
stone-dust,  tests had also been carried out  with water barriers and with barriers 
remotely  operated by  the advancing explosion through the agency  of  some  trigger device, 
and  these will be  mentioned  later. 
THE  APPLICATION  OF  STONE-DUST  BARRIERS 
A widely different attitude was  taken  by the mining engineers of  different 
countries to the use  of stone-dust barriers.  In the United States barriers were tried 
in many  mines  for  a  time  but  became  largely abandoned,  due  partly to difficulties 
associated with  rapid face  advance,  in favour  of  general stone-dusting.  In France, 
Holland and Belgium,  barriers,  though  not  universally required by  Regulation,  became 
used as supplementary protection to general stone-dusting in certain places.  In Poland 
more  emphasis  has  been placed on  the use of barriers and,  in conjunction with a  good 
level of  general stone-dusting,  they are regarded as  a  necessary safeguard.  In Ger-
many,  although there was  in the past  a  limited requirement  for stone-dusting,  much 
importance was  placed on the provision of stone-dust barriers:  recently,  however, 
alternative safeguards  have  been receiving attention. 
In general,  presumably as  a  result  of  the more  complicated ventilation sys-
tems  of  horizon mining,  continental practice has  been directed more  to the use of 
barrierS as  a  means  of  sealing off one district or circuit  from  another than to the 
siting of barriers in relation to potential sources of ignition. 
In Great  Britain the use  of barriers did  not  find  favour  and it was  believed 
that it was  better to prevent  the occurrence of  a  dust  explosion by  adequate general 
stone-dusting than  to allow an explosion to develop until arrested by  a  barrier at 
some  distance,  by  which  time there could  be  loss of life both of  men  in the path of 
the explosion and  of  men  downwind  being  overcome  by  the toxic afterdamp.  This belief 
was  no doubt  reinforced by the evident  beneficial effects of  the  introduction of  gen-
eral stone-dusting. 
It was,  nevertheless,  early recognised that  in practice it could be diffi-
cult to ensure that conditions were  always  and  everywhere safe.  Research has  shown 
that  fairly  intimate mixing  of  the stone-dust with the coal-dust  was  important,  and 
that  a  thin layer of coal-dust  lying over even  a  thick layer of  inert dust,  or  coal-
dust-rich zones along a  road,  could still allow an explosion to propagate.  The  fact 
that  explosions,  though  much  limited in their extent,  could still happen demonstrated 
the practical difficulties in achieving a  sufficiently even  degree  of  stone-dusting. 
With  the widespread  introduction of belt  conveyors  the situation became 
still more  unsatisfactory,  and it was  realised,  and demonstrated by research,  that 
coal-dust  on  the belt itself,  and  in spillage along the run  of  the conveyor,  could 
not  be  effectively neutralised by  general stone-dusting. 
These  deficiencies were tragically emphasised  by  the explosion at Easington 
Colliery,  in May  1951,  and  the need for additional precautions was  stressed in the 
Report  of  the Inquiry into the cause  and  circumstances of  the disaster. 
After discussing measures to minimise the hazard of  coal-dust  in mine  road-
ways,  the  Commissioner,  the then  Chief  Inspector of  Mines,  went  on to say: 
"When  all these measures  have  been  taken there will still remain the prob-
lem created by the ease with which  coal-dust  can be raised by  the blast of  an explo-
sion from the conveyor structure and  from the belts. The  only practicable solution 
at present  in sight  seems to be the provision of  some  form of dust  or water barrier 
at suitably chosen sites. There is still much  to learn about  barriers,  but  experience 
in Germany  with dust  barriers of  the shelf type has  been sufficiently favourable to 
justify their adoption in this  c~untry until something better is devised.  Research VIII,  77 
should be carried out  in the further use ·of  dust  barriers and  in the development  of 
water barriers,  and  in the meantime shelf  type barriers should be  installed on  con-
veyor  roads." 
Before the actual publication of  the Report  of this Inquiry action had 
already been taken  by  Mr.  H.E.  Collins,  then Divisional Production Director,  and bar-
riers of  the German  type were  introduced in the Durham  Division in January,  1952. 
This action was  followed,  in 1953,  by  the  issue by  the N.C.B.  of  a  general directive 
on the provision of stone-dust barriers. 
The  system of  protection required by  the Directive,  though  based  largely 
on  German  practice,  differed from  practice on the Continent  in requiring barriers, 
with certain exceptions,  only  on  roads  in which  gate conveyors  were  installed for 
transporting coal from the coal face,  and special attention was  paid  in the·siting 
of  the barriers to transfer and  loading points. 
In October,  1960,  Regulations  came  into force requiring stone-dust barriers 
of  a  type approved  by  the Minister to be  provided in or near  lengths  of  road  on which 
coal,  other than anthracite,  is carried by  means  of  a  conveyor,  and which are  in an 
area throughout  which  the flame  that  may  be caused  by  an  ignition of  inflammable gas 
or dust  occurring at  a  working  coal face  or  such other place as the mine  manager  may 
determine  is likely to extend.  Other than this the Regulations  make  no detailed re-
quirements as to the siting of  the barriers but  require the Manager  to prepare a  suit-
able  scheme  in respect  of  each· area concerned. 
PRESENT  PRACTICE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 
Following the introduction of these Regulations  a  Sub-committee of  the Coal 
Industry National Consultative Council's Safety and Health Committee  was  set  up to 
consider whether,  in the light of  more  recent  research and experience,  the N.C.B. 
Instruction on the type  and siting of barriers could be  improved.  The  recommendations 
of the Safety  and Health Committee  were  published by  N.C.B.  in the Report  on Stone-
Dust  Barriers on  Coal  Conveyor  Roads,  of  May  1961,  and the more  important  changes 
proposed were  as  follows. 
The  Report,  in view  of  the now-recognised  need  for  precautions in wet  and 
damp  conditions,  and  of  the possibility of  ignitions of  firedamp  in naked-light  mines, 
recommended  that barriers should be  provided even in wet  conditions  and  in naked-light 
mines. 
It was  also recommended  that,  in future,  barriers should be of the design 
developed  and  used  in Poland.  This was  based  on  a  careful  consi~eration of the avail-
able  information on the German  and the Polish designs,  from which it appeared that 
the Polish barrier had  been more  extensively tested and also was  thought  to be of  a 
construction likely to be  more  effective in weak  explosions. 
On  the siting of barriers,  it was  considered that  the barriers should be 
sited in relation to possible points of origin of  an  ignition,  and  since in coal-
producing districts more  explosions occur at  or near the coal face,  barriers should 
generally be  provided  in relation to working  coal faces  and  aimed at minimising the 
possible spread of  an  explosion.  In order best to achieve these objectives it was 
evident that  a  system of  two barriers was  necessary,  one barrier relatively near to 
the coal face  and  a  second barrier a  further distance  away. 
The  first barrier should be  installed within the range  50 - 120 yards  from 
the nearest  point  of  the face;  if sited closer to the face the barrier is likely to 
be  ineffective due to too short  an  interval between the flame  and the blast ahead. 
It should be  composed  of slightly loaded shelves readily disturbed by  weak blast. 
Although a  barrier of this type sited as  above  should succeed in arresting 
most  explosions which might  occur at  the face,  stone-dust barriers cannot  be relied 
upon to arrest  a  firedamp explosion.  It is therefore possible that  if a  large fire-
damp  explosion occurred at  the face,  or if there were  a  firedamp  layer at  or near the 
site of  the barrier,  flame  could be projected past  the barrier and  ignite coal-dust 
further outbye.  This risk is guarded against  by the second barrier. VIII,  78 
The  second  (or  heavy)  barrier should be sited far  enough  from the coal face 
for there to be  little risk that  it may  be  reached by  a  firedamp explosion at  the 
coal face,  or a  layer of  firedamp at  the roof  over the first barrier,  but  not  so far 
away  that it cannot  operate effectively.  Little is in fact  known  of  how  barriers will 
operate at  distances of more  than about  400 yards  from  the source of  an  explosion, 
and it is recommended  that  the second barrier should be  installed at  a  distance of 
200 - 350 yards  from the face.  This barrier needs to carry more  dust  than the first 
barrier,  as the explosion can  have  developed greater violence at  the greater distance 
from its source:  however,  in some  conditions the explosion may  still be  relatively 
weak  and  the design of  the barrier must  be  such as  to cover the  two possibilities. 
It  shoul~ therefore be  composed  of  some  lightly  loaded shelves,  similar to those of 
the first barrier,  and  some  shelves more  heavily  loaded to ensure,  by  virtue of  their 
greater stability,  that if the  interval between the blast  and  flame  is relatively 
long,  the dust  will not  all have  reached the floor  or become  too widely dispersed 
before the flame  arrives. 
Although these  light and  heavy  barriers will be  the  kinds  needed  in most 
places,  in some  circumstances,  for  example  where the distance between the gates of 
adjacent  newly  developed  faces  is insufficient to allow the installation of  both 
light  and  heavy  barriers,  there will be  a  need  for  a  barrier intermediate in size 
and  load~ng. 
The  above  Report  gives detailed recommendations  based  on this principle 
of  protection  by  two barriers,  designed to arrest  an  explosion near its source and 
to prevent  it spreading to other districts.  The  recommendations  deal with the siting 
of  barriers  in  long-wall workings,  headings  and  in bard and pillar districts.  The 
types  of  barriers at  present  approved are detailed in the Regulations. 
It should  be  emphasised that  although  these barriers may  appear  crude  and 
simple devices,  care must  in fact  be taken to ensure that  they are correctly con-
structed,  installed and  loaded.  The  arresting of  an  explosion  by  a  barrier is  indeed 
by  no  means  a  simple  process but  one  depending  on  a  correct  balance  between a  number 
of  factors,  on  which  our  knowledge  is still in many  respects  empirical,  and  apparently 
innocent  modifications  may  impair the efficacy of  a  barrier.  The  precautions that 
should be taken  in the installation of barriers are discussed  in a  paper  by  H.S. 
Eisner  (Practical aspects  of  stone-dust barriers.  Iron  & Coal,  April  21,  1961). 
The  system of  protection now  recommended  was  based  on  knowledge  of  the per-
formance  of  the Polish barriers,  and  of  the propagation of  coal-dust  explosions, 
gained  from  work  in experimental  conditions that of necessity differed somewhat  from 
those  in a  working  mine.  However,  the expectations  regarding the efficacy of  the sys-
tem have  been  confirmed  by  the successful operation of  the barriers in the explosions 
at  Fenton Colliery,  in June  1963,  and at  Mainsforth Colliery in August  of  the  same 
year.  In both  incidents well developed coal-dust  explosions were arrested,  and  in the 
Fenton explosion it is probable that the  loss of  life would  otherwise have  been  much 
greater.  A detailed analysis of the behaviour of the barriers in these explosions is 
given  in a  paper  by  H.S.  Eisner and F.J.  Hartwell  (Colliery Guardian,  July  17th, 
1964). 
DIFFICULTIES  ARISING  IN  PRACTICE 
In the  light  of  present  knowledge  and  experience,  the recommended  siting 
of barriers should be adhered to wherever possible,  but  it is recognised that  it may 
be difficult or even quite impracticable to do this in certain circumstances. 
The  main difficulties appear to arise in  low  and  narrow  roadways  and  in 
rapidly advancing workings.  In  low  and  sometimes  narrow  roads,  particularly where  in 
addition to the conveyor itself there may  be  other equipment  such as cables,  ducting 
and  mono-rails,  conditions are such that  a  normal barrier would  obstruct  men  travel-
ing or the transport  of  supplies.  Ripping or dinting of  the road to accommodate  the 
barrier is costly and  in many  instances would  lag behind the rate of  advance  of  the 
face.  In some  places,  the rapid advance of the face,  together with crush and  movement 
of the  roadways,  can render the maintenance of barriers in good  order and at  the 
recommended  distances a  difficult  problem. VIII,  79 
It is therefore evident that,  in practice,  modifications to overcome these 
difficulties must  be  sought  and  consideration has been and is being given,  both in 
this country  and  abroad,  to the possibility of  devising barriers less bulky  and  more 
easily erected,  capable  of  being accommodated without  obstructing a  roadway,  and bar-
riers designed to operate successfully at  any  distance from the point  of origin of 
an. explosion. 
MODIFICATIONS  OF  THE  PRESENT  BARRIER  SYSTEM 
One  modification,  namely  the use  of  a  barrier of  shelves extending over 
only part  of  the width of  roadway,  has  been tested by  Cybulski  in Poland and  found 
to be effective subject to certain provisions.  This system could be useful in roads 
where  there was  insufficient  headroom to install the normal  full-width barrier with-
out  special ripping and  where for various  reasons this was  not  practicable or desir-
able.  It is suggested that  in such places part-width barriers sited over the conveyor 
could be  allowed,  provided that 
(i) the  length of the shelves should not  be  less than 40 % of  the width 
at  its widest  point; 
(ii) there should be sufficient shelves to  accommodate  the same  total 
quantity of  dust  as would  be  required for  a  normal barrier,  prefer-
ably  in a  barrier zone not  to exceed the maximum  allowed  length for 
a  normal barrier; 
(iii)  longitudinal shelves should be fixed  along the  length of  the barrier 
zone,  on that side of  the roadway  not  covered by  the part-width bar-
rier;  these should be  6  to 8  inches wide  and  need  not  be  loose.  At 
least three tiers of  such shelves should be  provided and  as much  dust 
as  possible be  put  on  them. 
The  requirement  that the full quantity of  dust  be  provided  in the same 
length  of barrier zone  as  a  normal barrier could be achieved by  closer spacing of 
the shelves,  subject to the  recommended  minimum  distance apart,  or  by  having  two 
shelves the  one  above  the other. 
In certain circumstances,  with rapidly  advancing faces  and headings,  it is 
not  always  considered practicable to maintain barriers in the road at  the recommended 
distances  from the face,  and  guidance  on  the maximum  distance that  could be  permitted 
is desirable.  This is particularly desirable if the roads  have to be  ripped to accom-
modate  a  barrier.  Unfortunately there is at  present  little information on this problem, 
since it has  not  been  possible to test barriers at  great  distances  from the source of 
an explosion.  From such tests as  have  been  made  in Poland,  by  Cybulski,  the indica-
tions are that the "light" barriers may  fail if much  further  away  than the  recommend-
ed distance of  50 to 120 yards;  that  if the first barrier is inevitably placed at 
greater distances than these,  it should be  of  the "intermediate" type,  provided that 
the distance. is not  greater than 270 yards;  and that  "heavy"  barriers might  be  ex-
pected to be effective at distances  somewhat  greater than the maximum  normally  recom-
mended  provided half the dust  is on the  lightly  loaded shelves.  It is however felt 
that  it would be wise,  wherever  possible,  not  to have the first barrier at  a  distance 
greater than  400 yards,  and for the barrier to be at  least  of  the "intermediate" type. 
FURTHER  POSSIBLE  MODIFICATIONS  AND  ALTERNATIVES 
Among  the numerous modifications  and  types  of barriers which  have  from time 
to time  been suggested are some  which are at  present  being tTied out  in other coun-
tries and  some  which would  appear to merit  further study.  These  include modification 
to the present  Polish barrier by  replacing the dust-boards  by  light plastic troughs, 
which would facilitate the erection and  moving  of  the barriers,  the use  of  dusts more 
effective than  limestone dust,  the use of water  instead of dust,  and  the use  of  bar-
riers,  either of  dust  or water,  designed to be rapidly  and  positively operated by  a 
trigger mechanism set  off  by the flame  of  the  advancing explosion. VIII,  80 
The  choice  of  dust  for barriers 
In the past  some  work  was  carried out  in this country,  in France  and also 
in Poland to see whether finely divided  common  salt,  known  to be  very effective as 
an  explosion suppressant,  could be  used  instead of  stone-dust,  but  it was  realised 
that  the use  of salt was  not  practicable on  open barriers in mines  unless the humidity 
of  the air was  so  low that  the dust  would  not  cake. 
It is now  normally the practice to use  on the barriers the type of dust 
used  for  general stone-dusting and,  since it is particularly important  that  the dust 
will  no~  cake  in use,  in damp  or wet  conditions waterproofed  limestone-dust  is recom-
mended.  The waterproofed dust,  because the proofing agents are combustible,  is slighly 
less effective than untreated dust  in preventing explosions.  However,  it has  been 
found  (Eisner,  Maguire  and  Shaw,  1963)  that the incorporation in the proofing agent 
of certain combustion-inhibiting substances can offset this effect,  and it is possible 
·that  dust  treated in this way  may  be more  effective on barriers than the normal  stone-
dust. 
Water  barriers 
It had  frequently  been suggested that  finely divided water might  be  much 
more  effective than stone-dust  in extinguishing flame  and tests with various  forms 
of  water barriers were  made  as  long ago as  1910.  Water-trough barriers were tried by 
Taffanel  in 1911,  by  Czaplinski  and Jicinsky in Austria  in  1913  and  by  Beyling in 
Germany  in 1919.  Some  early tests were also carried out  by  the Bureau of  Mines  in 
America,  and  some  time  later  (1941)  Mayer  in Czechoslovakia  compared shelf-barriers 
of  stone-dust with troughs  of water.  These early experiments with water barriers, 
though  few  in number,  were  reasonably successful,  but  water barriers were  not  gener-
ally adopted  in the mines ·in the countries concerned apart  from Austria. 
In view of the present-day interest  in water barriers it is interesting 
to note the findings  of this early work  and  the reasons  given at that  time  for dis-
carding water  in favour  of stone-dust  barriers. Generally it was  f·ound  that  the bar-
riers were  most  effective when  the troughs used were  such as tobe shattered by  the 
explosion,  and that  there was  little difference,  weight  for weight,  between water  and 
stone-dust  as extinctive materials.  It was  thought  that the theoretically greater 
efficacy  of water  was  in practice offset  by  the facts that it was  not  easily broken 
up  into fine droplets and  that after reaching the floor  and  sides of  a  roadway it 
was  not  dispersed again by the blast  preceding the flame. 
The  essential objection,  both in France and  in America,  to the adoption of 
water barriers then was  that they would  require periodical checking and  maintenance, 
in contrast to a  dust barrier which was  considered to require little or  no :mainte-
nance. At  that  time  piped water was  not  available throughout  the mines  for replenishing 
the water troughs,  whereas  stone-dust barriers were  envisaged  as  being installed in 
fixed  positions. 
Under  present-day conditions,  however,  it is generally the opinion that 
water barriers would  be the more  convenient.  Now  piped water is usually available, 
filling and  replenishing the troughs  or boxes is quick and easy,  movement  of  a  bar-
rier would  be  comparatively simple,  and it might  be possible for the barrier to be 
installed and to be effective in places where it is difficult to accommodate  a  stone-
dust  barrier. 
In recent  years the  investigation into the use  of water barriers was  re-
newed  on the Continent,  by  Schultze-Rhonhof  and  by Hanol,  and work is still in prog-
ress  by  Steffenhagen and  Meerbach  and by  Cybulski.  Recently  developed types  of water 
barrier  are,  in fact,  now  allowed to be used in mines  in Germany. 
In the barriers developed  by  Steffenhagen and  Meerbach  the troughs are in 
the form  of  deep rectangular boxes  made  of  synthetic plastic. These are lighter than 
timber or metal  containers and  can be sufficiently translucent  for the water  level 
to be seen  from  the outside.  The  plastic should not  be tough,  and  although strong 
enough to stand up to transport  and handling should be  somewhat  brittle so that  it 
is shattered by  the blast  ahead  of  the explosion and the water rapidly dispersed. As 
the throughs are shattered by  th~ blast they  need  not  be  installed so as to be  moved VIII,  81 
bodily,  as  in the case  of stone-dust  barr1er shelves,  and  hence  can be  suspended  by 
clamps at their upper  edge:  lids can also be  used if desired. 
These barriers have  been tested in a  variety of  conditions,  with both strong 
and  moderately weak  explosions,  and with the troughs  disposed  in a  variety of  ways  in 
the experimental mine  roadway.  They  proved successful  in arresting the explosions with 
a  water content of  about  half the weight  recommended  for  a  stone-dust barrier.  No 
direct  comparison  has,  however,  been reported of  the minimum  quantity of stone-dust 
and of water  needed to arrest  an  explosion.  It was  found that,  like the stone-dust 
barriers,  they are not  effective when  sited too close to the source of  the explosion 
and  that the minimum  distance  from the source should be  about  the same  as for the 
dust  barriers. 
It is,  however,  not  yet  established whether the barriers would  operate so 
successfully and  give adequate dispersion of  the water  in the case of  weak  explosions 
such as those which  might  conceivably  occur  in conditions where  there was  a  high  level 
of  general stone-dusting,  as is the case  in this country,  and  further research is 
needed.  It would  also be desirable to obtain more  information on the  performance of 
such barriers when  sited at  comparatively  long distances  from  the source of an explo-
sion. 
Triggered Barriers 
Many  of  the difficulties in conveniently accommodating  and siting a  barrier, 
and  in ensuring that it operated correctly,  could  perhaps be  overcome if,  instead of 
relying on the blast to overturn the barrier and disperse the extinguishing material, 
one  could rely on the mechanical action of  a  device actuated by  a  trigger set off by 
some  property  of  the explosion itself. 
Some  experiments were  made  at  S.M.R.E.,  by  Allsop and others  (1939),  in 
which stone-dust  contained in mortars was  propelled into the  path of  an  explosion by 
explosive charges.  The  charges were fired by  a  device which consisted of  a  strip of 
celluloid which,  when  burnt  by  the flame  of  the explosion,  made  a  contact  in the fir-
ing circuit.  Only  few tests were  however  carried out  and the  project  was  not  pursued. 
At  the Bureau of  Mines,  in America,  Hartmann  and others carried out  tests 
in which  dust  contained  in paper  bags was  dispersed  in front  of  explosions  by  the fir-
ing  of  a  cartridge of  permissible explosive  .  Both  a  thermal  relay and  a  vane-operated 
contact,  placed at  some  distance in front  of  the dust  bags,  were  tried as triggers. 
These tests,  made  in a  variety of  conditions  in the Experimental  Mine,  gave  promising 
results,  but  it was  considered that  much  more  work  was  required before they  could se-
riously be  considered for installation underground.  Problems to be solved  included 
difficulties of maintenance  and  the design of  a  foolproof  actuating system. 
Experiments  made  at S.M.R.E.,  by  Shaw  and  Woodhead,  on the suppression of 
coal-dust explosions  by  water jets,  have  provided an  idea of  the  amount  of water  in 
the air necessary to arrest  an  explosion,  and  could be helpful in the design of trig-
gered water  ~arriers. 
Recently it has  been reported that triggered barrier systems are being used 
in Russia.  In these the advancing flame  of  an explosion is detected by  a  photocell 
which  operates the firing circuit of  an  explosive device which  then,  through mechani-
cal linkages,  upsets a  shelf-type barrier. 
Apart  from this recent  development  in Russia,  opinion has  in the past  been 
in favour  of the conventional self-operating barrier on the grounds that the advan-
tages of  a  trigger-operated system were,  in practice,  likely to be offset  by the need 
to maintain and  regularly check the trigger circuits and  mechanism.  Modern  electronic 
devices  and circuitry are,  however,  of much  increased reliability and are capable of 
wider applications.  Thus it could be  possible not  only for  a  trigger device to detect 
the arrival of the explosion flame  but  also to sense its speed of  advance  and to ar-
range to operate the barrier at the correct time  in relation to the speed of  the ex-
plosion.  In  view  of this the use of  triggered barriers may  deserve further  considera-
tion. VIII,  82 
FUTURE  DEVELOPMENTS 
Because  of the many  factors  involved in the propagation of  a  dust  explosion 
in a  mine  and  in the mechanism of its suppression by  such devices as barriers,  these 
cannot  be  fully investigated in the  laboratory  on  a  model  scale.  Certain stops  in 
these processes  can  be  isolated and  studied separately and useful  information obtained, 
and  several such studies are in progress.  These  include theoretical study  of  the rela-
tion between the blast  and the flame  in an  explosion,  investigations carried out  on 
a  model  scale in shock-tubes  of  the way  dust  is raised and barriers disrupted by blast, 
and  a  study of  the  combustion  of  coal-dust  clouds  and the effect  on  the combustion 
of  admixture  of  inert dusts. In the present state of  knowledge,  however,  a  proper as-
sessment  of the efficacy of barriers can  only  be  derived  from full-scale tests carried 
out  in experimental mines  or galleries bearing a  reasonable relation,  in disposition 
and size,  to conditions  in a  mine. 
Up  to the present  no facility has  been available in this country for  such 
large-scale work  on  coal-dust  explosions,  and  reliance has  had to be  placed  on  work 
carried out  abroad,  notably  in Germany  and  Poland.  However,  the commissioning of  the 
new  Coal  Dust  Explosion Gallery at the Buxton Station of  S.M.R.E.  has  remedied this 
deficiency  and  it is hoped will accelerate the development  of  improved  systems  of  pro-
tection against  coal-dust  explosions. 
The  new  gallery,  the  longest  surface explosion gallery in the world,  is 
400 yards  long and  has  an  arched cross-section of  60 square feet.  Near the closest 
end there is at  right-angles to the main gallery a  short  limb,  or "cross-cut",  of 
rectangular  cross-section~  simulating part  of  a  coal face,  which  can,  when  desired, 
be  shut  off from  the main  gallery.  Provision is made  for  instruments to be  installed, 
at  intervals of  25  yards,  to record the arrival of  flame,  the development  of  pressure 
and  of  the air-speed of  the blast. All  instrument  signals are recorded  on  magnetic 
tape at  a  central control  laboratory. 
The  main  objectives of  the work  envisaged for the  new  gallery are to increase 
our  knowledge  of  the mechanism of  coal-dust  explosions  and to further  the development 
of  barrier protection in relation to the requirements  of  modern  mining  practice in 
this country. 
Two  features  of  our  new  facility are of  particular  importance  in the pursuit 
of these objectives.  In past  work  information has  been  obtained  on  the speed  of  the 
explosion flame  and  of the pressures  produced  in the  roadway  or gallery,  but  there is 
little or no useful experimental  information  on  the strength and  development  of  the 
wind-speed  or blast ahead  of  the flame  on  which the operation of  conventional barriers 
depends The  use,  in the gallery,  of  instruments that  have  been  developed for this 
purpose,  by  Murray  and  Beardshall  (1958),  together with the results of  the theoretical 
and  shock-tube studies mentioned  previously,  should give  information that will be use-
ful  in assessing the design and siting of barriers. 
In addition,  the major part  of  the work  so far done  on barriers has been 
in conditions simulating headings,  with the explosion propagating from  the closed end 
of  a  straight gallery,  and  less is known  about  conditions similar to those of  long-
wall workings  in which there is release of  pressure behind the flame  provided  by  the 
face,  goaf  and  return.  The  availability of the cross-cut,  which  is adapted.to give 
variable pressure release,  will  now  enable investigation of  the extent  to which the 
explosion  and  the  performance  of barriers are affected in such conditions. 
To  be  in a  position to make  an adequate assessment  of  a  barrier system it 
is necessary to establish that  one  can  produce  in the test gallery explosions  varying 
in character within the range  believed to be  possible in the mine,  and  also to what 
extent  these  can  be  reproduced at  will,  in order to ensure that  a  sufficient  number 
of tests are made  to place proper confidence  in the results.  It is important  that,  in 
producing the experimental explosions,  the initiating source used is not  such as  of 
itself to cause  any  disturbance of  the barriers under test,  and also to check that  any 
reflected shock or pressure waves  from  the  open end  of  the gallery do  not  affect the 
operation of the barrier. 
This essential preliminary work  is now  in progress.  In  order to produce 
relatively mild  explosions in the gallery earlier work  had  shown  that  a  relatively VIII,  83 
mild source of  initiation was  required and that  the dust  to be  raised in the explo-
sion should contain a  fair proportion of  inert dust.  "Rocket"  igniters  had  been  pre-
viously  found  by  Shaw  to initiate mild explosions  in the  4  ft  diameter steel galleries 
and these were therefore chosen for trial as the source of  initiation in the new  gal-
lery. These  igniters,  the propellant unit  of  a  commercial firework rocket,  when  fixed 
to the floor  and fired  produce  a  fast  jet of  hot  gases,  extending for  a  few  yards, 
which raises and  ignites the dust.  It has  already been found  that  by  using a  number 
of  these igniters as an  initiating source,  and  by  varying the  length of  gallery over 
which  they  can stir up  and  ignite the dust,  the progress of  the explosion along the 
gallery can be  varied.  In some  of  the experiments  low  flame  speeds,  decreasing  in 
some  cases to 35  feet  per  second,  could  be  obtained over the first  200 yards  of  the 
gallery. 
Although  present  indications are that  reasonably  good  reproducibility may 
be expected,  these experiments are still in their early stages and  much  more  explora-
tory work  remains to be  done  before a  worthwhile examination of barrier systems can 
be undertaken.  Factors such as the effect  of  release of  pressure behind the flame, 
the effect  of  the roughness  produced  by  arches  and  lagging and the characteristics 
of  explosions simulating those resulting from unneutralised dust  as  a  conveyor  system 
require to be taken into account. 
Until this essential preliminary work is further  advanced it is difficult 
to forecast  the future,  but  it would  appear  likely that  a  large number  of tests will 
still be  required before it can  be said that  any  new  type  of  barrier or suppressive 
device,  such as for  example water barriers,  will operate reliably under  conditions 
realistically related to modern  mining  practice.  It should be  remembered  that the 
prese~t Polish type barrier,  even  though it was  the culmination of  much  early work, 
was  itself subjected to well over  100 tests in the experimental mine. 
To  make  a  proper assessment  of  any  new  suppressive· device,  however  simple, 
would  require it to be  subjected to a  variety of  explosions,  ranging from  weak  to 
strong,  and  in  each  case the tests would  have to be  made  at  a  range of  distances 
from the source  of  the explosion.  In addition,  even if the test explosions could be 
reproduced with reasonable certainty,  several trials in each  condition would  be desir-
able to establish the reliability of  operation of  the device. 
Because  of  the large scale of  the work  involved it appears  unlikely at  pres-
ent  that  more  than two experimental explosions  per week  could be staged  in the  new 
gallery,  and  in view  of  the extensive trials that  would  be  necessary,  it could there-
fore  be  some  considerable time before  a  major  change  in the present  system of  barrier 
protection could be  recommended. 
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Draft study programme  submitted to the Working Party on  "Inflammable Dusts" 
of the  Permanent  Commission  for  Safety in coal mines VIII,  87 
This  document  has  been  prepared  in response to the request  made  by  the 
Sub-Committee  on  "Accidents  and Testing Stations"  of  the Working  Party on  "Inflam-. 
:mable  Dusts"  at its meeting  on  16  May  1966  (items  'd'  and  'e'  of  the Minutes). 
In it a  test  programme  is put  forward  aiming to solve to most  urgent  prob-
lems  in the sphere of  inflammable dusts.  The  programme  is limited to establishing 
detailed re·search goals without  going  into the working methods  which  would  have to 
be applied. 
I.  BASIC  STUDY  OF  DUST  EXPLOSIONS 
Whatever  method  of  combatting the propagation of  a  dust  explosion may  be 
considered,  it would  be  very useful to know  more  about  the mechanics  of the phenom-
enon  and the role played by  the factors  causing it. Such  knowledge  is essential, 
especially so as to be able to apply results gained  in a  test gallery to mine  work-
ings.  In addition,  such  knowledge  can be  instrumental in suggesting new  methods  of 
combatting explosions or,  at  least,  of  speeding up  research  on the  improvement  of 
the existing methods:  neutralisation and barriers. 
Research into the. mechanics  of this phenomenon  can be carried out  by  three 
parallel methods: 
1)  Laboratory tests 
The  aim is to analyse the different,  basic  phenomena  which  contribute to 
dust  explosions,  in particular: 
a)  The  ignition and  propagation of  a  flame  in a  pre-formed dust  cloud 
The  main  factors to take into consideration are: 
the nature of the coal,  size distribution,  dust  concentration,  ash content,  addition 
of  inert matter. 
b)  Raising dust  by  means  of  an air current 
The  main factors to take  into consideration are: 
the size distribution of  the dust,  its moisture content,  the  c~aracteristics of the 
air jet, the addition of  inert matter  and fixing agents. 
2)  Theoretical studies 
The  aim is to determine the relationship between  aerodynamic magnitudes 
(velocity,  pressure)  and  thermodynamic  magnitudes  (temperature,  velocity,  rate of 
combustion). 
Research  on this has  been started in a  single,  simple  roadway.  It would  be 
advisable to follow up this research by  studying the  problems  in  a  system of  more 
complex  geometry. 
3)  Studies  in a  full-size roadway 
The  aim is to try to  establish~quantitative description of the phenomena 
by the measurement  of different  physical  ~nitudes. 
The  magnitudes to be measured should include:  air velocity and  pressure, 
velocity of  the flame  front,  shape  of the flame  front,  speed  of raising  (dispersal) 
of the dust,  the distribution of dust  concentrations across the cross-section. 
A distinction should be  made  between the initiation of  an  explosion and  a 
fully-developed explosion. VIII,  88 
Among  the factors which it is worth varying,  stress should be  laid on  the 
shape  and  the dimensions  of the cross-section,  the type  of  supports  and the effect 
of the equipment  in the  roadway  (conveyors,  ducting,  etc.). 
II.  STONE-DUST  BARRIERS 
Stone-dust  barriers have  been used for  a  very  long time and their effective-
ness has  been established in many  instances.  Nevertheless,  the following  objectives 
should  be  aimed  at: 
1)  Extending the field of  effectiveness of barriers 
Existing barriers do not  function  reliably: 
- in  cases  of  very  weak  explosions; 
- or  in cases  of  very  violent  explosions which  have  run  some  considerable distance. 
changing: 
Attempts  could be  made  to extend the  present  range  of  effectiveness by 
a)  - the size distribution of the material  -
Laboratory tests show  the advantage  of  using very  fine sizes,  but 
this does  not  make  for  good  dispersal.  An  optimum size distribution 
can  only  be  found  by direct tests in a  full-size  roadway; 
b)  - the construction and siting of  shelves  in the cross-section; 
c)  - the siting of  the barriers in the network  of  roadways  and  workings 
(in front  of  or  behind  a  bend,  at  what  distance from the faces?). 
2)  Research  into special types  of barriers which  would fit in with' existing equipment 
for winning work  and which  would  be  less inconvenient  for  the miner  (less bulky, 
easier to place  in position).  Lateral barriers are  one  example. 
3)  Finding a  practical method  of  checking the effectiveness of  a  barrier on site. 
III.  WATER  BARRIERS 
Water  barriers are,  as yet,  infrequently used  in mines.  Valuable tests have 
already been carried out  at  testing stations. 
The  objectives are the  same  as  those under  items  1) .and  2)  of  the  preceeding 
paragraph.  It is hoped  that  water barriers might  provide  a  better solution than stone-
dust  barriers,  i.e.: 
tives are: 
- either by  a  greater field of  effectiveness; 
- or  by  being  less bulky  and  easier to place in position. 
The  main  factors  which  can  be  varied in an  attempt  to achieve these objec-
a)- the nature of.the material of  which  the troughs are made;  shape and 
method  of  attachment  of  these troughs.  There is,  as yet,  no  clear-cut 
preference as  between  a  brittle material,  enabling the troughs to 
shatter easily under  the  impact  of  an intense air jet,  and  a  supple 
material able to discharge without  breaking; 
b)  - positioning of  the troughs along the  length  of  the roadway  - Specifi-
cally,  possible distributions are a  concentrated one as with existing 
barriers,  or,  on the  contrary,  a  very spaced-out  semi-continuous dis-
tribution along the entire  length  of  the roadways; VIII,  89 
c)  - addition of  soluble salts to the water  - Thus  it is hoped to reduce 
the amount  of water  required; 
d)  - position of  the barriers in the network of  roadways  and workings  -
The  best  position may  prove to be different  from that  of  stone-dust 
barriers. 
Objective 3)  presents itself in a  different  way  for water barriers.  The 
presence of  water  can be easily checked.  On  the other hand,  it would  be desirable 
to find .a  way  of  reducing the rate of water evaporation. 
IV.  TRIGGER  BARRIERS 
The  immediate  objective is to find  a  barrier which would be effective in 
dealing with an  explosion initiated in the proximity  of  a  face,  be it: 
- either,  a  very  weak  dust  explosion,  which  has  not  yet  developed; 
- or,  a  gas  explosion  (without  dust)  which  existing barriers are unable to 
arrest. 
Ultimately,  if such barriers were to prove to be  sufficiently simple  and 
effective,  they  could take the place of all existing barriers. 
The  study  consists of  three parts: 
a)  - development  of  a  detector capable  of  detecting the passage  of  an  ex-
plosion; 
b)  - development  of  a  suppressor device;  choice of  the extinguishing agent, 
choice  of the method  of  dispersal,  installation in the  roadway; 
c)  - choice of  position of  the detector and the suppressor device in the 
working. 
V.  COMBINATION  OF  BARRIERS  AND  OTHER  NEUTRALISATION  METHODS 
It hardly  seems  necessary to pursue the study  of the traditional stone-
dusting process,  where  the  limits of  effectiveness are more  or  less known.  Yet,  the 
interaction between stone-dusting or dust-fixing method  by  hygroscopic paste,  on the 
one  hand,  and barriers,  on the other,  calls for further studies.  To  what  extent  does 
the application of these processes help or hinder the effective operation of  barriers? 
In what  way  should they be  combined  ? 
VI.  RAPIDLY-INSTALLED  BARRIERS 
Development  of  a  barrier whose  installation would be rapid and  which  could 
give protection when  fire stoppings are being built. COMMON  ARRANGEMENT  OF  REPORTS  ON  TESTS  FORMING  PART 
OF  THE  EXPERIMENTAL  WORK  ON  STOPPINGS  TO  PROVIDE 
PROTECTION  AGAINST  COAL-DUST  EXPLOSIONS 
Presentation of test results on protective barriers 
against coal-dust explosions VIII,  93 
1.  Identification of test 
1.1.  Type  of barrier tested 
1.2.  Type  of  explosion  (fire-damp and  coal-dust· explosion or coal-dust  explo-
sion). 
1.3.  Pit  in which test was  carried out 
1.4.  Date of test 
1.5.  Designation of test series 
1.6.  Number  of  reference code of test 
2.  Roadway  used  (plan attached) 
2.1.  Local  designation 
2.2.  Length  (m) 
2.3.  Shape  of  cross-section  (circular,  arched,  trapezoidal,  rectangular,  etc.) 
2.4.  Cross-sectional area of  the roadway  (sq.  m.) 
2.5.  Alignment  (rectangular,  slightly winding,  very winding) 
2.6.  Profile  (horizontal,  inclined,  variable) 
2.7.  Intersections in the explosion zone 
2.8.  Type  of supports 
3.  Coal-dust 
3.1.  Type  of  coal 
3.2.  Size distribution,  specific surface  (m2/g,  method  used) 
3.3.  Volatile matter- dry basis  (%) 
3.4.  Moisture  (%) 
3.5.  Ash  content  (%) 
4.  Dust  deposition  (section by  section) 
4.1.  Abscissae of  the  two  ends  of  the  roadway 
4.2.  Dust  concentration  (in g  per  cubic metre  of  roadway) 
4.3.  Nature  of the dust  deposit  (on the floor,  on hurdles along the roadway 
walls,  on  shelves,  finely dispersed,  etc.) 
4.4.  Means  of  neutralisation  (water,  sand,  clay,  limestone,  sea salt,  other 
salts,  hygroscopic  pastes,  etc.) 
4.5.  Degree  of neutralisation  (%) 
5.  Source of  explosion 
5.1. 
5.11. 
5.12. 
5.2. 
5.21. 
5.22. 
5.3. 
5.31. 
5.32. 
5.4. 
5.5. 
6.  Barrier 
6.1. 
6.2. 
6.21. 
6.22. 
6.23. 
6.24. 
Ignition of  a  layer of  firedamp  in the roof 
Indications of  the gas content  in the  layer at  different  levels 
Volume  of  firedamp  used  (cubic metres) 
Ignition of  an  explosive mixture of  gases 
Nature  of  the explosive mixture  of  gases 
Volume  of  the explosive mixture  of  gases 
Direct  ignition of  coal-dust 
Type  of  initiation 
Positioning and quantity of  dust  at the point  of  ignition 
Initiation  (explosive,  detonator,  guncotton,  etc.) 
Assessment  of  the strength of  the initiation  (weak,  medium,  powerful) 
Description of type  of barrier,  type  of  suppressant  agent 
Type  of  construction and  charge 
Type  of  construction  (type  and dimensions  of  shelves or banks  of  troughs 
and  troughs,  grouped if necessary) 
Number  of shelves or  banks  of  troughs 
Total charge  (kilograms  of  suppressant  agent) 
Charge  per square metre  of  cross-section  (kg/m2) 6.25. 
6.251. 
6.252. 
6.26. 
6.3. 
6.4. 
6.5. 
VIII,  94 
Positioning in the cross-section 
Height 
Possible modifications  in the positioning of  the barrier in relation to the 
roadway  equipment 
Distance between the shelves or the banks  of troughs  (in metres) 
Distance between the barrier and  the source 
Overall  length of  the barrier  (in metres) 
If necessary,  other indications about  the placing of  the barrier in the 
roadway  (in relation to bends,  tapering sectors,  intersections,  obstacles, 
etc.) 
7.  Physical magnitudes relating to the explosion 
7.1. 
7.2. 
7.3. 
7 .4. 
7.41. 
7.411. 
7.412. 
7.413. 
7.414. 
7.42. 
7.421. 
7.422. 
7.423. 
7.43. 
7.431. 
7.432. 
7.433. 
7.434. 
7.44. 
7.441. 
7.442. 
7.443. 
7.444. 
7.45. 
7.46. 
Air temperature prior to the test 
Relative humidity  (%) 
Atmospheric  pressure in the test zone  (bars) 
Characteristics of the explosion 
Speed  of the pressure wave 
close to the source 
in the barrier zone  (in metres  per  second) 
maximum  speed  (in metres  per second) 
measuring  instruments used 
Blast  pressure 
close to the source  (kN/m2) 
in the barrier zone  (kN/m2) 
measuring  instruments used 
Static over-pressure 
close to the source  (kN/m2) 
in front  of  the barrier  (kN/m2) 
behind the barrier  (kN/m2) 
measuring  instruments used 
Flame  velocity 
close to the source  (m/s) 
in the barrier zone  (m/s) 
beyond  the barrier  (m/s) 
measuring  instruments used 
Travel of  flame  from the source  (m)  (measuring  instruments used) 
Time  elapsing between  incipient disposal of the suppressant  agent  and 
passage  of  flame  (s)  (measuring method) 
8.  Test  results 
8.1.  Did barrier function  (yes  or no) 
8.2.  Condition  of  barrier after the explosion 
8.3.  Other significant results 
9.  Comments 
9.1.  Estimated distance travelled by  flame  had there been no barrier 
9.2.  Other  comments IMPLEMENTATION  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
(AS  AT  1.1.1970) 
ANNEX  IX IX~  3 
The  recommendations,  assessments,  principles and reports prepared by  the 
Mines  Safety  Commission  since the beginning  of  its activities and distributed to 
the  Governments  and  other interested bodies in accordance with its terms  of refer-
ence,  for  further action or  for  information,  can usefully  be classified in four 
groups  accor~ing to their date of  issue  : 
A - the  recommendations which  are  included  in the First and  Second Reports of  the 
Mines  Safety  Commission,  the  implementation of which  was  published for  the last 
time  on  the basis of  the situation as at  1.1.1966 given in the Third Report, 
B  - the recommendations which are  included in the Third Report  of  the Mines  Safety 
Commission,  the  implementation of which  was  published for  the first  time  on the 
basis of the situation as at  1.1.1966 in the  same  Report, 
C - the  recommendations  which  are  included in the Fourth Report  of  the Mines  Safety 
and Health Commission,  the  implementation of which  was  published for  the first 
time  on the basis of  the situation as at  1.1.1968  in this Report, 
D - the recommendations which  are  included in the Fifth and  Sixth Reports  of the 
Mines  Safety  and Health Commission  for  1967  and  1968  respectively,  the  imple-
mentation of which is published for  the first time  in the present  (7th)  Report 
on  the basis of  the situation as at 1.1.1970.  · 
c 
~c 
NRP 
E 
? 
A 
The  following  symbols  are used in the tables 
The  national regulations are already  in accordance with the  recommenda-
tions 
The  recommendations  have  not  been embodied  in regulations,  but  have 
been  implemented  de  facto 
New  regulations in accordance with the recommendations  have  been drawn 
up  and  issued 
The  preparation of  new  regulations  in accordance with the  recommenda-
tions is in hand 
The  preparation of  new  regulations is being studied 
There  is uncertainty regarding  the steps to be  taken 
The  national authorities have  abstained  from  bringing their regulations 
into line with the recommendations. 
To  ensure  a  certain degree  of uniformity with regular reports on the meas-
ures taken,  the  following  survey  shows  not  only  those  recommendations which  aim  at 
modifying regulations and to this end are indicated by  the letters used  for  the pur-
pose,  but  also those which  need  not  be  implemented  by  means  of  regulations or  laws. 
These  latter call for  other modes  of application. 
The  situation with regard to  implementation of  the  above-mentioned recom-
mendations  and proposals is indicated,  with explanatory  notes,  in the following ta-
bles. IX,  5 
A - Regular report  on the  implementation of the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission's  Recommendations  published in the 1st  and  2nd  Reports 
I .- TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1968  1970  1968  1970  1968  1970  1968  1970  1968  1970 
A.- ELECTRIFICATION 
I  - Recommendations  regarding elimination 
of oil from  underground electrical 
equipment  ~1st Report  of  Mines  Safety 
Commission,  p.  7  ~German textJJ 
2a)  Resistances  installed underground 
should not  contain any  combustible 
oil.  (Exceptions  are allowed for 
the starting-up resistances of  C'+  C'+ 
large motors driving water  pumps).  c  c  NRP  c  NRP  NRC  E  NRP  C'  C' 
b)  Condensers  and transformers in-
stalled underground  must  not  con-
tain either combustible oil or 
dielectric substances which  can  C'+ 
give off noxious  gases.  c  c  NRP  c  NRP  NRC  E  NRP  C'  C' 
- otherwise effective measures 
should be taken against  the dan-
gers to workers  caused by  the 
use  of  these devices.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C' 
c)  Switches  and relals,  used under-
ground  and  operating on voltages 
below  1.100 V,  must  not  contain  C'+  C'+ 
any  flammable  oils.  c  c  NRP  c  NRP  NRC  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
d)  Protection of workers against  dan-
gers  involved in the use of 
switches and relals,  which  work  on 
voltages above  1~100 V and  contain 
flammable  oil.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  c  c  c  c 
3.  Recommendation to continue re-
search into the manufacture  of 
low-oil or oil-less HT  switchgear 
arid  protective relays which  can 
give riskfree service  in gassy  1)  1)  2)  2)  3)  C'+  2)  2) 
pits.  A  A  - - C'  ?  NRP  C'  - -
Recommendation to begin detailed 
investigation into the degree of 
increased safety which  can  be a-
chieved,  when  prescribing an  ex-
plosion-proof  housing for  normally 
spark-producing components  only, 
and  a  design of the "increased 
safety"  type for all other equip- 1)  2)  2)  3)  4)  4) 
ment.  A  c  - - C'  NRC  E  E  c  c 
4.  Extending the use of  low-oil or 
oil-less HT  switchgear and oil-
less HT  protective relays at  1)  :  5)  C'+ 
points where there is no  gas risk.  A  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  NRP  C'  c  c 
1)  cannot  be  laid down  in inspectorate regulations. 
2)  not  applicable. 
Ketber-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1968  1970 
c  c 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
c  c 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
E  E  I 
3)  devices with satisfactory characteristics exist; the conditions of  application must  be speci-
fied. 
4)  approval regulations have  been  issued for  equipment  in the "increased safety"  category,  but 
the type of protection is left to the individual firms. 
5)  with regard to t"he  approval of certain high-voltage switches. IX,  6 
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II - Recommendations  for shotfiring leads 
(2nd  Report  of  Mines  Safety  Commission 
P.  10) 
2.  Recommendations  for all shotfiring 
leads  ---
- Every  conductor  must  be  provided 
with  at  least  one  good-quality 
insulation.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  .  C'  C'  c  c 
- All  connections  must  be  properly 
insulated.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- Every  shotfiring lead  must  have 
the appropriate degree  of  flexi-
bility.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  ·C'  c  c 
- The  conductors  must  be  of  such 
cross-sectional area that  they  do 
not  occasion  an  excessive voltage  C'+  C'+ 
drop.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  ~p  NRP 
- The  shotfiring leads  must  be  made 
up  and  laid so that  the risk of 
any  fault  current,  resulting from 
contact  with metal  objects,  is  INRP  C'+ 
reduced.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  ft  c  NRP 
- Before  any  shot firing  operation 
in particular workings  and  before 
the  simultaneous firing  of  a 
fairly  large  number  of  shots,  the 
ohmic  resistance of  the circuit 
must  be  measured.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c 
a)  Temporary  shot  firing  leads 
- Careful  inspection before each 
firing.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- Regular  and  thorough testing by 
an  expert  either at  the surface 
or  in an  undergrou~d workshop.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
A thorough  checking must  consist  of 
at  least  : 
- a  careful  inspect  ion  of  the  lead 
over its whole  length;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  ~'+E C'+E 
- measurement  of  the insulation 
between the two  conductors,  if 
the  lead consists of  a  cable or 
rubber-covered  lead;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
- measurement  of  the  ohmic resist-
ance  of  the  lead.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c 
b)  Permanent  shot firing  leads 
- Regular  and  thorough  checks  by  an  1)  1) 
expert.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  C'  C'  - -
- Written  record of  every  thorough  2)  2) 
c' 
1)  1) 
check,  with the <!ate.  A  A  ·c  c.  NRC  NRC  c  c  C'  - -
1)  not  applicable. 
2)  seems  unnecessary  and  would  increase administrative work. IX,  7 
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3.  Further  recommendations  for  perma-
nent  and  temporary  shotfiring leads 
used  in gassl mines 
- The shotfiring leads must  fulfil 
conditions which  ensure suffi-
cient safety with  regard to  : 
a)  mechanical strength and  in 
particular tensile,  bending 
and  abrasion strength;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  C+C'  C+C' 
b)  electrical insulation;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  ~RP  NRP  C+C'  C+C' 
c)  impermeability  (to moisture) 
of  the insulation and  the  C'+  C'+ 
sheathing.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  ~RP  NRP  NRP  NRP 
Recommendation  that  checking stand-
ards which  correspond to the condi- 1)  1) 
tions be  laid down.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  - - ~RP  NRP  E  E 
4.  Supplementary  recommendations  for 
permanent  shotfiring  leads  used  in 
~assy pits 
- Permanent  leads  should  be  so ar-
ranged that,  as far  as  possible, 
damage  during firing of  the shots  1)  1) 
or from other causes  is avoided.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  - -
- If the shotfiring lead consists 
of  two separate conductors,  these 
should  be  arranged sufficiently 
far apart  and  in such  a  way  that  1)  1) 
inspection is possible.  c  c  CE  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  - -
- In shafts and dipping  roads,  the 
leads must  have  an  adequate  me-
chanical strength.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
III  - Recommendations  regarding the protec-
tion of  underground distribution net-
works  against  the danger  of  causing 
electric shocks  (2nd  Report  of  the 
Mines  Safety Commission2  p.l3~ 
I. The  following  recommendations  refer 
only to the  MT  networks  defined be-
low;  Medium  Tension  (MT)  :  the nor-
mal  voltage range for  working 
equipment  used underground with 
three-phase A.C.  (between  380 and 
11100 V).  These  networks  should 
fulfil all the  recommendations  set 
out  below. 
These  recommendations  refer neither 
to the  HT  networks,  nor  to voltages 
which are  lower than the medium-
tension range  and  are used for  par-
ticular purposes  (lighting,  drill-
ing apparatus,  telephone  installa-
tions,  etc.)  for  which  some  easing 
of  the restrictions may  be allowed. 
Overhead wire networks  with bare 
trolley wires are also excluded. 
1)  not  applicable. IX,  8 
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II. Protection a1ainst  the risk of 
electric shocks 
A - First order precautions 
(Protection against direct 
contact with  a  live phase) 
1.  Every  chance contact  with  a 
live phase  should be avoid-
ed as far as possible by 
laying the conductor  out  of 
the workmen's  reach,  by  in-
terposing effective bar-
riers,  by  sheathing the 
phase or by  insulating it.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
2.  The  cables and  leads used 
in medium-tension under-
ground  networks  should be 
mechanically protected ei-
ther by  means  of  a  metal 
armouring  connected to the 
pilot  lead,  or by  a  flexi-
ble envelope of the best  c  +  c  + 
possible design.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
- Leads  without  metal ar-
mouring  must  be electri-
cally protected by  sepa-
rate or  common  protective 
screens,  which trip safe-
ty devices  in the event  1)  2) 
of  a  fault.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
3.  Only  trained men  should  be 
allowed to open the hous-
ings of accessible live 
parts  (medium-tension volt-
age  range)  and this only 
under  conditions which  have 
been clearly laid down  in 
advance.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
4.  The  repair and maintenance 
of the electrical equipment 
should be entrusted only tc 
trained personnel.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
B - Second order precautions 
(Equipotential connection be-
tween conductive parts of the 
installation) 
1.  All underground  networks 
must  be  provided with an 
equipotential connection 
between the conductive  (not 
live in normal  operation) 
components of the installa-
tion and  the other metal 
elements connected thereto, 
such that its conductance 
is sufficient to prevent 
the occurrence,  between  anl 
two points accessible to a 
workman  simultaneously,  of 
a  voltage higher than the 
weak  voltage.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
I 
1)  in the case of  new  cables~ 
2)  for old cables,  a  transitional delay until 1.4.1972 has  been  provided. for. IX,  9 
N.R./1fph.  Saar  Belgium  France 
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2.  This equipotential connec-
tion  (protective lead)  must 
ensure electric connection 
between the conductive ele-
ments  of the installation 
over the whole  length of 
the network.  It  must  be 
maintained  in satisfactory 
condition and  must  be  in-
spected as often as  is ne-
cessary to ensure this.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
3.  The  above-mentioned  equi-
potential connection  (pro-
tective  lead)  must  be 
earthed to at  least  one 
point  of  the network via an 
earth connection of the 
lowest  possible resistance.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
4.  This earth connection must 
be  combined with the star-
point  earth connection,  if 
a  star-point is employed.  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
c - Third order precautions 
(Reduction of fault  duration) 
1.  Any  fault  current  must  be 
considered dangerous  in un-
derground medium-tension 
networks  if,  when  the fault 
current  flows  through the 
protective  lead and  con-
nected conductive  compo-
nents of  the installation 
of  earth,  there  :t.s  produced 
between  any  two points ac-
cessible to a  workman  si-
multaneously  a  voltage ex-
ceeding the level of  a  wea~ 
voltage,  regardless of 
whether it occurs  between 
parts of the installation 
or  between  such parts and  NRP  NRP 
earth.  c  c  c  c  c  c  +  C'  +  C'  c  C'  c  c 
2.  If the star-point of  a  net-
work is earthed via a  weak 
impedance or without  anl 
impedance,  so that the pre-
sumed  fault  current  is not 
restricted to a  low  value2 
then the network must  be 
provided with safety de-
vices which  can at  any  time 
automatically  isol~~e the 
damaged  section of the net-
work  from  the current 
source  (or render it com-
pletely dead)  before the 
fault  current  flowing 
through the protective  lead 
and  connected conductive 
components  of the installa-
tion or earth reach  a  dan- 1)  1)  1)  1)  1)  1)  C+  C+ 
gerous  value.  - - - - - - NRP  NRP  E  E  NRP  NRP 
1)  not  applicable,  as only  l~ated circuits are used. IX,  10 
Nether-
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- Since the complete or 
partial cutting-off of  a 
line voltage can have se-
rious effects on  the cur-
rent  supply to important 
equipment,  appropriate 
preventive measures 
should  be  taken. 
- Only  when  the  line has 
been repaired or the 
fault  eliminated,  or at 
the direction of  a  spe-
cialist who  has  taken all 
necessary  precautions, 
may  that section of the 
network  be  brought  under  C+  C+ 
voltage again.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  E  E  c  c 
3.  If the star-point  of  a  net-
work  is insulated or earth-
ed  via  some  impedancezwhich 
restricts fault  currents to 
a  low  value,  the network 
must  be fitted with super-
vising devices  which  are 
always  in  a  state of  readi-
ness  and  which  are capable: 
a}  - either of  checking the 
insulation of  the va-
rious parts of the 
network  and  of  indi-
eating any  damage  they  C+  C+ 
may  have  suffered or  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  NRP  NRP'  E  E  INRP  NRP 
- of  automatically cut-
ting off the damaged 
section of  the  network 
from  its source  of 
current  (or  rendering 
the entire network  1}  c2)  C+  C+ 
dead).  - c  c  NRP  NRC  NRP  NRP  E  E  ~p  NRP 
- If  no  automatic cut-
off d'evice  is instal-
led,  the responsibil-
ity for  cutting-off 
should  be  entrusted to 
an  expert  who  can  in-
tervene  as  soon  as  the 
warning signal of  the 
supervisory  system is 
tripped or if the 
fault  assumes  major  1)  1} 
dimensions.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  - -
- If cutting-off  has 
been necessitated by 
one  of  the two  cases 
cited above,  the res-
toration of current 
may  be accepted  only 
after repair of the 
line or elimination of 
the faultz  or only at 
the direction of  an 
expert official,  who 
has  taken all neces-
sary precautions.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  c  c 
1}  not  applicable,  as  only isolated circuits are used. 
2)  must  be  carried out  by  1.10.1971  in pits where there is a  risk of  firedamp. IX,  11 
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- If  no  automatic cut-
off device is instal-
led,  the rubber-cover-
ed  leads  of  mobile  rna-
chines should  be fit-
ted with an  automatic 
device which  renders 
them dead as soon as 
there occurs  a  fault 
current  which  is caus-
ed  by  damage  to the 
external armour  or  by 
damage  to the insula-
tion of  an  individual 
phase;  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
b)  - or  of  automatically 
cutting off the damag-
ed  section of  the net-
work  from its source 
of  current  (or render-
ing the entire network 
dea~) as soon as  a 
double  fault  occurs 
leading to a  dangerous 
fault  current  in the 
protective lead  and 
connected parts of the 
installation. 
- In this instance,  the 
current  may  be  switched 
on  again  only after 
the line has  been re-
paired or the fault  1)  1)  1)  1) 
eliminated.  - - - - NRP  NRC  NRP  NRP  c•  C'  NRP  NRP 
N.B.  The  comments  on this Recommendation 
are  given  in the Second Report  of the 
Mines  Safety  Commission,  pp.  15/22. 
B.- MECHANISATION  AND  LOCOMOTIVES 
I - Recommendations  regarding  locomotive 
equipment  ~First Report  of the Safety 
Commissionz  P.  20  (German  textJJ 
1.  New  locomotives  must  be  equipped with 
fixed,  rigid cabins which  at all 
times give the driver a  clear view 
along the roadway,  ahead  and  behind, 
without  any  need  for  him  to put  his 
head  out  of the cabin.(Fixed cabins 
are understood to cover those  forming 
a  part  of  the structure or which  can 
be  removed  only  laboriously with spe-c 2)  c 2)  C  2~C 2)  c  4) c 4) 
cial tools.)  A 3)  A 3)  A 3'A 3)  NRP  NRC  E  5) E 5)  c  c  c  c 
2.  Tne  locomotives  in service must  be 
modified to meet  this requirement.  c  c  c  c  NRP  A  E  E  c  c  A  A 
- locomotives  which  cannot  be modi-
fied should gradually  be  withdrawn 
from service,  within a  period to be 
fixed by  the responsible inspector-
ate,  or  c  c  c  c  NRP  A  E  E  c  c  A  2) 
1)  not  applicable~ 
2)  in the case of main-road  locomotives,  with the exception of "a clear view behind",  which is dif-
ficult technically._ 
3)  no application made  to gateroad  locomotives,  because the risk of  accident  is increased. 
4)  for trolley  locomotives~ 
5)  for other than trolley locomotives •. IX,  12 
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- only  be used  in roadways  which are 
wide  and  high  enough to eliminate 
accident  risk.  c  c  c  c  NRP  C'  E  E  A  A  E 
3.  For particular types  of  locomotive, 
or in certain circumstances,  the re-
sponsible Inspectorate can grant  ex-
ceptions from  the above  regulations, 
provided that safety regulations of 
equal stringency are laid down.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  E  E  A  A  E 
II- Recommendations  regardinl the neutrali-
sation of  Diesel-engine exhaust  fumes 
~First  Report  of the Safetl Commission, 
p.  23  ~German textH 
- General use  of better starters.  c  c  E  E  E  E  ?  ?  ?  ?  E 
- Intensified research into improving 
combustion  by  the use  of catalysts.  A 6) A 6)  EOP  EOP  E  E  ?  ?  2)  - 2)  ~ 2) 
- Draw  attention to the existence of 
this process.  - 3  - 3)  - 3)  - 3) - 3)  - 3' - 3)  - 3  - 3)  - - 3) 
- Continuation of the research  into an 
automatic transmission system,  which 
would  make  it possible to give Diesel 
engines a  constant  rpm. 
- Subsequent  resumption of trials with 
the Houdry  carbon monoxide  purifica-
tion process.  A 2)  A2) EOP  EOP  E  E  ?  ?  '2)  - 2)  lA  2) 
c.- FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION 
1- Recommendations  regarding equipment  for 
shafts in connection with the preven-
tion of fires  ~First Report  of the 
Safety  Commission,  p.  11  (German  text)) 
2.  Steps to prevent  any  accumulation  of 
grease  and  coaldust  (First  Report  of 
the Mines  Safety Commission,  p.  15 
(German  text)  and  Report  of  the Con-
ference,  p.  54,  No.  2,  para.  c.) 
, 
- Skip-winding installations should 
as far as possible be sited only 
in upcast  shafts;  C'  C'  A 4)  A 4)  E  E  A  A  C'  C'  C' 
- Equipment  in new  shafts should be 
of  aerodynamic  form;  C'  C'  c'  C'  E  E  E  E  E  E  c 
- all suitable steps should be taken 
to avoid  in every case any  accumu-
lation of dust  to ensure that  any 
such accumulation is removed.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  c 
3.  Preferred siting of methane-drainage 
lines in upcast  shafts  (First  Report 
of the Mines  Safety Commission,  p.l6 
(German  text)  and  Report  of the Con-
ference,  p.  54,  No.  3,  Par.  d) 
- This  recommendation  of the Confer-
ence applies particularly to pres-
sure lines.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  5)  - 5l  c 
1).  in the case of main-road  locomotives,  with the exception of  a  "clear view  behind",  which  is 
difficult technically. 
2)  not  suitable for  being  laid down  in inspectorate regulations. 
3)  not  applicable. 
4)  all skip-winding equipment still in use is installed in downcast  shafts. 
·5)  no  methane-drainage  lines in service. 
6)  the problem of  the  low  CO  content of Diesel  engine  exhaust  fumes  is solved  by  blocking the 
injection pump  at  a  pumping  capacity at which  the  CO  content  shows  a  marked  ris~  ... 
1.1. 
1970 
1) 
c 
c 
A 2) 
- 3) 
A 2) 
C' 
c 
c 
c IX,  13 
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4.  Sitin( electric cablesz  compressed-
air mains  and  gas-draina1e pipes 
(First  Report  of the  Mines  Safety 
Commission,  p.  16  (German  text)  and 
Report  of the Conference,  p.  54, 
No.  3,  par.  e) 
- electric cables and  leads,  com-
pressed-air drains  and gas-drain-
age  pipes should not  be sited in 
the haulage  compartment:  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  C'  C'  c  c 
- electric cables should not  all be 
sited in the same  shaft.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  C'  C'  c  c 
II- Guiding principles for  fighting mine 
fires  by  sending down  water  ~Second 
Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission, 
p.  26) 
1.  Installation 
a)  At  the top of  every shaft  reach-
ing to the surface there must  be 
a  device which  can send  down  at 
least  50 litres of water  per min-
ute  and  per square metre  of shaft 
cross-section.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  c  c 
b)  This device must  be installed in 
such  a  way  that  the supply  of wa-
ter can at  no  time  be seriously 
affected by  drawing-off  or flow-
ing-away  of water at other points  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  c  c 
c)  The  water  pipes and  the spray 
jets must  be set  in such  a  way 
that  they are protected from 
frost.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  c  c 
d)  The  damming  device or devices 
must  be set outside the shaft-top 
building in such  a  way  that  they 
can be operated at  any  time.  They 
must  be  marked  by  means  of  an 
instruction plate.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  c  c 
2.  Fires in down-cast  shafts 
a)  Immediate measures 
- it is essential to indicate in 
the fire-fighting plan the max-
imum  amount  of water which  can 
be sent  down  each of the down-
cast shafts,  without  creating 
additional dangers  for the 
workers  by  its effects on  the 
ventilation.  A 1) A 1) A 2) A 2)  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  c 
- the damming  device which  can be 
operated at this stage must  not 
release more  than this pre-
scribed quantity of water.  A  3) A  3)  A 2) .A  2)  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  c 
1)  there are doubts  as to the practicability of the Recommendation;  minimum  water quantities are 
laid down. 
2)  not  suitable for  inclusion in regulations. 
3)  there are doubts as to the practicability of the Recommendation. IX,  14 
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- until the  leader of the rescue 
operations  has  issued his  in-
structions and  as  long as there 
has  been  no  reversal of venti-
lation,  water  may  be  sent  down 
only  by  opening the  damming  de-
vice prescribed for this pur-
pose.  A 1)  A  1)  A  2)  A 2)  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  c 
b)  Measures  to be  taken  on  the  in-
structions of  the  leader of res-
cue  operations 
- the  leader of  the rescue  oper-
ations  must  therefore decide 
- taking into account  all the 
circumstances  - either to send 
down  an  increased quantity of 
water  - or  he must  give  orders 
that  reversal of  the ventila-
tion be  brought  about  or en-
couraged.  A 2)  A 2)  A  2)  A  2'  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  c 
- to facilitate the reversal of 
the ventilation in the burning 
downcast  shaft,  once this has 
been  opened  and  the main  fan 
stopped,  water  can  be sent  down 
the upcast  shaft.  c  c  C'  C'  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
- if reversal  of  the ventilation 
has  already  occurred - either 
as  a  result  of  the upward  cur-
rent  produced  by  the  heat  of 
the fire or deliberately -
downcast  shafts should  be 
treated as  though  they  were  up-
cast  shafts.  c  c  C'  C'  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
- if the  calculated water quanti-
ty appears  to be  too small to 
extinguish the fire  immediately 
or to hinder its spread,  addi-
tional precautions must  be 
worked  out  and  laid down  in the 
fire-fighting plan: 
- simultaneous  supply  of  water 
down  all downcast  shafts,  A 2) A 2)  A  2)  A 2)  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  c 
- partial shutting-off of  the 
burning shaft at  surface 
level,  A  3)  A 3)  A  3'  A  3)  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E  E  c 
- shut  undergrounq  fire-doors, 
etc.  A  3)  A 3)  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  c 
3,  Fires in upcast  shafts 
- in upcast  shafts,  water may  be 
sent  down  only  on the instructions 
of  the  leader of  the rescue  opera-
tion.  c  c  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
- as  long as  there are still any 
workers  in the pit,  only  so  1)1UCh 
water  may  be  sent  down  as will 
allow the fumes  of  the fire to 
continue to be extracted whilst 
the water  is falling,  c  c  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E  c  c 
1)  there are doubts as to the practicability of the Recommendation. 
2)  not  suitable for  inclusion in regulations.  . 
3)  not  sui  table for  inclusion in regulations;  must  be  decided separately in each  case.· IX,  15 
Nether-
N.R./Wpb.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  lands 
Recommendations  b)' the Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1968  1970  1968  1970  1968  1970  1968  1970  1968  1970  1968  1970 
Note,  A commentary  and  examples  (with dia-
grams),  regarding the calculation of 
the effect of  falling water  on  the 
ventilation are given in the Second 
Report  of the  Mines  Safety  Commission, 
pp,  29-50, 
III- Recommendations  for the sealing-off  by 
dams  of mine fires and  underground  com-
bust  ion  ~Second Report  of  the  Mines 
Safety  Commission2  p,  53) 
Introductor~ remark 
The  following  Recommendations  are not 
binding,  They  are not  intended to give 
Inspectorates  "ready-made"  regulations; 
on  the contrary,  it remains  for the 
competent  authorities to decide  how 
these Recommendations  are to be applied 
as regulations,  circulars or service 
instructions, 
These  Recommendations  refer only  to the 
actual fighting  of  the fire or combus-
tion;  they  do  not  refer to the measures 
to be  taken as  a  matter  of  priority to 
rescue men  following  the outbreak, 
A - When  a  mine fire has  broken out  or 
underground  combustion developed, 
it is indispensable to take the 
necessary  preparatory steps for  any 
later sealing-off by  dams  which  may 
be  necessary while the direct fire-
fighting  operations are still go-
ing on.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
- In the event  of sealing-off  by  dam 
becoming necessary,  as  a  general 
rule the first stoppings to be 
erected must  be  advance  dams,  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
These  advance  dams  are  in fact  the 
real subject  of  the present  Recommen-
dations. 
B  - Structure and erection of  the ad-
vance  dams 
1.  If there is no risk of  explo-
sion  ~1): 
a)  to make  the advance  dams 
themselves as air-tight as 
possible and to create the 
closest  possible seal between 
the  dam  and  the surrounding 
walls;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
b)  there is nothing against 
shutting off first of all the 
intake air.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  . C'  E.  E  c  c 
2.  If there is a  risk of  explosion: 
a)  - to have  at all times the 
most  precise  information 
possible regarding the de-
gree  of  explosion risks in 
the fire zone;  c  c  c  c·  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
1)  for the assessment  of the risk,  see chapter A- II a),  p.  52. IX,  16 
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- it may  be necessary to pro-
vide the men  constructing 
the advance  dams  with fire-
proof  clothing;  c  c  c  c  E  E  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
b)  - to ensure that the advance 
dams  are as air-tight as 
possible;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- to ensure that  they are 
strong enough to resist  an 
explosion;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
c)  - to ensure that  for the en-
tire period during which 
the stopping is being e-
rected,  there is sufficient 
ventilation of  the fire 
zone to counter  as far as 
absolutely possible the 
formation  of  an explosive 
gas mixture;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
d)  - to ensure that all suitable 
measures are talten to re-
duce as far as  possible the 
effects of  any  explosion 
which  may  occur;  (dust  bar-
riers, stone-dusting or 
water trough barriers);  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
e)  - to the greatest  possible 
extent,  the dams  on the in-
take  and return sides 
should be sealed simulta-
neously;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- only the number  of workers 
and  members  of  the staff 
strictly necessary for this 
work  should stay behind;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- as  soon  as the dams  have 
been  sealed,  the danger a-
rea must  be  completely e-
vacuated.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
c - The  final dams  must  be durable, 
built  of brick or concrete under 
the protection offered by  the ad-
vance  dams.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
Note:  Additional details to the foregoing 
Recommendations  are given in a  Commen-
tary  (Second  Report  of the Mines 
Safety  Commission.  pp.  53/5,8). IX,  17 
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A.- RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  MEDICAL 
EXAMINATION  {SECOND  REPORT  OF  THE 
MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION,  p.  79) 
I  - Pre-Entry  Medical  Examinations 
- All applicants for  employment  at 
collieries should undergo  a  pre-
entry medical  examination.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- This  must  establish that the appli-
cant  shows  no  symptoms  rendering  him 
unfit  for  such  employment.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
The  pre-entry medical  examination 
must  include: 
! 
- a  general  examination 
- such special examination as  may  be 
deemed  necessary for the purpose.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- The  examinations effected must  in-
elude,  as regards the chest,  a  ra-
diograph  or radiophotograph  of 
format  not  smaller than 70 x  70  mm;  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- the latter to be  supplemented if 
need be  by  a  standard-format  (1  :  1) 
radiophotograph;  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- The  nature  of  these examinations  and  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- the practical details,  together  with  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- the criteria on  which  the doctor 
should base his findings,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- should be  defined by  medical experts  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- In the case of  recruitment  for  work, 
whether  below or  above  ground,  where 
the worker will be  exposed to a  dust 
hazard,  the examination must  show  '"• 
a  normal  pulmonary  image.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
- The  concept  of  normal  pulmonary  im- . 
age  must  be  defined by  medical  ex-
perts.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
- These  are to be  regarded as  minimum 
medical  recommendations. 
- The  points concerning the  number  anc 
type  of  examinations to be carried 
out, 
- the effecting of  radiological  exam-
inations 
- the definition of the normal  pulmo-
nary  image 
- are subject  to review in each 
country 
- whenever this is felt to be  appro-
priate in the  light  of  progress  in 
medical  and  radiological knowledge 
- working  conditions,  and 
- preventive measures. IX,  18 
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II- Special Examinations 
1.  The  object  of  special medical  exam-
inations should be to establish -
taking into account,  according to 
circumstances,  the opinions of 
.J 
- the training  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- vocational-guidance and applied 
psychology  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  E  E  C'  C' 
- and  other services concerned 
a  worker's fitness for  certain 
specific occupations.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  c  c  c  c 
2.  Such  examinations are essential in 
the case of  jobs 
- which,  either in themselves or 
owing to the conditions under 
which  they  are performed,  involve 
a  special hazard to the worker 
himself  or to others as regards 
health and/or safety,  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- which  involve special health or 
safety requirements, 
- or  which demand  particular physi-
cal aptitudes or characterologi-
cal qualities.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  c  c  c  c 
3.  No  attempt  has  been  made  here to 
list in full the cases  in which 
special examinations are necessary, 
this being  left to the competent 
authorities in each country.  Exam-
ples  include: 
- winding  enginemen, 
- staple pit  enginemen, 
- motormen  (drivers of  locomotives, 
mobile  haulers and  surface vehi-
cles), 
- workers  assigned to hot  workings, 
- all those  employed  on  cage  han-
dling. 
III- Routine  examinations during  employ_ment 
A - Periodic health checks 
- The  object here is to establish 
whether  the subject  is still fit 
for duty,  - c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- to detect  any  symptoms  of occupa-
tiona! disease at the earliest 
possible stage,  - c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- where appropriate to help super-
vise the subject's health general-
ly.  - c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- All personnel should undergo  such 
check-ups at  intervals.  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c IX,  19 
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- The  interval is fixed at  two years  c  c  NRC  NRC  c  c  cl>  cl>  c2>  c2>  c  c 
- The  interval is reduced  for worlt-
ca>  ca>  ers under  21.  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  E  NRP 
- The  interval should  be  considered  4)  ~)  4)  4) 
as  a  maximum  figure.  c  c  - - - c  c  c  c  c  c 
This  interval can also be  reduced: 
- if the state of health of  a  worker 
indicates that  such  a  reduction is 
desirable;  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- in relation to the type of  work 
performed;  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  E  E  c  c 
- because  of  the nature of the place 
at  which  the work is being done.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  E  E  c  c 
B  - Medical  examinations  on specific 
occasions 
1.  In the case of  reassiinment 
- Workers  whom  it is proposed 
to assign to jobs involving 
hazards  not  previously taken 
into account  for the man  con-
cerned should be re-examined.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  E  E  E  c 
2.  Medical  examination followini 
absence  from work 
- Where  a  man's  return to work 
after an illness or accident 
involves risk to the safety 
of  himself  or others,  he  may 
be subjected to a  special ex- NRP 
amination,  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  +C'  c  E  E  C'  C' 
- the type  and  extent  of  which 
should be fixed  in each  case 
according to the circum-
stances.  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  E  E  C'  C' 
1)  the interval is one year. 
2)  articie 648 of  Inspectorate Regulations,provides for  an interval of  one  year~ 
3)  for workers under  18 years of  age~ 
4)  not  applicable'-IX,  20 
B  - Regular  Report  on  the  implementation of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission's  Recommendations  published  in the Third Report 
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I  - Recommendations  regarding the protec-
tion of  underground  electrical net-
works  against  fire and  firedamp-ex-
plosion rislts  (Doc,  115676174) 
1.  Recommendations  regarding the pro-
tection of  underground  electrical 
networks  against  fire risk 
A  - First-order precautions  -
avoidance  of  fire risk 
1)  Avoidance  of  excessive 
heating of  cables  in normal 
use  by  providing adequate 
conductivity,  Avoidance  of 
unforeseen  local heatings 
by  the use  of  suitable de-
signs  and  by  proper super-
vision.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
2)  Reduce  the possibility of 
faults  and  short-circuits 
occurring between  conduc-
tors,  or  between  conductor 
and  earth,  by  adequate  in-
sulation or proper  spacing 
of the conductors.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
B  - Second-order  precautions  -
protection against  the effects 
of  a  heating  or  a  fault 
1)  Use  of  heat-stable insula-
tions.  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
2)  Use  of  protective sheathing 
for  equipment  and  for  ca-
bles,  made  of flame-resist- cl> 
ant  and  non-propagating 
cl> 
+ 
material.  c·  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  NRP  C'  C' 
- Use  of oil as  a  non-con-
ductor only if no fire 
risk for  the workers  is 
involved.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  C' 
3)  Accumulations  of  flammable 
or  combustible materials 
and  pipelines for  combust!-
ble gases  should  be sited 
well away  from electrical  C'-+  C'+ 
equipment,  c  C+C'  C+C' C+C'  c  c  NRJ.:  NRP  C'  C' 
c - Third-order precautions -
measures  regarding the  network 
1)  Automatic protection of 
networks  against  abnormal 
overloads,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1)  with respect to armoured  cables.' 
Nether-
lands 
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2)  Automatic  protection of  net-
works  against  short-circuit; 
these protective devices 
must  be  capable of  handling 
the maximum  short-circuit 
current  at their point  of  c  +  c  + 
installation.  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  c  NRP  NRP 
Selecting and  regulating of 
these devices  in relation to 
the minimum  short-circuit 
current  which  can  occur at 
the end  of  the section they  c  +  c  + 
protect.  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
3)  Steps to give effective pro-
tection against  low-current 
faults,  which  might  get  past 
the  above-named  protective 
devices  and  cause  dangerous 
cl> 
C'+  C'+ 
heatings.  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
2.  Recommendations  for the protection 
of  underground electrical networks 
against  firedamp-explosion risks 
A.  First-order precautions - pre-
vention  of  accumulations  of 
firedamp 
1)  The  firedamp  content  at  the 
site of  the electrical appa-
ratus must  be  kept  within the 
limits prescribed by  the 
Inspectorate.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
2)  The ventilation situation 
must  be  checked before any 
new  installation or extension  C'+  c  + 
of electrical equipment.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
3)  There  must  be  a  thorough  in-
vestigation of  the possible 
consequences  of  any  altera-
tions in working  method,  of 
ventilation or gas  omission, 
which  might  cause  problems  in 
the vicinity of electrical 
equipment.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
B.  Second-order  precautions - pro-
tection against  ignition 
1)  In gassy workings:  use  of 
electrical equipment  which  is 
permitted by  the  Inspectorate 
only under its own  specified  c  +  c  + 
conditions.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
2)  The  electrical equipment  must 
be  installed,  used,  super-
vised and  maintained  in such 
a  way  as to keep it flame- c  +  c  + 
proof.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
All cables must  be  of  ade- c  +  c  + 
quate mechanical.strength.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
All cables must  be installed 
and  maintained without  damag~  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1)  must  be  carried out  by  1.10.1971  in pits where  there is a  risk of  fi~edamp. IX,  22 
H.R./1fpb.  Saar  BelgiWI  France  ItalJ 
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c. Third-order  precautions -
cuttini off the circuit 
1)  Networks  must  be designed  and 
installed in such  a  way  that 
any  fault  current  which  may 
arise between  phase  and earth 
is reduced to a  low  value or 
c4>  c  +  c  + 
quickly  cut  off.  NRP  c  c  NRJ:  NRC  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
2)  A protective relay,  prefer-
able automatic,  must  be  pro-
cl>+.  vided against  between-phase 
c4> 
C'+ C'+ 
faults  and  earth faults.  NRP  NRP  c  NRJl  NRC  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
3)  Precautions must  be taken to 
avoid accidents  when  faults 
are being  sought  or dealt  cc~ CC'+ 
with.  c  c  c  c  NR.Il  NRC  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
4)  Protection must  be  given to 
leads without  metallic 
sheathing,  and to those which 
supply  movable  machines,  by 
means  of  individual or col-
lective screens which  bring a 
protective device  into opera- c  +  C'+  C'+ 
tion if a  fault  occurs.  c  c  c  c  NR:P  NRC  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
5)  If the firedamp  content  rises 
above  the prescribed limit, 
all the sections of  the net-
work  involved  must  be cut  off.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
Issuing instructions to main-
tain in operation certain ma-
chines which  provide ventila-
tion.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C+C'  C+C' 
Restarting only  when  the 
firedamp content  has  fallen 
below the permissible value, 
and  only  on  the orders of  a  c  +  c  + 
trained person.  c  c  c  c  NR.Il  NRP  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
Supplementarl  precautions for Eits 
liable to sudden  outbursts of  gas 
1.  Risk of  damage  by  particles pro-
jected bl an  outburst  of ias 
- The  threatened zones  in which 
projection can  occur  should not 
be electrified.  ·A  A  c  c  NRP  NRC  c  2)  c  2) c 3) c 3)  A  A 
- The  electrical equipment  and 
cables should  be  protected 
against  heavy  blows.  A  A  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 3) c  3)  c  c 
- The  electrical equipment  should 
be designed to give adequate 
robustness.  A  A  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 3) c 3)  c  c 
1)  available for movable  equipment• 
2)  the.use of electricity is forbidden  in pits liable to sudden  outbursts of gas,  excepting for 
light_ing and-shot-firing.  Exceptions can,  however,  be approved  by the senior mining engineers: 
when  using armoured  cables,  telephone installations and methanometers  in intake airways  - pro-
vided that  no  damage  is likely to occur as a  result of  a  gas  outburst  - and also in main return 
airways. 
3)  No  pits liable to sudden outbursts of gas.  However,  in pits or parts of mines  which are consid-
ered to be  liable to sudden outbursts of gas,  the use  of electricity,  excepting for  lighting 
purposes  and  portable  lamps,  must  be authorized by  a  senior mining engineer,  subject to the 
observance of all other measures,  precautions or restrictions which  might  be  included in the 
authorization such as for  example the above-mentioned recommendations •. 
4)  must  be  carried out  by  1.~0.1971 in pits where  there is a  risk of  firedamp. IX,  23 
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2.  The risk of  firedamp  concentrations 
- Increased ventilation  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  1) c  1)  c  c 
- Use  of  remote-indicating methane-
meters  or ventilation-fault de-
teeters which  can cut  off the  C'+ c  + 
threatened section of the  networ~  C'  C'  E  2)  C'  E  E  c  c  c  1) c  1)  NRP  NRP 
- Relaxation shot-firing only after 
all equipment  has  been switched 
off.  C'  C'  C'  C'  NRP  NRC  c  c  c  1) c  1)  - -
3.  Supplementary electrical precau-
tions 
a)  Preferable use  of  a  starpoint 
earthed via a  strong  impedance, 
e.g.  by  means  of  an  insulation  C'+ 
detector.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRC  NRP  NRP  c  1) c  1)  NRP  NRP 
b)  Quickest  possible automatic pro-
tection of the network against 
all insulation faults,  even if 
formed  by  resistances between  c  +  c  +  c +  c  + 
phase  and earth.  NRP  c  4) NRP  NRP  NRP  NRC  c  c  c  1) c  1)  NRP  NRP 
II - General guidelines for the opening-up 
of  sealed-off fire areas  ~Doc.  130473/ 
641 
I  •  GENERAL  3)  3) 
Special reasons for  opening-up a 
district sealed-off after a  fire: 
- recovery of  bodies 
- salvage of material 
- recovery  of  roadways  and  workings 
- reduction  of  the sealed-off area 
- inspection of  the district,  and, 
if necessary, 
- direct fire-fighting. 
The  following  hazards  can arise 
from  reopening a  sealed-off dis-
trict: 
- release of  co,  foul air and  hot 
damp  air, 
- explosion of  firedamp  or fire gas 
where  the fire is not  yet extin-
guished, 
- recrudescence  of the fire,  which 
need  not  necessarily occur  imme-
diately,  but  even after some  time 
has  elapsed. 
Recrudescence  of the fire can  occur 
only when  fresh air reaches the 
seat  of the fire,  so that with all 
operations  involved in reopening  a 
fire area it is of  prime  importance 
to inspect  the individual air cur-
rents constantly.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  NRP  C' 
1)  no pits liable to sudden outbursts of gas.  (See  note 3,  previous  page), 
2)  already applied in individual  cases~ 
3)  the opening-up of fire areas is carried out  on the responsibility of the manager,  who  prepares 
a  reopening plan - taking into account  the scale and  type of fire and  the ventilation situation 
in the fire area - in collaboration with the Main  Rescue Station.  The action plans of the Main 
Rescue  Stations very  largely embody  the guidelines  laid down  in Doc.  1304/3/64 .. 
4) ·must  be  carried out  by  1.10.1970 in low-tension  networks. IX,  24 
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All places suspected of  having  been 
seats of fire or beatings must  be 
ascertained with the utmost  speed.  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
II. BASIC  RULES 
Sealed-off districts may  be  reopen-
ed  only after the competent  author-
ities have been notified or  have 
given their permission.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  1)  c  1  c  1) c  1)  C'  C' 
Before  opening  commences,  gas  sam-
ples must  be taken  from  the fire 
area,  at  each stopping  and  from all 
sampling  pipes.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C' 
The  gas  samples are analysed and 
the results assessed  from  the point 
of  view of  explosion risk in the 
sealed-off area and  the state of 
the seat  of  the fire.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C' 
The  cooling-off time of  the seat  of 
the fire must  be  taken into account.  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If possible,  the sealed-off dis-
trict should be  inspected before 
any  air is circulated or any opera-
tions are started.  A  A  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Before  opening  commences,  a  plan 
should be  drawn  up jointly with the 
Main  Rescue  Centre.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
This  plan  must  'cover  the following 
points: 
- the  method, 
- nature,  scope  and  order of  opera-
tions, 
- direction and  supervision,, 
- checking of  the ventilation sys-
tem and  of the composition  of the 
air, 
- communications, 
- preparation of material, 
- evacuation,  prohibition of  access 
to and  remanning  of  endangered 
workings, 
- deployment  of  the Rescue  Team, 
- connection and  disconnection of 
electrical equipment  and cutting-
off  the  supply  of electricity in 
both equipment  and  part  of  net-
work  concerned, 
- opening  and  closing of  the  com-
pressed air,  water  and methane-
drainage  pipeline valves, 
- re-sealing of the fire area in 
emergency.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  method to be  adopted for re-
opening sealed-off districts de-
pends  on the  presence or otherwise 
of 
- non-explosive  gaseous  mixtures 
which  remain  non-explosive  on 
dilution with air, 
- non-explosive  gaseous  mixtures 
which  may  become  explosive  on 
dilution with air,  or 
- explosive  gaseous mixtures. 
1)  applies only to the opening-up of fire areas after particularly large fires. IX,  25 
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Fire areas  may  be  opened at  one 
point  or at several points.  In the 
latter case,  a  continuous direct 
circulation of air is  automaticall~ 
established and  the fire area is 
permeated with fresh air.  An  exam-
ination should be  made  of  the ef-
fects of  the opening of  the area  on 
the ventilation system of the pit 
as  a  whole  and  within the fire area  c  c  C'+C  C'+C  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
A sealed-off district may  be re-
opened  by 
- breaching  one  or more  stoppings 
(with  or  without  the use  of  an 
air-lock),  or 
- cutting a  new  entry into the 
fire-area. 
Before  opening a  sealed-off area, 
provision should be  made  for  im-
mediate reclosure if necessary.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Stoppings  may  be  opened  only on the 
instructions of the manager  under-
ground  and  under  the constant  su-
pervision of  personnel appointed  b~ 
him.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
Workings,  into which the opening  oi 
a  stopping may  release toxic gases 
or foul air,  or where  there is a 
risk of  explosion,  must  be  evacu-
ated and  put  out  of  bounds to per-
sonnel before opening.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
Since conditions in the district, 
the state of the seat  of  the fire 
and the risk of  gas  explosion may 
change  during the opening  operation 
the composition of the fire gases 
or fumes  must  be  checked at regular 
intervals.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c•  C' 
The  kind  and  number  of  samples  and 
the points at which  they  are to be 
taken should be fixed  in advance.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c.,  c•  C'  C'  C'  C' 
In doing so,  the possibility of  gas 
accumulations  forming  should be 
allowed for.  (In general,  the for-
mation  of  gas  layers is fostered  by 
low air velocities and differences 
in temperature.)  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c 
Where  a  stopping is opened  in the 
knowledge that  a  fire is not  yet 
extinguished,  or where the fire is 
revived·as  a  result,  the area in 
question must  be resealed at  once, 
if the composition of the fire 
gases  or  fumes  changes  in such a 
way  that an explosion hazard might 
arise.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
With  non-explosive gas mixtures in 
the fire area,  this is necessary 
only if extinguishing operations 
seem unlikely to succeed.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
It is the responsibility of the 
Rescue Team  to open  and  inspect 
fire areas,  even after they  have 
been ventilated.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c•  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' IX,  26 
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On  the  intake side,  breaching of 
stoppings  need  not  be carried out 
by the Rescue  Team  provided that 
no  gas  hazard is to be  reckoned 
with.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
When  deploying the  Rescue  Team, 
allowance  should  be  made  for the 
adverse  climatic conditions which 
are  likely to obtain at  any  point 
where  they  may  be  employed.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
III.  OPENING-UP  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS 
CONTAINING  NON-EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIX-
TURES 
1.  Opening-up  one  side only 
A sealed-off district contain-
ing  non-explosive  gas mixtures 
may  be  opened  on  one  side even 
if the fire is not  yet  extin-
guished. 
It must  first  be  established 
whether  the  remaining stoppings 
and  seals are sufficiently air-
tight  and that there is no  risk 
of  releasing fire gases,  in 
particular carbon  monoxide  in 
other parts of the working, 
which  may  be  connected with the 
fire area.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If the stopping to be  opened  is 
on  the return side,  special at-
tention should be  paid to the 
release of  CO  or  of  other toxic 
or dangerous  gases  or foul air.  c  c  c  c  c  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  decision  as to whether to 
carry out  operations  in the 
fire area without  ventilation 
air or with auxiliary ventila-
tion depends  on  the purpose  of 
the reopening  of  the area,  the 
expected duration of  the  Rescue 
Team's  operations  and  the pos-
sible hazards  involved.  Auxil-
iary ventilation is especially 
desirable for  extended opera-
tions within the fire area. 
a)  Working  without  ventilation 
air,  especially_behind an 
airlock,  has  the advantage 
of  eliminating the risk of 
reviving the fire.  When  car-
rying  out  extinguishing 
operations without  ventila-
tion air and  under unfavour-
able air conditions,  it is 
advisable first to set  up 
water sprinklers or  nozzles 
and to put  these into opera-
tion only after the Rescue 
Team  has  left the fire area.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
b)  If auxiliary ventilation is 
used,  it should preferabiy 
be  by  suction.  c  c  A 1)  A 1)  C'  C'  C'  C'  2)  - 2)  C'  C' 
1)  experience  hitherto has  shown  that  blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferable,  to ensure that 
no  explosive gases.are sucked  in by  the auxiliary fan< 
2) the  use of  blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferred, IX,  2 7 
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It is advisable to isolate 
the fire area ventilated by 
an  auxiliary fan  from the 
non-ventilated section by 
means  of an auxiliary stop-
ping if the seat  of  the 
fire is situated in the 
non-ventilated section.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.  Opening  on  two sides to estab-
lish a  circulation of air 
round the sealed-off area 
A sealed-off area containing 
non-explosive gas mixtures  may 
be  ventilated only if it is 
likely that the fire is ex-
tinct.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
While ventilation is being es-
tablished,  a  Rescue Team  wear-
ing breathing  apparatus  may 
enter the fire area to examine 
conditions within it and to 
extinguish any fires.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
IV.  REOPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS 
CONTAINING  GAS  MIXTURES  WHICH  MAY 
BECOME  EXPLOSIVE  ON  DILUTION  WITH 
AIR 
1.  Opening  on  one  side only 
A sealed-off area containing 
gas mixtures  which  may  become 
explosive  on  dilution with air 
may  be  opened  on  one  side onlfl 
even if the fire is not  yet 
extinguished. 
It is,  however,  essential to 
install a  tight airlock in 
front  of  the stopping to be 
opened,  so as to ensure  an ef-
fective air seal.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
It must  first be checked 
whether  the remaining stop-
pings  and seals are suffi-
ciently air-tight  and that 
there is no risk of releasing 
fire gases,  in particular car-
bon  monoxide,  into other parts 
of the workings  which  may  be 
connected with the fire area.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If the stopping to be  opened 
is on the return side,  partie-
.ular attention must  be  paid to 
the possibility of  releasing 
co,  CH4  or foul air  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
All operations must  be carried 
out  without  ventilation air.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
There  must  be  continuous  sam-
pling and evaluation of  the 
results of analysis to check 
whether  the gas mixture re-
mains  non-explosive.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
For  extinguishing operations, 
see section III .1. IX,  28 
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If the size of the sealed-off 
area is to be  reduced,  a  new 
explosion-proof  stopping must 
be erected.  In order to be 
able to erect this stopping 
under tolerable climatic con-
ditions and  possibly without 
wearing breathing apparatus, 
auxiliary ventilation may  have 
to be  provided.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
For this purpose,  an auxiliary 
stopping must  first  be erected 
and  sealed in an unventilated 
atmosphere.  (Before construct-
ing the main  stopping,  it 
should be  considered whether 
to erect  several successive 
auxiliary stoppings,  according 
to the possible hazards.)  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  section of  roadway  thus 
recovered must  then be venti-
lated by  an auxiliary fan so 
as to create suitable air con-
ditions for the erection of 
the main  stopping.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
When  starting up  the auxiliary 
ventilation,  it must  be  remem-
bered that  the  gas mixture be-
comes  explosive  on  dilution 
with air.  It is therefore es-
sential to ensure that there 
is no source of  ignition in 
the  workings to be ventilated.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
In addition,  it is essential 
to make  certain that the fan 
used  cannot  cause any risk of 
ignition.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Before starting up the auxil-
iary ventilation,  all workings 
likely to be exposed to the 
hazards  of fire gases  or ex-
plosions must  first be  evacu-
ated and  access thereto pro-
hibited.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Electrical equipment  must  be 
cut  off  from the power  supply.  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'_lJ C'l)  C'  C' 
In addition,  the ventilation 
must,  as far as  possible,  be 
regulated so that  no explosive 
gas mixtures  can be released 
over  long distances.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
For this purpose,  the quantity 
of air circulated should,  if 
necessary,  be  increased.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.  Openinl on two sides to estab-
lish a  circulation of air 
through the fire area 
This  method  of  opening auto-
matically results in the for-
mation  of  a  through air-cur-
rent  in the open district,  but 
not  necessarily in other parts 
of  the district. The  method 
can be  used  only if there are 
no remaining signs of fire in  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  the district • 
1)  special attention is drawn to the fact  that  the fan  must  be switched off. IX,  29 
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In addition,  a  period  long 
enough for the seat  of the fire 
to cool off  must  have  elapsed 
since the estimated time  of 
extinction,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If possible,  the Rescue  Team 
should carry out  an  inspection 
in an unventilated atmosphere,  A  A  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Failing this,  the results of 
the snuffle pipe tests should 
be  used to determine the condi-
tion of the seat  of  the fire.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Furthermore,  it should be  con-
sidered in such cases whether 
the method described  in section 
IV,l might  not  be  preferable,  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
In each case,  it is essential 
to check the  likelihood of  a 
recrudescence  of  the fire dur-
ing ventilation,  by  means  of 
fire gas  samples.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
This applies particularly in 
the case  of  a  much-branched 
district,  c  c  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Before ventilating the fire 
area,  all workings  exposed to 
the hazards  of fire gases  or 
explosions  of fire gases  or 
fire-damp  when  the stopping is 
opened  must  be  evacuated,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
All electrical installations in 
these workings  must  be  cut  off 
from  the  power  supply,  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
On  safety grounds,  it is advis-
able to open  the return stop-
ping first,  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
After the  Rescue  Team  has with-
drawn to less dangerous  zones, 
the  intake stopping should  be 
opened,  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
When  ventilating the fire area, 
the quantity  of air and  the 
content  of  inflammable  gases  in 
the air-current circulating 
through the fire area,  and  in 
the current  into which it sub-
sequently flows,  should  be 
checked,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  two  air-currents should be 
mutually  adjusted  in such  a 
manner  as to ensure that  no ex-
plosive mixture of  gases  is 
present  over  long  distances 
after their junction,  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Access to the fire area is pro-
hibited until it has  been ven-
tilated.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' IX,  30 
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v.  OPENING  OF  FIRE  AREAS  CONTAINING 
EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
Sealed-off districts may  not  be re-
opened,  either on  one  side or on 
two  sides,  if the  presence of ex-
plosive gas mixtures behind  the 
stoppings  is established.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c• 
- ---
VI.  OPENING  OF  FLOODED  FIRE  AREAS 
The  composition of  the air in fire 
areas  flooded  to extinguish the fire 
must  be  checked after draining.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
In workings  with solid coal,  allow-
ance  must  be  made  for  the  increased 
hazard of  spontaneous  ignition after 
drainage. 
Where  fire  areas  have  been  isolated 
by  local  flooding  instead of by 
stoppings,  the rules mentioned  in 
section  I  to V should  be  observed, 
insofar as  applicable,  when  opening 
a  district.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
VII.  REMANNING  OF  FIRE  AREAS 
After ventilating a  fire area, 
workings  may  not  be  manned  until 
a  Rescue  Team  has established that 
all workings  are  free of  noxious 
ga_ses.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c•  C' 
If the  fire  area is merely being 
reduced  in .size,  workings  free of 
noxious  gases  may  be  manned  only 
when  the remainder of  the fire-
area  has  been  sealed-off by  permanent 
stoppings.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' ·Ix,  31 
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III - Guidelines  for  the construction of 
advance  fire stoppings  from  plaster 
~doc.  492876372~ 
In all cases where  it is possible 
and  advantageous,  the erection of 
plaster stoppings to seal off fires 
and  beatings  is recommended. 
Is this process applied  in practice 
as  laid down  in the  guidelines  1)  2)  2) 
contained  in  the  report?  NRP  NRP  NRC  c  yes  yes  yes  yes  E  E  E  E 
Is the application of this process 
prescribed by  regulations?  NRP  NRP  NRC  c  no  no  no  no  no  no  E  E 
Is this process applied  in practice 
in  a  manner differing from  the 
principles  laid down?  NRP  NRP  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  no  no  E  E 
Is the application of  this modified 
process  prescribed by  regulations?  NRP  NRP  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  no  no  E  E 
IV  - Second  report on  specifications and 
test conditions relating to fire-
resistant fluids used for  power 
transmission  ~doc.  700/2/63~ 
Part  II  - Specifications and  test 
conditions  ~pp.  12  onwards5 
Article  1  - Conditions of authorisa-
tion 
1.  Fire-resistant fluids  for  hydrau-
lie power  transmission  and  hydrau-
lie control,  before being used  in 
mine  workings,  must  be  given  a  C'3)  C'3) 
certificate of  approval.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  +E4)  E  4)  E  E  E  E 
This certificate must  indicate 
that the  product has  been  subjec-
ted to the  following  tests: 
a)  Laboratory tests  (articles 3- 7) 
a a)  to determine criteria of 
flammability  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
(article 3,  p.l5) 
1)  formulation  of guidelines relating to fire stoppings and sealings;  the section "fire stoppings 
made  of  bending materials" is equally applicable to advance  fire stoppings. 
2)  the choice of  means  is,  however,  left to the mine-manager. 
·3)  in  the Charbonnages  de  France register,  the  ~ines Safety Commission Recommendations  have  been 
·taken into account.  · 
4)  the question of  drawing up  a  new  regulation is being examined  by  the  competent  authority. IX,  32 
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bb)  to determine  health cri-
teria  (article 4,  p.  16)  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
cc)  to determine  technical 
criteria  (article 5,  p.  16)  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
b)  Long-term tests during  normal 
operations  (article 8,  p.  24)  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
2.  These  tests are carried out  under 
an  authori!'ed  body.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
3.  Authorisation for  use  underground 
should  be  dependent  on  presenta-
tion of  the certificate mentioned 
in  1.  above.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'E  C'E  E  E  E  E 
Article  9  - Withdrawal  of  approval 
At  the  request  of  the  authorised  bod~ 
the  permitting authority may  withdraw 
the  approval  for  the  fluid  to be 
used  in mine  workings.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'E C'E  E  E  E  E 
v  - Report  on  the electro-magnetic 
examination of  winding  rope  ~doc. 
nr,  8470764/2). 
Steps  taken  to develop electro-
magnetic  testing methods  and  results  C'2)  C'2) 
obtained.  C'2  c  2)  - 3)  - 3) P'2)  C'2)  +4)  +4)  ?  ?  C'  C' 
VI  - Report  on  the  use  of  accelerometers 
to test winding  installations doc. 
3725/1761  J  p.  9  ~German text). 
Tests with accelerometers  should  be 
continued  on  a  large scale.  C'  C'  -2)  -2)  - - - - E  E  C'  C' 
Use  of  accelerometers  should be  1) 
extended.  C'  C'E  -2)  -2)  - - - - E  E  C'  C' 
VII  - Recommendation  regarding  the  con-
sulting of  foreign  experts  in  the 
case  of  rescue  operations connected 
with major  mining  accidents  {doc. 
4364/61/3). 
1)  the  formulation  of rules regulating acceleration measurements  in certain cases is being  examined. 
2)  trials to  improve  electro-magnetic  testing methods  are  under~ay. 
3)  measurements  are  taken  in  individual cases. 
4)  electro-magnetic testing of cables is required  in certain exceptional cases  in the General 
Mines  regulations, Recommendations  by the Commiasion 
In certain serious mining accidents 
advice  requested  by  the  leaders of 
the  rescue  operation  from  qualified 
foreign experts  in mine-rescue 
matters. 
I 
The  heads  of Mine  Rescue  Stations are 
provided for  this purpose with  a 
plan containing the most  important 
IX,- 33 
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addresses  and  information  needed.  C'l)  C'I: C'l) C'l) C'l)C'l) C'l) C'l)  C'  C'  C'l)  C'l) 
This plan  should  be constantly kept 
up-to-date. 
VIII -Report on  firedamp-proof  electrical 
equipment  for  nominal  voltages  above 
1,100 volts  (doc.  2400/64/1) 
1.  Wh~t use  has  been  made  of  the  in-
formation  contained  in this report, 
and,  in particular,  to whom  was  it 
distributed? 
2.  The  Working Party has  noted that, 
in the Community  countries, 
research  into the  development  of 
low-oil or oil-less H.T.  switch-
gear  having  the correct character-
istics for use  in  gassy pits is 
being continued. 
What  is the present position re-
garding this research and  what 
data  have  been obtained to date? 
3.  The  Working Party has  noted  that 
oil is being used  in respect of 
relays,  and  that research would 
be  needed  to reduce or eliminate 
the use of oil.  What  research is 
being carried out  to this end? 
4.  This Report  notes  that switchgear 
specialists are  trying to use  less 
- o~ even  no  - oil with voltages 
above  1,100 volts and  that,  in 
particular,  oil-less switchgear 
with separate poles,  and  low-oil 
switchgear,  were  being more  and 
more  widely used  in most  countries, 
at least for  new  plant. 
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4)  NRP  4)  4)  3)  3) 
1)  the main  First-Aid Stations are in touch with the main Rescue  Stations in the Community 
countries. 
2)  trials with oil-less relays are underway. 
3)  no  research of this kind is being carried out. 
4)  see above. IX,  34 
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These  observations were  deduced  from 
practice during  1960  - 1962. 
What  have  been  the  trends since 
then?  1)  1)  2)  2)  3)  3)  4)  NRP  4)  4)  2)  2) 
1)  this trend continues. 
2)  not  applicable. 
3)  within certain limits,  these  devices may  also be  used elsewhere after the  promulgation of  the 
·new  regulations.  ' 
4)  cf.  p.  IX,  33. IX,  35 
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Recommendation  on  the  fixing of climatic 
limits  ~the unabridged text  is reproduced 
in  doc.  3034/4/62) 
1.1  The  basis is the American effective 
temperature  (0  eff basic scale).  c  ..  c  c  c  • C'  C'  A  E  6)  NRP  NRP  c  c 
Air velocities  above  3  metres/sec 
should be  considered  as  only 3  metre~ 
sec  in determining  the American 
effective temperature.  c 1)  c 1)  c  c  C'  C'  - - NRP  NRP  c  c 
1.2  The  temperature data  must  be  given 
so  as  to make  possible  a  comparison 
on  the basis  indicated under  1.1.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  - - NRP  NRP  c  c 
1.3  The  climatic limits determined shall 
be  maximum  values.  c  c  c  c  - - - - NRP  NRP  c  c 
More  favourable  climatic values for 
the workers shall remain  unchanged.  c  c  c  c  - - - - NRP  NRP  -3)  - 3) 
1.4  There will be  further  investigation 
into the effectiveness and  accuracy 
of  the various climatic  indices.  ?  ?  - - - - - - NRP  NRP  - 3)  - 3) 
2.  Determination of  a  maximum  climatic 
value 
2.2  Work  on  location is forbidden  in 
working  places where  the  temperature 
exceeds  32°  eff A  (basic scale), 
excepting the  cases  named  in 2.3  and 
2.4.  c  c  c  c  - - 2)  E  2)  NRP  NRP  c  c 
2.3  An  exception can be  made  to  the  ban 
'on working  on  location  in tempera-
tures  above  32°  eff A  (basic scale) 
if the  competent  authority has  given 
permission  and  the workers  in  ques-
tion have  been  medically examined. 
In  this case  the  following  conditions 
must  also be  fulfilled:  c 4)  c 4)  c  c  - - A  A  NRP  NRP  c  c 
2.3.1 The  responsible  authority can  only 
issue permission for  a  fixed  period 
and  for  given  work~ng operations.  c  c  c  c  - - A  - NRP  NRP  c  c 
2.3.2 The  work  must  be carried out under 
medical  supervision.  c  c  c  5) c  5)  - - - - NRP  NRP  c  c 
Guidelines must  be  worked  out,  in 
collaboration with medical experts, 
covering the medical  examination  I 
envisaged under 2.3.  c  c  - - - - - - NRP  NRP  c  c 
1)  3,5 metres/sec. 
2)  working points where  the  temperature reaches 2s•c  are considered as particularly hot  (without 
1
this being  an  absolute  maximum  value). 
3)  not  applicable. 
4)  for  mine  rescue personnel. 
5)  kedical  supervision obligatory. 
6)  climatic values only  have  to be  determined in certain very  exceptional cases. 
1\ IX,  36 
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2.3.3  Work  must  not continue uninterrupted 
for more  than  one  hour.  A suitable 
break must  then  be  arranged  in  a 
better "climate".  c  c  c  c  - - A  - NRP  NRP  c  c 
The  duration of uninterrupted working 
time,  as well  as  the duration  and 
frequency of  the breaks  and  the eli-
matic  range  in which this break is 
spent,  as  also all other necessary 
provisions are to be  laid down  in 
writing by  the  competent authority 
together with  the responsible doctor 
before the work  begins.  c  1)  c  1'  c  c  - - A  - NRP  NRP  c  c 
2.3.4 Acclimatised persons must  be  chosen. 
Persons over 40  years of  age  should 
not be put to this work.  c  c  - - - - - - NRP  NRP  c  c 
Persons under  21  and  over 45  years of 
age  must  not be put to this work.  c  c  c  2)  c  2) - - - - NRP  ~RP  c  c 
2.4  An  exception can also be  made  to the 
ban  on  working  on  location  in tempe-
ratures  above  32°  eff A  (basic scale) 
if danger threatens or  in special 
circumstances calling for  immediate 
action.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c 3) c  3)  NRP  NRP  c  c 
In such case,  however: 
2.4.1 The  competent  authority and  the 
responsible  doc·tor  must  be  immediate-
ly  informed.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  A  - NRP  NRP  c  c 
2.4.2 This  work  must  be  performed  as  soon 
as  possible under  the conditions 
listed in 2.3.1 to 2.3.4.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  c  c 
3.  Climatic  range  between 32°  eff A  and 
28
11  eff A  ~basic  scale~  4)  4) 
3.1.1 Only  persons  shown  .bY  medical  exami-
nation  to be suitable can be  em-
ployed  in this climatic range.  A  A  C'  C'  - - c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
The  medical  examination must  pay 
particular attention to the heart 
and  to blood circulation.  A  A  C'  C'  - - c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
Persons continually employed  in this 
climatic range  must  be  examined  me-
dically at least once  a  year.  A  A  - - - - c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
In addition,  the  following provi-
sions apply: 
1)  laid down  generally in the mine  rescue plans. 
2)  no  provision made  for excluding persons below 21  years of  age  from  exceptional hot work. 
3)  .••  ban  on  work  on  location in excessively high  temperatures  ••• 
4)  range of climatic conditions above  28
11C. IX,  37 
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3.1.2 As  soon  as  a  working-point  reaches 
a  temperature  above  28°  eff A 
(basic scale)  the  competent  autho-
rity must  be  informed  in writing.  A  A  c  1)  c 1)  - - A  A  NRP  NRP  c  c 
3.1.3 The  length of  stay in  the climatic 
range  between  30°  and  32°  eff A 
(basic scale)  is restricted to 5  A  A  c  2)  C2)  - - A  - NRP  NRP  c  c 
hours,  and  in.the range  between 
28°  and  30°  eff A  (basic scale)  to 
6  hours.  A  c  c  c  C'  C'  A  - NRP  NRP  c  c 
3.1.4 For  work  in·a climatic range  between 
28°  and  32°  eff A  (basic scale)  a 
method of  payment  corresponding  to 
these conditions  must  be  applied 
to eliminate  any overloading.  A  A 3) A 3)  A 3)  - - C'  C'  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
3.1.5 The  provisions  quoted  in 3.1.3  and 
3.1.4  apply to all persons who, 
during one  shift,  have  to work  more 
than half  the  time  of that shift  in 
one  of the climatic ranges  mentioned 
above.  A  A  c  c  - - A  A  NRP  NRP  C'  C' 
1)  if 3o•  eff A  (basic scale)  is reached or exceeded,  the Mines  Inspectorate must  be  informed. 
2)  six hours. 
3)  must  be  arranged  by tariff,  outside  the  intervention of  the Mines  Inspectorate. IX,  38 
C  - Regular report on  the  implementation of  the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission's Recommendations  published  in the Fourth Report 
HUMAN  FACTORS 
N.R./Wpb.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy 
Recommendations  by the Commission 
If  ether-
lands 
1.1.' 1.1. 1.1.  1.1. 1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 1.1.  1.1. 1.1.  1.1. 
1968  1970 1968  1970 1968  1970  1968  1970 1968  1970 1968  1970 
I.  Recommendations  on  the psychological 
and  sociological factors affecting 
safety  ~3rd report of the Mines  Safe-
ty Commission,  p.  425L 
1.  Measures  which will make  it possible 
for  workmen  to recognise  dangers  and 
to carry out their work  in such  a 
way  that these dangers  are  avoided 
1.1  Recognising dangers 
1.1.1 Before starting work  in  a  district, 
a  section of  a  working or a  working-
point  and  before  any planned major 
change  in the  manpower  deployment 
or  in working conditions,  it is im-
portant to check all the safety 
precautions to meet  any  dangers  to 
be  encountered.  c  c  c  c  C'  c•  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
' 
1.1.2 During  the  work,  regular reports on 
the  following  points must  be  prepared 
on  the basis of  the safety conditions 
which  have  to be observed under con-
t inuous  superv·is  ion: 
a)  changes  in operating conditions  4)  ~,7) c•7> 
b)  accidents or  incidents  c  c  c•·  C' 
c)  dangerous  situations encountered  ~)+ 
during work  C'l)  C+C  C+C'  C+C'  5)  5)  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
The  data brought  together  in these 
reports should  be  systematically 
assessed with  a  view to  improving 
c2~  or adapting the safety precautions 
in force.  C'l)  C+C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1.1.3 After the work  has  been  finished, 
the  data  assembled  on  the basis of 
daily experience  should be used  to 
c.3>  6)  C)  prepare  a  report of experience  C'  C'  C'  6)  C'  8)  8)  C'  C' 
which  should at least  include  infor- cr3)  C'  C'  C'  6)  6)  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  mat ion  regarding the winning methods 
used, 
1)  laid ,down  by  the responsible authority for particular cases,  otherwise generally included  in 
the enterprise's  man~al. 
2)  laid down  for  accidents. 
3)  where  new  processes or materials are  introduced. 
4)  no  report is drawn up,'-verbal or written  instructions given to the personnel concerned. 
5)  such situations are discussed at management  or supervisor level,  no report is drawn  up. 
6)'no report is drawn  up  although account  is taken of experience gained. 
7)  as  regards the pattern of work  and  not actual operations as mentioned  in the text. 
8)  not only when  work  is finished but  in any case either weekly,  monthly or annually  • 
./ IX,  39 
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the dangers which  have  arisen  and 
C'l)  the precautions taken to deal with  C'  c  c  2)  2)  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
them,. 
together with  any  accidents,  inci-
dents  and  dangerous  situations which 
C'l)  have  occurred duririg  the working  C'  c  c  2)  2)  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
operations. 
1.2  Making  known  the  dangers  to all 
concerned 
1.2.1 Before starting work  in  a  district, 
a  section of  a  working or  a  working-
point  or  in the event of  a  major 
change  in the  operating conditions, 
it is advisable  to arrange  a  discus-
sion between representatives of  the 
management,  supervisory staff and 
members  of  the safety services as 
well  as the workers  concerned or 
their representatives,  in order: 
- to  inform each  individual with 
regard to the  work  envisaged 
- to study in detail the work  to 
be carried out 
- to settle upon  the method  of work  C'  C'  C'  C'  3)  3)  C'4) c,4)  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1.2.2 The  workers  concerned  should be 
informed  by  the most  appropriate 
means  of  the  method  of  work  chosen.  c  C.  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1.2.3 During the execution of the work, 
the  management  and  the supervisory 
staff should refer to the regula-
tions and  instructions to be  ob-
served as often as  necessary  to 
counteract  the effects of habit.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1.2.4 If it is considered necessary to 
issue new  safety instructions,  these 
should be brought regularly to the 
c,5) C'5)  notice of every worker  concerned.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C' 
1.2.5 Reports made  by each of the workmen 
regarding dangerous  situations which 
arise during the work  should be 
brought  to the notice of  the  ~anage-
ment  staff.  C'  C'  c  c  C'+C C' +C  C''  C'  C'+C C'+C  c  c 
1)  where  new  processes or materials are  introduced. 
2)  no  report is drawn  up,  although  account  is taken of experience  gained. 
3)  this takes place.at engineer or supervisor level,  or even  at Safety Committee  level,  but not 
at meetings where all the  people mentioned  are present. 
4)  workers'  safety representatives may  give their opinion  and  submit their observations  in the 
form  provided for  in the  labour legislation. 
5)  by  means  of service instructions issued by  the management  of  the mine,  or of service notes 
issues by departmental heads  and  supervisers. IX,  40 
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1.3  Instruction  in the  manner  in which 
the  work  is to be carried out 
without  danger 
1.3.1 Every  worker  assigned  to underground 
work  must  be  able  to show  that  he 
has: 
- a  general training as  an  under-
C.'3)  c,5)  ground  worker;  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  4)  4)  c  c 
- a  special training for  the  work 
to which  he  is to be  assigned;  c 1)  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  4)  4)  c  c 
- the  necessary additional training 
to cover  the  special working 
conditions at the point where 
he will work.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  4)  4)  c  c 
1.3.2  Should  there  be  a  change  in  the 
work  or  in  the working conditions, 
the  necessary additional training  c ,2)  C'2  must  be  provided,  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1.3,3 Instruction  in safety precautions  is 
to be  considered as  an  integral part 
of vocational training.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c•  C'  C' 
1.4  Supervision to check  that safety 
regulations  are observed  during work 
1.4.1 During  the  work,  the safety condi-
tions  must  be  subject to continual 
supervision.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
1.4.2 The  duty to see  that safety regula-
tions are observed,  and  the respon-
sibilities resulting from  this 
duty,  fall upon  the  management  and 
supervisory staff.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1.4.3 The  supervision,  which  must  be exer-
cised with authority,  should  in its 
every-day action seek  to  improve 
the  training and  education of  the 
workmen  on  the basis of daily expe-
rience,  and  should give rise to 
fines or penalties only  in very se-
rious or repeated cases of  in- C'+  c• 
fringement.  C+C'  C'  C'  C'  5)  5)  C'  C'  C'  C'  c•  C' 
2.  Training the  management  and  super-
visory staff  in  the matter of 
safety 
1)  laid down  for particular cases,  e.g.  ventilation specialists,  locomotive drivers and  winch 
operators. 
2)  laid down  by  the responsible authorities for particular cases,  otherwise generally included 
in  the enterprises manual. 
3)  convention of  the Joint National Mines Commission. 
4)  systematic  training courses were  provided up to 1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged 
and  therefore  apprenticeship  and  training are only provided where  new  machinery  and  equipment 
is  introduced. 
5) concerns  the  last part of the sentence:  " •••  and  should give rise  ••• ". IX,  41 
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2.1  General 
2.1.1 Steps must  be  taken  to ensure that 
the  supervisory staff does  not 
A2)  A2)  change  posts frequently.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  ?  ?  C'  C' 
2.1.2 The  vocational training should be 
adapted to the particular features 
of  the staff member's  task and  his 
responsibilities,  and  in particular 
to the requirements of his place  in 
the hierarchy of  management  or su-
r.' 1) 
3)  3) 
pervisory staff.  "' 
C'  c  c  C+C'  C+C'  C'  C'  C+C' C+C'  C'  C' 
2.1.3 The  transition from  one  grade  to 
another  should be  possible for  a 
given person only after he  has 
actually proved  to have  the  re- 1)  4)  4) 
quired  knowledge  and  skill.  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2  Guidelines for  the vocational 
training of  the  management  or 
supervisory staff 
2.2.1 The  management  and  supervisory staff 
must  have  an  adequate  knowledge  of: 
- the safety regulations;  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- the safety precautions to be 
taken;  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- the  available safety  equipment 
and  its use;  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
- the  instructions  in force  for  the 
different vocational  groups  whose 
work  they are called upon  to su-
pervise,  and  the  instructions for 
the exercise of activities at the 
working  points for  which  they are 
responsible.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
2.2.2 The  management  and  supervisory staff 
must  be  able: 
- to point out  in  a  suitable way  to 
the workers  under their orders 
the dangers  associated with their 
work;  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to instruct these workers  as  to 
how  best to carry out  the  work 
in order to avoid  these dangers.  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1) where certain supervisers are not recognised by the responsible authorities,  the responsibility 
for carrying out this recommendation  is left to the managing director of  the mine. 
2)  cannot be  laid down  in the  form of'·a regulation. 
3)  for  the shotfirer. 
4)  by  limited competition  in the E.N.E.L.  (Ente  Nazionale  per  l'Energia Elettrica). 
!• IX,  42 
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2.2.3 The  management  and  supervisory 
staff should  be  trained in  how  to  1)  1)  2)  2) 
issue  instructions.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2.4 Special attention must  be paid to 
the  continual further  training of 
all management  and  supervisory 
staff.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2.5 The  management  and  supervisory 
staff must  both: 
- account  for  and  report on  the 
execution of  their work,  and  C'  C'  C'  C'  c•  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- account  for  and  report  on  all 
accidents  and  other notable 
incidents which  have  occurred 
during the working period at the 
points for which  they are respon-
sible.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C' 
2.2.6 The  management  and  supervisory 
staff must  be  able: 
- to  draw up  accident reports 
C.'3) C'3)  correctly;  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to assess  and  use  the  data  in 
C'3) C'3)  these reports;  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to study and establish the 
C'3) C'3)  causes of  accidents;  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to work  out means  to avoid 
C'3) C'3)  accidents;  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- to receive  the  training necessary 
c.3> C'3)  to this end.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.3  Staff responsible for training 
2.3.1 The  staff responsible for  the 
training activities set out  in 
paragraphs  1.3  and  2  must  be  numer-
ous  enough  and  must  have  available 
the necessary means  and  time  to 
carry out their task properly.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  4)  4)  C'  C' 
2.4  Drawing up of  an  accident report; 
training of staff responsible for 
filling in such reports 
1)  for the management  staff. No  systematic training in management  for other grades. 
2)  this is not considered as  a  subject for training.  Preference is given  to constant super-
vision of  the staff. 
3)  for  the  management  staff. For supervision staff in certain cases only. 
4)  eystematic training courses were  given up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged 
-and  therefore apprenticeshop and training are only provided  whe~e new  machinery  and equip-
ment  is introduced. IX,  43 
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2.4.1 The  accident report must,  taking 
into account all the  appropriate 
human  and  technical  factors,  give 
all necessary  information  and  in 
particular: 
- the  circumstances,  the conse-
quences of  the accident,  the 
causes,  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- the precautions proposed  to 
avoid similar accidents  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4.2  Each  of  these  items of  information 
referred to  in point 2.4.1 must  be 
capable of  formulation  as  an  answer 
to  a  clear  and  precise question.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4.3 The  breakdown  and  layout of  the 
form  used  for  accident reports 
must  clearly show  which  questions 
have  to be  answered  by  each of  the 
members  of  the staff contributing 
C'l) r,l)  to the preparation of  the reports.  1..  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4.4 There  must  be  sufficient room  on 
the  form  for  supplementary remarks 
or sketches which  may  be  provided 
C'l) r,l)  by  the  person or persons  concerned.  1..  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4.5 Each of  the  persons contributing 
to the preparation of  the report 
must  be  informed  with regard  to: 
- the  importance  of  each question,  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- the  way  to provide correct answers 
to  the  questions.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4.6 Practical  instruction should  be 
provided  to  draw  the attention of 
the  employees  concerned  to  the 
consequences  of  omissions,  neglect-
ful  or unclear  answers  to  the 
questions.  C'  C'  C'  C'  2)  2)  C'  C'  3)  3)  C' 
2.4.7 Systematic attention should be  paid 
to ensure that the  answers  are 
complete,  accurate  and  precise.  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4.8 The  accidents reports referred to 
in this chapter are to be  drawn  up 
for  the sole purpose of  accident 
prevention.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1)  the  form used  by  the professional mining organisation does  not  comply entirely with this 
provision. 
2)  does  not exist. 
1.1. 
1970 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
3)  systematic training courses were  given up  to 1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged 
and  therefore  apprenticeship and  training are only provided when  new  machinery  and  equipment 
are  introduced.  · IX,  44 
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2.5  Appointment  and  promotion of 
management  or supervisory staff 
2.5.1 Care  should  be  taken  to ensure that 
there  is available  an  adequate  num-
ber of  management  or supervisory 
staff possessed of  the requisite 
skills both  in  the  technical  and 
safety fields.  C+C' C+C'  c  c  C+C' C+C'  C'  C'  C+C' C+C'  C'  C' 
2.5.2  The  selection of  this staff is the 
responsibility of  the  employer, 
who  must  at least  inform  th~ compe-
tent authority of  the  persons 
entrusted with supervision of  working  C+C'  ~+C' 
operations,  together with  the  neces- c2>  c2)  3)  3) 
sary data justifying the selection.  c  c  c  c  c  c  A  A  c  c 
2.5.3  To  ensure  a  selection which  promises 
success,  there  should  be  laid down 
the minimum  requirements for  appoint-
ment  to  a  post  in one  of  these cate-
gories,  either by  direct  appointment 
or by  promotion,  together with  the 
certificates and  other documents 
which  are  the necessary requisite  4)  4) 
for  such  an  appointment.  C'  C'  c  c  l)  1)  C'  C'  c  c  c  c 
2.5.4  The  competent  authority should  be  in 
a  position  to  check  the  knowledge 
and  skills of  the  management  or 
supervisory staff - both  from  the 
human  and  technical points of  view -
should this authority consider it 
necessary,  at  least in the case of 
a  major  failure or of  repeated  6)  5) 
failures  in  the  performance of duties  c  c  c  c  c  c  A  A  A  A  c  c 
3.  Usefulness of  psycho-technical 
examinations 
3.1  On  assignment 
3.1.1 It is recommended  that  the  applica-
tion of  a  relatively simple  psycho-
technical examination upon  assignment 
should  be  developed  as far  as pos-
sible,  in order to: 
- determine  the  general  intellectual  5)  5)  7)  7)  8)  8) 
level of  the  candidate;  A  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C+C' C+C'  C'  C' 
- to exclude  those  candidates whose 
intellectual level lies below  a  7)  7)  8)  8) 
pre-determined  minimum.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1)  does  not exist in practice. 
2)  the managing director of  the  mine  informs his chief engineer of  the name  of the departmental 
head  in charge  of  technical matters. 
3)  as regards  the reasons for  the choice. 
4)  th~ law  lays  down  a  provision concerning the  academic  qualifications of directors and  depart-
mental  heads.  · 
5)  psycho-technical examinations  are required for certain duties only  (winding-enginemen,  loco-
motive  drivers).  Other enterprises have  these  types of  examination for  other duties. 
6)  for  the shotfirers. 
7)  this ceased  when  recruitment was  discontinued. 
8)  cf.  3)  on  previous  page. IX,  45 
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3.2  Before  the exercise of  specific 
duties  ---
3.2.1  In  every  instance,  the  workmen  who 
are  to be  made  responsible for  the 
execution of  particular working 
operations. 
- with which  there  is associated  a 
particular responsibility  in 
respect of  collective safety 
or 
- which call for  particular 
intellectual or personality 
characteristics 
should  be  subjected to  a  special 
psycho-technical examination  to 
determine  whether  they  have  the 
capacities required  for  this activ- 1)  1)  2)  2)  3)  3'  ') 
ity.  c  c  C+E  C+E  C'  C'  C'  C'  E  E  c 
3.2.2  T~e competent  authority must,  in 
co-operation with the representatives 
of  the  employers  and  employees,  keep 
up  to date  the list of  work  for 
which  those special examinations  are 
to be  prescribed  and,  to this end, 
should list the duties which  have 
been  shown  by  experience  to call 
for  such tests and  for  which  such 
tests can  in practice be carried  1)  1) 
out.  c  c  E  E  4)  4)  A  A  E  E  C' 
3.3  Before  any  promotion of  a  worker 
to  a  supervisory post 
3.3.1 Before  the  promotion  of  any  workman 
to  a  supervisory post,  a  suitable 
psycho-technical examination must  1)  1)  5)  5)  6)  6) 
be carried out.  A  A  A  A  c  c  C'  C'  E  E  C' 
3.4  Principles underlying  the various 
psycho-technical examination 
3.4.1 The  psycho-technical examinations 
listed under 3.2  and  3.3 should, 
as far  as possible,  aid  the  voca-
tional specialisation of  the  1) 
worker  in question.  A  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  7)  7)  C' 
1)  cf.  5)  on  previous  page. 
2) .for wtnding-enginemen  and  locomotive  drivers. 
3)  ceas~d when  recruitment was  discontinued. 
4)  does  not exist. 
5)  eligibility for  promotion within  the supervisor grade  is determined  during  the vocational 
training laid-down by  the  responsible authorities. 
6)  when  there was  in fact  a  psychological  department. 
7)  systematic training  cour~es were  given up  to 1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged 
and  therefore  apprenticeship  and  training are only provided when  new  machinery  and equip-
ment  are  introduced. 
1.1. 
1970 
c 
C' 
C' 
C' I~,  46 
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3.4.2 The  management  must  lay down  the 
criteria which  have  to be  met  by 
the candidate on  assignment,  or  1)  1' 
later, when  directed to special  A  C'  ·~  E  E  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
tasks, 
and  must  seek the advice of  1)  1' 
psychologists when  so doing.  A  c•·  E  E  C'  C'  C'  C'  c•  C'  C' 
3.4.3 The  psychologist's assessment will 
be valid only for  a  restricted 
period  and  must  be  compared  with 
the  assessments of  the  voca~ional  1)  1)  2)  2) 
behaviour of  the  person  in question.  A  C'  E  E  c•  C'  c•  C'  E  E  C' 
(1)  psycho-technical examinations are required for certain duties only  (winding-enginemen, 
locomotive drivers).  Other enterprises have  these  types of  examination for other duties. 
(2)  when  there was  in fact  a  psychological department. 
1.1. 
1970 
C' 
C' 
C' IX,  47 
GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  IMPLEMENTATION  BY  ITALY 
It should be  noted that,  pursuant  to Article 23  of  the  Mining Regulations 
in force,  the subject referred to above  has  been  included  in the collective agree-
ments. 
The  Italian coalmines,  which as is well known,  are only worked  in the 
Sulcis  (Sardinia)  coalfield,  have  been for  some  time  placed under  the control of 
the  "Ente Nazionale per  l'Energia Elettrica  (E.N.E.L.)",  since their total produc-
tion are  intended for  the Porto Vesme  (Cagliari)  thermal plants.  The staff in these 
mines benefit from  the  guarantees given by  the collective agreement applicable to 
workers  in the electricity sector,  which  is among  the most  favourable  collective 
agreements at present in force  in Italy.  In particular,  this agreement  excludes 
piecework and,  consequently a  negative answer  should be  given to the questionnaire 
as regards  the application of  the  recommendation concerned or,  in any case,  the 
latter should be  considered as not  complying with  the de  facto situation. 
For  the  sake of covering all contingencies,  however,  it was  considered 
advisable to  include  the rather  improbable possibility of  new  coalmines being opened, 
which  are not directly linked with the production of electrical energy,  and  to 
answer  the  questionnaire ori  the basis of  the collective agreement  of  13  May  1967 
which  is applicable  in the mining  industry. 
It should also be  noted  that,  from  page  49  onwards  of  the questionnaire 
concerned,  the  symbol  "C"  and other symbols  used  in the answer refer to clauses of 
the collective agreement  mentioned  above  and  not to standards codified  in the  form 
in legislation or regulations. IX,  49 
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II.  Recommendations  as  to principles  to  (cf.gen-
be  observed  in view of  the  possible  eral re-
influence of  payment  at piece rates  marlts  011 
·on  safety  in coalmines  (4th report  previous 
of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  page) 
Commission,  Annex  IV) 
1.  Piecework  arrangements  1)  1)  4) 
1.1  Minimum  age;  medical  examinations 
1.1.1 To  be  assigned  to piecework,  a 
miner  must 
- be  not  less than  18  years of  age  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C5)  c5)  c  c 
- have  undergone  a  medical  examina-
tion to establish his fitness for 
c2>  c2>  C5)  c5>  such work,  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1.1.2 Similar examinations must  follow  at 
C'2) C'2)  c3>  c3)  C5)  C5)  regular  intervals,  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1.2  Make-up  of  piece rates 
1.2.1 Written particulars of  the  operations 
to be  performed  must  be  given  to  the 
men  concerned,  including such  infor-
mation as  is needed  to calculate  the 
C'6) C'6)  amount  payable  therefor,  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1.2.2  In  the  interests of safety,  the 
piecework  arrangement  employed  must 
either 
- provide  that operations of  impor-
tance  to safety shall be  paid  on 
a  separate basis,  or  - - - - C'  C'  - - C'  C'  C'  C' 
- contain equivalent financial  safe-
guards  for  the  proper execution of 
C'6) C'6)  such operations.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1.2.3  In  the event of  its being  found 
necessary  to carry out safety opera-
tions  not expressly provided for, 
this must  not  be  allowed  to affect 
C'6) C'6)  the  pay of  the  man  or men  concerned.  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1)  Questions relating to pay cannot  be  dealt with by  the responsible authorities.  Such questions 
are settled by  means  of collective agreements. 
2)  all workers  are subjected to medical  examinations  when  taken  on  and  to similar examinations at 
regular intervals.  · 
3)  periodic X-ray examinations  (every  15  months at most).  Periodic clinical examination only 
where  signs of  pneumoconiosis are detected or on  medical  advice. 
4)  pursuant to Article 23  of  the Mining Regulation  in force,  this question was  the subject of 
collective agreements.  Consequently,  from  page  2  onwards of  the questionnaire,  the  symbols 
used refer to clauses of  the collective agreement  of  13  May  1967. 
5)  pursuant to  the Mining Regulation  and  to.the provisions relating to  young  workers. 
6)  settled by collective agreement. IX,  50 
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1.3  Fixing of  norms  and  of  rates payable 
therefor 
1.3.1 The  men  must  have  the  right to 
discuss  the  fixing of  piecework  1)  1) 
norms  and  rates with  the  employer.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1.3 .2  If agreement  is not  reached,  the  men 
or their representatives must  have 
the right to start conciliation pro- 1)  l) 
ceedings under  4  below.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  3)  3)  c  c 
1.4  Forms  of  piecework 
1.4.1 One-man  piecework  should  preferably 
be  permitted only where  the  opera-
tions concerned  are not of  a  nature 
to allow of  any  other  form  of  piece- 2)  2) 
work.  A  A  C'  C'  ?  ?  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
1.5  Determination of  the  norm 
1. 5.1 The  norm  must  be  determined  in 
accordance  with  : 
the  amount  of  time  actually  1)  1) 
available  during  a  normal  shift;  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
the  amount  of  work  the  men  can 
fairly be  expected to perform 
during this time,  having  regard  1)  1) 
to  the working conditions;  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  E  E  c  c 
the  amount  of  time  required  to  1)  1) 
perform the  operations properly.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
1.6  Calculation of  the  end  wage 
1.6.1 The  basis  and  mode  of  calculation 
must  be  sufficiently simple  for  any 
worker  to be  able  to work  out  for 
himself  the  sum  due  to him  for  a  1)  1) 
given period.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
1.7  Performance  in piecework 
1. 7.1 Regulations  should  be  laid down 
requiring that periodic checks  be 
carried out  on  the  amounts  of  work 
performed  for  the  purpose of deter- 1)  1 
mining  the  wages  payable  therefor,  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
and  that the  findings  be  duly  1)  1 
notified to the  men  concerned.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
1)  settled by collective  agreement. 
2)  for certain operations,  one-man  piecework  is considered by both sides to  the  agreement  as 
the  most  appropriate  type  of  remuneration. 
3)  the collective  agreement  does  not  provide  for conciliation procedures,  although  such  procedure 
exists  and  the Ministry of Labour  and  Social Security acts as  an  arbitrator  (whose  decisions 
are  not  binding). IX,  51 
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1.7.2 Particulars must  be  supplied  to  the 
men  of  all additions  and  deductions 
affecting the  amount  of  the  end  wage, 
together with details as  to  how  these  1)  1) 
were  calculated.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
2.  Changes  in conditions at  the  work-
place 
2.1  A piecework  arrangement  may  be  ter-
minated  or  amended  if the  employer 
and  the  men  are  agreed  that genuine 
difficulties warranting this course  1)  1) 
have  been objectively found  to exist.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Failing such  agreement,  the  men  must 
have  the  right  to  ask  nevertheless 
that  the  arrangement  be  terminated  1)  1)  2)  2) 
or  amended  forthwith.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c 
2.1.1 If the  men  cannot  be  paid at piece 
rates for  so  long  as  the difficulties 
persist,  they must  be  paid  a  proper  1)  1)  3)  3) 
wage  appropriate  to  their grade.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c 
3.  Managerial  and  supervisory staff 
3,1  In  the  interests of safety,  extra 
supervision must  be  provided  in 
workings  where  men  are  employed  on 
piecework.  C'  C'  C'  C'  ?  ?  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
3.1.1 Since  failure  to carry out safety 
operations in  good  time  can result 
in particular hazards,  the super-
visory personnel must  give  the  men 
strict and  relevant  instructions to 
this effect,  and  check  regularly to 
see  that  these  are carried out.  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
3.2  Payment  of  managerial  and  supervisory 
staff 
3.2.1 Since  managerial  and  supervisory 
staff are  responsible not only for 
the organisation and  smooth running 
of operations,  but also 
1)  settled by  collective agreement. 
2)  provided for  in agreements at provincial  and enterprise level. 
3)  the collective agreement  guarantees minimum  pay  and  ancillary allowances. IX,  52 
M.R./1fph. 
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for  the  safety of  the  men  engaged 
in.them,  t~ey should  as  a  rule be 
paid  out  on  a  basis  independent of  1)  1) 
the  ups  and  downs  of  production.  A  A  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
They  may  be  granted production or 
output  bonuses  provided  they  have 
at  the  same  time  a  sufficient finan-
cial  incentive  to devote  the  1)  1) 
necessary attention to safety.  A  A  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
. 
4.  Settlement of disputes 
4.1  There  should  be  a  conciliation system 
for  dealing with  any  disputes 
arising between management's  and 
men's  representatives with  regard 
to piecework  arrangements or their  2)  2) 
implementation.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  3)  3)  c  c 
4.1.1 The  conciliation system should oper-
ate  by  means  of  a  board  on  which 
employers  and  workers  are equally 
represented,  and  which  should 
approach disputes  in the  light of  2)  2) 
the  present  recommendations.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  3)  3)  c  c 
4.1.2  The  fact  that proceedings of  this 
kind  are  pending  must  not  affect 
the  terms  of  employment  of  the  men  2)  2) 
concerned,  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
who  must  continue to be  entitled 
to  a  fair wage  appropriate  to their  2)  2) 
grade.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c 
1)  cannot  be  the  subject of Mines Authority prescriptions.  Settled according to area. 
2)  settled by collective agreement. 
3)  systematic training courses were  given  up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged  and 
therefore apprenticeship and  training are only provided when  new  machinery  and  equipment  are 
introduced. IX,  53 
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V E  N T  I  L  A T  I  0  N 
Practical conclusions on  the application of 
the theory  of stabilisation of ventilation 
(sixth report  of  the mines  safety  and 
health commission  - Annex  III) 
1.  Supervision of ventilation 
The  supervision of ventilation in  a 
mining  system requires  an  overall view, 
and  should therefore  be  entrusted to  a 
single man  specially appointed,  having 
at his disposal all the  necessary  means 
for  carrying out  his task. 
2.  Fundamental  factors  in ventilation 
Apart  from  a  regular  inspection and 
analysis of ventilation conditions  in 
mines,  ventilation officials require to 
have  data  on 
- the actual characteristics of the main 
and  auxiliary ventilation fans, 
- the order  of magnitude  of  the  aero-
dynamic  effect of natural ventilation 
in summer  and  winter, 
- the potentials of  the  intersections 
(at  least the main  ones). 
3.  Additional  representations  of ventila-
tion systems 
In  order  to obtain  a  precise picture of 
the overall structure of  ventilation 
sy~tems and  to reveal  possible instabil-
ities, it would  be  advisable when  nec-
essary  to have,  in addition to the 
regulation diagrams,  representations 
of other types,  such as,  for  example  : 
a)  a  representation of the whole  of  the 
mine workings  in perspective  (iso-
metric  or  any  other equivalent 
system); 
b)  a  diagram without  any  topographical 
information. 
4.  Characteristics of ventilation 
The  representations mentioned  in conclu-
sion  No.  3  should make  available all 
the  data necessary  for  the understanding 
of  analysis of ventilation,  particularly· 
a)  at  the measuring  points 
- the air quantities 
- the direction of  the airflow 
- the methane  content 
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1)  in every colliery with  over  500 workers  the  engineer  responsible is also assisted by  a  supervisor 
who  ensures application of 'the ventilation measures.  In each coalfield an  engineer has  been spe-
cially entrusted with  studying the application of  the ventilation stabilisation theory  adopted 
by  the Mines  safety and  health commission. 
2)  applies to recent ventilators,  but  not  to old ones. 
3)  these are being carried out. 
4)  carried out  by  means  of  network  plans  in ventilation calculations made  by  electronic computers. 
5)  applicable to some  coalfields  ,  but  not  all. Nether-
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- the temperatures  c  c  NRC  2)  c  c 
- the pressures  (at  least at the 
principal intersections)  c  c  E  c'  E  c 
b)  in addition 
- the lengths  and  average  cross-
sections of  the  roadway  C+C 1  c  E  c'  c  c 
- the calculated resistances  c'  c  E  c'  E  c 
- the angles  of  inclination,  partie-
ularly at the  ends  of  the  inclined 
and  vertical section  c  c  E  c'  c'  c 
- the positions of  the air doors  and 
control  doors,  and  of  the barriers  c  c  E  c  c  c 
5.  InsJ2ection of ventilation conditions 
In each  mine,  there should  be  a  system-
atic analysis of the ventilation system, 
at  least once  a  year  and  after any  major 
modification of  the  system,  in order to  2) 
detect  any  probable cases of  instability c  + 
E3)  under  the  normal  operating conditions.  NRP  c  E  c'  c 
In addition,  cases of  instability which 
may  be  caused  by  the  introductions of  ad 
ditional aeromotive  sources,or the chang  1) 
ing or elimination of  the existing aero- c  + 
E3)  motive  sources,  should also be  examined.  NRP  c'  E  E  c 
6.  Informing  the 12ersonnel 
Taking  into account  the  importance of 
ventilation for  the whole  of  the  under-
ground workings,  each responsible person 
should  be  informed  of ventilation condi-
tions within his  own  field.  c  c  E  c  c'  c 
Furthermore it is essential that  sepa-
rate meetings  should be held  once  a  year 
at  least,  as well  as after any  major 
modification in the ventilation system, 
at which  the colliery ventilation engi-
neer will explain the ventilation condi-
tions obtaining at  the pit,  together 
with  any  modifications which  have  recent· 
ly  been made,  in the presence of  : 
a)  the  management  officials,  the techni-
cal departements,  the chief of the 
rescue  team  and  the officials respon-
sible for  ventilation;  c'  c  E  c'  E  c 
b)  the  local officials,  each  in respect  c4>  of his  own  speciality  c'  E  c  E  c 
On  these occasions,  attention should be 
drawn  to districts where  instabilities 
are already likely in normal  conditions 
and,  in particular cases of  instability 
which  make  the occurrence of  a  fire 
likely.  c'  C'  E  c'  E  c 
·- ···----- --
1)  headlines  for  the evaluation of pressure measurements  are  non  being drafted. 
2)  not  systematically recorded. 
3)  now  being studied by  the users. 
4) this instruction is not  usually given at separate meetings Recommendations  by the Commission 
7.  Exercises  on  plans 
Once  a  year at least,  the management  or 
the competent  mining  authority  should 
organise  an exercise  on  plans covering 
measures to be  taken  in the event  of  an 
underground  fire.  This  should  be  attend-
ed  by  the mine  owner  or his represent-
ative,  the ventilation engineer  and  the 
competent  officials responsible  for  the 
organisation of  fire-fighting and  rescue 
operations. 
IX,  55 
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E  E  2)  E  c 
f--···-·- _. __  .,_  _  _,_  _  __,,__-t---f---+--t--+---t--t---1 
8,  Position of  regulation doors 
When  doors are necessary  for  regulating 
ventilation they  should  be  placed as 
near  as possible to roadway  junctions, 
taking  into account  other requirements, 
in order to facilitate access  in smoky 
conditions.  A3)  E  5)  c'  c 
1--···--+--·+---+-·-f--··--+-----+--+---t---t---+----1 
9.  Measures  and  equipment  for  slowing-down 
ventilation 
In all collieries,  devices  for  rapidly 
slowing-down ventilation in order to 
stabilise it shall be  installed in all 
intake  airways,  subject  to exceptions 
to be  previously  determined,  after each 
roadway  junction or  branch,  and  as  near 
as possible to it. 
10.  Instructions to officials in the event 
of underground  fire 
c  E  7)  c'  c 
Apart  from  the usual  prov1s1ons  regard-
ing the obligation to attack any  seat 
of  a  fire  in order to extinguish it as 
soon as possible,  and  to  inform the 
officials and  management  without  delay, 
there  should  be  instructions to offi-
cials laying down  the other measures  to 
be  taken in the  event  of  a  mine  fire in 
order to slow  down  ventilation so  as to 
avoid an  increase  in the air supply  to 
the seat of  the  fire.  AS) 
1---------+----+---r---t----1---t----t--;--~--~--; 
E  10)  E  c 
~1.  Instructions to management  officials in 
the  event  of  underground fire 
No  decision to modify  the ventilation is 
to be  taken by  the  management  staff 
with a  study  being made  of  the  conse-
quences,  by  means  of  application of  the 
theory  of  the stabilisation of ventila-
tion,  and with the help of plans  and 
ventilation schemes which  have  previous-
ly been prepared in respect  of all the 
possible causes  of ventilation inversion 
whether  these causes result  from  the 
fire or  from  the structure of  the  mine 
(ventilation by  multiple  fans  etc.).  c' 
1) will be  regulated by  the fire-fighting plan. 
E  c  c 
2)  these will be  organised after  implementation of  the  Budryk plan,  but  the ventilation officials 
and  the rescue centres already contact  each other  from  time  to time. 
3)  owing  to the different local conditions  a  uniform regulation would  be unsuitable. 
4)  the  decision is to be  taken oy  the head  of  the fire-fighting  unit. 
5)  as  soon  as possible,  but  not  automatically. 
6)  experience has  shown  that it is more  convenient  to have  a  central store of materials for 
constructing regulation doors. 
7)  now  being studied by  the users. 
8)  the ventilation must  be  not  modified except  on  the express order of the officials in charge. 
9)  the  decision is to  be  taken  by  the  leader  of  the  fire-fighting unit. 
10)  not  supervisors level but  the  chiefs of rescue  teams  and the rescue centres. 
11)  to be  specified after  implementation of the Budryk plan. OFFICE  FOR  OFFICIAL  PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
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